Russian Muslims Research Articles

ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN RUSSIA: CHECHNYA AND DAGESTAN COMPARED

Muslims in Russia are often alleged (most recently by President Putin) to be potential Islamists, ready to support the radical Chechen separatist project of establishing an Islamic state in the Caucasus. This article challenges this claim, which assumes that Muslims in Russia form a coherent group based on religious identity, and as such, share a set of common political preferences that oppose the central state. The article demonstrates instead that: (1) Russian Muslims practice various forms of Islam; (2) religious belief and practice is not always correlated with anti-Moscow political mobilization; (3) ethnicity, rather than always reinforcing Muslim identity, interacts with Islam in complex ways throughout Russia's ethnic republics, and (4) Muslims in Russia have largely opposed radical Islamic movements during the past 15 years and most likely will continue to do so. These points are supported by an analysis of Islam, identity and politics in Dagestan and Chechnya, the two republics in Russia that have witnessed the largest amount of Islamic mobilization.

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN IDENTITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

This is a review of recent English-language scholarship on the development of Russian identity since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The first part examines literature on the economic and political changes in the Russian Federation, revealing how scholars became more sceptical about the possibility of Russia building a Western-type liberal democracy. The second part investigates approaches to the study of Russian national identity. The experience of empire, in both the tsarist and Soviet periods, gave Russians a weak sense of nationhood; ethnic Russians identified with the multi-national Soviet Union. Seeking legitimacy for the new state, President El'tsin sought to create a civic identity focused on the multi-national Russian Federation. The Communist and nationalist opposition continued to promote an imperial identity, focused on restoring the USSR or creating some other formation including the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet republics. The final section discusses accounts of the two Chechen wars, which scholars see as continuing Russia's imperial policy and harming relations with Russia's Muslim population. President Putin's co-operation with the West against ‘terrorism’ has not led the West to accept Russia as one of its own, due to increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism.

Kinship, ethnicity and religion in post-Communist societies

Among the consequences of perestroika and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been the rise of ethnic nationalism. In the non-Russian parts of the former USSR this process has been accompanied by the reactivation of clan and other primordial social networks which under Soviet Communism had been in abeyance. This article, based on extensive field research material, examines political and social transformation in post-Communist Kabardino-Balkariya, a Russian Muslim autonomy in the North Caucasus. In particular, it analyses the nature of the nation-building policies of the ruling regime, and its relationship with the clan system. It is also concerned with Islamic revival and Islamic radicalism in the region and their correlation with the Islam-related republican and wider federal policies. The article reveals some grey areas in the current academic debate on ethnicity and nationalism and injects more conceptual syncretism into the study of post-Communist societies.

“Ислам”, “Ϻусульмане”, “Государство” в Российском Исламоведении

SUMMARY: Galina Khizrieva’s article analyzes terminological inconsistencies and methodological problems of Islamic studies through research into “the core of the Russian ummah ”, that is, into the worldview of those believers whose relationship to Islam is not mediated through national or political identity. Khizrieva argues that the methodology of Islamic studies in Russia is caught by controversial and ambivalent discourse, which opposes “good” Islam (moderate, regional, popular, scholarly, etc.) to “bad” Islam (radical, extremist, bookish, foreign, etc.). The author notes the impossibility of identifying those who confess “pure” versions of any of these types. Making scholarly discourse on Islam part of political ideologies obscures the problem even more. Khizrieva argues that the current state of research and methodology in Russian Islamic studies cannot grasp the dynamics of the development of supra-ethnic institutions in the Caucasus (in particular under Shamil) interrupted by the Russians. For Khizrieva, the Russian ummah has overcome a period of acute radicalization in the past decade, built a more tolerant system of Islamic education, and even attempted to adjust Russian law to the needs of Muslims (without infringing upon the constitutional principles of Russia). Still, Islamic studies in Russia follow the Eurocentric approach borrowed from the West and sees Islam as an ultimate Other. Khizrieva sees the solution in studying the worldview of Muslims in Russia, mostly through research into oral traditions. The author’s particular case study in this article is based upon fieldwork in Ingushetia (with materials related to vird , or spiritual orders of Sufi Islam). Khizrieva concludes that her research into oral traditions of Ingush tarikats reveals three different levels of Islamic discourse. The first (universal Islamic discourse) has to do with general issues of belief and is related to classic sources of Islam. The second level is represented by the oral tradition of tarikat and is related to stories about teachers and murids , stories about the extraordinary capacities of true Muslims, etc. Finally, the third and “pragmatic” level reflects individual positions of Muslims, and their political and social views in the quickly changing world. It is these different levels of discourse that are mixed by the indiscriminating terminology of Islamic studies.

