Moscow Patriarchate Research Articles

Історична наука про угодовство та нонконформізм Руської православної церкви в період утисків 1950-1960 рр.

The work aims to analyze the publications on the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the authorities in the USSR in 1950-1960; to investigate the issues of agreement and adaptation of the Church, manifestations of nonconformism and opposition, protection of the interests of the faithful. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, problem-solving, comprehensiveness, systematics, and objectivity. The mentioned principles are implemented through the methods of analysis, synthesis, and generalization, historical-comparative, historical-genetic, historical-typological. The scientific novelty consists in the fact that we conducted a historiographical analysis of the problems of agreement and non-conformity of the ROC in relation to the state. It was found that Soviet and official church authors avoided investigation of the tense situations of the relationship between the government and the Church. Most foreign, dissident, and contemporary Ukrainian and Russian researchers point out the lack of militant actions by the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) in the protection of the rights and interests of the believers from state oppression, accusing it in collaboration with the authorities in the question of closing churches. However, the degree and motives of this collaboration are evaluated differently by researchers. It is widely believed that the Patriarchate, trying to “survive” in the conditions of atheistic politics, to “adapt” to the Soviet state and communist ideology, by forced concessions to the authorities, maintained the structure and social positions of the Church. Conclusions. Most researchers, analyzing the attitude of ROC bishops to the anti-religious policy of party and state bodies, draw attention to the pas-sivity of the Church leadership, adaptation and reconciliation to the actions of the authorities. In the USSR, both the authorities and the MPs pursued the Russification policy, pursuing any manifestations of disagreement with the centralizing great-power imperial policy. The MP not only did not dare to actively protest but also cooperated with the authorities in restricting worship and reducing the religious network. Of course, among the bishops of the Church, there were some feeble manifestations of disagreement with the anti-religious course; but they were isolated, and not supported by senior management. Therefore, it was ordinary believers who resisted the atheistic onslaught the most. Ukrainian authors observe the higher religiosity of the population of the USSR compared to other republics of the USSR and, accordingly, greater resistance to the offensive. The ROC as an institution did not become an opposition force – even at a time when the state was actively restricting its activities, closing churches, and restricting worship. The hi erarchs of the MP at meetings with representatives of foreign churches and delegations assured of freedom of religion in the USSR. However, religion, as an ideology, was still an alternative to communist ideology, to a certain extent a “spiritual opposition.” Currently, the issue of conformism and opposition in the ROC during the period of oppression of the authorities is one of the least studied and promising to study.

The Role of Political and Electoral Technologies in Continuing the Church and Civilization Schism in Ukraine

This article examines the impact of the church schism in 2018 on the change in the civilizational identity of modern Ukrainians. Modern Ukraine is in the zone of the conflict of Russian and Western civilizations, openly expressed since 2014. One of the strategies for resolving the conflict appears to be changing the civilizational identity of the enemy by transforming the cultural core of civilization, which also includes religion and religious practices. The transformation of the civilizational core in Ukraine occurs through the instrumentalization of religion, which turns into a way to solve the internal and foreign policy problems of the modern Ukrainian government. This article studies the history of the establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2018, the reception of tomos from the Constantinople Patriarchate and the confrontation between the OCU and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which acts as a conductor of the Russian civilization's influence. The internal goals of the Ukrainian government, achieved through a church schism, include reducing the consolidation of society and strengthening its own position in a fractured society. Their foreign policy objectives involve reducing the cultural influence of Russia, excluding the Russian part of the Ukrainian society from receiving the Russian civilization's values and changing the civilizational identity of Ukrainians. One way to change the civilizational identity of Russians in Ukraine while formally preserving the Orthodox religion in the country involves promoting eucharistic ecclesiology, which is not historically rooted in the Orthodox Church and has been developing since the mid-20th century as an alternative to the universal ecclesiology. The latter assumes that the universal church is not reduced to the sum of its parts, that the criterion for correct faith is the unity of the episcopate, and that maintaining the integrity of the empirical church is one of the values of church communion. Eucharistic ecclesiology presumes that the fullness of grace is contained in each experiential community united by the common Eucharist. Eucharistic ecclesiology aids in instrumentalizing the church and turning it into the spokesperson for the secular interests of communities, which is already happening in Ukraine. This article shows that despite the church schism itself does not remove Ukrainians from the Russian civilizational space, it includes church communication into the foreign policy of reducing the Russian cultural influence in Ukraine and changing the civilizational identity of its inhabitants.

