National Security Intelligence Research Articles

A Study on the Integrated Operation of the Presidential Security Service through the Establishment of the ‘Office of National Security (ONS)' National Security Intelligence Investigation Center

A Study on the Integrated Operation of the Presidential Security Service through the Establishment of the ‘Office of National Security (ONS)' National Security Intelligence Investigation Center

BUILDING INTELLIGENCE REVIEW INTO NATIONAL SECURITY - THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

On November 17, 2023, John Davies, Executive Director, National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), presented Building Intelligence Review into National Security: The Canadian Experience for this year’s West Coast Security Conference. The key points discussed were the structure and responsibilities of NSIRA, the challenges and experiences of NSIRA in the last four years, and NSIRA’s plans for the future.
 
 Received: 01-20-2024
 Revised: 01-29-2024

Democratic Control and National Security Intelligence Services in the United States (1972-1980)

Resumo Neste artigo, analisamos as vicissitudes do controle democrático das atividades governamentais de inteligência nos Estados Unidos entre 1972 e 1980. Durante a fase anterior da Guerra Fria (1947-1971), a alta polarização sistêmica entre os Estados Unidos e a União Soviética, juntamente com a expansão da capacidade estatal e dos conflitos sociais internos nos EUA, condicionaram diretamente a formação de um complexo sistema nacional de organizações e atividades de inteligência nos dois países. Nos anos 1970, a estabilização estratégica das relações entre os EUA e a URSS (détente) dependeu também do desenvolvimento tecnológico da coleta de inteligência de comunicações, sinais e imagens por meio de satélites. A vigilância policial e militar de dissidentes internos e a crise política crescente até o final do governo Nixon criaram as condições para uma tentativa inédita e consistente de exercício do controle externo democrático das atividades de inteligência por parte dos Poderes Legislativo e Judiciário. O recrudescimento da Guerra Fria a partir de 1980 e a eleição de Reagan marcam o início de uma reversão parcial nos controles. Em menos de uma década, uma democracia altamente institucionalizada como a norte-americana fez grandes esforços e teve muitas dificuldades para regular e controlar as atividades de inteligência.

National Security Intelligence and Business Intelligence: A Comparative Analysis

National Security Intelligence and Business Intelligence: A Comparative Analysis

Communicating uncertainty in national security intelligence: Expert and nonexpert interpretations of and preferences for verbal and numeric formats.

Organizations in several domains including national security intelligence communicate judgments under uncertainty using verbal probabilities (e.g., likely) instead of numeric probabilities (e.g., 75% chance), despite research indicating that the former have variable meanings across individuals. In the intelligence domain, uncertainty is also communicated using terms such as low, moderate, or high to describe the analyst's confidence level. However, little research has examined how intelligence professionals interpret these terms and whether they prefer them to numeric uncertainty quantifiers. In two experiments (N=481 and 624, respectively), uncertainty communication preferences of expert (n =41 intelligence analysts in Experiment 1) and nonexpert intelligence consumers were elicited. We examined which format participants judged to be more informative and simpler to process. We further tested whether participants treated verbal probability and confidence terms as independent constructs and whether participants provided coherent numeric probability translations of verbal probabilities. Results showed that although most nonexperts favored the numeric format, experts were about equally split, and most participants in both samples regarded the numeric format as more informative. Experts and nonexperts consistently conflated probability and confidence. For instance, confidence intervals inferred from verbal confidence terms had a greater effect on the location of the estimate than the width of the estimate, contrary to normative expectation. Approximately one-fourth of experts and over one-half of nonexperts provided incoherent numeric probability translations for the terms likely and unlikely when the elicitation of best estimates and lower and upper bounds were briefly spaced by intervening tasks.

Legalizing Illegal Mass Surveillance: A Transnational Perspective on Canada’s Legislative Response to the Expansion of Security Intelligence

AbstractThis article offers a transnational perspective on Canada’s legislative response to globally expanded national security intelligence activities in the War on Terror since 2001. I situate Canada’s new legislation against the backdrop of US and Japanese legislative responses and analyze the transition, including Bill C-13 (2014), Bill C-44 (2015), Bill C-51 (2015), and Bill C-59 (2019). I argue that the thrust of this legislative trend has been the active legalization of previously illegal surveillance activities by security intelligence agencies, rather than passive ineffectiveness in restricting state mass surveillance enabled by information and communication technologies. The transition is in synch with a global legislative trend that lowers the legal standards of privacy and personal data protection and weakens checks and balances in democratic governance. As a result, mass surveillance has increasingly undermined and regulated the rule of law, not vice versa.

