Mutual Manipulability Research Articles

Anatomy’s role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour

Explanations in behavioural neuroscience are often said to be mechanistic in the sense that they explain an organism’s behaviour by describing the activities and organisation of the organism’s parts that are “constitutively relevant” to organism behaviour. Much has been said about the constitutive relevance of working parts (in debates about the so-called “mutual manipulability criterion”), but relatively little has been said about the constitutive relevance of the organising relations between working parts. Some New Mechanists seem to endorse a simple causal-linking account: organising relations are constitutively relevant to organism behaviour if and only if (and because) they are causal relations that link the working parts that are constitutively relevant to organism behaviour. In this paper, I argue that the causal-linking account is inadequate because it neglects the constitutive relevance of anatomical relations that organise the working parts of a behaving organism. I demonstrate this by considering a case study where the anatomical organisation of the barn owl (Tyto alba) is constitutively relevant to their mechanism for sound localization. The anatomical organisation of this mechanism is best understood as the back-and-forth flow of task information across 7 “levels of anatomy” (a notion that I distinguish from levels of mechanism). A further implication, I conclude, is that at least some of the interlevel structure of neuroscientific explanation is accounted for by levels of anatomy, not levels of mechanism.

A mechanistic alternative to minimal sufficiency as the guiding principle for NCC research.

A central project for the neuroscience of consciousness is to reveal the neural basis of consciousness. For the past 20-odd years, this project has been conceptualized in terms of minimal sufficiency. Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the project is better conceived in mechanistic terms as the search for difference-makers. In this paper, I (i) motivate this mechanistic alternative to minimal sufficiency, (ii) develop it further by clarifying debates about the prospects of leveraging mutual manipulability to distinguish constitutive difference-makers from those that are merely causal, and (iii) explore the implications this has for recent debates concerning the status of the prefrontal cortex. I argue that adopting a mechanistic approach to the neuroscience of consciousness suggests that the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness even if it is not strictly speaking a necessary part.

Light-Driven Spontaneous Phonon Chirality and Magnetization in Paramagnets.

Spin-phonon coupling enables the mutual manipulation of phonon and spin degrees of freedom in solids. In this study, we reveal the inherent nonlinearity within this coupling. Using a paramagnet as an illustration, we demonstrate the nonlinearity by unveiling spontaneous symmetry breaking under a periodic drive. The drive originates from linearly polarized light, respecting a mirror reflection symmetry of the system. However, this symmetry is spontaneously broken in the steady state, manifested in the emergence of coherent chiral phonons accompanied by a nonzero magnetization. We establish an analytical self-consistency equation to find the parameter regime where spontaneous symmetry breaking occurs. Furthermore, we estimate realistic parameters and discuss potential materials that could exhibit this behavior. Our findings shed light on the exploration of nonlinear phenomena in magnetic materials and present possibilities for on-demand control of magnetization.

Ariadne’s thread and the extension of cognition: A common but overlooked phenomenon in nature?

Over recent decades, our philosophical and scientific understanding of cognition has changed dramatically. We went from conceiving humans as the sole truly cognitive species on the planet to endowing several organisms with cognitive capacities, from considering brains as the exclusive seat of cognition to extending cognitive faculties to the entire physical body and beyond. That cognition could extend beyond the organism’s body is no doubt one of the most controversial of the recent hypotheses. Extended cognition (ExC) has been discussed not only to explain aspects of the human cognitive process, but also of other species such as spiders and more recently, plants. It has been suggested that ExC could offer insights for the grounding of environmentally extended cognitive traits in evolved ecological functions. Here, we reviewed the ecological literature for possible ExC examples that satisfy the mutual manipulability criterion, which can be used to establish experimentally the boundaries of cognitive systems. Our conclusion is that ExC might be far more common than previously thought, and present in organisms as diverse as plants, fungi, termites, spiders, mammals, and slime moulds. Experimental investigation is needed to clarify this idea which, if proven correct, could illuminate a new path into understanding the origins and evolution of cognition.

Defending the use of the mutual manipulability criterion in the extended cognition debate.

Defending the use of the mutual manipulability criterion in the extended cognition debate.

