Municipally-owned Utilities Research Articles

Labor resistance and municipal power: Scalar mismatch in the Los Angeles Green New Deal

In 2019, the Mayor of Los Angeles announced the Los Angeles Green New Deal (LAGND), an ambitious plan to shift the city's power system to 100% renewables by 2045. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP)—the electricity provider for the city and the largest municipally-owned utility in the United States—began a consultation process with local stakeholders and energy system modelers to determine possible scenarios to accomplish this goal. While the LAGND was lauded by environmentalists and progressives both within Los Angeles and beyond, it has been heavily opposed by the IBEW 18, the union that represents nearly all employees at LADWP. IBEW 18 has staged protests, created political advocacy organizations, and funded anti-decarbonization political candidates. This paper draws on 20 semi-structured interviews and other secondary materials to understand the union's oppositionand to demonstrate some of the unique challenges that municipal-scale Green New Deal (GND) plans face. We argue that the tensions between the mayor's office and unionized utility workers can be explained, at least in part, by three instances of scalar misalignment—or mismatch—that arise from trying to undertake a GND plan at the city level. These include mismatch between: (1) the scales of political activism and engagement between the mayor and the union, (2) the aims of the GND narrative and the limits imposed by the jurisdiction of the City of Los Angeles, and (3) the current and future geographies of the electric power system and related infrastructure and its path dependencies.

The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Alberta Utilities Commission Over Municipally Owned Utilities

The primary approach in Alberta has been that the distribution of utility services delivered by investor-owned utilities are subject to full economic regulation by the Alberta Utilities Commission, whereas if public utility services are delivered by municipalities it has been recognized that the services should be principally regulated by the municipal council rather than the Commission. Affording the municipal council, or its equivalent, regulatory jurisdiction over municipally owned utilities involves a more politically responsive form of regulation. The role of the Commission in this context is limited. The Commission has exercised narrow jurisdiction to ensure that rates established for municipally owned utilities are internally and externally consistent, and to ensure that such rates are not unreasonably discriminatory.

Electricity reform and retail pricing in Texas

Electricity market reforms have pursued two goals, both aimed at increasing economic efficiency. The first is to ensure that suppliers minimize costs. The second is to make prices more reflective of marginal costs. We use data from Texas to examine whether post-reform retail prices have better reflected wholesale prices, and whether reform has reduced retailer costs. We find clear evidence of both outcomes in competitive market areas but not in non-competitive areas supplied by municipally-owned utilities or co-operatives.

City profile: Medellin

After being known as the ‘murder capital of the world’ in the 1990s, Medellin has pioneered innovative forms of city planning and management and was acclaimed the most innovative city in the world by the Urban Land Institute (ULI) in 2013. Hosting the World Urban Forum in 2014 allowed it to showcase its approach, key elements of which have been: creation of innovative transport infrastructure linking poorer peripheral districts to the city centre; culture-led regeneration; strong support of local development from the local business sector; and a successful municipally-owned utilities company. However, the city is spreading outwards without services and employment being provided; new low-income developments are replicating high-rise models which failed worldwide; there is limited intervention in the existing informal areas, many being in highly vulnerable locations where the level of risk is likely to increase with climate change; development has little regard for topography, ecological and environmental considerations; investment in accessible and good quality public space is restricted to some areas; the quality of the public realm does not always support health and wellbeing of the ageing population. This paper explores the institutional and socio-economic context in which Medellín has achieved the internationally recognized status of an ‘innovative city’. It questions to what extent social equity, environmental sustainability and citizen empowerment have been promoted as per the ULI claims when it conferred the prize. The paper queries the extent to which ‘urban innovation’ is happening in Medellín, which has considerable implications given its recently found role as a ‘model’ city in Latin America and beyond.

