Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Research Articles

The United States Navy and Employees with Cancer: The Time for Change Is Now.

The US Navy, including the US Marine Corps and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP), has a robust radiological protection and monitoring program meeting (and typically exceeding, in the name of conservatism) federal law requirements. The program covers the variety of ways in which the Navy produces and uses ionizing radiation and radioactive sources: in medicine, nuclear ship propulsion and repair, industrial and aircraft radiography, and myriad other unique uses in carrying out its vital mission. In executing these programs, thousands of people across the world are employed as active-duty Sailors and Marines, government civilians, and government contractors. These workers include physicians, reactor operators, radiation safety officers, and nuclear repair workers, to name but a few. The health protection standards for these workers are promulgated in the publicly available Navy Medicine P-5055 Radiation Health Protection Manual (NAVMED P-5055), published February 2011 with Change 2 published December 2022, and are applicable to Navy and Marine Corps and NNPP radiation protection programs. The NAVMED P-5055 outlines the individual medical requirements for those qualified and able to receive exposure to ionizing radiation as part of their duties and requires that "Radiation workers receive focused medical examinations to establish whether or not cancer is present which would medically disqualify a person from receiving occupational radiation exposure." Additionally, without scientific or medical basis, the NAVMED P-5055 requires disqualifying those employees who have a history of cancer, cancer therapy, radiation therapy including radiopharmaceuticals received for therapeutic purposes, or bone marrow suppression from drawing dosimetry, entering radiation areas, or handling radioactive material. This policy, which exists regardless of lifetime occupational radiation dose or projected future radiation dose, applies to all cancers except adequately treated basal cell carcinoma. The policy is not supported by relevant scientific and medical literature; does not align with reasonable professional ethical standards; does not conform to US Navy radiological training, which stipulates the assumed increased risk of developing cancer from Navy and Marine Corps and NNPP occupational radiation exposure is small; and removes critical leadership and mentoring capability from the workforce unnecessarily. This article discusses in detail (1) this policy and its ramifications to the Navy and Marine Corps and NNPP workforce and (2) recommendations, benefits, and impacts for the Navy and Marine Corps and NNPP to remove this policy and still maintain a robust radiation protection program.

Technical and Policy Lessons for the Domestic Future Nuclear-powered Submarine learned from the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

Technical and Policy Lessons for the Domestic Future Nuclear-powered Submarine learned from the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

The Canary in the Nuclear Submarine: Assessing the Nonproliferation Risk of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Loophole

ABSTRACTThe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows states to exempt nuclear material from international safeguards for use in nuclear submarine programs. This material, however, could be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes without the knowledge of inspectors, creating a potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty. This article argues that exercising that loophole today would amount to admitting a nuclear weapon program, making it a particularly poor pathway to a weapon for a potential proliferant. Still, if states like Brazil ultimately exempt nuclear material from safeguards for a nuclear submarine effort, they could set a dangerous precedent that makes it easier for others to use the loophole as a route to a nuclear weapon capability. There are several policy options available to mitigate the damage of such a precedent; most promising is the prospect of a voluntary safeguards arrangement that would allow international inspectors to keep an eye on nuclear material even after it has been dedicated to a naval nuclear propulsion program.

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program: A Brief Case Study in Institutional Constancy

In an article published in November/December 1996 issue of Public Administration Review, LaPorte and Keller argued that management of large organizations that deal with hazardous materials (materials that pose significant risks over long periods) presented extraordinary challenges for public institutions. They postulated that, in our society, such organizations are Pressed to operate at nearly fault-free levels in order to remain viable. LaPorte and Keller went on to describe a concept they called They argued that such constancy is a necessary (but not sufficient) attribute of organizations, if they wish to achieve public acceptance in their operations with hazardous materials (see also LaPorte and Metlay, 1996). LaPorte and Keller describe institutional constancy from a number of perspectives: perceived need for it, barriers to achieving it, and an outline of matters that must be attended to if institutional constancy is to be achieved. In suggesting further paths for research, LaPorte and Keller urge that case studies be developed that examine the characteristics and experiences of institutions that have achieved a degree of institutional constancy. They mention a number of organizations that, based on externally available information, appear to meet their criteria for institutional constancy. One of these organizations is Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. The authors concur that much can be learned regarding institutional constancy by reviewing history, organization, and management of such organizations as Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (or Naval Reactors, as it is more commonly known). This program is responsible for design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of nuclear power plants that propel approximately 40 percent of major combatant ships of U.S. Navy. As such, Naval Reactors has managed building and operation of approximately 240 nuclear reactors and, importantly in today's environment, safely and responsibly decommissioned more than 50 of these reactors and their associated equipment. Since organization has safely and effectively dealt with hazards associated with nuclear power for almost 50 years, it seems appropriate to evaluate some of reasons for that success. In following discussion, Naval Reactors will first be described from an insider's perspective, that is, discussed in term that program (and its chroniclers) have employed. This description is intended to provide a feel for program The attributes that emerge during this discussion will then be compared to basic structure of institutional constancy described by LaPorte and Keller. Inside Naval Reactors Naval Reactors is a joint program of Navy and Department of Energy. The need for a joint effort stems from fact that Department of Energy is only government agency empowered by law to conduct research and development on power reactors (Rockwell, 1992, 44-46, 54-64; Duncan and Hewlett, 1974, 60-67, 88-94). In basic terms, Navy defines required features of nuclear power plants; Department of Energy develops and tests plants to ensure that they meet requirements. The Navy builds, operates, and decommissions shipboard plants, and then turns decommissioned reactor plants over to other organizations within Department of Energy for burial.(1) Very early in development of naval nuclear power, H. G. Rickover, then a Navy captain, saw that this statutory division of responsibilities posed grave difficulties. He recognized that development and utilization of this revolutionary new source of power should be treated as a series of closely related technical functions including research and development, detailed design, procurement of apparatus, maintenance and repair of equipment, and selection and training of personnel. …