Myanmar Military Research Articles

Exploring public opinions on Rohingya refugees residing in India: An empirical study

The Rohingya population is widely acknowledged as one of the most persecuted minority groups worldwide. The ongoing tripartite conflict involving the Rohingya, the Rakhine, and the Myanmar military has resulted in numerous clashes and massacres, leading to forced displacement. Countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and India have recorded an influx of Rohingya immigrants. While extensive studies have been conducted on the Rohingya in Myanmar and Bangladesh, there has been a limited scholarly focus on the Rohingya in India. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature. It is important to note that India is neither a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, which addresses refugee status and protections, nor does it have a domestic refugee law. Consequently, refugees in India are not officially recognized as a distinct group and lack legal protection against exploitation and abuse. This situation leaves them vulnerable to various forms of mistreatment, including exploitation, violence, and limited access to employment, education, and healthcare. Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designates the Rohingya as refugees, the current Bharatiya Janata Party government views this stateless community as illegal migrants and a perceived threat to India. This stance raises important questions: (i) How does the Indian population perceive and internalize this interpretation? (ii) What are their attitudes toward the Rohingya, and what policy options do they prefer? To address these inquiries, the authors of this article analyzed data from the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey, a large-scale online survey organized by one of the authors. In addition, interviews were conducted with Rohingya individuals residing in India to gather firsthand perspectives.

Challenges Facing the ASEAN Political and Security Community due to the 2021 Myanmar Military Coup: The Role of ASEAN Centrality

Challenges Facing the ASEAN Political and Security Community due to the 2021 Myanmar Military Coup: The Role of ASEAN Centrality

Myanmar Military Coup: Can ICCPR Protect Civil Society?

Myanmar Military Coup: Can ICCPR Protect Civil Society?

Resistance from Overseas: U.S. Diasporic and Transnational Activism in Response to the 2021 Myanmar Military Coup

Resistance from Overseas: U.S. Diasporic and Transnational Activism in Response to the 2021 Myanmar Military Coup

“This Bra Protects me Better than the Military”: Bodies and Protests in the Myanmar Spring Revolution

This article explores the gendered dynamics of revolutionary movements through a focus on women’s bodies as tools of resistance and protest. In the Myanmar Spring Revolution, gendered relations of power articulate with military authority to engender both women’s activism and military responses. To maintain power, the Myanmar military have sought to regulate women’s behaviour – and quell the protest – through attention to women’s bodies, sexuality, and reproductive potential. In response, women activists have mobilised against both state control and the violation of women’s bodies in imaginative and transgressive ways, using their bodies as well as gendered artefacts to subvert patriarchal and military norms. This analysis shows how women’s bodies constitute both the material object of protest – in the virtual and physical spheres – and the subject of resistance, aiming to challenge gendered logics. It means that the gendered body must be taken seriously in studies on revolutions and protests. The integral yet historically overlooked role of women in Myanmar’s revolutionary movements necessitates a gender-conscious analytical lens to fully comprehend the transformative potential and the power dynamics of such upheavals.

Settlement of the "Cleaning Operation" Case of the Rohingya Ethnic in Myanmar Based on International Law

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM) released a report on August 27, 2018, documenting over 10,000 deaths and the displacement of more than 725,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh due to "clearance operations" conducted by the Myanmar Military. These actions constitute severe violations of international human rights law, potentially amounting to crimes against humanity, for which perpetrators could face prosecution at the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, Myanmar's non-ratification of the Rome Statute presents a significant obstacle to effective enforcement. Therefore, a more robust approach is necessary to address the plight of the Rohingya ethnic group affected by these operations. This study adopts a normative research methodology employing both statutory analysis and case study approaches. The Tatmadaw's culpability in committing acts of genocide against the Rohingya ethnic group has been established. To address this, three key mechanisms are proposed: the application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, the involvement of international governmental organizations (IGOs), and the pursuit of justice through ICC proceedings. Urgent action is required to ensure accountability for those responsible for genocide, particularly high-ranking Tatmadaw officials, thereby preventing impunity from perpetuating.

