Mouth Crisis Research Articles

Dynamics of Change in the Aftermath of the 2001 UK Foot and Mouth Crisis: Were Lessons Learned?

This article investigates the UK animal health sector in the aftermath of the 2001 foot and mouth crisis. The article draws together perspectives from crisis management, policy and institutional change literatures in order to assess the extent of reforms since the epidemic. Interviews with government officials and parliamentarians and the analyses of official documentation indicate that lessons have been learned and there are successes in many areas; yet, there remains key aspects of crisis management that have yet to change, which leave the government vulnerable in the event of more wide‐scale foot and mouth outbreaks. The results of the study serve to suggest that post‐crisis change research should consider making more explicit links with the institutional literature on change dynamics.

The aftermath of foot and mouth in the UK: Post-crisis change and Europeanisation

This article assesses the aftermath of the 2001 UK foot and mouth crisis in the context of Europeanisation. Informed by significant elite interviews with British politicians and senior officials in the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Cabinet Office, and the European Commission, the article shows that the 2001 foot and mouth crisis led to an enthused approach by UK policy-makers to reforming the EU legislative framework governing future outbreaks but that this was unmatched by a problematic policy implementation process – despite the impact of a crisis. The article concludes that the twin conceptual bases of Boin et al.’s categorisations of change and Europeanisation are important lenses for studying the aftermath of the foot and mouth crisis.

SECURING OUR FUTURE

As the meaning of security has expanded well beyond its simple conception of inter-state war and peace, domestic resilience now falls under its ambit. Events in Britain at the turn of the twenty-first century – such as the fuel strike, foot and mouth crisis and catastrophic flooding – highlighted these new imperatives. Jennifer Cole looks at what has been done to shore up the UK's institutional architecture for all-hazards response, and what the future might hold.

Whom Do You Trust? Information Seeking During the U.K. Foot and Mouth Crisis

The 2001 U.K. foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak constituted the biggest crisis ever to affect the U.K. farming system. The crisis unfolded as a series of information and communication problems—primarily from government to farmers—with consequences for action in a time of crisis. This study explores how trust affected farmers’ information seeking and use during the FMD crisis. It attempts to answer questions such as what sources of information people trust in a crisis and which information providers people trust in a crisis. These are critical questions as, by acting upon trusted information, farmers could shape and influence the nature of the crisis.

Information in Isolation: Gossip and Rumour during the UK 2001 Foot and Mouth Crisis – Lessons Learned

The 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak constituted the biggest crisis ever to affect the UK farming system; it was one of the worst epidemics of its kind in the world. Farmers and rural communities were disrupted and traumatized as FMD spread rapidly through the whole of the country. The crisis unfolded as a series of information and communication problems, primarily from government to farmers, with consequences for action in a time of crisis. Farmers needed information at the different stages of the crisis to inform them about the various processes and procedures that had to be carried out once a farm had been infected, and information on the complex system of biosecurity measures introduced by the government. As these measures were implemented to control the spread of the disease, the places where farmers usually met to communicate and exchange information either shut down or became inaccessible. There were many gaps in the information needed; there was not enough information; it conflicted with earlier information or information from other sources; and it was disseminated and received too late for the required purpose. The paper explores the role of rumour and gossip as a means of conveying information between the various actors during the crisis. During the FMD crisis there was much confusion and distrust, which provided the right kind of setting for rumour and gossip to flourish. Rumour and gossip took on new dimensions and played an important role in the exchange and transfer of information about events and also in people's behaviour and activities. As farmers were isolated, unable to meet, much of their information came third-and fourth-hand via informal channels of gossip and rumour. This study used a mixed method approach of semi-structured interviews with members of farming house-holds. It concludes with suggestions as to what various actors, including libraries, in similar crisis situations could learn from this study by examining how lessons learned concerning the role of gossip and rumour in the FMD crisis may be applied to other crises, particularly the current H1N1 virus (swine flu) pandemic.