Clergy Participation in Elections, Political Parties and Government from the Perspective of Secular and Church Law

This article presents a comparative analysis of solving the issue of Orthodox clergy's participation in elections, political parties and public bodies previously and in modern times from the standpoint of secular and church law. At different stages of history, there were both times when the clergy took active part in the legislative bodies of our country and abstained from it. The relevance of this question is conditioned by the following fact: while the Church is unified and its establishments are inviolable, there are historically many states of many types, and the relations between them should always be adjusted specifically to each case. There is no general theoretical formula that would suit them all. The clergy participated in political parties, elections and the State Duma before the revolution, but the results of this participation were very mixed. In the post-Soviet years, after the constitutional crisis of October 1993, the Church made the only right decision. At an expanded session on October 8, 1993, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church adopted a resolution that instructed clergy to refrain from participating in the elections to the Federal Assembly as candidates for deputy, and to abstain from membership in political parties under the penalty of prosecution. As for the Church law, the canons of the Orthodox Church do not permit clergymen to hold secular positions of authority. This is confirmed by the Apostolic Rules and decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. Adopted in 2000 by the Jubilee Council of Bishops, “The Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church” reflected the official position of the Moscow Patriarchate in its relations with the state and secular society . The Fundamentals formulate a concept of the state-church relations, the key concept of which is “the cooperation between state and church”. However, by prohibiting the clergy to participate in government bodies, the Church emphasizes its another resource: the participation of Orthodox laymen in the activities of government bodies and parties. The contemporary challenges include an enormous increase in the influence of the Internet, mass media, the ethical problems of modern technology, the lack of an Orthodox component in educational programs — they are only a few problems and challenges to the dialogue between church and state.

Reaction of the Byelorussian Exarchate and the Roman Catholic Church to the August 2020 post-election protests in Byelorussia

In August 2020, the presidential elections took place in Byelorussia, which, according to official data, were won by A. G. Lukashenko by a wide margin. The announcement of the preliminary election results provoked a protest reaction of the opposition forces, who declared the results to be falsified and mobilized part of the Byelorussian population for mass street protests. The authorities deemed these actions illegal and used force to suppress them. This gave the opposition and protesters grounds to criticize the authorities with renewed vigor, accusing them of violence and infringement of political freedoms. The representatives of the Orthodox Church (the Byelorussian Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate) as well as of the Roman Catholic Church in Byelorussia reacted to the situation in the country, which caused a significant resonance in Byelorussia itself and abroad. The Byelorussian Exarchate did not support any of the conflicting sides, whereas Metropolitan Pavel, patriarchal exarch, unambiguously advocated the soonest cessation of the civil confrontation. At the same time, a few representatives of the clergy of the Byelorussian Exarchate publicly took the side of the protestors, including Archbishop Artemy of Grodno, but their statements were supported neither by the Synod of the Exarchate nor by the absolute majority of its bishops. The Roman Catholic Church, which has considerably smaller congregations in Byelorussia, also called for an end to the confrontation, but at the same time was much more immersed in the political agenda, poorly concealing its support for the opposition and protesters; the head of the Byelorussian Catholics at that time, Metropolitan T. Kondrusievicz, indirectly sympathized with the opposition as well. Despite the actual difference in the two churches' attitudes to the political situation, they both similarly appealed to spirituality and faith as a means of overcoming the conflict.

What Is God’s and What Is Caesar’s? Autocephaly, Schism and the Clash of Political Theologies in Ukrainian Orthodoxy

ABSTRACT The article offers a general overview of the conflicting political theologies developed by rivaling churches and religious movements in Ukrainian Orthodoxy with the view to protecting their ideological agendas and institutional interests under different socio-political circumstances. It explores the dynamics of politicization and depoliticization of autocephaly and the perspectives on the proper church-state relations in the works of the key representatives of Ukrainian autocephalism in the first half of the 20th c. Based on this, the study analyses how these theological frameworks were further interpreted and employed in the post-Soviet period in the discourses of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and its successor the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Finally, the article outlines an alternative political theology of autocephaly advanced by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in order to justify its unity with the Russian Orthodox Church despite the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991.