Islam in the North Western-Caucasus : Kabardino-Balkariia, Karachaevo-Cherkessiia-Adyghea

Since 11 September 2001 Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, in particular, have been at the centre of media, academic and political debate in the West, the Islamic East and in the post-communist Eurasia. This debate, however, has been dominated by a decontextualized approach portraying Islamic radicalism as a homeless global force, disconnected from real people, places and histories. In reality, it has numerous regional and ethnic forms that are rooted in particular local cultural contexts, traditions, ways of life, and political and social structures. This article seeks to explore one such distinctive Muslim community represented by the Muslims of the north-western Caucasus which is administratively divided between Russia's Muslim autonomous republics of Kabardino-Balkariia, Karachaevo-Cherkessiia and Adyghea.

Staat und Nationalitäten in Russland. Der Integrationsprozess der Burjaten und Kalmüken, 1822-1925 by Dittmar s> Schorkowitz (review)

148 SEER, 8i I, I 2003 Schorkowitz,Dittmar. Staatund fationalitdten inRussland. DerIntegrationsprozess der Burjatenund Kalmilken,I822-I925. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichten des ostlichen Europa, 6I. Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, 2001. 6I6 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Figures. Tables. Notes. Appendices. Bibliography . Index. ?96.12. IT has been over a decade since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its fragmentation along national lines. A sudden realization of the importance and continuous relevance of national, ethnic, and religious issues generated much discussion and anticipation of new imperial histories with greater focus on the non-Russian peoples, away from the Russian capital and central Russian region. But for all the talk, such topical and geographical shifts have been slow to take place. The book under review, together with several recent works by American historians (in particular by Robert Geraci and Paul Werth, whose nuanced and sophisticated studies dealt with the Volga Muslims and Volga pagans respectively), makes an important contribution to our understanding of the workings of the Russian empire in its periphery. The volume is an imposing work of over 6oo pages, twenty illustrations, and thirty tables. Its empirical base is enormous. In addition to a large standard bibliography, Dittmar Schorkowitz introduces a large volume of archival materials from both central and local archives. As the subtitle indicates, the book focuses on the integration process of the Buriats and Kalmyks into the Russian empire and the early Soviet Union, I822-1925. The Kalmyks and Buriats belonged to Russia's numerous non-Russian and non-Christian subjects, whose total number by the late nineteenth century exceeded the number of Russians proper. Yet they differed from other nonChristian subjects in two important respects: their religion was Tibetan Buddhism or Lamaism, and they were nomads. These two features defined both the character and the status of these peoples within the empire and government policies toward them. XVhile the large pagan population had been converted to Christianity en masse and expediently, even though often nominally, Buddhism and Islam remained the two most important and deeply entrenched non-Christian religions. It was the religion which defined both the character of Russia's Muslim and Buddhist subjects. From the middle of the eighteenth century to the i 830s, the Russian authorities largely supported and encouraged lamaist clergy to convert the shamanist Buriats to Buddhism. This attitude was consistent with Russian policy which envisioned that the spread of Buddhism among the Buriats, just like that of Islam among the Kazakhs, would turn these people into more civilized and loyal imperial subjects. During the I830s, however, this. policy was reversed, and the government engaged in limiting and undercutting the authority of the lamaist clergy among the Kalmyks and Buriats until the Edict of Toleration of 1905. Throughout the nineteenth century, Russian policy vacillated between leaving the lamaist clergy alone in the hope that this would encourage their greater co-operation with the Russian authorities, and taking a hard line by accusing the lamas of corruption. Russian policy emerges here as a process shaped by different individuals, agencies and government visions. For instance, REVIEWS 149 the zealousand hostileapproachtakenby the Synod towardthe lamaistclergy was supportedby the Ministryof the Interior,but was invariablytemperedby the more pragmaticattitudeof the Ministryof StateDomains. At the core of Russian policy was the issue of the Kalmyks' and Buriats' religious conversion to the Orthodox Christianity. Conversion was always desirable, even though not easily achieved, and was seen as the ultimate and necessary step for the natives to become both civilized and Russian. Schorkowitz remarks that 'civilization was no longer pursued through the means of the Enlightenmentbut indoctrinatedthroughOrthodoxy' (p. 350). Inseparablefromreligiousconversionwas the idea of the forcedsettlement of the Kalmyks and Buriats. In the government's eyes, its Buddhist subjects were nomads and cattle rustlers, wild and primitive people whose mores would be tempered only by settling down, becoming peasants, learning Russian and, of course, joining the Orthodox Church -the attitude that Schorkowitzcalls xenophobic and 'chauvinisticRussocentrism'(p. 3I5). But settlingthem presented severaldilemmas. How was one to classifythe settled Kalmyks and Buriats? Should they be ascribed to the Cossack estate or become state peasants? (p. 356). Later on, the problem of dividing the land and drawing boundaries (pp. I6I-7I) became one of...

