Multiple Banking Relationships Research Articles

Credit allocation to businesses in Italy amid the Covid-19 crisis

This note investigates the credit allocation process to businesses in Italy during the Covid-19 crisis, utilizing methodologies from Herrera et al. (2011) for gross credit flows and Cuciniello and di Iasio (2020) for the intensive and extensive margins. It reveals that the surge in net credit flows was primarily driven by gross credit expansion, with about 50 percent of the fluctuation attributed to the rise in public guaranteed loans. Additionally, fluctuations in credit expansion are predominantly influenced by the intensive margin, particularly the debt increase of firms with pre-existing multiple bank relationships, where lenders have lower exposure to their debt.

Multiple banking relationships: the role of firm connectedness

Abstract This paper sheds light on the role of firm social connectedness in multiple banking relationships, controlling for other firm-level determinants. Using a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms, we develop novel text-based measures of firm connectedness and multiple banking relationships. We measure firm connectedness by exploiting information on the number of links that a non-financial firm has with any other non-financial firm through individuals who hold a position (such as shareholder, administrator, and technical or administrative employee) in both firms. The paper finds empirical evidence that firm connectedness is positively associated with the number of banks lending to the firm. This effect is stronger for younger, smaller, and more indebted firms, suggesting that firm connectedness favors the diffusion of soft information and ultimately their access to multiple sources of credit by reducing negotiation and transaction costs. Connectedness, on the other hand, does not seem to reduce firms’ incentives to increase the number of lenders in order to minimize hold-up risks.

Government Borrowing and Crowding Out

We investigate the impact of fiscal expansions on firm investment by exploiting firms with multiple banking relationships. Further, we conduct a localized approach and compare the lending behavior of banks that barely met and missed the criteria of being a primary dealer, as well as barely winners and losers at government auctions. Our results indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in primary dealer banks’ bonds-to-assets ratio decreases loans by 0.2 percent, which leads to declines in firm investment, profits, and wages. Our findings are grounded in a quantitative model with which we compute the cost of borrowing on the economy. (JEL D22, E12, E23, G21, G32, H63, O11)

Creditor rights and lending relationships

ABSTRACT We assess the impact of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) enacted in India in 2016 on corporate behaviour. Using firm-level data for 2009–2018, we find that IBC lowered debt and borrowing costs. The impact was pronounced for firms with multiple banking relationships, although it was firms with single banking relationships that experienced significant cutbacks in investment.

Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking

We study the effects on loan rates of a quasi-experimental change in the Italian legislation which forbids interlocking directorates between banks. We use a difference-in-differences approach and exploit multiple banking relationships to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We find that the reform decreased rates charged by previously interlocked banks to common customers by between 10-30 basis points. The effect is stronger if the firm had a weaker bargaining power vis-a-vis the interlocked banks. Consistent with the assumption that interlocking directorates facilitate collusion, interest rates on loans from interlocked banks become more dispersed after the reform.

Asymmetric information and the securitization of SME loans

Using credit register data for loans to Italian firms we test for the presence of asymmetric information in the securitization market by looking at the correlation between the securitization (risk-transfer) and the default (accident) probability. We can disentangle the adverse selection from the moral hazard component for the many firms with multiple bank relationships. We find that adverse selection is widespread but that moral hazard is confined to weak relationships, indicating that a strong relationship is a credible enough commitment to monitor after securitization. Importantly, the selection of which loans to securitize based on observables is such that it largely offsets the (negative) effects of asymmetric information, rendering the overall unconditional quality of securitized loans significantly better than that of non-securitized ones. Thus, despite the presence of asymmetric information, our results do not accord with the view that credit-risk transfer leads to lax credit standards.

Hubungan Simultan Bank-Firm Relationship dan Kinerja pada Perusahaan Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) di Indonesia

A bank-firm relationship in the company occurs when the bank as a lender can obtain more extensive information from other parties. This study aims to examine the simultaneous relationship between bank-firm relationships and company performance. The sample in this study is non-financial socially responsible investment (SRI) firms listed on the SRI KEHATI index. The data analysis method uses two-stage least square (2SLS). The results of this study found that only multiple-bank relationships had a positive and significant effect on company performance. In addition, the company's performance also influences the company's decision to conduct multiple-bank relationships. These results indicate a simultaneous relationship between multiple-bank relationships and the performance of companies that implement socially responsible investment (SRI) in Indonesia. Multiple-bank relationships provide convenience to banks in monitoring companies. While other indicator such as company relations with foreign banks, domestic banks, the number of banks and the bank loan ratio (BLR) were not significant in the simultaneous relationship. The implication of this research is that a company can conduct multiple-bank relationships to diversify external funding sources, reduce credit constraints and reduce strategy failures.

Culture and Multiple Firm–Bank Relationships: A Matter of Secrecy and Trust?

