Multi-attribute Auction Model Research Articles

Auction Mechanism of Micro-Grid Project Transfer

Micro-grid project transfer is the primary issue of micro-grid development. The efficiency and quality of the micro-grid project transfer directly affect the quality of micro-grid project construction and development, which is very important for the sustainable development of micro-grid. This paper constructs a multi-attribute auction model of micro-grid project transfer, which reflects the characteristics of micro-grid system and the interests of stakeholders, calculates the optimal bidding strategy and analyzes the influence of relevant factors on auction equilibrium by multi-stage dynamic game with complete information, and makes a numerical simulation analysis. Results indicate that the optimal strategy of auction mechanism is positively related to power quality, energy storage quality, and carbon emissions. Different from the previous lowest price winning mechanism, the auction mechanism formed in this paper emphasizes that the energy suppliers which provide the comprehensive optimization of power quality, energy storage quality, carbon emissions, and price will win the auction, when both the project owners and energy suppliers maximize their benefits under this auction mechanism. The auction mechanism is effective because it is in line with the principle of individual rationality and incentive compatibility. In addition, the number of energy suppliers participating in the auction and the cost of the previous auction are positively related to the auction equilibrium, both of which are adjusting the equilibrium results of the auction. At the same time, the utilization rate of renewable energy and the comprehensive utilization of energy also have a positive impact on the auction equilibrium. In the end, this paper puts forward a series of policy suggestions about micro-grid project auction. The research in this paper is of great significance to improve the auction quality of micro-grid projects and promote the sustainable development of micro-grid.

English multi-attribute reverse auction model with the minimum non-monetary attributes bidding values

We propose a new English multi-attribute reverse auction model with the minimum non-monetary attributes bidding values under the procurement auction scenario. The existing multi-attribute auction models usually do not include the constraints on non-monetary attributes bidding values. Obviously, it is unreasonable because the auctioneer usually will have a requirement for the non-monetary attribute value. So we extend the multi-attribute reverse auction model and propose the structurised mathematical expressions of the optimal bidding price and non-monetary attributes for the bidders’ bidding decision. Further, we analyse the mathematical characteristics and the economic implications of these expressions. Finally, we present two numerical examples to demonstrate the minimum non-monetary attributes bidding values indeed impact on the bidders’ bidding decision and the final auction result.

A multi-attribute auction model by dominance based rough sets approach

As an alternative to the price-based traditional auction model, the multi-attribute auction model is an integrated model requiring the simultaneous trade of different types of attributes as the sellers and buyers deal. As a result, the design and modeling of the auction mechanism have become very difficult. This paper proposes a multiattribute auction model using the dominance-based rough sets approach (DRSA). The multi-attribute decision method by DRSA can directly mine out the preference relations between the attributes of alternatives so that relevant auction mechanisms can be designed. This model uses a natural reasoning procedure similar to that of decision makers. Finally, a numerical example demonstrates the simplicity, efficiency, and feasibility of the proposed auction model.