National Security Problems Research Articles

People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations

People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations

LAMPF-Its Origins, History, and Accomplishments

The main vehicle for bringing the pion to bear on a vast array of problems, has been the meson factories. Today there exist such facilities in Switzerland (SIN), in Canada (TRIUMF), and in the USA (LAMPF). A fourth is just now being completed in the Soviet Union. They are enormous enterprises - the current replacement value of LMPF is $350 million, not including the part devoted to national security problems. But they accommodate hundreds of scientists from around the world and by so doing generate political as well as intellectual and economic capital. Proton facilities, together with heavy-ion accelerators and electron facilities, form a triad on which stands the present edifice of experimental nuclear science. Each leg of this triad is dependent, to a greater or lesser extent, on the other two. However, in terms of versatility, the size of the community it serves, and the relatively short-term application of the knowledge base and people base for which nuclear science is responsible, the meson factory part of the above triad is by no means the least important component. I discuss this component from the standpoint of the facility I know best, namely LAMPF. 33 refs., 36 figs.

People, states and fear: the national security problem in international relations

Journal Article People, states and fear: the national security problem in international relations Get access People, states and fear: the national security problem in international relations. By Barry Buzan. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf. 1983. 262pp. Index. £20.00. Pb.: £6.95. M. Wright M. Wright 1University College of Wales, Aberystwyth Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 60, Issue 2, Spring 1984, Pages 289–290, https://doi.org/10.2307/2619056 Published: 01 April 1984

T2Transfer of high technology from the united states to the soviet bloc: A public policy issue

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet-bloc states are engaged in an extensive effort in the legal as well as illegal acquisition of United States high technology. This study examines the importance to the U. S. of such losses; the manner in which the Soviets acquire our high technology; benefits of such acquisitions to the Soviet Union; steps being taken by the U. S. to reduce its loss of high technology; and the author's recommended course of action to reduce high-technology transfer. The transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union is recognized as one of our most serious national security problems. This problem is complicated, however, when considering our free enterprise system and the need to promote free trade. On the one hand high technology represents a substantial share of our current exports, while on the other, the United States has relied on technological superiority to offset the Soviet-bloc edge in military might. An equilibrium must be established to ensure protection of both economic and national defense interests of the United States. The Soviet effort to acquire U. S. high technology is broad based, supported by the Military-Industrial Commission and State Committee for Science and Technology (in legal acquisitions), as well as the Soviet Intelligence Service (in illegal acquisitions). Such techniques as review of U. S. publications, U. S.-Soviet exchange programs, as well as extensive clandestine intelligence operations, are utilized by the Soviets in obtaining our high technology. The Soviet acquisition of U. S. high technology has greatly benefited the USSR. This is clearly seen in U. S. Government estimates that the Soviets may have saved as much as $100 million in research and development of advanced microcircuitry. Several examples of savings to the Soviet defense industry as a result of high-technology transfer are elucidated in this work. In short, the Soviets have been able to save billions of defense dollars by utilizing proven U. S. designs with none of the risks experienced in the research and development of this technology. Because of the paradoxical nature of this question of high-technology transfer, U. S. Congressional reaction to renewal of the Export Administration Act of 1979 has been mixed. On one side of the aisle, there has been support of looser controls on high-technology exports to promote free trade. On the other side of the aisle, tighter controls on such exports have been supported to protect critical U. S. high technology. At the same time, the U. S. Government has undertaken steps to strengthen its agreement with the COCOM nations. Another effort undertaken by the U. S. and other Western governments is the expulsion of accused Soviet spies from various Soviet diplomatic establishments (at least 67 Soviets from January to May, 1983). Additionally, the U. S. Department of State, Defense, Commerce, and Customs, as well as the American Intelligence Community, have undertaken efforts to reduce high-technology transfer to the Soviet Union. U. S. industry has attempted to increase security of high-technology; however, because of the Defense Investigative Service's workload, the quality of background investigations on individuals, working in firms handling defense contracts, has suffered. The author recommends establishment of an ad-hoc matrix organization to integrate the resources and efforts of all of the federal agencies, as well as industry, in controlling the transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc states. The author also includes recommendations as contained in various Congressional bills. The author's suggestions are made with a view toward creating a balance necessary to the protection of our free market system and protection of the national defense of the United States.

