E-waste production is exploding as a result of rising demand for electronics and a faster rate of replacement. A crucial, yet unresolved issue is how to encourage cooperation among primary agents in the recycling of e-waste. To examine a multi-agent collaborative model of e-waste recycling among local governments, producers, and consumers, this research employs the techniques of evolutionary games and system dynamics. Evolutionary games are used to analyze the strategy choice results, while system dynamics are adopted to depict the decision-making processes. Overall, we find that rewards and penalties affect the stability and efficiency of the collaborative model of e-waste recycling and that the greater the correlation between the rewards-and-penalties mechanism and the strategies, the more stable the model is. Specifically, the results show that: (1) static rewards-and-penalties mechanism is likely to breed mutants and thus is not conducive to stable cooperation; (2) dynamic rewards-and-penalties mechanism can inhibit the instability of e-waste recycling model, but only 60% of producers are willing to build an e-waste recycling system; (3) dynamic rewards-and-penalties optimizing mechanism can ensure that producers and consumers wholeheartedly work for e-waste recycling consistently without local governments regulation; (4) according to the sensitivity analysis, increasing the amount of rewards and penalties can facilitate faster evolution of collaboration in the e-waste recycling system. Finally, this study makes implications for promoting efficiency and stability in e-waste recycling among local governments, producers, and consumers.
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