Expert evidence before the EC courts

The EC courts are regularly asked to rule on complex scientific and technical matters, as illustrated by cases concerning the foot–and–mouth crisis or conglomerate effects in merger control. In order to apprehend these technical issues, the EC courts may, like any other court, rely on experts who are appointed either by the courts themselves or by the parties. However, the law on the use of expert evidence by the EC courts is unclear on many aspects. The purpose of this article is therefore to set out briefly the law on expert evidence, to explore how the EC courts use it and to assess whether improvements are desirable. Section 2 of this article describes how the EC courts use “neutral” expert evidence (i.e., evidence obtained through an expert’s report commissioned by the court). An analysis of the case law reveals a paradox: while the status of neutral expert evidence is clearly defined by the rules of procedure governing the EC courts, such evidence is rarely used in practice. Section 2 therefore also endeavours to explain why the use of neutral expert evidence remains exceptional. Section 3 focuses on how the EC courts use “partisan” expert evidence (i.e., expert evidence that is voluntarily submitted by the parties). It shows that partisan expert evidence is the mirror image of neutral expert evidence: while its procedural status is unclear, it is widely used before the EC courts. Finally, in Section 4, it is argued that this situation is not wholly satisfactory. It is submitted inter alia that there is no convincing justification for systematic self–restraint over technical issues. Some changes are therefore explored which could be contemplated in order to improve the use of expert evidence by the EC courts.

Understanding mission command: a model for developing competitive advantage in a business context

Abstract Academic and business journals have extensively covered the requirements for the successful implementation of business strategies without arriving at a consensus as to how this objective should be achieved. In Nutt's (2002) 20‐year research on the decision‐making process he found that over 50% of the decisions made by corporate leaders failed. The author contends that failed or poor decisions are directly linked to the way those decisions are implemented and therefore implementation methodology has become a critical business issue. This paper critically reviews the British Army's implementation methodology which has shown extensive versatility in such circumstances as the Gulf War, the firemen's strike, the foot and mouth crisis and a host of unexpected support operations. This work examines the British Army's definition of mission command, its historical background, the underpinning concepts and the potential utility of such an approach for the private sector. The authors argue that despite the British Army's training and terms of reference it has shown the flexibility and adaptability to achieve success in a volatile and diverse spectrum of tasks. At the heart of the organization's implementation process is mission command. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Biosecurity and Insecurity: The Interaction between Policy and Ritual during the Foot and Mouth Crisis

In 2001 a highly infectious animal disease, foot and mouth disease, broke out in the UK and spread rapidly. In May, when the spread seemed to be slowing down, new disease hotspots appeared in previously little affected regions, such as North Yorkshire. New biosecurity rules were imposed. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, this article shows that the biosecurity measures farmers implemented during the epidemic meant more than just reducing the risk of spreading FMD. For many, cleansing and disinfecting became Foot and Mouth. Biosecurity actions became invested with symbolic values and, in particular, were ritualised as part of the symbolic spatial construction of an otherwise ‘invisible’ enemy.

Biosecurity and Insecurity: The Interaction between Policy and Ritual during the Foot and Mouth Crisis

In 2001 a highly infectious animal disease, foot and mouth disease, broke out in the UK and spread rapidly. In May, when the spread seemed to be slowing down, new disease hotspots appeared in previously little affected regions, such as North Yorkshire. New biosecurity rules were imposed. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, this article shows that the biosecurity measures farmers implemented during the epidemic meant more than just reducing the risk of spreading FMD. For many, cleansing and disinfecting became Foot and Mouth. Biosecurity actions became invested with symbolic values and, in particular, were ritualised as part of the symbolic spatial construction of an otherwise ‘invisible’ enemy.

Recovering from crisis

PurposeTo provide a critique of the strategies that the UK Government employed at that time of the closure of the countryside during the foot and mouth disease (FMD) and their subsequent effects upon leisure and tourism providers. The work evaluates the sector's responses to the FMD crisis and considers their significance and influence in relation to the strategies deployed. Possible alternative strategies are presented which both government and industries can consider.Design/methodology/approachThe complete sector of tourism and leisure providers within the market town of Keswick was surveyed twice over a two‐year period. The initial survey was undertaken in 2002 and the second survey occurred in 2004. Keswick is situated in the northern sector of the English Lake District National Park, which is situated within the county of Cumbria. This area was seen to be the most affected by the foot and mouth crisis both in terms of severity and duration of infection. In addition to the survey conducted, key personnel from government agencies and voluntary organisations were also interviewed using a semi‐structured approach. Additional information was accessed from a FMD discussion web site.FindingsThe impact of the foot and mouth crisis devastated the rural tourism and leisure industries. The governmental policy utilized was myopic in its outlook and ineffectual in that it concentrated mainly upon the consequences to, and the needs of, the farming industry. The current proposals acknowledge to some degree that the town's tourism and leisure industry are a valued part of the rural economy, but the authors question if these are effective enough.Originality/valueThe originality of the study has enabled the evaluation of the strategies put in place immediately after the FMD crisis. It not only critically appraises proposed policies (i.e. limited closure of the countryside in future) but uniquely proposes a number of alternatives.

