Mortgage Servicing Rights Research Articles

Adverse selection in the market for mortgage servicing rights

Transfer activity in the U.S. market for mortgage servicing rights has increased in recent years. Incumbent servicers are at an informational advantage relative to potential buyers of these servicing rights, introducing the possibility of adverse selection. This paper marks the first investigation of adverse selection in the market for mortgage servicing rights. Using data from mortgage servicers, we find that loans with higher ex ante measures of prepayment and default risk were more likely to experience a servicing transfer. Results from an ex post analysis in which we condition on these risk measures reveals that loans that experienced a servicing transfer were more likely to prepay and default, a finding that suggests that the market for servicing rights is characterized by adverse selection.

Mortgage Servicing Fees and Servicer Behavior: A Close Examination of the Unexpected Heterogeneity in Servicing Fees

Even though mortgage servicing plays an important role in housing finance, directly affecting millions of homeowners and mortgage-backed security investors, its economics is not well understood, hence making policy formulation and implementation challenging. To fill this gap, we examine the determinants of servicing fees in the non-agency mortgage market and explore how the current compensation structure affects servicer behavior during default remediation. We show that servicer compensation reflects expected mortgage termination risks and depends on whether servicing is outsourced. Furthermore, servicing fees decrease with deal allocation, which suggests economies of scale in servicing, and increase with the intensity of default in servicers' mortgage portfolios. Finally, it appears that issuers' drive to maximize deal returns by auctioning mortgage servicing rights leads to servicing fees determining mortgage modifications and foreclosures, possibly to the detriment of security investors. This is the first study addressing this potentially serious incentive problem in mortgage servicing. The economics of servicing will continue to produce low levels of mortgage renegotiation, despite the Dodd-Frank requirements on servicers.

Testing for Information Asymmetry in the Mortgage Servicing Market

Our objective is to test for evidence of information asymmetry in the mortgage servicing market. Does the sale of mortgage servicing rights (MSR) by the initial lender to a second servicing institution unveil any residual asymmetric information? We are the first to analyze the originator’s selling choice of MSR. We use a large sample of U.S. mortgages that were securitized through the private-label channel during the period of January 2000 to December 2013 (more than 5 million observations). We propose a new nonparametric instrumental variable testing procedure to account for potential endogeneity. For robustness, we present parametric analyses to corroborate our results using instrumental variables. Our empirical results provide strong support for the presence of second-stage asymmetric information in the mortgage servicing market

Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks

Shadow bank market share in residential mortgage origination nearly doubled from 2007 to 2015, with particularly dramatic growth among online “fintech” lenders. We study how two forces, regulatory differences and technological advantages, contributed to this growth. Difference in difference tests exploiting geographical heterogeneity induced by four specific increases in regulatory burden–capital requirements, mortgage servicing rights, mortgage-related lawsuits, and the movement of supervision to Office of Comptroller and Currency following closure of the Office of Thrift Supervision–all reveal that traditional banks contracted in markets where they faced more regulatory constraints; shadow banks partially filled these gaps. Relative to other shadow banks, fintech lenders serve more creditworthy borrowers and are more active in the refinancing market. Fintech lenders charge a premium of 14–16 basis points and appear to provide convenience rather than cost savings to borrowers. They seem to use different information to set interest rates relative to other lenders. A quantitative model of mortgage lending suggests that regulation accounts for roughly 60% of shadow bank growth, while technology accounts for roughly 30%.

Increasing Capital & Liquidity for GNMA Mortgage Servicing Rights

This paper reviews the research literature concerning mortgage servicing rights (MSR) and mortgage finance more generally. We then review the history of financing the acquisition of MSRs in the market for loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and securities guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). The paper then focuses on the credit relationship between GNMA and the issuers operating in that market, with particular emphasis on separating the loan servicing function from the investment in the MSR. The paper notes that state law regulation seems to be suppressing competition for GNMA MSRs by limiting participation by smaller investors. The paper makes several proposals as to amendments to the GNMA Acknowledgement Agreement (AA) governing the credit relationship between the FHA, GNMA and the issuer to support the goal of increasing the liquidity of the GNMA MSR market.

Assessing Involuntary Termination Risk on Residential Mortgage Servicing Rights

This research paper outlines some of the issues facing investors in mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) and/or creditors holding security interests against these intangible assets or the underlying collateral. These issues include swings in the valuation of the MSR, repayments of loans in the underlying portfolio that may cause the MSR to decay more rapidly, and most important, the possibility of an involuntary transfer of the MSR that causes the investor and/or secured creditor a total loss. The paper concludes by suggesting some of the key quantitative and qualitative indicators which investors and regulators should assess to avoid situations where involuntary servicing termination may occur.