Ownership selection in the US electric utility industry

This paper examines municipal selection of ownership form at retail in the US electric utility industry from 1945 to 1991. Residents are assumed to select a rural electric cooperative (REC), municipally owned utility (MOU), or investor-owned utility (IOU) to maximize net benefits subject to exogenous rate setting constraints. Examination of 233 municipalities that changed ownership form, and 250 that did not, suggests that residents change ownership form to obtain lower rates, other things equal. In addition, access to federal power (MOU case only), growing municipal population, and a larger fraction of Republican-appointed regulatory commissioners increase the probability that residents change to an REC or MOU from an IOU, other things equal.

03/01750 Power stations and the ANZECC/ARMCANZ water quality guidelines: Batley, G. E. and Riley, K. W. PowerPlant Chemistry 2002, 4, (7), 419–423

After being known as the ‘murder capital of the world’ in the 1990s, Medellin has pioneered innovative forms of city planning and management and was acclaimed the most innovative city in the world by the Urban Land Institute (ULI) in 2013. Hosting the World Urban Forum in 2014 allowed it to showcase its approach, key elements of which have been: creation of innovative transport infrastructure linking poorer peripheral districts to the city centre; culture-led regeneration; strong support of local development from the local business sector; and a successful municipally-owned utilities company. However, the city is spreading outwards without services and employment being provided; new low-income developments are replicating high-rise models which failed worldwide; there is limited intervention in the existing informal areas, many being in highly vulnerable locations where the level of risk is likely to increase with climate change; development has little regard for topography, ecological and environmental considerations; investment in accessible and good quality public space is restricted to some areas; the quality of the public realm does not always support health and wellbeing of the ageing population. This paper explores the institutional and socio-economic context in which Medellín has achieved the internationally recognized status of an ‘innovative city’. It questions to what extent social equity, environmental sustainability and citizen empowerment have been promoted as per the ULI claims when it conferred the prize. The paper queries the extent to which ‘urban innovation’ is happening in Medellín, which has considerable implications given its recently found role as a ‘model’ city in Latin America and beyond.

Price Effects of Across-State Regulation of U.S. Electric Utilities

Investor-owned utilities (IOUs)serving multiple states are subject to multiple publicservice (utility) commission (PSC) regulation. Focusing on relative rates of an IOU across PSCsisolates regulatory effects. This analysis examines38 such multistate IOUs from 1995. For theresidential-commercial customer comparison, electedPSC commissioners, Republican-appointed commissioners,PSC jurisdiction over municipally-owned utilities (anindirect IOU competitor), and IOU home-state statusare associated with a higher relative rate, whereasmore PSC employees per capita and population densityare associated with a lower relative rate. Thecommercial-industrial comparison results are largelyreversed, but are similarly robust.

Local Electricity Distribution in Italy: Comparative Efficiency Analysis and Methodological Cross-Checking

This paper analyzes the efficiency of Italy's local electricity distributors according to two different measurement techniques. Distribution zones belonging to the national monopolist (ENEL) are compared with municipally-owned utilities (MUNIs) which serve individual towns and are usually owned by City Councils (with a few of them currently undergoing privatization). ENEL-MUNI comparisons are displayed subject to a number of caveats, and statistical techniques are used in order to cross-check the results stemming from different methodologies. The paper's main finding is that comparative efficiency analysis failed to spot any systematic efficiency superiority of ENEL's local units over municipal utilities. Overall efficiency comparison outcomes were mixed, thus suggesting that a case-by-case approach should be adopted by Italy's regulatory and governmental authorities when dealing with the territorial reform of electricity distribution. Similarly, any ownership transfers and/or mergers involving ENEL?s units and MUNIs should depend on the varied efficiency records which were detected according to different regional and economic scenarios.

Departmental Autonomy for Municipally Owned Utilities

Journal AWWAVolume 51, Issue 3 p. 333-338 Article Departmental Autonomy for Municipally Owned Utilities John R. Fee, John R. FeeSearch for more papers by this author John R. Fee, John R. FeeSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 March 1959 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1551-8833.1959.tb15745.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume51, Issue3March 1959Pages 333-338 RelatedInformation