National Patriotic Front Of Liberia Research Articles

Rebel Mobilization through Pandering: Insincere Leaders, Framing, and Exploitation of Popular Grievances

In civil wars, unpopular and violent rebel organizations sometimes gain support from politically motivated constituencies who should, by outside appearances, logically oppose such groups. I explain this through a logic in which self-interested, insincere rebel leaders pander to aggrieved civilian populations to mobilize them, presenting the rebel organization as empathizing with and offering solutions to popular grievances. Leaders exploit an information asymmetry about their true preferences to gain allegiance using cheap sociopolitical appeals, rather than more costly material incentives or coercion. I inductively develop the theory through a case study of Renamo in Mozambique and then probe the generalizability of the logic through case studies of the Nicaraguan Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, drawing on interviews and archival materials. This article explicates a previously undertheorized phenomenon in the study of rebel mobilization and demonstrates how apparent popular, voluntary support for rebels can be more tenuous than it appears.

R v. Reeves Taylor (Appellant). [2019] UKSC 51

The First Liberian Civil War (1989–1996), in which Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) waged an ultimately successful military campaign to depose President Samuel Doe, was characterized by widespread atrocities. During this period, Agnes Reeves Taylor, known as “The Mother of the Revolution” and at the time Charles Taylor's wife, allegedly committed multiple acts of torture in her capacity as a high-ranking member of the NPFL. After moving to the United Kingdom, Agnes Taylor was charged in 2017 with seven counts of torture and one of conspiracy to commit torture under Section 134 of the UK Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA), which domesticates aspects of the UN Convention Against Torture 1984 (CAT) and asserts universal jurisdiction over torture. During the prosecution, a question over a key definitional element of the crime was appealed to the UK Supreme Court (Supreme Court): whether nonstate actors could be liable under the statute, which requires that torture be carried out by a “public official or person acting in an official capacity” (para. 14). The Court gave a qualified answer in the affirmative, holding that this definition includes individuals acting for a nonstate body that exercises control over territory and carries out governmental functions in this territory. As the first apex court decision extending liability for torture to de facto authorities, the Supreme Court decision is likely to have significant jurisprudential influence well beyond the United Kingdom.

State Security Policy and Changing the Nature of the Conflict after the End of the Cold War Rivalry

The aim of the paper is to try to determine the essence of the new face of armed conflict. Liberia is the main point of reference in the analysis for two reasons. Firstly, Liberia is the oldest independent republic on the African continent and its establishing is linked to paradoxical events begun in 1821, when black people settling in the vicinity of Monrovia, former slaves liberated from South American cotton plantations, reconstructed a slave-like type of society, taking local, poorly organised tribes as their subjects. Secondly, Liberia proves that the intensity of changes in armed conflict does not have to be strictly dependent on the size of the land: a country of small geographical size can equal or even exceed countries with several times larger surface in terms of features of “new wars”. In 1989 in Liberia, the nine-year presidency of Samuel Doe, characterised by exceptional ineptitude and bloody terror, led to the outbreak of clashes between government forces and the opposition from National Patriotic Front of Liberia, led by Charles Taylor. Thus, the first civil war in Liberia was begun, that lasted until 1997 and became an arena of mass violations of human rights, leaving behind 150,000 dead victims and about 850,000 refugees to neighbouring countries.

Przemoc i społeczne skutki konfliktów w Liberii i Sierra Leone

The civil war in Liberia began in 1989, when the country was attacked by the rebels of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. In Sierra Leone the civil war was initiated in 1991 by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh. The article describes the specifics of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It discusses social and economic context of the wars as well as causes of their longevity. In addition, it presents the international community actions for ending the prolonged civil war in Sierra Leone and the importance of the policy “weapon for diamonds”. The article uses a historical-analytical method of research.

What Makes Islamist Movements Different? A Study of Liberia’s NPFL and Nigeria’s Boko Haram in West Africa

ABSTRACTWest Africa witnessed many violent rebel movements in the post-cold war era, some of which led to protracted conflicts in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the post-9/11 era, Muslim extremist movements have emerged. While the scholarship on the past “conventional” rebel movements mostly understood them in their local socio-political contexts, Muslim extremist groups have been dominantly interpreted in the context of the global “war on terrorism.” This is mainly due to the latter’s unique use of a unique form of violence (terror), its religious narrative, and its external links to other groups in other countries. This article interrogates this different understanding of conventional and religious types of anti-state rebellion in West Africa through a comparative study of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (1989–1997), and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. After a synthesisation of four key questions, the article concludes that Muslim extremist groups in West Africa are not any different from past rebel movements. Muslim extremist groups, just like past movements, are much more rational in the local West African contexts than it is dominantly acknowledged in peace and security scholarship and practice.