Adverse Selection in the Market for Mortgage Servicing Rights

Activity in the U.S. market for mortgage servicing rights has increased in recent years. Incumbent servicers are at a significant informational advantage relative to potential buyers of these servicing rights, introducing the possibility of adverse selection. This paper marks the first investigation of adverse selection in the market for mortgage servicing rights. Using data from mortgage servicers, we find that loans with higher ex ante measures of prepayment and default risk were more likely to experience a servicing transfer. Results from an ex post analysis in which we condition on these risk measures reveals that loans that experienced a servicing transfer were more likely to prepay and default, a finding that suggests that the market for servicing rights is characterized by adverse selection.

Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks

Shadow bank market share in residential mortgage origination nearly doubled from 2007-2015, with particularly dramatic growth among online “fintech” lenders. We study how two forces, regulatory differences and technological advantages, contributed to this growth. Difference in difference tests exploiting geographical heterogeneity induced by four specific increases in regulatory burden –capital requirements, mortgage servicing rights, mortgage-related lawsuits, and the movement of supervision to Office of Comptroller and Currency following closure of the Office of Thrift Supervision -- all reveal that traditional banks contracted in markets where they faced more regulatory constraints; shadow banks partially filled these gaps. Fintech lenders appear to offer a higher quality product and charge a premium of 14-16 basis points. Relative to other lenders, they seem to use different information to set interest rates. A quantitative model of mortgage lending suggests that regulation accounts for roughly 60% of shadow bank growth, while technology accounts for roughly 30%.

Assessing mortgage servicing rights using a reduced-form model: Considering the effects of interest rate risks, prepayment and default risks, and random state variables

Assessing an MSR's value is difficult in practice because it involves various revenues and costs that are influenced by both the stochastic property of interest rates and the likelihood of prepayment and default. This paper derives a pricing formula using a reduced-form model in order to appraise the MSR's breakeven servicing fee. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the applications of this reduced-form pricing formula in deriving the breakeven servicing fee and analyzing profits of an MSR. We also provide numerical sensitivity analysis results for operational and state variables to show how the breakeven servicing fee changes with respect to various operational conditions and economic circumstances. Results reveal that changes in the breakeven servicing fee depend mainly on direct servicing costs, the initial interest rate, and the volatility of the interest rate. Our model can assist financial institutions and regulators in evaluating fair servicing fees and in turn improve the management of the various risks of an MSR in response to changing economic conditions and operating costs.

Overview of U.S. Single-Family Residential Investment Strategies

This article focuses on describing the recent granular strategies pursued by investors to get closer to the active value creation activities in U.S. single-family residential investing. Since the onset of the credit crisis, alternative and distressed asset managers have employed a variety of strategies in the U.S. residential space to achieve attractive returns. The strategies have included non-agency RMBS, non-performing non-agency whole loans, REO-to-flip, and REO-to-rent. Lately, investors have also looked into the creation and/or recapitalization of originators, servicers, and purchasers of mortgage servicing rights. Fund managers and sponsors have used hedge-fund and private-equity style vehicles but are increasingly exploring public REIT (real estate investment trust) investment vehicles to also capture the enterprise value of the specialized infrastructure they have built. This article will provide general insights and an overview of the new opportunities being pursued and the requisite infrastructure and expertise for executing them. With millions of residential borrowers still in serious delinquency and an even-larger population with the prices of their homes still below their loan amounts, distressed residential properties and loans are expected to remain an area of interest for investors with managers developing new strategies to exploit them.

Discussion of “The financial reporting of fair value based on managerial inputs versus market inputs: evidence from mortgage servicing rights”

Contrary to the guidance provided by regulators and industry associations suggesting that mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) be recorded as Level 3 assets, Altamuro and Zhang identify that 25 % of banks classify them as Level 2 assets. This variation in the asset classification of a single asset type provides a unique setting to examine the role of inputs in the fair value measurement process. Altamuro and Zhang find that the fair value of MSRs based on managerial inputs (Level 3) better reflects the economics of the underlying assets than the fair value of MSRs based on market inputs (Level 2). This discussion examines the institutional features of the MSR market, particularly the market concentration and the illiquidity of the market, that are important when considering this result. The discussion also raises a number of questions about the inputs used in the fair value process and calls for further research on this topic.

The financial reporting of fair value based on managerial inputs versus market inputs: evidence from mortgage servicing rights

This research examines whether the fair value of mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) based on managerial inputs (Level 3) better reflects the cash flow and risk characteristics of the underlying assets than the fair value of MSRs based on market inputs (Level 2). Using mortgage servicing fees as a proxy for the underlying cash flows, we find that the valuation multiples for MSRs based on Level 3 inputs are more positively associated with the persistence of future servicing fees compared with the fair value of MSRs based on Level 2 inputs. We also document that only the valuation multiples based on Level 3 fair values are negatively associated with proxies for risk factors. Our results suggest that, although unobservable inputs are subject to managerial discretions, managers can generate higher quality fair value estimates than market inputs due to their information advantage, especially when the market for the underlying asset is inactive.

