Natural Kinds Research Articles

Interpolating causal mechanisms: The paradox of knowing more.

Causal knowledge is not static; it is constantly modified based on new evidence. The present set of seven experiments explores 1 important case of causal belief revision that has been neglected in research so far: causal interpolations. A simple prototypic case of an interpolation is a situation in which we initially have knowledge about a causal relation or a positive covariation between 2 variables but later become interested in the mechanism linking these 2 variables. Our key finding is that the interpolation of mechanism variables tends to be misrepresented, which leads to the paradox of knowing more: The more people know about a mechanism, the weaker they tend to find the probabilistic relation between the 2 variables (i.e., weakening effect). Indeed, in all our experiments we found that, despite identical learning data about 2 variables, the probability linking the 2 variables was judged higher when follow-up research showed that the 2 variables were assumed to be directly causally linked (i.e., C→E) than when participants were instructed that the causal relation is in fact mediated by a variable representing a component of the mechanism (M; i.e., C→M→E). Our explanation of the weakening effect is that people often confuse discoveries of preexisting but unknown mechanisms with situations in which new variables are being added to a previously simpler causal model, thus violating causal stability assumptions in natural kind domains. The experiments test several implications of this hypothesis. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Two approaches to natural kinds

Philosophical treatments of natural kinds are embedded in two distinct projects. I call these the philosophy of science approach and the philosophy of language approach. Each is characterized by its own set of philosophical questions, concerns, and assumptions. The kinds studied in the philosophy of science approach are projectible categories that can ground inductive inferences and scientific explanation. The kinds studied in the philosophy of language approach are the referential objects of a special linguistic category—natural kind terms—thought to refer directly. Philosophers may hope for a unified account addresses both sets of concerns. This paper argues that this cannot be done successfully. No single account can satisfy both the semantic objectives of the philosophy of language approach and the explanatory projects of the philosophy of science approach. After analyzing where the tensions arise, I make recommendations about assumptions and projects that are best abandoned, those that should be retained, and those that should go their separate ways. I also recommend adopting the disambiguating terminology of “scientific kinds” and “natural kinds” for the different notions of kinds developed in these different approaches.

Natural kinds of mental disorder

Are mental disorders (autism, ADHD, schizophrenia) natural kinds or socially constructed categories? What is at stake if either of these views prove to be true? This paper offers a qualified defence for the view that there may be natural kinds of mental disorder, but also that the implications of this claim are generally overestimated. Especially concerns about over-inclusiveness of diagnostic categories and medicalisation of abnormal behaviour are not addressed by the debate. To arrive at these conclusions the paper opens with a discussion of kind formation in science, followed by an analysis of natural kinds. Seven principled and empirically informed objections to the possibility of natural kinds of mental disorder are considered and rejected. The paper ends with a reflection on diagnostics of mental health problems that don’t fall into natural kinds. Despite the defence of the possibility of natural kinds of mental disorder, this is likely to be the majority of cases.

Indeterminacy and reference: comments on Roads to Reference

Roads to Reference: An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language by Mario Gómez-Torrente provides an ample attack against certain more recent variants of descriptivism in the theory of reference. The book discusses a wide variety of expressions, but the focus of this short note is on proper names and natural kind terms. In the case of proper names, indeterminacy plays an important role in Gómez-Torrente’s critical argument. Some questions related to it are raised. As to natural kind terms, the differences between ordinary kind terms and (proto-) scientific kind terms are discussed, and the somewhat ignored relevance of reference borrowing for natural kind terms is emphasized.

How to define today a medical disorder? Biological and psychosocial disadvantages as the paramount criteria.

The 20th century has seen great developments in the concept of disease. Marked by the biopsychosocial paradigm, several strategies for disease definition were added to previous descriptive organic views, but a final concept is still out of reach. A critical review was carried out on thorough analysis of articles and textbooks to describe the main concepts and definitions of disease. The concept 'disease' is a pragmatic construct, not a natural kind. Three main ways to define disease were identified, and characterized: Biological (disease as a lesion, disadvantage/deviation from normal and dysfunction), Psychosocial (distress and disability, existential potentials, descriptive prototype, and prototype typification), and values-based definition. All the paradigms have advantages and flaws, but progressive use of all criteria in disease definition adds validity and reliability to diagnostic constructs. Such constructs must be, above all, useful for practice and research. Biological paradigm is relevant, but fails to cover all the complexity that involves human illness and the treatment process. An emphasis on distress, dysfunction, and carefully selected value-laden characteristics might be the right direction for useful diagnostic construct conceptions.