Islam and Globalization: Russian Muslims' Place in the Context

Islam and Globalization: Russian Muslims' Place in the Context

Sufism and Politics in the North Caucasus

After the collapse of communism in Russia, which is the home of more than 14 million Muslims, there has been an Islamic revival that has been part of the process of political and intellectual liberalization of society. The major Islamic enclaves of the Russian Federation are located in the Volga-Urals, the North Caucasus, and central Russia. Russian Muslims are concentrated in the eight autonomous republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Adyghea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Chechnya. Most Muslims belong to theHanafi madhhab(the juridical school) of Sunni Islam, although Dagestani and Chechen Muslims adhere to theShafii madhhabof Sunni Islam. There is also a small Shia community in southern Dagestan. A large number of Dagestanis, as well as Chechens and Ingushes, profess Sufism—a mystical form of Islam, which is also known as parallel Islam.

The Legal and Ethno-Religious, World of Empire: Russian Muslims, in the Mirror of Legislation, (early Twentieth Century)

SUMMARY: В статье Диляры Усмановой рассматривается специфика имперского законодательства с точки зрения влияния на него и отражения в нем этнического и религиозного факторов. Речь идет о мусульманах как объектах законодательства и субъектах законотворческой деятельности. В первом разделе автор анализирует роль религиозного фактора в развитии имперского законодательства, особенно важного в тех случаях, когда этническая группа (например, татары Волго-Уральского региона) включалась в состав Российской империи в период, когда религия являлась одним из основополагающих национально-государственных критериев. Второй раздел статьи посвящен проблеме особенностей административно-правового устройства мусульманских регионов России в начале ХХ века. Автор считает, что эти особенности в значительной мере определялись условиями вхождения того или иного региона в состав империи. На более ранних этапах этого вхождения регионы просто включались в общероссийскую политико-административную систему. На более позднем этапе этносоциальный фактор оказывал большее влияние, что проявлялось как в более активном вовлечении инородческой элиты в административное управление, так и в прямом заимствовании традиций и институтов обычного права. В частности, в статье подробно рассматривается вопрос о сохранении норм мусульманского права (норм шариата) в системе судопроизводства Кавказского региона. В третьем разделе статьи Усманова анализирует ограничительные нормы российского права, направленные против мусульман. Автор делает вывод о том, что в мотивации подобных ограничительных мер религиозная риторика постепенно уступала место национальной. При этом ограничительные меры и охранительные тенденции в религиозном законодательстве наиболее явно проводились в отношении татар, что свидетельствует, по мнению автора, о дифференцированности проводившейся политики в отношении мусульманских народов. Последний, четвертый раздел статьи посвящен деятельности мусульманской фракции Государственной Думы как субъекта законотворческого процесса. Автор подчеркивает, что наличие групп и фракций, объединенных принадлежностью к одной национальной, религиозной или же сословно-этнической общности, было характерной чертой российского парламента. В связи с деятельностью мусульманской фракции автор затрагивает такие проблемы, как специфика избирательной системы, делившей избирателей по национальному и религиозному признаку; реальное и мнимое единодушие мусульман России по вопросам национальной политики; тактика взаимодействия “национальных” и “партийных” фракций, а также “политизация религии” в думский период. Правовое и этно-конфессиональное пространство империи описано автором как пространство малодинамичное, в пределах которого с трудом примирялись противоречивые тенденции государственной политики и идеологии и национально-религиозное многообразие империи. Д. Усманова подчеркивает, что осуществление либерального по своему духу проекта единого гражданского законодательства для всех подданных российской короны осложнялось наличием этого самого многообразия – с одной стороны, и стремлением государства обрести “национальное” лицо – с другой.

