Constituency-building is an important yet underappreciated corporate political strategy. In contrast to conventional strategies, such as lobbying and campaign contributions involving direct interactions with policymakers, constituency-building expands the scope of conflict by mobilizing stakeholders to pressure policymakers. Although prior studies of constituency-building have highlighted how enlisting stakeholders in political battles creates unique opportunities and risks, what has often been overlooked is the importance of blending “strange bedfellows” of economically- and morally-motivated constituents, sometimes called bootlegger-and-Baptist coalitions. Drawing on theories developed in political science, regulatory economics, and corporate political strategy, we advance a theoretical framework to examine (a) the motivations of policymakers and stakeholders, which constitute the theoretical basis for constituency-building strategies; (b) the tradeoffs of creating blended coalitions consisting of parties who have distinct motives for moral legitimacy or economic interest; and (c) how blended coalitions may take distinct overt, covert, or tacit forms. We also differentiate between campaigns that take place at the firm- versus industry-level. We develop propositions to advance theory development on constituency-building, linked to stakeholder mobilization and social movement approaches. We offer wide-ranging real-world examples to provide guidance to empirical research.