Dry Creek medicine bundle, Northeastern Wyoming: Patterns, outliers, and the importance of small sites

A cluster of two nonlocal flakes and two crystals is believed to be the remaining contents of a small personal medicine bundle carried by an individual and lost. Characteristics and arrangement of the four artifacts indicate they are an uncommon assemblage for the region and are distinct from surrounding prehistoric sites. Therefore, the site is considered an outlier to the general regional pattern of observed site types. The kinds of artifacts and intact nature of their placement on the surface suggests recent activity, probably Late Protohistoric or early Historic, about AD 1700–1850. The locality exemplifies the potential for small sites to contribute information to regional archaeology.

How Does a Theoretical Term Refer?

This paper deals with the question of what the most appropriate semantic theory for theoretical terms would be. Traditionally, in the contemporary literature of philosophy of language, there have been two widely held semantic theories: the descriptivist theory and the causal theory. Comparing theoretical terms with natural kind terms, I attempt to show that the causal theory of reference applies to natural kinds owing to certain ontological and epistemological assumptions of natural kinds realism. I argue that there is no reason to keep these assumptions with respect to theoretical entities. Consequently, the causal theory of reference cannot be applied to theoretical terms. Instead, because of certain ontological and epistemological features of theoretical entities, the rival semantic theory, i.e., the descriptivist theory of reference, properly explains how the referents of these terms get fixed and how these terms find their referents. The paper is structured as follows: the first part deals with the question of how a theoretical entity/kind should be distinguished from non-theoretical ones. The second part facilitates a comparison between theoretical kinds and natural kinds to reveal the ontological and epistemological features of each category. In the third part, I argue why the causal theory of reference fails to be a plausible semantic for theoretical terms, and why its rival theory, i.e., the descriptivist theory, provides an appropriate semantic for such terms. Finally, I raise two potential objections regarding my proposed view and try to show how these objections can be overcome.

The Effect of Liquidity Capital Structure, Company Size, Debt Policy and Profitability on Company Value in Property, Real Estate and Building Construction Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2016-2019 Period

Property, real estate and building construction in the past three years have faced a sluggish market. His research aims to determine the effect of capital structure, liquidity, company size, debt policy and profitability on firm value in property, real estate and building construction companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2016-2019 period. The approach is quantitative with its kind of descriptive quantitative and causal nature. The population is 83 property, real estate and building construction with a sample of 23 companies. The result is that the capital structure does not have a partial effect on company value in property, real estate and building construction companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2016-2019 Period. Liquidity does not have a partial effect on company value in property, real estate and building construction companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2016-2019 period. The size of the company does not have a partial effect on the value of the company in the property, real estate and building construction companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2016-2019 period. The debt policy does not have a partial effect on company value in property, real estate and building construction companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2016-2019 period. Profitability has a partial effect on company value in property, real estate and building construction companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2016-2019 period. Capital structure, liquidity, company size.

Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns

Abstract In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.

Testing the Reference of Biological Kind Terms.

Recent experimental work on "natural" kind terms has shown evidence of both descriptive and nondescriptive reference determination. This has led some to propose ambiguity or hybrid theories, as opposed to traditional description and causal-historical theories of reference. Many of those experiments tested theories against referential intuitions. We reject this method, urging that reference should be tested against usage, preferably by elicited production. Our tests of the usage of a biological kind term confirm that there are indeed both descriptive and causal-historical elements to the reference determination of some natural kind terms. We argue that to accommodate our results and earlier ones, we should abandon the common assumption that any one theory of reference fits all natural kind terms. Rather, it is likely that some terms are descriptive, some causal-historical, some ambiguous, and some hybrid. This substantive conclusion is accompanied by a methodological one. Our experiments, like some earlier ones, found participants contradicting both each other and themselves. We argue that these contradictions indicate a lack of linguistic competence with the term. We conclude that these experiments have been faulty, because they test terms that are novel to participants and/or use fantastical vignettes. We provide some suggestions for future research.

A change of pace: The history of (emotional) experiences.