National security intelligence activity: a philosophical analysis

ABSTRACT This article provides philosophical analyses of some of the key notions involved in national security intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. In Section 1, and relying on the intelligence studies literature, the notion of intelligence is characterized by means of an outline its main features or, at least, those features typically ascribed to it. In Section 2, an analysis of the notion, or rather inter-related set of notions, of knowledge (broadly understood) that lies at the heart of intelligence activity is provided. In Section 3, the focus shifts to the activity, or rather inter-related activities, of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination and, in particular, the notion of joint epistemic action.

Expanding Mental Models in Intelligence Through Diverse Perspectives

Intelligence organizations need a workforce that draws on a variety of perspectives, as do other types of organizations. The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) was created to address the conflict situations of the last century. The early workforce reflected the requirements of that time; it had strong ties to the military, was of primarily European heritage, Judeo-Christian morality, was righteous about democracy, and mostly male. Today’s security problems extend well beyond situations of state conflict, to include transnational crime, crises of the natural environment, and other fluid issues that defy the previous expectations. National security intelligence workforces must be both knowledgeable and agile. This combination of knowledge and mental agility is, paradoxically, difficult to achieve. The heritage of the IC created modes of thinking that are at odds with the current need to imaginatively consider interconnected factors and various perspectives. The IC is stymied by its own culture, structures, processes, policies, and thinking patterns. Increased inclusion of diverse points of view will better enable assessment of complex, dynamic global issues. This article discusses mental frameworks as they affect intelligence work, drawing conclusions about the value of diversity in an intelligence and national security workforce.

The integration of statistical learning in intelligence education: is the academy equipping tomorrow’s intelligence professionals to analyze data-centric threats?

ABSTRACT ‘We need data-literate analysts’ is a refrain heard from both the intelligence community and the private sector. In this study we ascertain the degree to which graduate programs in intelligence studies 1) meet professional standards and 2) have integrated quantitative analysis courses into their curricula. To better understand the current state of intelligence education we used a modified version of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) educational standards to examine 28 United States educational institutions offering a graduate program focused on national security intelligence. One-quarter of the programs (25%) offered classes in all seven educational categories. In addition, of the programs surveyed, 25% have developed curricula that provide statistical learning skills. Considering the significant changes in the US threat environment, and the comparative lack of quantitative analysis content in graduate intelligence programs in the US, there is an urgent need to make intelligence curricula more robust and comprehensive by adding quantitative analysis capabilities. We posit that a well-trained and educated intelligence workforce must include peer-reviewed standards for intelligence education. A debate on the accreditation of intelligence programs is a logical next step to advancing the intelligence profession through continuous improvement of the quality of academic degree programs and curricula.

Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion in National Security Intelligence

On November 23, 2021, Mr. Artur Wilczynski, Associate Deputy Chief at Communications Security Establishment (CSE), presented on Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion in National Security Intelligence at the 2021 CASIS Vancouver West Coast Security Conference. This presentation was followed by a question and answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives. The key points discussed included how a lack of diversity in intelligence can negatively contribute to Canada’s national security, how diversity broadens the effectiveness of organizations, and how Canadian national security institutions must be in service to all Canadians.

Public Service Motivation and Morale: Exploratory Study of Former Agents of the National Security Intelligence of Korea

ABSTRACT This article examines the relationship between public service motivation (PSM) and morale by surveying former bureaucrats from the National Security Intelligence (NIS) of Korea. Despite decades of research, there is still much room for exploring the effects of PSM and morale by extending the scope to government retirees. Our data demonstrate that the higher the level of PSM, the higher the level of morale both before and after retirement. We also find that recent political turmoil surrounding the agency influences the former agents of the agency. With the present study, we make theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature by addressing the PSM and morale of government retirees, who have been underrepresented in the literature to date, using empirical data from former agents of the NIS, which has also been rarely presented in previous research.

Demystifying Schrems II for the cross-border transfer of clinical research data.