The Right Tool for the Job? Modeling, Spatial Relationships, and Styles of Scientific Practice in the UK Foot and Mouth Crisis

In this paper we explore the expert controversy over the management of a major rural risk issue, the foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak that affected the United Kingdom in 2001, and in particular the role of predictive epidemiological modeling in the decisionmaking process. We pose the questions of why this technique was identified as the right tool for the job by government and why, at the same time, its use was so fiercely contested by other experts in animal health. To set our analysis in context we outline briefly the causes, characteristics, and consequences of FMD together with its history in the United Kingdom. We then provide an account of the 2001 FMD outbreak and the policies that were employed to control the epidemic. In the main discussion we integrate the geographical concept of spatial practices with the concept, drawn from the sociology of scientific knowledge, of styles of scientific practice and apply this to the analysis of the knowledge practices and arguments of the scientific groups that advised on controlling the epidemic. We analyse the key differences between expert groups and their policy recommendations in terms of their different styles of scientific spatial practice. In the rhetorical boundary work of the opposing scientific groups we see these differences in ‘style’ being invoked to delineate the boundaries of ‘sound science’ and thereby legitimate their respective policy prescriptions. We conclude by discussing the relationship between styles of scientific spatial practice and recent trends in government policy style and its implications for future risk policy.

Badger culling does not control cattle TB

A somewhat unpredicted effect of the 2001 Foot and Mouth crisis, has been to ‘derail the TB control programme both as regards cattle measures and the badger culling trial’ (EFRA 2003). Sadly, cattle TB is now out of control, rising by c. 20% a year, and back to 1960s levels. Unfortunately attention has focused to such an extent on badgers that many now seemingly do not understand how TB works in cattle and why annual testing and movement bans are the answer: they brought cattle TB down to tiny southwest hot-spots by the mid-1970s without any badger culling (Hancox 2000, 2002, 2003).

Risk communication, value judgments, and the public-policy maker relationship in a climate of public sensitivity toward animals: revisiting britain's foot and mouth crisis

This paper offers some suggestions on, and encouragement for, how to be better at risk communication in times of agricultural crisis. During the foot and mouth epizootic, the British public, having no precedent to deal with such a rapid and widespread epizootic, no existing rules or conventions, and no social or political consensus, was forced to confront the facts of a perceived "economic disease." Foot and mouth appeared as an economic disease because the major push to eradicate it was motivated exclusively by trade and economic reasons and not because of threats it posed to the lives of human beings and livestock. The British public deferred responsibility to their elected officials for a speedy end to this non-life threatening viral epizootic. The latter, however, did not have a contingency plan in place to tackle such an extensive outbreak. The appeal to an existing policy, i.e., mass eradication, as the exclusive strategy of containment was a difficult pill for the public to swallow well before the end of the 226-day ordeal. Public outcry reflected (in part) serious misgivings about the lack of effective communication of risk-informed decisions between government agents and all concerned. The government's handling of the matter underestimated concerns and values about animal welfare, public trust, and the plight of farmers and rural communities. A general loss of trust by some segments of the public was exacerbated by perceived mismanagement and early fumbles by government agents. Public moral uneasiness during the crisis, while perhaps symbolic of growing discontent with an already fractured relationship with farmed animals and the state of animal farming today, arguably, also reflected deep disappointment in government agents to recognize inherently and conditionally normative assumptions in their argument as well as recognize their narrow conception of risk. Furthermore, broader stakeholder participation was clearly missing from the outset, especially with respect to the issue of vaccination. A greater appreciation for two-way risk communication is suggested for science-based public policy in agriculture, followed by suggestions on how to be more vigilant in the future.