Ideology and the Implicit Authorization of Violence as Policy: The Myanmar Military’s Conflict-Related Sexual Violence against the Rohingya

A partir del trabajo de campo original y de otras fuentes primarias y secundarias, evaluamos si la violencia sexual generalizada durante las operaciones militares de Myanmar en 2017 contra las comunidades rohinyás fue una política (ordenada o autorizada por los comandantes) o una práctica (impulsada desde abajo y tolerada por los comandantes). Argumentamos que la violencia sexual fue autorizada como una política basados en (1) la prolongada exclusión ideológica de los rohinyás del estatus de ciudadanos, así como el historial de ingeniería demográfica para limitar su reproducción, (2) el contexto de limpieza étnica y el control efectivo que ejercían los comandantes sobre las tropas, (3) la evidencia de que los militares ejecutan un patrón de violencia sexual contra los rohinyás diferente al usado contra otras minorías étnicas, incluyendo ataques contra su capacidad reproductiva, y (4) un largo y continuo historial de impunidad de la violencia sexual relacionada con el conflicto, incluyendo en contra de los rohinyás. Nuestro análisis contribuye a la comprensión académica de las condiciones bajo las cuales la violencia sexual es autorizada como política y aquellas bajo las cuales la ideología prescribe o legitima patrones específicos de violencia, incluida la limpieza étnica. También es oportuno para apoyar los esfuerzos por enjuiciar y prevenir la violencia sexual relacionada con los conflictos.

THE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYA REFUGEES IS MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS: A SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS

Bangladesh has been acting as a safe haven for the Rohingyas for the last four decades. They have taken shelter in Bangladesh from the persecution of the state and radical Buddhists from the neighboring country, Myanmar. 2,00,000 such Rohingya refugees came to Bangladesh in 1978. In the early 1990, another 50,000 arrived in Bangladesh because of the Myanmar military's anti-Rohingya campaign. Many of the Rohingyas who came to Bangladesh in these two phases went back to their home country, Myanmar, after spending days in various sufferings at different times. But many did not return. They are in Bangladesh. Bangladesh supports them. On August 25, 2017, the world witnessed a massive humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Uncountable people from the Rohingya community fled the violence in Rakhine State, their villages destroyed. It triggered an unprecedented influx of people crossing the border into neighboring Bangladesh. Within a few weeks, more than half a million people entered Bangladesh in search of safety and shelter. A severe humanitarian crisis was averted due to the generous support of the local Bangladeshi community and the multinational aid efforts led by the Government of Bangladesh. This large number of refugees is definitely a big burden for Bangladesh. At times, the government has to face various political pressures and security problems regarding these refugee camps. The government of Bangladesh is facing a multifaceted reality regarding these Rohingya refugees. Myanmar is reluctant to take these refugees back home. Considering the overall situation, it is very unlikely that Myanmar will take back the Rohingyas in the near future. I don't think Myanmar will take them back unless they are forced to. This problem is not going to be solved in a year or two. Myanmar's clamor for the return of refugees reinforces that belief. As mentioned at the outset, this problem for Bangladesh began four decades ago. It took almost four decades to solve this problem. However, due to the negative role of Myanmar for a long time, the problem has not been solved. In the context of Myanmar's negative role in taking back the Rohingya, it is said that the problem is long-term for Bangladesh. In 2017, Bangladesh had hoped to send back more Rohingyas this time. But in October that year, when the Rohingya did not stop coming to Bangladesh, Bangladesh initiated talks with Myanmar to send them back. Myanmar formed a joint working group in December after signing a memorandum of understanding with Bangladesh. The purpose was to coordinate the return of the Rohingyas to their state. Both sides committed to repatriate the Rohingyas to their state in a voluntary, safe and dignified manner. So far, however, no progress has been made. The two countries took the initiative to repatriate the Rohingyas in November 2018 and October 2019. Not a single Rohingya could be sent back to Myanmar through these two initiatives. Although they want to go back, the problem arises with the terms of return to their state. They want to say they will not go back to Myanmar unless the institutional discrimination against them is removed and the continuous persecution is stopped. Rohingya leaders set some preconditions for their return. These include officially recognizing that the Rohingya are a minority ethnic group in Myanmar; returning them to full citizenship; upholding the freedom of movement of the Rohingya community; and providing them with job opportunities in Rakhine State. They want a system where this is their last chance to become refugees. They don't want it to happen again. They want to return to Myanmar with full rights.