The Courts of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in its July 2020 Schrems II decision that, in order for entities in other countries to import personal data from the European Economic Area (EEA), the importer must be able to provide data protections ‘essentially equivalent’ to those the EEA offers under its General Data Protection Regulation. The CJEU expressed particular concern that United States’ national security intelligence gathering laws prevent U.S.-based entities from providing such protections. This decision has sharply limited the sharing of clinical research data from the EEA to the United States. After describing the pertinent aspects of the Schrems II decision, this article evaluates U.S. national security intelligence gathering frameworks, including Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Executive Order 12333. The article then leverages recent draft guidance from the European Data Protection Board to explain how entities may be able to adopt widely used contractual and technical measures, such as data pseudonymization, to provide ‘essentially equivalent’ protections in the clinical research context.

Rethinking the Just Intelligence Theory of National Security Intelligence Collection and Analysis: The Principles of Discrimination, Necessity, Proportionality and Reciprocity

ABSTRACT In this article, it is argued that the constitutive principles of Just War Theory and the jus ad bellum/jus in bello duality do not transfer all that well to national security intelligence activity. Accordingly, while Just Intelligence Theory – comprising jus ad intelligentiam and jus in intelligentia – provides a useful starting point in the construction of a normative framework for national security intelligence activities, ultimately it is found to be wanting in a number of important respects. For instance, while war ought to be a last resort, intelligence collection and analysis ought to be a first resort. In addition, analyses are offered of the key principles of discrimination, necessity and proportionality, and it is shown in general terms how they apply, or ought to apply, to national security intelligence activity. Importantly, the principle of necessity has been given a novel analysis according to which it is in reality a set of different principles, depending on the institutional setting in which it is being used. Moreover, the analysis reveals that as typically used it consists (in part) of a means/end principle of rationality and one or other versions of a principle of harm minimisation. Finally, it is argued that there is a normative principle governing espionage, in particular, that is not a constitutive principle of Just War Theory; this is a principle of reciprocity.

The Spy Power, Technological Innovations, and the Human Dimensions of Intelligence: Recent Presidential Abuse of America’s Secret Agencies

The purpose of national security intelligence is to provide policy officials with an advantage in the making of effective policy, based on the collection and analysis of accurate information from around the world that can help to illuminate a decision. Foreknowledge is invaluable in the service of a nation’s security; and, in the gathering of useful information, technological innovations in the world of intelligence can result in a stronger shield to protect citizens against the many dangers that lurk across the continents in this uncertain and hostile world. Despite all the marvels of modern espionage tradecraft, the governments that rely on them must still deal with the human side of intelligence activities. Unfortunately, arrogance, shortsightedness, laziness, frenetic schedules, and the corrosive influences of power (among other flaws) often lead policy officials to ignore or warp the advantages they could accrue from advanced intelligence spycraft, if they would only use these sources and methods properly. This article examines some of the problems that imperfect human behavior has created for intelligence in the United States at the highest levels of government over the past two decades.

Security information resources and strategies of the XXI century

National Intelligence is a priority of national security strategies and intelligence to the US security and defence or in the UE States (Strategists/White Books), by which it is proposed, for the first time, achieving an overall, systematic reforms and long term to this area for important strands of which mention: coordination, structural transformations, the formation of a new structureImprove the quality and activity of human resources reform in the intelligence research, technical development capabilities for gathering information. The dynamics of transformations is necessary to streamline the work of intelligence organizations. In Romania there is an older Security Strategy (2006) and no Intelligence strategy, which would need to be developed. Whatever the model and how to design, american or european, for turning his Romanian intelligence is important for their effectiveness by the maximum of the intelligence community and its components. All these directions and actions are required to be prepared for the strategic change in the world and intelligenceul in order to meet the new challenges of the 21st century.