The British 2001 Foot and Mouth crisis: a comparative study of public risk perceptions, trust and beliefs about government policy in two communities

This mixed methodology study examines public attitudes to risk and its management during the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) epidemic in Britain. A quantitative survey and qualitative focus groups were conducted to examine how two communities (Norwich and Bude) responded to the crisis. People were more concerned about a broad range of indirect consequences than about the direct (health) impacts of the disease, especially about the effects on the livelihood and future of rural economies. Moreover, people detected a complex of causes underlying the emergence of FMD, which suggests that the outbreak of FMD was considered a system failure, rather than something that could be blamed on one specific cause or actor. In general, people appeared to be critical about governmental handling of the FMD epidemic. Although there was some support for the government policy of slaughtering infected animals, the government was widely criticized for the way they carried out their policies. Only minor differences between the two communities Norwich and Bude were found. In particular, differences were found related to the government handling of the disease, reflected most notably in people's trust judgements. It is argued that these were the result of contextual differences in local experience, and debate on the crisis, in the two communities.

The aftermath of the Foot and Mouth crisis in agricultural logistics: the case of the UK fat lamb supply chain1

Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) in the UK in 2001 exposed the complex nature of the structure in the domestic fat lamb supply chain. This supply chain comprises a large number of physical and information transactions between members and the underlying complexity is exacerbated by the limited use of traceability mechanisms. This paper provides a detailed overview of the structure and relationships in the UK fat lamb supply chain pre and post FMD 2001. The fat lamb transportation methods used by supply chain members based in the north-east of England are analysed to determine the members' opinions about optimum transportation practices in relation to cost efficiency, management of animal welfare and consumer safety. These three variables are also used to determine the supply chain members' opinions concerning the optimum location of auctions and abattoirs. The findings reveal, inter alia, the supply chain's changing structure and relationship dynamics during and post FMD 2001 and the need for improved integration between farmers, live auctions and abattoirs. 1Paper based on a research project funded by the Institute of Logistics and Transport (UK).

Rural and Regional Development: The Role of the Regional Development Agencies in England

W ARD N., L OWE P. and B RIDGES T. (2003) Rural and regional development: the role of the Regional Development Agencies in England, Reg. Studies 37 , 201- 214. The Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were established in 1999 to promote economic development in the English regions and inherited staff and programmes from the former Rural Development Commission. The paper analyses the evolving role of the RDAs in rural development. It argues that the changing treatment of rural issues in regional development reflects a shift from a national to more regionalized and differentiated conceptions of rurality, and suggests that the 2001 foot and mouth crisis prompted a rethink of the "rural' in the "regional' among RDAs. The paper concludes by reflecting on the future evolution of the RDAs' rural development work.

Mental health of British farmers

Aims: To estimate the prevalence of neurotic symptoms in a sample of British farmers, to investigate whether farming characteristics are associated with psychiatric morbidity, and to test the hypothesis that...

Human injury as a result of the recent foot and mouth crisis

A bolt gun, also known as a captive-bolt gun, is a powderactivated device using a bolt and a piston mechanism. When fired at close range, an explosive force provides massive propulsion of the piston and the bolt. It is usually held at right angles in contact with the forehead of the animal. The animal is killed as the bolt penetrates the skull and then the bolt retracts. There are several recorded cases of suicides and homicides [1] from such devices, but only three reported cases of accidental injuries [2]. In our search we found no such cases in the UK. During the recent foot and mouth crisis in the UK, the North East of England was particularly badly affected and we report two such cases from this area.

The 2001 Foot and Mouth Crisis – Rural Economy and Tourism Policy Implications: A Comment