The Dual Problems of Peace and National Security

The strategic consensus that has characterized American official and popular thinking about nuclear weapons since World War II has greatly eroded in recent years. That consensus consisted not only of an American determination to use nuclear weapons to deter a direct Soviet attack on the United States but also of a commitment to extend the American deterrent to cover a Soviet nuclear or large-scale conventional attack on America's principal allies. In the face of the recent massive and continuing growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities this consensus has come under growing challenge.This challenge to the consensus on the policy of nuclear deterrence has come from both ends of the political spectrum. On the political “right,” the Reagan administration has argued that deterrence alone is too weak a reed to forestall a Soviet attack on the United States or one of its allies; the prevention of a Soviet attack requires the development of a nuclear war-fighting strategy similar to that which the Soviets themselves are presumed to possess. On the political “left,” a large and highly vocal antinuclear movement largely under the banner of the “freeze,” challenges one aspect or another of the deterrence strategy and demands a deemphasis on, if not the complete elimination of, nuclear weapons. Both of these positions, I believe, are flawed and fail to provide a satisfactory solution to the difficult situation in which the United States finds itself in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

The Dual Problems of Peace and National Security

The strategic consensus that has characterized American official and popular thinking about nuclear weapons since World War II has greatly eroded in recent years. That consensus consisted not only of an American determination to use nuclear weapons to deter a direct Soviet attack on the United States but also of a commitment to extend the American deterrent to cover a Soviet nuclear or large-scale conventional attack on America's principal allies. In the face of the recent massive and continuing growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities this consensus has come under growing challenge.This challenge to the consensus on the policy of nuclear deterrence has come from both ends of the political spectrum. On the political “right,” the Reagan administration has argued that deterrence alone is too weak a reed to forestall a Soviet attack on the United States or one of its allies; the prevention of a Soviet attack requires the development of a nuclear war-fighting strategy similar to that which the Soviets themselves are presumed to possess. On the political “left,” a large and highly vocal antinuclear movement largely under the banner of the “freeze,” challenges one aspect or another of the deterrence strategy and demands a deemphasis on, if not the complete elimination of, nuclear weapons. Both of these positions, I believe, are flawed and fail to provide a satisfactory solution to the difficult situation in which the United States finds itself in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

The Dual Problems of Peace and National Security

The strategic consensus that has characterized American official and popular thinking about nuclear weapons since World War II has greatly eroded in recent years. That consensus consisted not only of an American determination to use nuclear weapons to deter a direct Soviet attack on the United States but also of a commitment to extend the American deterrent to cover a Soviet nuclear or large-scale conventional attack on America's principal allies. In the face of the recent massive and continuing growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities this consensus has come under growing challenge.This challenge to the consensus on the policy of nuclear deterrence has come from both ends of the political spectrum. On the political “right,” the Reagan administration has argued that deterrence alone is too weak a reed to forestall a Soviet attack on the United States or one of its allies; the prevention of a Soviet attack requires the development of a nuclear war-fighting strategy similar to that which the Soviets themselves are presumed to possess. On the political “left,” a large and highly vocal antinuclear movement largely under the banner of the “freeze,” challenges one aspect or another of the deterrence strategy and demands a deemphasis on, if not the complete elimination of, nuclear weapons. Both of these positions, I believe, are flawed and fail to provide a satisfactory solution to the difficult situation in which the United States finds itself in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

People, States and Fear The National Security Problem in International Relations. By Barry Buzan. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1983. Pp. x + 262. $24.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

People, States and Fear The National Security Problem in International Relations. By Barry Buzan. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1983. Pp. x + 262. $24.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

The quiet revolution in the scientific study of international politics and foreign policy

The application of quantitative international political and foreign policy research to real decision-making and forecasting problems has been quietly progressing over the past ten years. However, this “quest for relevance” has not been targeted at the highest policy-making levels; rather the applications have occurred at the middle- and low-level policy support and analysis levels. Specifically, applied analysts have profiled crisis management problem areas, developed a computer-based early warning and monitoring system, developed and applied several Bayesian forecasting techniques, and developed a computer-based crisis management decision aid which have all been used to solve specific analytical problems within the U.S. Department of Defense. Nearly all of the applied research is interdisciplinary. All is problem-oriented, and a great deal is computer-based. In all likelihood the number of applications will increase as the complexity of international and foreign affairs increases. The national security decision- and policy-making analytical process will thus become more pluralized and, because of the computer-based nature of much of the research, more accelerated and concentrated. Thusfar the impact can be said to be positive; the future will enlarge or shrink the role of applied quantitative analysis in response to how beneficial such analyses actually are to real national security problems.

