Multi-party Contract Signing Protocol Research Articles

Blockchain-Based Confidential Multiparty Contract Signing Protocol Without TTP Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Abstract Signed information is difficult to manage and this difficulty is even bigger when pieces of signed digital information have to be exchanged in an atomic procedure. Multiparty contract signing is an application of fair exchange of values, where the information to be exchanged are signed versions of a contract. Traditionally, this trust service requires the involvement of a trusted third party (TTP). This is a point of weakness for the generalization of the use of electronic contract signing protocols. Another usual problem for multiparty contract signing is that the protocols for multiparty exchanges are far more complex that those for two-party exchanges. Additionally, it is common that the signers demand protocols that assure the confidentiality of the contract. In this proposal blockchain-based technologies and smart contracts are used to obtain a protocol for electronic contract signing that does not need a TTP in any stage of the procedure. The protocol satisfies the ideal requirements for the contract signing service, even allowing the signature of confidential contracts. Moreover, the proposed solution is far more efficient than previous solutions for fair exchange protocols using blockchain presented up to the date thanks to the use of elliptic curve cryptography.

A Multi-Party Contract Signing Solution Based on Blockchain

Fair digital signature of contracts and agreements is an essential process in any electronic commerce scenario, and therefore also in data marketplaces, where the relationships and agreements among the different parties (consumers and providers) are more dynamic. In multi-party contract signing, N parties wish to sign a contract in a such a way that either all signatories obtain evidence of the signing or none obtains conflicting evidence regarding the honest signatories; the exchange must be fair. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based multi-party contract signing protocol. This solution does not require the existence or potential intervention of a trusted third party (TTP), thus avoiding the difficulty of N signatories agreeing upon a TTP. In addition, this proposal meets the necessary requirements: fairness, timeliness, non-repudiation of origin, and non-repudiation of receipt. Furthermore, confidentiality can be easily achieved. To minimize costs associated with the use of blockchain, it should be invoked in the case of exception (analogous to optimistic solutions with a TTP) and by only one of the N signatories. However, when the use of blockchain is required, we show that its cost is within perfectly manageable margins.

Formal Analysis of Fairness for Optimistic Multiparty Contract Signing Protocol

Optimistic multiparty contract signing (OMPCS) protocols are proposed for exchanging multiparty digital signatures in a contract. Compared with general two-party exchanging protocols, such protocols are more complicated, because the number of protocol messages and states increases considerably when signatories increase. Moreover, fairness property in such protocols requires protection from each signatory rather than from an external hostile agent. It thus presents a challenge for formal verification. In our analysis, we employ and combine the strength of extended modeling language CSP# and linear temporal logic (LTL) to verify the fairness of OMPCS protocols. Furthermore, for solving or mitigating the state space explosion problem, we set a state reduction algorithm which can decrease the redundant states properly and reduce the time and space complexity greatly. Finally, this paper illustrates the feasibility of our approach by analyzing the GM and CKS protocols, and several fairness flaws have been found in certain computation times.

Game-based verification of contract signing protocols with minimal messages

A multi-party contract signing (MPCS) protocol is used for a group of signers to sign a digital contract over a network. We analyse the protocols of Mauw, Radomirović and Torabi Dashti (MRT), using the finite-state model checker Mocha. Mocha allows for the specification of properties in alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) with game semantics, and the model checking problem for ATL requires the computation of winning strategies. This gives us an intuitive interpretation of the verification problem of crucial properties of MPCS protocols. MRT protocols can be generated from minimal message sequences, depending on the number of signers. We discover an attack on fairness in a published MRT protocol with three signers and a general attack on abuse-freeness for all MRT protocols. For both attacks, we present solutions. The abuse-freeness attack leads us to a revision of the methodology to construct an MRT protocol. Following this revised methodology, we design a number of MRT protocols using minimal message sequences for three and four signers, all of whom have been successfully model checked in Mocha.