Japan’s relations with Myanmar: Subtle politics or just business?

The article examines Japan’s relations with Myanmar at the present stage with an emphasis on their features after the military coup in that country on February 1, 2021. Japan’s ties with the armed forces of Burma, which were created during the Second World War with Japanese assistance, have been preserved for many post-war decades and are still an important factor that predetermined Japan’s special relations with Myanmar. Currently, maintaining informal contacts with the Myanmar military allows Tokyo to claim the role of a “bridge” between Myanmar and Western countries and pursue its own “balanced course” in relation to this country in the face of a clash of geopolitical interests of the main international actors in Myanmar. This coup prompted Tokyo to distance itself somewhat from the ruling regime. However, at the same time, the Japanese Government is pursuing a very flexible policy aimed at preserving its political and economic positions in Myanmar. This is not hindered by the fact that Tokyo’s approaches to Myanmar often conflict with the positions of other Western countries and cause criticism from not only these countries and various international organizations, but also within Japan itself. A powerful pro-Myanmar lobby has been operating in Japan for many decades, personified by the Japan-Myanmar Association. Thanks to the actions of this lobby, as well as the so-called “special relationship” with Myanmar, Japan has become the world’s largest aid donor to this country and one of the leading foreign investors in its economy. Despite the fact that the majority of American and European companies curtailed their activities in Myanmar after the military coup, most Japanese firms, not wanting to lose profitable business, remained in the country, taking a wait-and-see attitude in the hope of the business environment improving. It can be assumed that the rich experience accumulated over many decades in the development of Japan’s relations with Burma/Myanmar, as well as continuing ties with the country’s military elite, will allow the Japanese government to adapt its political and economic ties to Myanmar under any regime in power in this country.

Heritage as boundary object: the troubling potential of the Secretariat in Yangon, Myanmar

ABSTRACT In Yangon, Myanmar, urban heritage has been deployed to mean material objects capable of both recalling history and producing a better future. This article examines the ‘heritagisation’ of the Secretariat during the so-called ‘transition’, even as ‘transition’ and ‘heritagisation’ were intertwined ideas and discursive tactics that capitalised on the temporary retreat of military autocracy. We use the term ‘heritagisation’ to indicate a process wherein something comes to be quite commonsensically considered as ‘heritage’ and in which actors and stakeholders disavow being the driving force behind this process. Heritagisation, for us, differs from heritage-making in that the former excludes accountability. It is predicated on the eventual heritage status of a place, object or practice appearing as obvious, naturally emergent, and seemingly indisputable rather than constructed by invested actors. This process of claiming significance effectively turned heritage into a ‘boundary object’ that enabled Myanmar’s cultural elites and international stakeholders to not only reframe colonial architecture as ‘heritage’ but also imagine an alternative future wherein the actions of coercive governments – both British colonial and Myanmar military – could be reconciled with the idea of a new democratic nation, made visible by a revitalised colonial cityscape.

Return of the junta: why Myanmar's military must go back to the barracks

Return of the junta: why Myanmar's military must go back to the barracks

The Conflict, Climate Change, and Displacement Nexus Revisited: The Protracted Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh

This article examines the relationships between conflict, climate change, and disaster in forced displacement contexts. We present these nexus dynamics through the case of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh who are exposed to climatic hazards and other vulnerabilities that threaten their lives and livelihoods. Having fled persecution by the Myanmar military, Rohingya refugees face a range of conflict- and climate-related risks, both in the overcrowded and disaster-prone camps in Cox's Bazar and on the island of Bhasan Char where Bangladeshi authorities have relocated tens of thousands of people. The protracted refugee crisis has exacerbated social tensions between the Rohingya and host communities; limited access to resources and exposure to significant hazards that exacerbate conflict-induced displacement challenges. This paper contributes to the nascent literature on the region's conflict, climate change, and disaster displacement nexus by examining how cascading risks and state fragility contribute to increased instability. The article demonstrates the need for a more nuanced understanding of how conflict-induced displacement leads to new threats and vulnerabilities in hazard-prone environments.