Kampaniya v sovetskoj pechati v period hrushchyovskogo nastupleniya na cerkov' i rukovodstvo Moskovskoj patriarhii

The main goal of the authors is to form a holistic view of the position and actions of the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church - Patriarch Alexy I (Simansky) and his de facto deputy Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich) - in connection with the campaign to discredit the clergy, clergy and religion in general, which unfolded in the Soviet press from the late 1950s during the Khrushchev offensive against the church and was carried out under the guise of scientific atheistic propaganda. The position of the Moscow Patriarchate leadership is shown on the basis of documents of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, letters of Patriarch Alexy I to this institution and memoirs of the clergy, and 23 research works are also used.

THE UKRAINIAN-MOSCOW TREATY OF 1654 IN THE INTERPRETATIONS OF POLISH HISTORIANS OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Summary. The purpose of the study is to research the interpretations of the Ukrainian-Moscow treaty of 1654 in the works of Polish historians of the first half of the twentieth century; study the approaches of scientists to identify the reasons for the mutual understanding of the Ukrainian Cossacks with the tsarist authorities; analyze the peculiarities of the study by Polish scholars of the history of the relations of the Hetman’s Chancellery of B. Khmelnytsky with Moscow; consider the specifics of historians’ vision of the circumstances of concluding the agreement in Pereyaslav and Moscow as well as the course of negotiations between the parties and their implementation; study the researchers’ assessments of the significance of the Ukrainian-Moscow agreement in the history of Ukraine, Tsardom of Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The research methodology is based on the general scientific principles of objectivity, historicism, scientific pluralism and reliance on historical sources. General scientific (analysis, synthesis, comparison) and special-historical (historical-genetic, historical-typological, problem-chronological, historical-systemic) methods have been used in the work. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the analysis of a wide range of historiographical sources that reflect the interpretations of Polish scholars of the first half of the twentieth century history of the conclusion of the Ukrainian-Moscow treaty of 1654. The peculiarities of the historians’ approaches to the causes of the union between the Cossacks and Moscow and the circumstances of its conclusion are particularly studied. The ideological influences of historical schools and political concepts on the assessments of scholars of the Pereyaslav agreement and bereznevi statti (March articles) have been analyzed. Conclusions. Polish historians of the first half of the twentieth century considered 1654 a milestone in the fate of Ukraine and one of the most important in the history of Poland. It was from the Cossack-Moscow treaty that they deduced the beginning of the rejection of the eastern lands of the Commonwealth in favor of Russia. Scholars saw the causes of these fateful events in the significant depletion of the Ukrainian uprising. As another reason, they also pointed to the complication of the international situation of the Cossacks due to frustration with the Turkish protection and the dual role of assistance to the Crimean Khanate. Polish scholars have drawn attention to the long history of Cossack-Moscow relations since the uprisings of the first half of the seventeenth century. However, they also pointed to Moscow’s unpreparedness for the war against the Commonwealth and its indecision. In their interpretations of Cossack-Moscow relations during the national liberation war Polish historians emphasized the parties’ differing views on the terms of the union. Thus, the scholars indicated that B. Khmelnytsky understood the agreement as a military understanding directed against Poland, where there was no talk of any restriction of Ukraine’s broad autonomy. Instead, the tsarist government understood the treaty as a simple incorporation of Ukrainian lands. This, in turn, as scientists have pointed out, it has caused many sharp misunderstandings. Among the most irritating researchers named the issue of financing the Cossack register and the disagreement of the Ukrainian clergy with the attempts of the Moscow Patriarchate to absorb its church structure. Thus, in the vision of Polish historians of the first half of the twentieth century, the Ukrainian-Moscow union was perceived as hopeless and even utterly dangerous for the very existence of the Ukrainian people.

A Rational Choice? Explaining the Growth of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Philippines

Abstract This paper shines a light on the three Eastern Orthodox churches which are currently operating in the Philippines and asks why it is the Moscow Patriarchate rather than the Ecumenical or Antiochian Patriarchates which is displaying the most significant growth. Using rational choice theory, the paper argues that the Moscow Patriarchate is best placed to capitalise on the opening created by the lack of dynamism in the country’s religious marketplace. This is so because it insists on the strict observance of Orthodox traditions and therefore operates in the strict market niche which is underserved by the country’s majority Catholic church. The paper, however, also finds that it is not only the Moscow Patriarchate’s strictness, but also the financial resources provided by Russian businessmen, which are fuelling its growth.