‘Our Muslims’ — The Lithuanian Tatars and the Russian imperial government

In percent 1 897, of according the population to official of the figures, Russian Muslims Empire, made that up is to some say, eleven nearly p rcent of the pula i n o the Rus an E pir , tha is o say n arly double the percentage of the better known (both then and now) Jewish ( Obshchii svod 1: 250-1). In recent years scholarly and general interest in the minority (to use a convenient, though misleading and analytically unhelpful term) has grown significantly; the present paper aims to discuss one small and little-known segment of the Empire's Muslim population, that is, the so-called Lithuanian Tatars.1 As many recent studies have pointed out, the Empire's nationality policy did not follow any one consistent line. Certainly, anyone trying to find a single and integrated policy will seek in vain. But even given the diversity of Muslims living under Russian rule, the Lithuanian Tatars represent an exceptional group. Their small numbers, geographical location, language, culture, and political situation in a region dominated by Polish-Russian strife all contributed to make the Lithuanian Tatars a most unusual Muslim population, and one generally unknown outside of the region. The Lithuanian Tatars trace their ancestry back to the fourteenth century, when the Grand Dukes invited Tatar warriors and their families to settle in the Grand Duchy. Of particular significance here were the Grand Duchy's wars with Muscovy, during which Tatar and Lithuanian rulers allied against the Muscovites (Martin 207-19). In the late fourteenth century the Tatars were themselves riven by internal strife, making settlement in the distant Lithuanian lands seem attractive. In this context Grand Duke Vytautas (Witold) encouraged the first major settlement of Tatars on his lands in the 1380s. One Russian writer of the early twentieth century wrote that the first Tatar to voluntarily settle in Litva was the Khan of the Golden Order Tokhtamysh who fled here from the overlordship of Tamerlane in 1396 (Shimelevich 63). Tatars continued to migrate to Lithuania until the early sixteenth century, playing a significant military role within the Grand Duchy, rather like that of the Cossacks in the Russian Empire (Lasocki 372-5). While this military role would diminish over time, even in the eighteenth century Tatars served in military units in the Commonwealth and Lithuanian

Russia's Return to the Middle East

Since the eastward expansion of NATO dashed Moscow's early hopes of being integrated into the West, Russia has pursued an independent foreign policy focused mainly on Central Asia and the Middle East, including "rogue" states shunned by Washington. Among Russia's advantages are tens of thousands of Arabic-speaking former Soviet experts and a growing regional anti-Americanism. At the same time, Russian Muslims are becoming more assertive. Russia's dependence on the West for economic aid, however, sharply limits its margin of maneuver.