Deductive verification of alternating systems

Abstract Alternating systems are models of computer programs whose behavior is governed by the actions of multiple agents with, potentially, different goals. Examples include control systems, resource schedulers, security protocols, auctions and election mechanisms. Proving properties about such systems has emerged as an important new area of study in formal verification, with the development of logical frameworks such as the alternating temporal logic ATL *. Techniques for model checking ATL * over finite-state systems have been well studied, but many important systems are infinite-state and thus their verification requires, either explicitly or implicitly, some form of deductive reasoning. This paper presents a theoretical framework for the analysis of alternating infinite-state systems. It describes models of computation, of various degrees of generality, and alternating-time logics such as ATL * and its variations. It then develops a proof system that allows to prove arbitrary ATL * properties over these infinite-state models. The proof system is shown to be complete relative to validities in the weakest possible assertion language. The paper then derives auxiliary proof rules and verification diagrams techniques and applies them to security protocols, deriving a new formal proof of fairness of a multi-party contract signing protocol where the model of the protocol and of the properties contains both game-theoretic and infinite-state (parameterized) aspects.

Fair multi-party contract signing using private contract signatures

A multi-party contract signing protocol allows a set of participants to exchange messages with each other with a view to arriving in a state in which each of them has a pre-agreed contract text signed by all the others. Garay and Mackenzie (GM) proposed such protocol based on private contract signatures, but it was later shown to be flawed by Chadha, Kremer and Scedrov (CKS); the authors CKS also provided a fix to the GM protocol by revising one of its sub-protocols. We show an attack on the revised GM protocol for any number ( n > 4) of signers. Furthermore, we argue that our attack shows that the message exchange structure of GM’s main protocol is flawed: whatever the trusted party does will result in unfairness for some signer. This means that it is impossible to define a trusted party protocol for Garay and MacKenzie’s main protocol; we call this “resolve-impossibility”. We propose a new optimistic multi-party contract signing protocol, also based on private contract signatures. We present a proof that our protocol satisfies fairness as well as its formal analysis in NuSMV model checker for the case of five signers. The protocol requires n ( n - 1 ) ( ⌈ n / 2 ⌉ + 1 ) messages to be sent in the optimistic execution, which is about half the number of messages required by the state-of-the-art Baum-Waidner and Waidner protocol, and in contrast with Baum-Waidner and Waidner, it does not use a non-standard notion of a signed contract.

Mechanical proofs about BW multi-party contract signing protocol

We report on the verification of a multi-party contract signing protocol described by Baum-Waidner and Waidner (BW). Based on Paulson's inductive approach, we give the protocol model that includes infinitely many signatories and contract texts signing simultaneously. We consider composite attacks of the dishonest signatory and the external intruder, formalize cryptographic primitives and protocol arithmetic including attack model, show formal description of key distribution, and prove signature key secrecy theorems and fairness property theorems of the BW protocol using the interactive theorem, prover Isabelle/HOL.

Multiparty Contract Signing Over a Reliable Network

Most contract signing protocols make use of a trusted third party (TTP) to ensure fairness. It has been shown that in the crash network model, this is inevitable. However, for stronger networks, where misbehavior is allowed but failure excluded, the necessity of a TTP has not yet been debated. We consider a strong network model, that includes reliable broadcast, bounded delays and timestamps and use it to describe a simple multiparty contract signing protocol that does not rely on a TTP. This shows that by strengthening the assumptions on the network, the transfer of trust from one dedicated server to the network is feasible. The result is commented in a more general setting of multiparty protocols and problems. The correctness of the proposed protocol for any number of participants is proven using process algebra techniques.

Formal Analysis of Multiparty Contract Signing

We analyze the multiparty contract-signing protocols of Garay and MacKenzie (GM) and of Baum and Waidner (BW). We use a finite-state tool, Mocha, which allows specification of protocol properties in a branching-time temporal logic with game semantics. While our analysis does not reveal any errors in the BW protocol, in the GM protocol we discover serious problems with fairness for four signers and an oversight regarding abuse-freeness for three signers. We propose a complete revision of the GM subprotocols in order to restore fairness.