Mutual manipulation between a dark soliton and an Airy pulse at the optical event horizon

A fiber-optical analog of the event horizon is proposed via the collision dynamics between a dark soliton and an Airy pulse for the first time, under the effect of soliton-induced Kerr nonlinear effect. An Airy wave packet is more effective in manipulating the properties of a dark soliton than a Gaussian-like pulse in the regime of the optical event horizon since the Airy-soliton horizon can be regarded as the successively isolated horizon processes. Besides, the initial chirp and attenuation factor are two key regulators of the Airy pulse, which can not only adjust the flatness and width of the output spectrum during the collision process but also modify the properties of the output dark soliton. The interesting dynamic investigated in this work as a process of mutual manipulation can be considered as a promising candidate for frequency conversion and broadband supercontinuum generation, which proves the theory basis for further understanding of the light-by-light controlling in a more controllable manner.

Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited

Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited

Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited

An adequate understanding of the ubiquitous practice of mechanistic explanation requires an account of what (Craver, J Philos Res, 32:3–20, 2007b) termed “constitutive relevance.” Entities or activities are constitutively relevant to a phenomenon when they are parts of the mechanism responsible for that phenomenon. Craver’s mutual manipulability (MM) account extended Woodward’s account of manipulationist counterfactuals to analyze how interlevel experiments establish constitutive relevance. Critics of MM (e.g., Baumgartner and Casini, Philos Sci 84:214–233, 2017; Baumgartner and Gebharter, Brit J Philos Sci 67:731–756, 2016) argue that applying Woodward’s account to this philosophical problem conflates causation and constitution, thus rendering the account incoherent. These criticisms, we argue, arise from failing to distinguish the semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical aspects of the problem of constitutive relevance. In distinguishing these aspects of the problem and responding to these critics accordingly, we amend MM into a refined epistemic criterion, the “matched interlevel experiments” (MIE) account. Further, we explain how this epistemological thesis is grounded in the plausible metaphysical thesis that constitutive relevance is causal betweenness.

Mutual manipulation between a dark soliton and a probe wave for the gray-dark solitonic well

We propose an approach to actively control the formation of the dark solitonic well by adjusting the input properties of both the dark solitons and probe waves under the fiber-optical analog of the event horizon. An interesting process of the trapping of a probe wave by the gray solitonic well is demonstrated here, which is accompanied by a transformation between the gray and black solitonic wells. This solitonic well transformation and control process originates from the intrinsic competition between the probe-soliton collision-induced nonlinear phase shift and the internal phase of the dark soliton. The trapping efficiency is sensitive to both the grayness value of the input dark soliton and the frequency of the launched probe wave. The solitonic well investigated as a combination of white- and black-hole horizon can be considered as a qualified candidate for achieving the photonic transistorlike action. The study of a gray-black solitonic well proves the theory basis for further understanding of the light-by-light controlling in a more controllable manner.

THE SPACE OF THE SUBJECT ZONES “OWN” AND “ALIEN” AS A PHENOMENON OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF CHARACTERS (BASED ON "THE COLD SUMMER OF 1953" SCREENPLAY)

This article considers the subject environment of the film “The Cold Summer of 1953” using the author’s model of investigation of the text of a film based on the original theory of cognitive - pragmatic programs (CPPs). The subject environment of the screenplay is segmented into separate zones with the help of political markers. The peculiarities of the subject zone “Own” depend on the functioning of the basic partisan - ideological CPP, which, on the one hand, is in constant search for new real / potential enemies, and, on the other hand, is ever using its powerful mythological potential as a tool for manipulating the mass consciousness, and continues active search for / recruitment of new adepts. The relations within the ideologically marked zone “Own” (the determining marker - “Comrade”) are not built on sincerity, honesty, and mutual respect, but on the way the words and actions of the “comrade” correspond to the requirements of the dominant CPP. Hidden conflict and mutual manipulation turn out to be quite normal. The external subject - role status of the person is unstable and depends on the degree of compliance with the program. Actually, every Soviet person is endowed with a dual status (potential “enemy” / “comrade”). The subject - role zone “Alien” is made up of two mutually opposed groups: ideological enemies of the CPP (via the markers “political prisoner” / “enemy of the people”) and criminal enemies of the CPP (via the markers “criminal” / “scum”). Even after physical isolation of the “alien” subject, the system continues to carry out the “cognitive adaptation” of their consciousness. That is why, in search of new tools and ways to control the consciousness of the ideological enemy, the state system relies on the criminal environment. The source system and its “criminal” variant have common principles of modeling and target orientation (suppression, subordination, manipulation, cognitive recoding of the subject’s consciousness, who is treated by the program itself as a source of real / potential danger), and use similar destructive instrumental strategies and have a common conventional “enemy”.