Burden of the Third Rome: The threat of Russian orthodox fundamentalism and Muslim eurasia

For contemporary Muslim public opinion, anxious to comprehend the revival of Orthodoxy and nostalgia for starina (old times), the growing radical Orthodox fundamentalism seems to indicate the return of anti‐Islamic Pan‐Slavism. The Neo‐Soviet National Liberals and National Communists are both opposed to the self‐determination of Muslims in Tatarstan, Boshkirstan, Chechnya, Crimea and Daghestan. They are also hostile to the Islamic revival ( al‐sahwa al‐islamiyya) in Central Asian Turkestan and Tajikistan. Their misconception of Islam is shaped by the long tradition of Russian messianism which is rejuvenated after every cyclical decline of Russian political authority. The success of Russian messianic nationalism lies neither in its selective historiosophy nor in its dialectic politics, but in the charismatic reasoning of the old geopolitical threats to the existence of Russians, demonized as the Islamic reconquest of Idel‐Ural (Musulmanskiye dvizheny na Volgu) initiated by the restoration of Pan‐Turkic Islamistan and the Muslim Commonwealth in Central Asia. Like other Russian philosophies of the past, modern Russian nationalism draws on a host of European thinkers and their ideas, but its context is governed by the fundamental notion of ‘Holy Mother Russia’ (Sviataya Matushka Rassieya) and its Byzantine paradigm of ‘the True Holy Church of Constantinople’. Influenced by the militant anti‐Islamic and anti‐Western traditions of the Eastern Orthodox Church, modem All‐Russian nationalism has become a new and dangerous chimera of economically and politically frustrated Russians. Revitalized Russian Orthodox fundamentalism is a real threat to the newly emancipated Islamic East, because the fall of Communist atheist tyranny did not eliminate the old threat of Russian Orthodox hegemony in the Russian Federation, Central Asia and the Caucasian independent republics. Invasion, occupation and military interventions in the Chechen Republic of Itchek‐eria, Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan, as well as the prospect of armed rebellions by the Russian separatist minorities in Kazakhstan, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Crimea and Tatarstan, explicitly demonstrate the nature of All‐Russian hegemonism at the end of the post‐postmodernist age. The geopolitical and cultural continuity of the Tsarist‐Soviet empire, regardless of the political and economic regime in Moscow, still determines Russian Islamophobia and animates an obsession with ‘national security’ among the rulers of the Kremlin, who attempt to improve Russia's strategic status by a re‐annexation of the so‐called ‘near abroad’ ( blizhnee zarubezhye) countries into the Russian‐dominated confederation of Independent States.

Islam and Muslims in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union

After the collapse of the Soviet Union sovereign Islamic states arose in the traditional Islamic regions of the USSR, although Islam was not declared to be an official or state religion in the constitutions of these states, since, as before, religion was sepa­ rated from the state. These states were: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. With the exception of Kazakhstan, these Muslim republics have become members of international Islamic organisations and societies. Since almost half the population of Kazakhstan are not Muslims, this state takes part in international Islamic organisations as an observer or guest. The collapse of the Soviet Union separated more than 65 million Muslims in the Muslim regions of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan from Russia. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not mean that Russia ceased to be a state with a large Muslim population. Within Russia there remain nine Muslim republics: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Adygeya, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Northern Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia, with a population of more than 20 million Muslims. The Muslim Legacy from the Communist Regime in Russia For more than 1400 years of Islamic history before the arrival of the communist regime in Central Asia and Turkmenistan, in the Volga region and the Urals and in the Caucasian regions, Islam was the sole regulator of social and economic matters and of culture, morality and family life. For the first time in the history of the Muslim peoples Soviet power not only denied Islam the right to regulate the social and spiri­ tuallife of society, but also imposed a concrete task - to eradicate Islam and replace it by a communist world outlook. The entire political apparatus, legal and social institutions and the activity of party and ideological workers and the educational sys­ tem were directed towards achieving this end. The domination of the communist regime in the regions of traditional distribution of Islam in the Soviet Union has left its mark, and its wounds. Islam and Muslim organisations have been obliged to endure 70 years of persecution and oppression. The whole period from 1917 to 1985 was characterised by struggle, oppression and persecution of religion and religious organisations, although from time to time the party and state to a degree softened their oppression of religion and changed their

Dale F. Eickelman (ed.): Russia's Muslim frontiers: new directions in cross-cultural analysis. (Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies.) 206 pp. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993. $29.95 (paper $12.95).