A new methodology for strategic assessment of transnational threats

ABSTRACT Transnational threats including organised crime and terrorism pose serious physical and national security concerns, and have significant economic and social costs. Despite these widely recognised harms, there is limited literature on using strategic intelligence resources to understand and assess transnational threats to enable action to reduce them. Whilst there is growing consensus that national security and national law enforcement intelligence challenges are moving closer together – especially in relation to transnational threats – there is very little theory or practitioner guidance. This article presents an applied national law enforcement case study; the provision of strategic intelligence assessments to senior decision-makers of the Australian Federal Police intended to improve decision-making. During this case study, practitioners drew on national security intelligence approaches and analytical techniques to produce strategic assessments of transnational threats. The case study addressed challenges raised in the literature as obstacles to effective strategic intelligence, including ambiguity relating to the role of intelligence in the criminal environment, a broad range of divergent threat types and the need to demonstrate value of strategic intelligence for decision-makers. This has broader applicability in different jurisdictions and on different topics due to the focus on consultation, engagement and collaboration alongside traditional intelligence processes. Given the lack of literature in the field, it makes a contribution to understanding and developing best practice in strategic intelligence as applicable to national policing and security.

Closing the Gap Between Law Enforcement and National Security Intelligence: Comparative Approaches

Gunfire from a modified semi-automatic weapon wielded by a lone gunman took the lives of 59 people in Las Vegas Nevada in October 2017.1 In November 2015, 129 people were killed in the Paris terror...

Watchful Eyes: National Security Review and Oversight in Canada

For almost two decades, the reach of Canada’s intelligence and security community continued to expand in this vein without any significant enhancement to the review bodies that serve as a check on its power. Until 2019, only the RCMP, CSIS and CSE were subject to regular national security review, while other organizations like CBSA, DND, and DFAIT underwent sporadic review by commission of inquiries established to investigate catastrophic failures in the system; commissions which consistently identified Canada’s siloed approach to national security review as a priority for reform. This chapter begins by setting out the definition of review and oversight, followed by the history of Canada’s review bodies. It then details the dramatic remodelling of review and oversight in Canada and describes the structure, mandates and resources of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), the National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), and the office of the Intelligence Commissioner (IC). It is too early to identify the impacts these reforms will have on Canada’s intelligence and security community thus, this Chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the factors that could impact their success.

Correcting Judgment Correctives in National Security Intelligence.

Intelligence analysts, like other professionals, form norms that define standards of tradecraft excellence. These norms, however, have evolved in an idiosyncratic manner that reflects the influence of prominent insiders who had keen psychological insights but little appreciation for how to translate those insights into testable hypotheses. The net result is that the prevailing tradecraft norms of best practice are only loosely grounded in the science of judgment and decision-making. The “common sense” of prestigious opinion leaders inside the intelligence community has pre-empted systematic validity testing of the training techniques and judgment aids endorsed by those opinion leaders. Drawing on the scientific literature, we advance hypotheses about how current best practices could well be reducing rather than increasing the quality of analytic products. One set of hypotheses pertain to the failure of tradecraft training to recognize the most basic threat to accuracy: measurement error in the interpretation of the same data and in the communication of interpretations. Another set of hypotheses focuses on the insensitivity of tradecraft training to the risk that issuing broad-brush, one-directional warnings against bias (e.g., over-confidence) will be less likely to encourage self-critical, deliberative cognition than simple response-threshold shifting that yields the mirror-image bias (e.g., under-confidence). Given the magnitude of the consequences of better and worse intelligence analysis flowing to policy-makers, we see a compelling case for greater funding of efforts to test what actually works.

Transparency or Loopholes: Target Locations, FISA Warrants, and Reasonable Belief

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 was a grand compromise. FISA aimed at continued collection of national security intelligence, while preserving American civil liberties from government overreach. This compromise sought to assuage concerns from the tech industry and high-level government officials by providing protection to both from litigation. The FISA comprise was premised on the independence of a specially created judicial court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), overseeing executive power while providing reporting to Congress. A true balance of power. From its inception, FISA's basic foundation for legality is founded on government knowledge of the physical location of targets. This foundation has not aged well as technology has evolved. In addition to technological advances, the law itself has not been updated to reflect the changes in technology. Congress has shown a penchant for reacting to either the executive or the Supreme Court. Congress' reaction to litigation in 2018, the Court's recent ruling in Carpenter, and Special Counsel Mueller's investigation into Russian election interference with subsequent Congressional disclosures, all threaten the vitality of FISA. This article outlines the foundation, covers the technological developments, and exposes flaws in the FISA system. The Article argues the Government, along with the tech industry must rework another grand compromise to ensure the continued vitality of national security surveillance, while continuing to protect American civil liberties from government overreach.