Extended cognition, the new mechanists' mutual manipulability criterion, and the challenge of trivial extendedness

ABSTRACTMany authors have turned their attention to the notion of constitution to determine whether the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) is true. One common strategy is to make sense of constitution in terms of the new mechanists' mutual manipulability (MM) account. In this paper, I will show that MM is insufficient. The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive behaviors are extended in a way that should not count as verifying EC. This challenge can be met by adding a necessary condition: cognitive constituents satisfy MM and they are what I call behavior unspecific.

Constitutive Relevance in Interlevel Experiments

One reason for the popularity of Craver's mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance (MM) is that it seems to make good sense of the experimental practices and constitutive reasoning in the life sciences. Two recent papers (Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016]; Baumgartner and Casini [2017]) propose a theoretical alternative to (MM) in light of several important conceptual objections. Their alternative approach, the No De-Coupling (NDC) account conceives of constitution as a dependence relation which, once postulated, provides the best explanation of the impossibility of breaking the common cause coupling of a macro-level mechanism and its micro-level components. This entails an abductive view of constitutive inference. Proponents of the NDC or abductive account recognize that their discussion leaves open a big question concerning the practical dimension of the notion of constitutive relevance: Is it possible to faithfully reconstruct constitutional reasoning in science in terms of a failure to de-couple, via interlevel experiments, phenomena from their mechanistic constituents? Focusing on the field of memory and LTP research, this paper argues that the abductive account provides a more adequate description of interlevel experiments in neuroscience. We also suggest that the account highlights some significant practical recommendations of how to interpret the findings of interlevel experiments.

Constitutive relevance in cognitive science: The case of eye movements and cognitive mechanisms

In this paper I assess whether the recently proposed “No De-Coupling” (NDC) theory of constitutive relevance in mechanisms is a useful tool to reconstruct constitutive relevance investigations in scientific practice. The NDC theory has been advanced as a framework theoretically superior to the mutual manipulability (MM) account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms but, in contrast to the MM account, has not yet been applied to detailed case studies. I argue that the NDC account is also applicable to empirical practice and that it fares better than the MM account on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I elaborate these claims in terms of applications of the NDC theory to two case studies of cognitive science research on the role of eye movements in mechanisms for cognitive capacities.

Hydrogen‐Bonded Liquid Crystals in Confined Spaces—Toward Photonic Hybrid Materials

AbstractA series of hybrid materials based on chiral nematic mesoporous organosilica (CNMO) films infiltrated with liquid crystalline hydrogen‐bonded assemblies is prepared and characterized with respect to the mutual manipulation of the photonic properties of the host and the liquid‐crystalline behavior of the guest. Detailed differential scanning calorimetry studies reveal the impact of confinement on the mesomorphic behavior of the liquid crystalline assemblies in the pores of the CNMO films. The photonic properties of the chiral nematic mesoporous host can be controlled by changing the temperature or irradiating the films with UV light. These stimuli‐induced phase transitions are accompanied by changes in the orientational order of the mesogens as revealed by 19F NMR spectroscopy. The combination of confinement and changes in the molecular orientation in a unique hybrid material based on hydrogen‐bonded liquid crystals and a porous host with a chiral nematic mesostructure is an interesting concept for the design of optical sensors, reflectors, or filters.

Homosexual Behavior Between Male Spider Monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi).

Homosexual behavior is defined as genital contact or genital manipulation between same-sex individuals. In nonhuman primates, it may regulate social relationships by serving as a means of reconciliation, tension alleviation, or alliance formation. Grappling is a rare and complex behavior, which most frequently occurs between same-sex individuals of the genus Ateles and can include mutual manipulation of the genitalia. Here we report three cases of penile-anal intromission during grappling between wild male spider monkeys living in the natural protected area of Otoch Ma'ax Yetel Kooh, Mexico. In all the observed cases, the same adult male was the actor. To our knowledge, this is the first report of penile-anal intromission between males in any New World primate species.