Позиция Русской Зарубежной Церкви по вопросу о благодатности Московской Патриархии при митрополите Филарете (Вознесенском)

Позиция Русской Зарубежной Церкви по вопросу о благодатности Московской Патриархии при митрополите Филарете (Вознесенском)

Ankstyvieji ekumeniniai ryšiai tarp Romos Katalikų, Stačiatikių ir Liuteronų Bažnyčių sovietinėje Lietuvoje, komunistinės valdžios reakcija

In the 1960s, when the Second Vatican Council and the Moscow Patriarchate invited Christian churches to develop closer ecumenical relationships, the first signs of ecumenism appeared in Lithuania. In 1965, the first ecumenical service was held in the Šilutė Lutheran Church, which was attended by representatives of four denominations. Such ecumenical relations soon became a common phenomenon in Soviet Lithuania. The article analyzes the origins of the ecumenical movement and its development in Lithuania, as well as the reaction of the Commissioner of the Council of Religious Affairs in Moscow for Lithuania to this new religious phenomenon.

Exhumation: Past and Present

The modernization of a society leads to changes in the society’s attitude towards funeral practices. This article is devoted to the study of socio-cultural, historical, religious and political-legal aspects of the exhumation phenomenon. Thanatosociological, historical, biographical, religious studies, legal and political approaches form the methodological basis of the study, which made it possible to identify features of exhumation in the past and present. The study has fixed that modern experts criticize the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) for the fact that the return to church life of already known relics and the inclusion of new shrines in it do not always meet the canonical requirements. As a result, gaining and ‘traffic’ of the last decades relics “with their historical unreliability, political background and clerical ambitions” causes direct damage to the spiritual life of a society. It has been established that exhumation, on the one hand, ‘compensates’ for losses in family relationships, gives impetus to the development of religious life, and solves specific problems of scientific research and investigative actions. On the other hand, sometimes exhumation is carried out for opportunistic, political, mercenary or criminal purposes thus, the problem of ensuring the peace of the buried remains very relevant.
 Keywords: funereal, cemetery, exhumation, reburial, relics

Последование святым царственным мученикам в контексте княжеской службы

In 1981 Tsar Nicholas II and his family were canonized as a martyr by the Russian church abroad. In 2000, they were also canonized by the Russian church (Moscow Patriarchate) as passion bearers. Tsar Nicholas II was the last Royal saint for Russia somehow closing the circle of holy Russian princes, since the first of them SS. Boris and Gleb were also canonized as passion bearers. There are a lot of hymnography devoted to Royal Martyrs but in the article only 3 “official” services are taken in account. In the article it is made an attempt to see this service in the context of Russian princely service and in some cases to show models of creation.

Orthodox religion and state ideology in modern ukrainian realities

The article examines the relationship between the state and religion, the formation and implementation principles of the state's domestic and foreign policy foundations. The Moscow Patriarchate influence on political, social and religious processes in Ukraine, in particular, after the signing of the Tomos, is investigated. It is substantiated that in the ideological system of the modern Russian Federation, Russian Orthodoxy fulfills the fundamental ideas of the new doctrine: the idea of the Third Rome; the idea of "Holy Russia"; the idea of continuity and succession of Kievan Rus. It is noted that the Tomos opened new opportunities for modernizing Orthodoxy in Ukraine by making adjustments to the religious picture of the world, rethinking the problem of the relationship between faith and knowledge, science and religion, including through the inclusion of scientific potential and terminology in theological argumentation; the formation of a different approach to the problem of personal value orientations, taking into account current trends.