State and Security: An Elementary Consideration Study on National Security Problems

State and Security: An Elementary Consideration Study on National Security Problems

Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems. Edited by Klaus Knorr. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976. Pp. 387. $6.95, paper.)

Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems. Edited by Klaus Knorr. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976. Pp. 387. $6.95, paper.)

Review: Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, by Klaus Knorr

Book Review| November 01 1977 Review: Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, by Klaus Knorr Historical Dimensions of National Security ProblemsKlaus Knorr Paul A. C. Koistinen Paul A. C. Koistinen Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Pacific Historical Review (1977) 46 (4): 680–681. https://doi.org/10.2307/3638191 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Paul A. C. Koistinen; Review: Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, by Klaus Knorr. Pacific Historical Review 1 November 1977; 46 (4): 680–681. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3638191 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentPacific Historical Review Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1977 The Pacific Coast Branch, American Historical Association Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Book reviews

Book reviews

The New Military Strategy

Essay| August 01 1964 The New Military Strategy Gordon H. Evans Gordon H. Evans Strategic Analyst Gordon H. Evans is a strategic analyst and writer on national security problems. His study of Communist China’s nuclear potential, “China and the Atom Bomb,” was published in The Royal United Service Institution Journal (England). In this country, he has written for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the New Leader. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1964) 47 (276): 77–80. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1964.47.276.77 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Gordon H. Evans; The New Military Strategy. Current History 1 August 1964; 47 (276): 77–80. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1964.47.276.77 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1964 by The Regents of the University of California1964 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process

Despite the extensive government apparatus for policy-making on problems of national security, the American President in the postwar period has, from time to time, appointed groups of private citizens to investigate particular problems and report to the National Security Council. Some of these groups have performed their task without the public's ever becoming aware of their existence; others have in one way or another come to public attention. Among the latter are those which have become known under the names of their chairmen: Finletter, Gray, Paley, Sarnoff, Gaither, Draper, Boechenstein, and Killian. President Truman made use of such groups, and the variety of tasks for which they were appointed grew steadily during the Eisenhower Administration.

The New Civil-Military Relations

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

The New Civil-Military Relations

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

National Security Policy as a Field for Economics Research

Problems of national security are in no sense novel for the application of economic analysis. Adam Smith, in a well-known passage in The Wealth of Nations, was concerned with the allocation of resources between “defense” and “opulence”—what we would call the problem of the size of the national security budget. There has been great interest among economists, especially during and following the First and Second World Wars, in problems of industrial mobilization during war, including the associated problems of economic stablization. In fact, to many economists during the past generation this set of mobilization problems constituted the economics of defense. Books were published with titles like Economics of Defense that dealt with little else.

Historia Mentem Armet: Lessons of the Past

It is a distressing paradox of our time, when we are concerned as never before with military problems on whose solution may depend our national existence and even the survival of civilization, that we should turn our backs on history and deny that the lessons of the past have any validity for the present.There are many reasons for this. The problems we face are enormously complex and highly technical; the weapons on which we must rely and which threaten our existence are so revolutionary in character as to make past experience seem highly irrelevant. And there are few to tell us that this is not so, for military history has never really been seriously studied in this country. The historian has stood on the sidelines while his academic colleagues, the political scientists, the economists, the physicists, and others, have become increasingly active, officially and unofficially, in the study of national security problems.

The role of medical education in civil and defense mobilization.

I am grateful for the opportunity to address this group, but let me assure you at the outset of these remarks that I do not speak as an expert on medical subjects. So, for the sake of the medical profession and my responsibility to the federal government, I should like very simply to express to you something of the urgent problem which each of us faces as we live in this age of continuing and accelerating changes. Although I am not a medical man, I feel curiously at home in this gathering. Your concern with medical education and specialism parallels my concern over some of the major national security problems which we face today. That sounds like an enigma. Let me explain. The crux of your problem is the acceleration and proliferation of scientific knowledge and technological development. In the few years since 1940 we have made more scientific progress