This study examines the impact of trust and a national culture of secretiveness on the number of bank relationships per firm. We hypothesize that the degree of openness of a firm and trust between economic agents may influence the willingness of the firm to release sensitive information to its lenders, as well as the decision between maintaining single or multiple bank relationships. Using a sample of over 8000 non-financial firms operating in 12 countries from the eurozone we provide evidence that a national culture of secrecy enhances the number of bank relationships, while trust has the opposite effect. Results are robust to the use of various estimation techniques, alternative definitions of secrecy and trust, controls for firm-level and country-level characteristics, and instrumental variables. The main implication of this finding is that the financial decisions of firms cannot be effectively examined without considering deep-rooted national cultural elements. We also find that the results are mainly driven by small and medium enterprises, implying that the higher informational opaqueness of these firms enhances the role of secrecy and trust.

The Hold-up Problem and Banking Relationships: Evidence from the Polish SME Sector

This paper investigates how lender-borrower relationships affect credit cost for small and medium sized companies (SMEs). We use data within the period 2006–2015 for the Polish SME sector and deploy panel regression models to analyse how the number and length of banking relationships influence the financial costs of a random sample of Polish SMEs. We document that the price of capital decreases as relationships progress. Outcomes of the research are thus inconsistent with the “hold-up” hypothesis. Moreover, we find evidence that supports the view that multiple banking relationships generate more financial benefits for companies than a relationship with one lender.

Local competition, innovation, and firms’ bank relationships

With firms searching for secured external funding by engaging in multiple bank relationships on the one hand and banks for profit maximization on the other hand, conflicts of interests may arise when firms’ banks demand access to corporate private information. This information can help banks to gauge the creditworthiness of borrowers, but also exposes the latter to losses of secrecy. Thus, firms which are dependant on informative secrecy – especially innovative firms – might incur difficulties when trying to get access to external funding. As rival firms prevail within firms’ own industries, a special focus is on effects of local industry specialization and competition when investigating the quantity of firms’ bank connections. Analysing German firm level and county specific industry data, I find evidence that the number of bank relationships decreases for the cross-section of firms with local industry diversification. The effects of the indicators of industry-specific and overall competition are twofold with the former being positively related to the probability of using multi-bank relationships and the latter negative. Concluding, firms located in industrially specialized areas might rather refrain from relationship lending, due to potential loss of external funding, while innovative firms seem to rely on transaction-based banking. Contrarily, firms located in areas that are diversified w.r.t. industries, firm sizes and corporate landscape engage in relationship banking

Multiple banking relationships, agency costs and firm value: evidence from India

PurposePrior literature demonstrates that the effectiveness of bank monitoring decreases when multiple banks are involved, due to a free rider problem, leading to lower firm value. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether this free rider problem exists in an emerging market context, and whether the relationship between multiple banking relationships and firm value is conditioned on bankers’ incentives to monitor.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use multivariate panel regression to examine the hypotheses. The conditioning effect of the incentive to govern (the amount of average bank lending) is modeled using an interaction variable. Based on the result of the Hausman test, the authors employ two-way fixed effects estimator to estimate the coefficients.FindingsFirst, the negative relationship between multiple banking relationships and firm value holds true among Indian firms. Second, the authors show that this negative relationship is lessened for firms with high average bank debt or higher free cash flows. The analyses suggest that these moderating effects are related to a reduction in the free rider problem rather than a decrease in financial constraints. However, these results are only significant among larger firms.Originality/valuePrior literature has not considered the conditioning impact of the “incentives to govern” when examining the free rider problem, inherent in situations where multiple actors are involved. The authors show in this study that the free rider problem disappears when the incentives to govern are considered in the overall research framework.

Lending technologies, banking relationships, and firms’ access to credit in Italy: the role of firm size

ABSTRACTThis paper analyses the role of lending technologies and banking relationships on firms’ credit access in Italy. Using EFIGE firm-level data, we show that the depth and strength of firm–bank relationships have heterogeneous effects on credit demand and rationing probabilities depending on the size of the borrower. Multiple banking relationships alleviate financial constraints for small firms, while borrowing from a large number of lenders hinders access to credit for large companies. Small and medium-sized enterprises with a higher share of debt with the main bank have a lower probability of being credit denied, as debt concentration contributes to overcome the opacity problems typical of the SMEs. Long-lasting relationships, by reducing information asymmetries, significantly improve access to credit for small and large firms. Conversely, we find that medium-sized enterprises are more exposed to financing constraints as relationship duration increases, due to possible lock-in effects. Finally, firms maintaining banking relationships based on transactional technologies are more likely to be credit denied, while the use of relationship lending technologies improves credit availability for both small and large enterprises.

The Real Effects of Bank-Firm Relationships

We investigate whether firms’ number of bank relationships affects labor market outcomes. Using 5 million observations on matched credit and labor panel data from Brazil, we estimate IV regressions, employing exogenous variation in bank relationships due to nationwide bank M&A activity. Firms with more bank relationships employ more workers and pay higher wage bills. Credit availability, cost of credit and bank heterogeneity are economic channels behind these results. The firm-level results translate into positive macroeconomic effects in municipalities and states. The evidence is novel and indicates positive effects of multiple bank relationships on labor market outcomes in an emerging economy.

Multiple banking relationships: Do SMEs mistrust their banks?