On 19 February 2001, a suspected case of foot and mouth disease was discovered at an abattoir in Essex in south-eastEngland. The following day the case was confirmed by the Ministry ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food(MAFF), signalling not only the first major outbreak of the disease in Britain since 1967, but also the onset of one of the most serious economic and social crises to face rural communities in recent years. Indeed, despite government assurances as early as 12 March that the outbreak was under control, it was not until the end of that month that the daily number of new cases peaked and, even by mid-May, a small number of new case swere being confirmed each day. By that stage, 1593 cases of the disease had been confirmed although, as a direct result of the government’s policy, announced on 24 March, to cull all livestock within a three kilometre radius of infected farms, a further 6014 farms and other premises were affected(www.sheepdrove.com). Altogether, 2,657,000 animals had been slaughtered and a further 75,000 were due to be slaughtered, whilst 40,000 carcasses were awaiting disposal. It is likely that the final total of animals slaughtered as a result of the crisis will bewell in excess of 3 million, representing over 6%of the national livestock herd. Inevitably, the outbreak of foot andmouth has had, and will continue to have, serious and far-reaching consequences for an agricultural sector already enduring significant economic hardship. Farm incomes in 2000 were, at an average of £7800 per capita, already at their lowest level in 25 years (Countryside Agency, 2001)and, although compensation will be paid for the loss of all slaughtered livestock, it has been estimated that those farms directly affected by the crisis will collectively face further losses of £84 million as a result of potentially higher restocking costs, wages, and other costs incurred during the quarantine period (Midmore, 2001). Therefore, it is likely that a significant number of farmers will either retire (the average age of farmers in Britain is 57) or seek alternative livelihoods whilst others, supported by government subsidy,mayembrace a new role as ‘keepers’, as opposed to exploiters, of the rural environment. That is, they may become involved in environmental management or conservation programmes, in particular in the more fragile, peripheral rural regions. In short, many rural areas will undergo fundamental socioeconomic restructuring once the initial efforts to eradicate the disease have been successful. It is not only the farming industry, however, that has suffered as a result of the foot andmouth outbreak. Certainly, the social and economic impacts on farmers have been enormous but, in financial terms alone, the costs of the crisis to the wider economy have been far greater than those borne by the farming sector. In particular, the tourismindustry has endured a huge downturn in business, with estimates of losses ranging from £140 million to £500 million a week

History of medicine

There are many challenges, developments and successes surrounding the delivery of information to healthcare practitioners and consumers in a fast-changing world. A special issue on medical history may seem incongruous, or even irrelevant, in that context. Why bother about all that old stuff when surely, what we need to know more about is greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness in managing the information of today? Not only is history a hugely popular concern, but most people will readily agree that it matters. In health care, history can teach and inform in many ways. Quite apart from its obvious ability to warn us against repeating the mistakes of the past, history abounds with subtler messages about the dangers of assuming too much by way of scientific knowledge. Treatments are new, illnesses are not, and the ways in which both practitioners and patients of the past have coped with the psychological and physiological traumas of disease can inspire or help us today. A historical perspective is often necessary in order to understand present practices—the recent foot and mouth crisis being a case in point. For all kinds of reasons, people want to know about medical history, whether they are completing a PhD on the development of the NHS, whether they are researching social attitudes to some particular disease or whether their grandfather was a doctor and they wish to know more about him. Medical librarians have a key role to play in preserving the record of today for the historians of tomorrow. The point is succinctly but eloquently made by Roy Porter in his opening piece, and amplified by David Pearson who highlights the difficulties of controlling the ever more diverse contemporary record of medicine, and the need for a collaborative professional approach. Bruce Madge opens up for us the remarkable story of Elizabeth Blackwell—whose Curious Herbal is now automated as one of the British Library’s Turning the Pages projects—and Lucretia McClure teases out the need for ‘experimental doubt’ and the importance of studying the medical past in her paper on ‘Giants’, originally given at last year’s 8ICML Conference in London. The brief communications highlight a range of initiatives and issues that are currently taking place in the medical historical field. A growing interest in the subject, and in the interface between medical training and history, is generating two new CD-ROM products, one sponsored by the Open University and one by The Wellcome Trust. Wellcome are also supplementing their existing support for medical history with an important new funding scheme for libraries and archives. This will be administered in partnership with the British Library and will provide a million pounds during 2001–2 for projects that focus on easing access to, or preservation of documentary collections in medical history. The management and preservation of contemporary medical records also pose many problems; Jo Melling describes his local experiences in the south-west. Many people wish to develop their interest in medical history—Robin Price describes the flourishing diploma course run by The Society of Apothecaries. To quote from Roy Porter, ‘future historians will bless or blame us, depending upon how wisely we act now’. Most medical libraries see their primary responsibility as being towards the present but we have a responsibility to the future too. It is in that spirit that this special number of HILJ is offered, and we hope that readers will be inspired by the challenge.