Dale F. Eickelman (ed.): Russia's Muslim frontiers: new directions in cross-cultural analysis. (Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies.) 206 pp. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993. $29.95 (paper $12.95).

L'apport de quelques sources russes officielles à l'historiographie du djadidisme chez les Tatars de la Volga (Aux Archives centrales d'État du Tatarstan)

Rafiq Mouhammetchine, The contribution of Russian official source material to the historiography of jadidism among the Volga Tatars (Turkestan Central State Archives). The author, a disciple of the aforementioned one, attempts at analysing the perception Russian observers had of Tatar jadidism, mainly on the basis of a report laid down in 191 1 by A. V. Goriachkin at the request of an examining magistrate in Kazan. The sources under scrutiny reveal the conceptual and terminological looseness of that official literature, which testifies to the paucity of information in Russian ministries — concerned as they were with fighting agaiast Ottoman influence — on the social and cultural processes then developing among the Muslim community on their own territories. It was only due to the outburst of the World War and the revival of an autonomous nationalist Muslim press that observers in St. Petersburg became aware of the deep ideological changes that had been taking place among the Muslims of Russia from the start of the century; the latter were progressively forsaking Islamic communitarism in favour of ethnic nationalism.

Russia's Muslim Frontiers

The sudden independence of five Muslim Central Asian countries-Khazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-and one Muslim country in the Transcaucasus regionAzerbaijan-has surprised even the international scholarly community.When the former Soviet Union was alive and well, there were "Sovietscholars," a rubric that largely included specialists on Russia, Ukraine,and the Baltic states. Western scholars were almost never inclined tospecialize in, or to give any serious attention to, the Muslim regions ofthe Soviet Union. This neglect was also reflected in their evaluations ofthe problems of this region, as can be seen by the uncritical acceptanceof the Soviet vocabulary. For instance, the Qorabashi armed resistancein Muslim Central Asia was labeled the "Basmachi" (or bandit) movementby the Soviet Union and its scholars. This phrase was also used bywestern scholars.Now there is no more Soviet Union, the cold war has entered history,and there are six new Muslim republics. These developments haveengendered a renewed interest in these republics, as can be seen by thenumber of recently published books that have been devoted to them.Although some of them have been hurriedly compiled, others have beenwritten with a lot of forethought and balanced analysis.Eickelman's present anthology definitely falls into the latter category.In fact, to the best of my knowledge, his anthology is one of thefirst books that raises the question of whether the above-mentionedQorabashi movement was indeed an armed struggle against the Sovietimperial masters or was a "bandit" movement as portrayed by Sovietscholars. This book comprises four parts: "International and RegionalPerspectives," "Central Asia " "Afghanistan and Iran," and "Pakistan."The first two sections formulate the essence of this study. Eickelman'sintroduction, in my estimation, is certainly one of the best chapters. Itis unfortunate that he did not include more of his writing in this book.His review of the literature on modernization theories and orientalismin this chapter will be read by students of Central Asia and the MiddleEast with interest.Other noteworthy contributions are the two essays by RichardCottam and Gregory Kornyenko. It is refreshing to read Cottam's ...

Future reviews

Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: his life and times. Stanley Wolpert, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994 pp 378, $35.00 hb Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross‐Cultural Analysis. by Dale F. Eickelman (ed), Indiana University Press, 1994 PP 206 Between Marx and Muhammad: The changing face of Central Asia. by Dilip Hiro, Harper Collins, 1994 pp 402 The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or nationalism. by Ahmed Rashid, Zed Books, 1994 pp 278 And Weapons for All. William D. Hartung, Harper Collins, New York, 1994

The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: Brothers or rivals?