Saving the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance

Constitutive mechanistic explanations are said to refer to mechanisms that constitute the phenomenon-to-be-explained. The most prominent approach of how to understand this relation is Carl Craver's mutual manipulability approach (MM) to constitutive relevance. Recently, MM has come under attack (Baumgartner and Casini 2017; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Harinen 2014; Kästner 2017; Leuridan 2012; Romero 2015). It is argued that MM is inconsistent because, roughly, it is spelled out in terms of interventionism (which is an approach to causation), whereas constitutive relevance is said to be a non-causal relation. In this paper, I will discuss a strategy of how to resolve this inconsistency—so-called fat-handedness approaches (Baumgartner and Casini 2017; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Romero 2015). I will argue that these approaches are problematic. I will present a novel suggestion for how to consistently define constitutive relevance in terms of interventionism. My approach is based on a causal interpretation of manipulability in terms of causal relations between the mechanism's components and what I will call temporal EIO-parts of the phenomenon. Still, this interpretation accounts for the fundamental difference between constitutive relevance and causal relevance.

Is it possible to experimentally determine the extension of cognition?

Various analytical tools originally developed for theories of mechanistic explanation have recently been imported into the ongoing debate on the hypothesis of (extracerebrally) extended cognition (HEC). One such tool that appears particularly relevant to that debate is Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitution (MM), most of all because it promises to settle the debate on experimental grounds. This paper investigates whether it is possible to deliver on that promise. We first find that, far from grounding an experimental evaluation of HEC, MM is conceptually incompatible with both internalist and externalist accounts of cognition. Next, we propose a suitable modification of MM, MM*, but it turns out that MM* presupposes rather than produces clarity on the extension of cognition. Moreover, subject to MM* the inference to constitution is radically empirically underdetermined. Finally, we argue that our results can be generalized and conclude that, for principled reasons, it is impossible to experimentally determine whether cognitive processes have extracerebral constituents. Determining the extension of cognition is an inherently pragmatic matter.

An Abductive Theory of Constitution

The first part of this article finds Craver’s mutual manipulability theory (MM) of constitution inadequate, as it definitionally ties constitution to the feasibility of ideal experiments, which, however, are unrealizable in principle. As an alternative, the second part develops an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), which exploits the fact that phenomena and their constituents are unbreakably coupled via common causes. The best explanation for this fact is the existence of an additional dependence relation, namely, constitution. NDC has important ramifications for constitutional discovery—most notably, that there is no experimentum crucis for constitution, not even under ideal discovery circumstances.

From mutual manipulation to cognitive extension: challenges and implications

This paper examines the application of the mutual manipulability criterion as a way to demarcate constituents of cognitive systems from resources having a mere causal influence on cognitive systems. In particular, it is argued that on at least one interpretation of the mutual manipulability criterion, the criterion is inadequate because the criterion is conceptualized as identifying synchronic dependence between higher and lower ‘levels’ in mechanisms. It is argued that there is a second articulation of the mutual manipulability criterion available, and that it should be preferred for at least two reasons. The first is that the criterion of mutual manipulability is an instance of continuous reciprocal causation. The second is that it has implications for how to understand this distinction between causation and constitution. It is shown that when considering dynamic systems, continuous reciprocal causation - ubiquitous in dynamical systems - is a form of constitutive causality, which entails that causal factors may, in the right circumstances, by genuine constitutive factors of cognition. This notion of constitutive causality lends support to conceiving of the mutual manipulability criterion as a genuine demarcation principle in the debate over the boundaries of mind.

Mechanistic explanation, cognitive systems demarcation, and extended cognition

Approaches to the Internalism–Externalism controversy in the philosophy of mind often involve both (broadly) metaphysical and explanatory considerations. Whereas originally most emphasis seems to have been placed on metaphysical concerns, recently the explanation angle is getting more attention. Explanatory considerations promise to offer more neutral grounds for cognitive systems demarcation than (broadly) metaphysical ones. However, it has been argued that explanation-based approaches are incapable of determining the plausibility of internalist-based conceptions of cognition vis-à-vis externalist ones. On this perspective, improved metaphysics is the route along which to solve the Internalist–Externalist stalemate. In this paper we challenge this claim. Although we agree that explanation-orientated approaches have indeed so far failed to deliver solid means for cognitive system demarcation, we elaborate a more promising explanation-oriented framework to address this issue. We argue that the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, extended with the criterion of ‘fat-handedness’, is capable of plausibly addressing the cognitive systems demarcation problem, and thus able to decide on the explanatory traction of Internalist vs. Externalist conceptions, on a case-by-case basis. Our analysis also highlights why some other recent mechanistic takes on the problem of cognitive systems demarcation have been unsuccessful. We illustrate our claims with a case on gestures and learning.