War, Sex and Justice: Barriers to Gender Justice in Post-Conflict Liberia

IntroductionThe Liberian civil conflict took place at a time when at least 38 countries across the globe; 14 of which are on the African region, were either, entering into, actively waging, or concluding armed conflicts (Gettleman, 2010). Liberia went through civil wars from 1989 to 1996 and from 1999 to 2003. While the underlying causes varied, the key characteristics and impacts of these seemingly disparate conflicts were strikingly similar. Almost without exception, these conflicts were marked by the indiscriminate mass-scale commission of sexual and gender based violence, the extent and sheer brutality of which was unprecedented. It is widely estimated, for example, that up to 54% women and girls in Liberia were victims of sexual violence during that country's ten-year war (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Sexual violations committed by National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a rebel group alleged to be supported by neighbouring Guinea, entered Northern Liberia., and raping sprees carried out by Liberian armed groups in the north-eastern regions of Sierra Leone followed similar patterns of sexual violations across national borders.To address the issues that arise in conflict and move toward effective reconstruction, policymakers and practitioners must understand the needs, experiences, and motivations of the different populations involved. At the heart of most conflicts are the armed combatants themselves-often among the most difficult groups to access, but some of the most essential to understanding the factors driving violence. Hit by two successive civil wars in 1989 and 1999, the country of Liberia hangs in limbo between a conflict and post-conflict state. In a theatre of impunity, over twenty armed groups operate in a shifting landscape of motivations and alliances, leaving the country, after years of unrest, with some of the worst health and development indicators in the world. Extremely brutal forms of sexual violence have been one of the most salient and destructive characteristics of the conflict. Despite international recognition of the problem, levels of rape in Liberia increased in 2003 and remain extremely high (Scott, 2005). Rehn, and Johnson Sirleaf, (2002) estimates that 75% of the population to which 62% to 72% women and girls have been assaulted over the past twelve years. In the first three months of 2003, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 75% women were sexually assaulted throughout the country (Campbell, 2008).More than a third of these rapes occurred in Bahn and Nimba County, in the conflictaffected villages and rural communities. These regional figures are comparable to the same period in 2014, revealing little progress in decreasing sexual violence.21 The extant research on SGBV has, predominantly and appropriately, focused on victims and survivors of rape. In a survey conducted in Liberia in 2014, over 54% of women interviewed reported that their attacker was wearing some kind of uniform (Piccard, 2011). Over twothirds said they were gang-raped, and almost half reported being abducted. These findings speak to the highly militarized forms of rape in Liberia, suggesting that understandings of why sexual gender-based violence occurs there are incomplete without fuller insight into the experiences and attitudes of combatants' themselves.3The article takes into consideration and addresses the following questions: What is the concept of justice and how do Liberia's current conditions relate to it? What are the main issues concerning the Liberian women population with regard to dealing with its present and past gender-based violence? What measures have been employed in dealing with the present and past gender-based violence? Past injustices on gender-based violence in Liberia that remain unaddressed can easily become a source of new tensions and conflict, while impunity undermines trust in institutions and prevents the normalization of contacts between communities. …

Denial-of-Resource Operations and NPFL Radio Dominance in the Liberian Civil War

There has been limited scholarly analysis of former Liberian President Charles Taylor's manipulation of radio broadcasting, or of the extensive use of propaganda by his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) during the country's enormously destructive 1990–97 war. Scholars and writers of the conflict have noted these issues in passing, but they have presumed NPFL control over nation-wide mass media and communications, without explaining the circumstances through which Taylor and his forces came to possess them. This article addresses five related gaps in the historical record. First, it locates broadcast resource acquisition within the wider context of scorched earth tactics that characterized the conflict – identifying it as a deliberate military and political subset of more generalized denial-of-resource practices. Second, it anchors in place and time the wartime broadcast resources at the disposal of Taylor, the NPFL, and to a lesser extent, their enemies. Third, it demonstrates the singular interest of Taylor and his forces in acquiring and maintaining enhanced communication capabilities, destroying those that they could not control, thereby leaving the country exposed and vulnerable to rebel media saturation. Fourth, it describes two windows of opportunity during which Taylor and his forces could have dominated the ether, their opponents unable to respond in kind. Finally, this article contests the claim that combatants were beyond the command and control capabilities of rebel leaders. It argues instead that Taylor had the means to convey his intentions and expectations, directly and indirectly, to commanders, fighters, and non-combatants both near and far – his ability to do so in large part contingent on preferential access to an extensive array of broadcast communications facilities