The Soviet Presence in the Middle East in the Context of the Unfolding Cold War: Church Institutions and Actors of Influence in Palestine in 1940–50th

The Soviet diplomacy in the second half of the 1940s included the Russian Orthodox Church and its institutions of international presence in its sphere of activity. At that time the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) began to play a significant role in the Soviet Union's foreign policy. The Middle Eastern direction becomes one of the most significant areas of “church diplomacy”. The first visit of Patriarch Alexy (Simanskiy) to the Holy Land in 1945 was part of a “package” of diplomatic steps made by Soviet diplomacy in partnership with the Moscow Patriarchate in 1945–1955 to restore the property of the ROC in Palestine. The analysis of the documents on the ROC (State Archive of the Russian Federation, F. R-6991) and the materials on the foreign policy of the USSR Council of Ministers (State Archive of the Russian Federation, F. R-5446), as well as the extensive historiography of historical relations between Russia and the Holy Land, allows the authors to consider joint efforts to consolidate the presence of the ROC in the region. The research allows tracing the “birth of tradition” of foreign policy mission of the Moscow Patriarchate and its foreign structures, which became points of influence of the USSR in the post-war world. It allows one to reconstruct the social image of Moscow's “agents of influence” in the Middle East, both the new emissaries and the traditional agents of Russian influence in the region – the pilgrims and nuns of the Russian monasteries of the Holy Land.

СТАНОВИЩЕ РУСЬКОЇ ПРАВОСЛАВНОЇ ЦЕРКВИ В УКРАЇНІ В СЕРЕДИНІ 1940-х РОКІВ

The article analyzes the change in the position of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine in the mid-1940s. The influence of the World War II on the change of religious policy in the USSR and the international activity of the ROC was clarified. The meeting of the Soviet leaders with the church hierarchs on September 4, 1943, the activities of the Council of Bishops on September 8, 1943 and the degree of implementation of their previous agreements and decisions were analyzed. The main directions of the state religious policy in the USSR and the achievements of the ROC in the mid-1940s were determined. The study traces the change in the position of the Orthodox clergy in the state and the factors contributing to develoing the position of coexistence with the Soviet authorities in the church environment. Considerable attention was paid to the Local Council of the ROC in 1945 and the adoption of the “Regulations on managing the ROC”. The change of the internal life of the Church was analyzed in accordance with the document. It determined the increasing role of the clergy in managing parishes and the episcopate in managing the Church. The article emphasizes the ambiguity of the religious situation in Ukraine, in particular in the newly joined Ukrainian regions. Emphasis was placed on the problem of lack of educated clergy, which the ROC faced immediately after its legalization. In this context, attempts to solve the problem by restoring the activities of religious schools and expanding their network in Ukraine were studied. The conditions of study and requirements for future seminarians were highlighted. The evolution of the state’s attitude to religious education was investigated. Special attention was paid by the author to involving the ROC to the international and interreligious arena. In this context, the emergence of the confrontation between the Moscow Patriarchate and Vatican authorities was highlighted. The main tasks and directions of such confrontationweare determined, an attempt was made to analyze the main measures implemented by the ROC on the way to transforming Moscow into a new world religious centre.

Russia’s 2020 Constitutional Amendments and the Entrenchment of the Moscow Patriarchate as a Lever of Foreign Policy Soft Power

Much has been written about the Kremlin’s embrace of the Russian Orthodox Church—Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) as a lever of soft power for advancing Russia’s foreign policy. Based on the substance of the constitutional amendments ratified in July 2020, this chapter reasons that the church-state partnership is poised to grow stronger and more entrenched in the coming years. After briefly highlighting the energizing effect several key constitutional amendments are likely to have on existing Kremlin foreign policy objectives, this chapter offers an assessment of the ROC’s central role in disseminating and advocating these newly minted constitutional norms across its international platforms for interreligious, civil society and diplomatic engagement. Given that the constitutional amendments position the Church as an even more vital Kremlin instrument and bless President Vladimir Putin’s ability to retain power, the chapter concludes that policymakers should consider divesting the ROC of its veneer as an autonomous religious actor and adopt measures intended to scrutinize its activities and expose them where necessary as manifestations of Kremlin influence.