Misunderstanding Myanmar

executive summary: This article examines how, in retrospect, the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 was a foreseeable consequence of domestic political dynamics in the country and the misperceptions of the international community about the hybrid civilian-military government. main argumentOn February 1, 2021, the military in Myanmar deposed the civilian side of the hybrid civilian-military government to reassert direct military rule. The coup ignited a nationwide resistance against the new military junta, the State Administrative Council, involving many of the nation's decades-old ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), newly created People's Defense Forces (PDFs), and an opposition National Unity Government. Looking back, Myanmar's military saw the 2008 constitution and its hybrid government as the end point for political reform, not as the beginning of a transition. The military's actions during this decade reflect this. Attempts by Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, and the international community to foster further political changes may have been contributing factors to the military's decision to stage a coup. Myanmar is now embroiled in a multifront civil war involving most of the country's largest ethnic communities, including the Bamar majority, with no end in sight. policy implications • Peaceful resolution of the conflict in Myanmar is not likely at this time. The U.S. and other nations should consider providing limited and targeted military assistance to the EAOs and PDFs. • The Biden administration should expedite implementation of the authorities provided in the BURMA Act, including the provision of nonlethal assistance to the EAOs and PDFs. The U.S. State Department should rekindle its ties to the EAOs to facilitate nonlethal assistance and efforts to form local governments in areas "liberated" by the EAOs and PDFs. • The U.S. Agency for International Development should shift the delivery of humanitarian assistance to local organizations operating in India and Thailand to more effectively provide aid to refugees and internally displaced persons from the civil war. • The U.S. and other nations should provide financial assistance for efforts to document possible war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the junta's military forces and coordinate this effort with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice.

Double Standards in International Legal Politics in the Settlement of Violations of Human Rights to the Rohingya Ethnic

This article aims to identify the resolution of gross human rights violations against the Rohingya ethnic group who have been discriminated of the Myanmar Military Junta Government. The international community and political response are giving pressure and criticism about upheaval against the settlement of violations against the Rohingya. The Myanmar government rejection of accusations of gross human rights violations can be seen from the international double standards towards the settlement of the Rohingya case. This article uses the library research method, and critical analysis to understand the settlement of human rights violations against the Rohingya. The conclusion is Discrimination against this ethnic can be considered by international human rights law as a gross violation of human rights, even though Myanmar has legal arrangements for protecting human rights in force in its country. International human rights law as a political instrument has powerful in efforts to create quality international policy products including guaranteeing the implementation of respect for human rights in the world through the role of international institutions as guardians in the process of enforcing human rights violations committed by a country through various strategic steps both repressive, preventive and curative. Discrimination against the Rohingya can be seen in the application of double standards by several countries such as the Western block countries, where they seem to keep quiet about these human rights violations.

THE ROLE OF MILITARISM IN THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF MYANMAR SOCIETY

This paper discusses how the Myanmar military took back power from the government, the democratic efforts built by the Myanmar government returned to a dream after the coup on 1 February 2021. The conflict between civil society and militarism became something that could not be avoided, people took to the streets and made a ceasefire, thousands of civilians were killed in the democracy they aspired to, some-ASEAN communities condemned the conflict that occurred. The purpose of this paper, to see how the dynamics of the Myanmar state in building a complete democracy with a military coup, as well as the role of the Military in the socio-political dynamics in Myanmar, the methodology used is a qualitative method, with the approach of conflict theory, welfare theory.

Democratic backsliding disrupted: The role of digitalized resistance in Myanmar

More than one year since its coup, the Myanmar military has neither established effective control of the territory nor crushed online dissent. What factors have enabled the resistance forces to deny the consolidation of military rule? We address this question by building a novel theoretical framework that incorporates the role of long-standing digitalized pro-democracy activism and by conducting a mixed methods analysis that includes an original, largely representative sample of public Facebook posts in post-coup Myanmar. We find that the development of online and hybrid pro-democracy activism against digital abuse and other illiberal policies under previous quasi-civilian governments enabled anti-coup resistance forces to thwart the military's attempt at authoritarian revival in 2021. Our research findings deepen understanding of Myanmar's post-coup contestation dynamics as well as other cases of unpopular autocratization in the digital age.