The Rape of Dinah: Human Rights, Civil War in Liberia, and Evil Triumphant

The Rape of Dinah: Human Rights, Civil War in Liberia, and Evil Triumphant Kenneth L. Cain (bio) Now Dinah, daughter to Jacob, went out to visit the daughters of the land. Shechem son of Hamor the Hivite, chief of the land, saw her, and took her and lay with her by force. Jacob heard that Shechem had defiled his daughter Dinah. Hamor came to Jacob and his sons, saying, “my son Shechem longs for your daughter. Please give her to him in marriage” and offered Jacob landrights in return. Shechem also spoke to Jacob and the sons, “Do me this favor, and I will pay whatever you tell me . . . only give me this maiden for a wife.” Jacob’s sons were indignant and very angry, because he had committed an outrage in Israel by lying with Jacob’s daughter by force—a thing not to be done. The men thus answered with guile, instructing Hamor and Shechem that the sons of Hivites must be circumcised, only on this condition would they agree. The words pleased Hamor and Shechem who convinced the men of their town that in order to usher in an era of profitable relations with their neighbor Jacob, all men of the town must be circumcised. On the third day, when the Hivites were in pain, Simeon and Levi, two brothers of Dinah, took each his sword, came upon the city unmolested, and slew all the males. They put Hamor and his son Shechem to the sword, took Dinah out of Shechem’s house and went away. The other sons of Jacob came upon the slain and plundered town, because their sister had been defiled. They seized their flocks and herds and asses, all that was inside the town and outside, all their wealth, all their children, and their wives, all that was in houses, they took as captives and booty. Jacob said to Simeon and Levi, “you have brought trouble on me, making me odious among the inhabitants of the land, the Canaanites and the Perizzites; my men are few in number, so that if they unite against me and attack me, I and my house will be destroyed.” But they answered, “Should our sister be treated like a whore?” 1 The Rape of Dinah Genesis, Chapter 34 [End Page 265] The looters, the plunderers, the obsessively ambitious must not be allowed to block the cravings of the vast majority. What wickedness. 2 William Twaddell US Ambassador to Liberia They are writing “Angels of Death.” Look, I am no Angel of Death and I am going to prove it in this town. I am very serious, me, Charles Ghankay Taylor, I will prove that I am no Lord of War and I am no Angel of Death. If you don’t respect this presidency, you’ll respect it or I am going to lock horns with some people here one on one. They think ECOMOG here to support their nonsense and their talks. ECOMOG will not stop me. It’s almost reaching now that we will make sure that different processes; due processes of law maybe, and in some cases, the laws of the jungle to bring things under control in this town. You know Charles Taylor, we will straighten things out. 3 Charles Taylor 5 November 1995 What the journalists have failed to point out is that this time, unlike previous fighting in Monrovia, the civilians have not really suffered. . . . In the past, fighters would rip out people’s intestines and use them to string up roadblocks, or cut off people’s heads. This time there has been none of that. 4 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) Spokesman J.T. Richardson amidst carnage in Monrovia April, 1996 Right temporarily denied is stronger than evil triumphant. 5 Dr. Martin Luther King I. Introduction Liberia is important in its own right—human beings live and die there. In the immortal words of Primo Levi, as he struggled to make some moral sense out of Auschwitz, “We are in fact convinced that no human experience is without meaning or unworthy of analysis, and that fundamental values, even if they are not positive, can be deduced from this particular...