ЦЕРКВА В УКРАЇНІ В УМОВАХ СУЧАСНИХ ЗАГРОЗ: РЕАКЦІЯ НА РОСІЙСЬКУ ВІЙСЬКОВУ АГРЕСІЮ

The aim of the article is to try to find out the attitude of Christian denominations in Ukraine to the Russian-Ukrainian war in eastern Ukraine as a manifestation of their religious and national identity. External risks for modern Ukrainian society require in-depth scientific analysis of this issue, in particular in sphere of religious relations. Russia's military and ideological aggression has become a marker of the social identity and civilizational choice of Christian denominations. It clearly revealed the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as a structural part of the Russian Orthodox Church and a powerful tool for implementing the policy and ideology of the "Russian world" in Ukraine. Factually, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate represents the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church as it adheres to its guidelines for Ukraine to be in the sphere of Russian geo-confessional interests. This is evidenced by the dominance of the Russian language in worship, sermons, educational institutions, publishing. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has not even formally condemned the Russian intervention so far, nor has it recognized Russia as an aggressor. On the contrary, some priests of the Church openly promote Russian aggression and call for the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity. The temples of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Donbas serve as weapons depots for Russian troops, and Russian terrorists openly serve the Moscow Patriarchate. The attitude of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate / Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and other Ukrainian Churches to Russian aggression determines their patriotic pro- Ukrainian position. This is most eloquently characterized by the institute of chaplaincy, which thіs Churches actively supply with their staff.

Philosophical and pedagogical views of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill (Gundyaev)

The article analyses the historical and philosophical views of Patriarch Kirill and his evaluation of modern Western philosophy, formed in the era of postmodernism. A distinctive feature of that time is the blurring of the criteria that define the border between good and evil. According to the Patriarch, this approach is caused by the absolutization of a person’s freedom, considered beyond the context of one’s responsibility for the actions performed. As a result, the philosophy of liberalism justifies the rejection of the Christian commandments, since they are claimed to suppress one’s personal freedom. Thus, the Patriarch emphasizes the importance of preserving the “Christian dimension” of a person’s behavior. The present work pays special attention to the Patriarch’s conceptualization of the Russian philosophical tradition, which is views as an important means to preserve national identity. Representatives of the Russian religious renaissance (S. N. Bulgakov, N. A. Berdyaev, V. V. Zenkovsky and others), reflecting on the understanding of the Church, society, personality, were able to meet the challenges of the time and satisfy questioning believers. The article focuses on the Patriarch’s ideas related to educational issues and reforms. It is posited that educational innovations should be based on Russian traditions, namely on the fundamentality of education. In this respect, it is essential to realize that when introducing the unified state examination procedure as a universal system of students’ assessment, pedagogues need to amend educational plans in order to include the development of learners’ fundamental skills and knowledge. The Patriarch is opposed to the technocratic approach to education because the goal of education is reduced only to the formation of the skills necessary for work. He agrees that school graduates should possess certain competences related to their career, but they should know Russian history, literature, and culture at a sufficient level. The Patriarch’s aspiration to preserve the unity of education and upbringing as a unique feature of the Russian educational process is accentuated.

РАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЕ ПРАВОСЛАВИЯ В ЮГО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ И РОЛЬ РУССКОЙ ПРАВОСЛАВНОЙ ЦЕРКВИ В РЕГИОНЕ

The authors analyze the spread of Orthodoxy and Orthodox parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in some the countries of Southeast Asia, and their impact on Russian and Russian-speaking immigrants and expats. The article shows the growth of the publication activity of the ROC in Southeast Asia and translation activities (translation of prayers and spiritual literature into the languages of the indigenous peoples of the region). The article reveals the influence of Orthodox parishes on the implementation of social communication, identification and self-identification of Russian compatriots in Southeast Asia, the formation and preservation of the cultural Orthodox basis of semantic and value orientations of parishioners. A proposal was made to use the potential of the ROC MP in Southeast Asia to strengthen the influence of the Russian Federation in the region.

The Great Patriotic War and the Russian Orthodox Church on the pages of the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate” in 1943–1945

The article presents an analysis of the materials in the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate” from 1943–1945, devoted to the Great Patriotic War and the position of the Russian Orthodox Church in relation to this terrible event in the history of mankind. There are four main blocks of materials: the official chronicle of the war, coverage of military events and the situation of the Church in the conditions of military operations, messages to the faithful population in the territories embroiled in military operations, and articles on particular issues related to the war. Of great importance is not only the coverage of the chronicle, but also the support in the conditions of the ongoing war, which was provided to believers by bishops Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky), Metropolitan Alexy (Simansky, Patriarch since February 1945), and Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich). In the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate”, the struggle against the German invaders was regarded as a struggle against the servants of the devil. Correspondence from the field testified to the damage caused by the Nazis not only to the Church, but also to the civilian population. In the mid-1940s, the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate” became the publication where the Russian Orthodox Church could express both its attitude to events and its unity with the people, which was necessary in the conditions of war.