(1994). The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: Brothers or rivals? Central Asian Survey: Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 409-416.

Reviews

Andrei Kuznetsov, Foreign Investment in Contemporary Russia: Managing Capital Entry. New York: St Martin's Press Inc, 1994. xiv + 188 pp., £45.00 Leslie Dienes, Istvan Dobozi & Marian Radetzki, Energy and Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Production, Consumption and Exports. London: Macmillan, 1994, xiv + 246 pp., £45.00 Hilary Pilkington, Russia's Youth and its Culture. A Nation's Constructors and Constructed. London: Routledge, 1994, xiv + 358 pp., £40.00 h/b., £12.99 p/b. Peter Gatrell, Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900–1914: the Last Argument of Tsarism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, xx + 399 pp., £55.00 h/b., £19.95 p/b. Margot Light (ed.), Troubled Friendships: Moscow's Third World Ventures. London: British Academic Press, 1993, vii + 225 pp., £39.50. Dale F. Eickelman (ed.), Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross‐cultural Analysis. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993, ix + 225 pp. Ljubo Sirc, Criticism of Self‐Management Still Relevant? London: Centre for Research into Communist Economies, 1994, 134 pp., £7.50. Dušan Pokorný, Efficiency and Justice in the Industrial World: Volume 1. The Failure of the Soviet Experiment. New York, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1993, 297 pp., £53.00. Linda J. Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed. Welfare Policy and Workers’ Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1994, xiii + 272 pp., £35.95/$53.95. Henryk Kierzkowski, Marek Okolski & Stanislaw Wellisz (eds), Stabilization and Structural Adjustment in Poland. London: Routledge, 1993, xi + 314 pp., £45.00. Stephen Whitefield (ed.) The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993, ix + 204 pp., £40.00

The History of Islam in St Petersburg∗

Islam in St Petersburg, strange as it may seem to some, goes back to the very founda­ tion of the city. Its history is linked firstly with the local Muslim congregation and secondly with the academic, scientific and political institutions of the city as the capital of a huge state. Muslims were among those who first arrived to build the city.! In line with the declared will and the edicts of Peter I, manpower and resources from throughout the country were drawn in, and Muslims living in Russia at that time were no exception. They were obliged to supply workmen who were responsible for providing their own food, tools, horses and fodder. At that time, the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Muslim population of the Russian Empire consisted of Tatars whose lands had been conquered and had ceased to be a separate state in the middle of the sixteenth century. The Tatars who helped to build St Petersburg came from Kazan', Kasimov, Sergach, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara and Astrakhan' - in other words the whole Volga basin. D. Aminov quotes one of the early surviving descriptions of St Petersburg in the first half of the eighteenth century (by one Andrei Bogdanov): On the St Petersburg side there is an enclave called Tatarskaya. .. from Bol'shaya Nikol'skaya to Mytny Dvor. There used to be Tatar yurts here, which is why Bol'shaya and Malaya Nikol'skaya are called the Tatar streets. This is because from the beginning of the work on building the St Petersburg earthwork fortress, the Tatars were employed to cover it with turf and then to carry out all kinds of work with the artillery. It was not only construction workers from among the Russian Muslims who came to St Petersburg, but also merchants, artisans of various professions and people who had entered the service. The tsarist government also attracted Muslims to serve in the army and the navy, and in the lifeguards who protected the imperial family and palaces. Peter the Great and his successors waged successful wars of conquest around the Black Sea and in the Caucasus, and little by little Muslims from these regions too came to settle in St Petersburg. The number of Muslims in St Petersburg apparently never exceeded one to one-and­ a-half per cent of the population; but estimates of the Muslim population, whether permanent or transient, were never very regular or reliable. According to the census of 1869 there were 2,000 Tatars in the city; but this figure did not include the guards who had quarters there or sailors of the Baltic fleet, or, apparently, the inhabitants of suburbs with a significant concentration of Tatars such as Kronshtadt and Ligovo.