In this article, I present some of the most interesting attempts to go beyond the natural kinds approach to emotions, paying special attention to the work of Fay Bound Alberti and Rob Boddice, both of whom have been influenced by Lisa Feldman Barrett's theory of constructed emotions. I propose that some of the flaws detected in the history of the emotions by Bound Alberti and Boddice can be solved relying on social psychology, and specifically I propose Larissa Z. Tiedens and Colin W. Leach's (2004) The Social Life of Emotions as a useful approach. In conjunction with Barrett's theory, Tiedens and Leach provide a framework in which history of the emotions can harness its full potential, encompassing a more comprehensive approach to emotional experience. I discuss the idea of a new history of emotional experiences and suggest some of its possible features. I make a plea for a collaborative, transdisciplinary approach to the study of the emotions, in which humanities and social sciences play a fundamental role. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Beyond vernacular: Measurement solutions to the lexical fallacy in disgust research

Disgust may play an important role in several mental disorders, in part because disgust seems impervious to corrective information, a feature noted long before it was studied by clinical psychologists. A deeper understanding of disgust could improve not only the treatment of mental disorders, but also other societal problems involving this peculiar emotion. In this paper, we review the measurement of disgust and identify issues that hold back progress in understanding how to treat this emotion. First, self-report measures of disgust, although optimized in terms of reliability, are compromised in terms of validity due to the “lexical fallacy,” that is, the assumption that vernacular usage of emotion terms reveals natural kinds. Improved self-report measures that parse disgust from neighboring states of discomfort and disapproval can address this limitation, but these approaches are absent in clinical psychology. Second, “objective” measures of disgust, although free of vernacular limitations, require greater psychometric scrutiny. In a critical review, we find that most instrument-based measures fail to demonstrate adequate reliability, rendering them unsuitable for the individual differences research crucial to clinical psychology. In light of this assessment, we provide several recommendations for improving the reliability and validity of disgust measurement, including renewed attention to theory.

The God, the blood, and the fuzzy: reflections on Cornerstones and two target articles

ABSTRACT In response to Cornerstones of attachment research and the target articles, I reflect on three questions. First, what is “attachment”? Although a natural kind, I argue against an essentialist understanding (i.e. in terms of necessary/sufficient conditions for class membership). Instead, the attachment concept must be allowed to have fuzzy boundaries, partly because of how attachments transform in both phylogeny and ontogeny. Second, how to think about the normative (species-typical) features of the theory vis-à-vis dyadic/individual differences in attachment? Whereas the former are foundational, I argue that the latter largely reflect surface variation. Despite this, the lion’s share of attachment research has horned in on variation and its measurement, to some detriment to the theory’s potential and applications. Finally, what is encouraging and discouraging about recent developments? While applauding large-scale cooperative endeavors (e.g. individual participant meta-analyses, consensus statements) I caution the field not to lose sight of the value of smaller-scale, creative explorations of uncharted territories.

On the Epistemic Value of Students’ Conceptions in Science Education

In this article, I present an analysis of the epistemic value of the students' conceptions, as employed in the current constructivist research. I focus on the conceptions about natural kinds. Since natural kind terms are a crucial part of the discourse of the natural sciences, my conclusions are particularly relevant in science education. To perform my analysis, I use a thought experiment, adapted from Hilary Putnam’s famous Twin-Earth examples. I conclude that, to avoid some strong ontoepistemic implications, an externalist view of the learner’s thought must be adopted. In my approach, students’ conceptions are re-interpreted in terms of Hilary Putnam’s stereotypes, conventional representations of a natural kind that guarantee a semantic competence in a specific linguistic environment. As a conclusion, I argue that the role of students’ conceptions is not epistemic but pragmatic. They should not be understood as a partial or provisional representation of how a natural kind really is but as linguistic tools that permit the learner to engage in classroom discourse. Finally, I present a preliminary application of my ideas to the study of the usage of tautologies in science education.

No fruits without color: Cross-modal priming and EEG reveal different roles for different features across semantic categories.

Category-specific impairments witnessed in patients with semantic deficits have broadly dissociated into natural and artificial kinds. However, how the category of food (more specifically, fruits and vegetables) fits into this distinction has been difficult to interpret, given a pattern of deficit that has inconsistently mapped onto either kind, despite its intuitive membership to the natural domain. The present study explores the effects of a manipulation of a visual sensory (i.e., color) or functional (i.e., orientation) feature on the consequential semantic processing of fruits and vegetables (and tools, by comparison), first at the behavioral and then at the neural level. The categorization of natural (i.e., fruits/vegetables) and artificial (i.e., utensils) entities was investigated via cross–modal priming. Reaction time analysis indicated a reduction in priming for color-modified natural entities and orientation-modified artificial entities. Standard event-related potentials (ERP) analysis was performed, in addition to linear classification. For natural entities, a N400 effect at central channel sites was observed for the color-modified condition compared relative to normal and orientation conditions, with this difference confirmed by classification analysis. Conversely, there was no significant difference between conditions for the artificial category in either analysis. These findings provide strong evidence that color is an integral property to the categorization of fruits/vegetables, thus substantiating the claim that feature-based processing guides as a function of semantic category.