미얀마의 보건의료 현실과 ‘국가-사회’ 관계의 동학

The civil disobedience movement launched by medical staffs at public hospitals in response to the coup conducted by Myanmar's military in 2021 shows the perception that the political crisis triggered by the coup is more fatal to the safety and health of the people of this country than the health crisis caused by COVID-19. Myanmar's healthcare system has gone backwards over the past 50 years under military rule. Myanmar has established systems and policies aimed at universal health security from a very early age, but the reality has shown a big gap with it. Rather, most people’s right to health has been seriously violated as the military, which reigns over the people as a ‘state within a state’ exclusively monopolizes scarce healthcare resources and utilizes them politically. This situation had undermined public health system and resulted in catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures accounting for more than 70% of total healthcare spending of this country. Therefore, it can be said that Myanmar's healthcare crisis is fundamentally caused by a political crisis. By examining the implications of the civil disobedience movement and the characteristics and limitations of Myanmar's health care policy, this article emphasizes that the improvement of Myanmar's poor healthcare should start with resetting the multi-layered 'state-society' relations, which has been marked by long conflicts.

Use and Abuse of Social Media in Myanmar between 2010 and 2022

Myanmar, or Burma as it was previously known, has been under almost most continuous military rule since 1962 except for a brief period from 2016 until 1 February 2021. The military started the transfer of power to a civilian government in 2010 until the military staged a coup on 1 February 2021. The country has essentially been in a state of various civil wars since its independence in 1948. The period from 2010 saw the opening up of the telecommunications sector and a rapid uptake in social media. The spread of smartphones has opened up communication to the masses and provided them with access to information; the Myanmar Military has also used it to spread disinformation. These campaigns are used to uphold the state, people and religion. To the military, this essentially means the Burman (Bamar) majority, the Buddhist religion and the unitary state (with the military as its guardian). In many of these endeavours, they have been supported by non-state actors such as militant Buddhist monks. Since the military takeover in 2021, the resistance has also used social media, particularly young people and the many ethnic armed groups. Keywords: Social-media, disinformation, human rights, military rule, cyber security legislation

Ideology and the Implicit Authorization of Violence as Policy: The Myanmar Military's Conflict-Related Sexual Violence against the Rohingya

AbstractDrawing on original fieldwork, other primary and secondary sources, we assess whether widespread sexual violence during Myanmar's 2017 military operations against Rohingya communities was policy (ordered or authorized by commanders) or practice (driven from below and tolerated by commanders). We argue that sexual violence was authorized as a policy based on (1) the regime's long-standing ideological exclusion of the Rohingya from citizenship and its record of demographic engineering to limit their reproduction, (2) the context of ethnic cleansing and commanders’ effective control of forces, (3) evidence that the military engages in a distinct pattern of sexual violence against the Rohingya, including the targeting of reproductive capacity, and (4) a record of long-standing and ongoing impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, including against the Rohingya. Our analysis contributes to scholarly understanding of the conditions under which sexual violence is authorized as policy and those under which ideology prescribes or legitimates specific patterns of violence, including ethnic cleansing. It is also timely for efforts to prosecute and prevent conflict-related sexual violence.

ASEAN’s Response to the Myanmar Military Coup: From Non-Intervention to Responsibility to Protect

This article examines how ASEAN has reacted to the military coup in Myanmar. The February 1, 2021 coup was appalling because Myanmar was progressing toward democracy especially since Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in the 2015 general election. This article shows that although ASEAN tries to adopt ‘constructive engagement’ towards Myanmar, its approaches remain ineffective because it basically still maintains the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. ASEAN must recognize that regional stability depends on respect for democracy, human rights, and rule of law within each member states. This article argues that ASEAN needs to transform its ineffective approaches toward more active response by gradually internalizing the new concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) and actively put pressures on the military to restore democracy in the country.