War without End and an End to a War: The Prolonged Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone

An attack on Liberian government forces in Nimba County, Liberia, on Christmas Eve, 1989, ignited a full-scale civil war. It was carried out by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and consisted of Libyan-trained dissidents, headed by Charles Taylor, a former employee of President Samuel Doe's government. After six months of fighting, the NPFL controlled 90 percent of Liberia and was ready to launch a final assault on the capital, Monrovia. Eight months from the start of the war, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a Nigerian-led peace-keeping force, ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to put an end to the civil war. ECOWAS' military intervention failed to stop the war or to bring peace. Almost half of the Liberian population of two-and-a-half million was displaced, hundreds of thousands were killed or wounded, the economic and administrative infrastructures were destroyed, and law and order ceased to exist. After more than a year of fighting in Liberia, the war spilled over into neighboring Sierra Leone. A force headed by Foday Saybana Sankoh, consisting of Sierra Leone dissidents of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), launched a military attack backed by NPFL units. After gaining control over the resource-rich area of Kailahun, the RUF fought its way to the capital, Freetown. The war in Sierra Leone appeared to follow the Liberian experience: with many casualties, displacement of population, destruction of economic and administrative structures and anarchy replacing the rule of law and order.

Rebuilding the University of Liberia in the Midst of War

I arrived in Monrovia in March 1991—after nearly eight years of exile in the United States—and was shocked by the destruction of the University of Liberia—the country’s only national institution of higher learning. In July 1990, the campus became the battlefield for opposing forces of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia and Liberia’s military dictator—Samuel K. Doe—for control of the city. The combatants seemed determined to destroy not just Liberia, but also its mind and soul—as embedded in and symbolized by the university. Established in 1862 as Liberia College, the University of Liberia—the oldest degree-granting institution in West Africa—has trained leaders of state, church, industry, and commerce for Liberia and other African countries. During Africa’s colonial period, the university provided higher education for many Africans for whom such education was unavailable in the colonies, and continued during postcolonial times.

Chaos in Liberia

Good afternoon. I appear before you today at one of the bleakest moments in Liberia's history. Monrovia, once a safe haven for more than 1 million civilians, lies in ruins, the result of fierce fighting by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia— NPFL— and Alhaji Kromah's United Liberation Movement for Democracy— ULIMO-K— rebels against Roosevelt Johnson's break-away faction of ULIMO— ULIMO-J, comprised primarily of ethnic Krahns. More than 80,000 Liberians have been left homeless. Thousands have fled or are trying to flee the fighting in the capital. At least 100 peacekeepers have lost their lives attempting to restore security in the city and its environs. At this point we do not know how many Liberian fighters and civilians have been killed.

LIBERIA 1989–1994 A STUDY OF ETHNIC AND SPIRITUAL VIOLENCE

Journal Article LIBERIA 1989–1994 A STUDY OF ETHNIC AND SPIRITUAL VIOLENCE Get access STEPHEN ELLIS STEPHEN ELLIS Researcher Stephen Ellis is a researcher at the Afrikastudiecentrum, Leiden. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar African Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 375, April 1995, Pages 165–197, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a098806 Published: 01 April 1995

The obstacles to the peaceful resolution of the Liberian civil conflict

Over the last two years, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has attempted to resolve the Liberian civil conflict peacefully.’ This effort has drawn valuable lessons from previous civil conflicts in the other African states. Importantly, the ECOWAS‐sponsored cease‐fire was observed by the various warring factions for two years; however, the ceasefire was shattered on October 15, 1992, when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the principal rebel organization, launched an armed attack on Monrovia, the capital city. In turn, this has recommenced the civil war and has drawn ECOMOG, the ECOWAS peacekeeping force, into the conflict. Against this background, the purpose of the paper is to examine both the domestic and external factors that have impeded the peaceful resolution of the Liberian civil conflict.

Combatants, patrons, peacemakers, and the Liberian civil conflict

Abstract The paper examines the various major actors in the Liberian civil conflict, the impact of the conflict, and the efforts to resolve it peacefully. First, the major combatants are identified as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the major insurgency movement, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the breakaway faction from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, and the Armed Forces of Liberia, the remnants of the Liberian army that supported the Doe regime. Second, the external players are the Economic Community of West African States, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Libya, Burkina Faso, and the United States. The conflict is the by‐product of the perennial problems of socioeconomic underdevelopment and political repression that have undergirded the Liberian polity since the country became independent in 1847. Accordingly, in order to resolve the conflict completely, concerted efforts must be made to address these problems. In other words, the cessation of military hostilities and ...