This paper focuses on the determinants of the use of multiple banking relationships by SMEs. We exploit the results of an original survey conducted on a sample of French SMEs in December 2012. We first provide evidence that access to multiple banking relationships is influenced by firms’ characteristics. We find that larger, high-performing and innovative firms are more likely to develop multiple banking relationships. More originally, relying on the management literature, we also highlight the explanatory power of trust from the perspective of the CEO: when the CEO mistrusts the firm’s main bank, the firm will be more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships.

Debt Restructuring with Multiple Bank Relationships

When the debt of distressed firms is dispersed, free riding makes it difficult to reach a restructuring agreement. We develop a multistage game in which banks come across each other frequently, allowing them to threaten punishment in case of free riding. As the number of banks grows, the chance of re-encountering a bank and of being punished for free riding increases, improving the likelihood of cooperation. Looking at Italian firms in distress, we find that the restructuring probability increases with the number of banks up to a threshold - around three banks - beyond which coordination problems prevail.

Multiple banking relationships and exposure at default

PurposeThis paper aims to analyse the exposure at default (EAD) in the event of multiple banking relationships to understand the differences with respect to solo banking relationships and forecast the banks risk exposure.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a unique database provided by the Italian public credit register representative of the full Italian market before the financial crisis. The analysis compares different EAD risk proxies for debtors with unique and multiple banking relationships to underline the main differences among the two groups.FindingsResults show that EAD forecast could be improved considering the existence of exposures with other lenders and banks that consider such type of information can reduce the risk of underestimating the risk exposure of a debtor.Originality/valueThe paper is the first attempt to model the EAD on the basis of the existence of multiple lending exposures. Results demonstrate a different lender’s risk exposure for debtors with multiple credit risk exposure and show the usefulness of the information about the overall system exposure in evaluating the risk exposure related to this type of customers.

Do Firm-Bank Relationships Affect Corporate Cash Holdings?

This paper explores the impact of firm-bank relationships on corporate cash holdings using a sample of more than 4,000 Ukrainian companies over the period from 2008 to 2015. The empirical evidence suggests that the duration of the relationship and the presence of multiple bank relationships affect corporate cash holdings. Specifically, an increase in the length of a bank’s relationship with a main bank initially reduces corporate cash holdings but the effect turns positive due to the hold-up problem when the relationship matures. We also observe that companies with a greater number of bank relationships tend to hold more cash reserves, whereas more competition among banks allows firms to hold less cash. Additionally, we document that firm-bank relationships are important in helping firms resolve agency conflicts and facilitate reducing a firm’s financial constraints.

Collateral Pledge: Does Relationship Lending Matters? The Case of Maize Farmers in Ghana

A survey was employed to gather the primary data needed to assess how relationship lending affect the collateral that must be pledged by the maize farmer borrowers when taking credit from financial institutions. The farmers were selected from 8 districts in Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions of Ghana. Multi-stage purposive and randomized sampling technique was used to sample 380 maize farmers. Descriptive statistics were used to evaluate collateral and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents while logit regression analysis was used to measure the effects of relationship lending on collateral used to secure loans taken by maize farmers. The results revealed farmer’s access to information has a reverse and significant with the collateral used to secure loans .multiple banking relationships is significant and directly related to the collateral used by farmers. The previous loan repayment behavior inversely affects the collateral pledge and is significant. Farmers who have investments with the bank are able to argue for lower or no collateral since those investments are used as securities. This explains the negative relationship with the collateral pledge. Thus farmers are encouraged to build more relationship with their banks in the form of investments, good repayments, getting more information minimizing the number of banks they deal with.

Lending Technologies, Banking Relationships, and Firms’ Access to Credit in Italy: The Role of Firm Size

This paper analyses the role of lending technologies and banking relationships on firms’ credit access in Italy. Using EFIGE firm-level data, we show that the depth and strength of firm-bank relationships have heterogeneous effects on credit demand and rationing probabilities depending on the size of the borrower. Multiple banking relationships alleviate financial constraints for small firms, while borrowing from a large number of lenders hinders access to credit for large companies. Small and medium firms with a higher share of debt with the main bank have a lower probability of being credit denied, as debt concentration contribute to overcome opacity problems typical of SMEs. Long-lasting relationships, by reducing information asymmetries, significantly improves access to credit for small and large firms. Conversely, we find that medium-sized enterprises are more exposed to financing constraints as relationship duration increases, due to possible lock-in effects. Finally, firms maintaining banking relationships based on transactional technologies are more likely to be credit denied, while the use of relationship lending technologies improves credit availability for both small and large enterprises.

SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE BANKING RELATIONSHIPS-EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE LENDING MARKET

Using Chinese firm level data for 2003–2012, this paper determines the factors that drive firms to switch from single bank loan providers to multiple bank loan providers. The results show that large firms are more likely to switch from single to multiple lending relationships. This study finds that medium size and small firms of high quality are more likely to have a single borrower relationship while large and high quality firms are more likely to have multiple bank relationships. Increasing market competition decreases the probability of single bank-firm relationship.