More-than-human territoriality: the contested spaces and beastly places of Canada geese in Europe’s largest urban wetland

ABSTRACT Late modern societies have seen a surge of interest in “urban nature”, with increased efforts to protect existing nature spaces as well as invite new natures into cities through restoration, renaturing and/or greening. However, to date, there has been little discussion on the kind of nature that gets promoted through these agendas and what the implications are for unwanted or “illegitimate” creatures. Through empirical work at Europe’s largest urban wetland, Walthamstow Wetlands, and focussing on a local population of Canada geese, this paper examines how species lay claim to space and assert their agency in the practice of city renaturing. Drawing attention to the “beastly places” of unsanctioned urban wildlife, this paper challenges the scope of an urban nature reserve. In doing so, it seeks to bring a more-than-human lens to questions of urban nature, thus extending efforts to “animate the urban” in more relational and ethical ways.

Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an explicationist rendering? I argue that in Kornblith’s case the answer to all three questions is essentially in the affirmative. Much of the knowledge first approach is also translatable into explicationism. However, from that perspective, Williamson’s central argument for treating knowledge as undefinable, referring to persistent yet unsuccessful attempts to solve the Gettier problem, amounts to an overreaction to that problem. Leaving explicationism aside, I ask, in the penultimate section, what Williamson’s own philosophical method really amounts to.

Are Emotions Natural Kinds After All? Rethinking the Issue of Response Coherence.

The synchronized co-activation of multiple responses-motivational, behavioral, and physiological-has been taken as a defining feature of emotion. Such response coherence has been observed inconsistently however, and this has led some to view emotion programs as lacking biological reality. Yet, response coherence is not always expected or desirable if an emotion program is to carry out its adaptive function. Rather, the hallmark of emotion is the capacity to orchestrate multiple mechanisms adaptively-responses will co-activate in stereotypical fashion or not depending on how the emotion orchestrator interacts with the situation. Nevertheless, might responses cohere in the general case where input variables are specified minimally? Here we focus on shame as a case study. We measure participants' responses regarding each of 27 socially devalued actions and personal characteristics. We observe internal and external coherence: The intensities of felt shame and of various motivations of shame (hiding, lying, destroying evidence, and threatening witnesses) vary in proportion (i) to one another, and (ii) to the degree to which audiences devalue the disgraced individual-the threat shame defends against. These responses cohere both within and between the United States and India. Further, alternative explanations involving the low-level variable of arousal do not seem to account for these results, suggesting that coherence is imparted by a shame system. These findings indicate that coherence can be observed at multiple levels and raise the possibility that emotion programs orchestrate responses, even in those situations where coherence is low.

Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency

One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely perceptual. We develop an explication of what it is for a representational state to be available to central coordinating agency for guidance of behavior. Second, drawing on this explication, we place a more careful understanding of the attributability of a state to the individual in the context of a range of empirical work on vision-for-action, saccades, and skilled typing. The results place pressure on the skeptic about unconscious perception. Third, reflecting upon broader philosophical themes running through debates about unconscious perception, we highlight how our discussion places pressure on the view that perception is a manifest kind, rather than a natural kind. In doing so, we resist the tempting complaint that the debate about unconscious perception is merely verbal.

Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory without Homeostatic Mechanisms: Two Recent Attempts and their Costs

The homeostatic property cluster theory (HPC) is widely influential for its ability to account for many natural-kind terms in the life sciences. However, the notion of homeostatic mechanism has never been fully explicated. In 2009, Carl Craver interpreted the notion in the sense articulated in discussions on mechanistic explanation and pointed out that the HPC account equipped with such notion invites interest-relativity. In this paper, we analyze two recent refinements on HPC: one that avoids any reference to the causes of the clustering of properties and one that replaces homeostatic mechanisms with causal networks represented by causal graphs. We argue that the former is too slender to account for some inductive inference in science and the latter, thicker account invites interest-relativity, as the original HPC does. This suggests that human interest will be an un-eliminative part of a satisfactory account of natural kindness. We conclude by discussing the implication of interest-relativity to the naturalness, reality, or objectivity of kinds and indicating an overlooked aspect of natural kinds that requires further studies.