Financial Reporting of Fair Value Based on Model Inputs versus Market Inputs: Evidence from Mortgage Servicing Rights

This research studies one specific financial instrument – Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSRs) and examines whether the fair value of MSRs based on managerial inputs (Level 3) has financial reporting characteristics that differ from the fair value of MSRs based on market inputs (Level 2). Since fair value represents discounted future cash flows, we use future mortgage servicing fees as a proxy for future cash flows and measure whether the fair value of MSRs reflects the persistence of future servicing fees. We find that the fair value of MSRs based on managerial inputs (Level 3) better reflects the persistence of future servicing fees compared with the fair value of MSRs based on market inputs (Level 2). We also document that Level 3 fair values have a stronger association with proxies for default risk and prepayment risk. Consistent with conjectures made by Ryan (2008) and Laux and Leuz (2009), our results suggest that, although unobservable inputs are subject to managerial discretions, managers have the potential to generate higher quality fair value estimates than market inputs due to their information advantage, especially when the market for the underlying asset is inactive.

Accounting Practices and Earnings Volatility in Mortgage Banking

Mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) accounting rules create severe interest rate earnings risk for mortgage banks, even when the firm is cash flow-neutral to interest rate changes. Mortgage banks have been forced to adopt aggressive and at times uneconomic hedging practices or abandon mortgage servicing altogether. In this paper, simple mortgage banking model is developed to analyze earnings volatility, with and without MSR hedges. The results suggest that short-term earnings volatility induced by the asymmetric accounting treatment of the servicing and mortgage origination franchises is marked and persistent, and that hedging, while somewhat reducing earnings risk, essentially shifts it over time.

What the Fair Credit Reporting Act Should Teach Us About Mortgage Servicing

The current housing crisis has revealed deep flaws in the way monthly mortgage payments by homeowners are handled by mortgage servicers – the companies that collect monthly mortgage payments from homeowners and forward the payments to investors in those mortgages. This article suggests that the structural flaws in mortgage servicing are directly analogous to the market failures that led to the creation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA). The FCRA thus serves as a significant model for possible reforms in mortgage servicing. The “robo-signing” scandals of 2010 drew unprecedented public policy attention to the mortgage servicing industry, and that attention has resulted in subsequent consent decrees, enforcement actions, and calls for national mortgage servicing scandals. As a historical matter, the structure of the mortgage servicing market is a recent phenomenon. Historically, most mortgage loans were made locally by thrifts or commercial banks. Where servicing was kept locally, lenders had the usual market incentives to treat borrowers well in hopes of providing other banking services to the family. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the increased use of mortgage-backed securities and other economic factors meant that a much larger proportion of local lenders sold off the mortgage servicing rights rather than keeping them in-house. In addition, market concentration in the servicing industry skyrocketed, with the 10 largest servicers having 11% market share in 1989, and 40% a decade later. Today, the top four servicers have roughly 70% market share. The comparison between the FCRA and mortgage servicing is straightforward and previously undiscussed. The FCRA emerged in 1970 at a time of rapid concentration in the credit reporting market. Mistakes and decisions about credit can have a large impact on a family, such as whether a loan is approved and on what terms. The clients of the credit reporting agencies, however, are lenders, insurers, employers, and others, but not consumers. The market incentives for credit reporting agencies are to optimize for their corporate clients, rather than worry about how a mistake affects an individual consumer. Mortgage servicing, recently, has seen rapid concentration. Mistakes and decisions by servicers can have a large impact on a family, such as whether to modify a loan or force a foreclosure. The clients of the mortgage servicers, however, are investors rather than the homeowners. The market failures in mortgage servicing, therefore, parallel those in credit reporting. Mortgage servicers lack any legal duty to act in the interest of the homeowners. They also lack any market incentives to act in the interest of homeowners; indeed, a consumer who chooses to exit by refinancing may quite possibly be stuck with the same servicer in any subsequent loan. In light of this structural lack of protection for consumers, new national mortgage standard should address issues such as disclosure, deceptive practices, and conflicts of interest in mortgage servicing.

Delta hedging a portfolio of servicing rights under gamma and vega constraints with optimal fixed income securities

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to develop the optimal delta hedge for a portfolio of mortgage servicing rights (MSR) under the constraint of a zero‐gamma in order to avoid costs related to the rebalancing of such portfolio.Design/methodology/approachThe paper develops the optimal delta hedge ratio with gamma and vega constraints for an MSR portfolio by finding the different combinations of coupon/maturity bonds (c, n) that satisfy the constraints under different yields (y). Rather than search for the available fixed income securities and see by trial and error which one should be added to the portfolio of MSR such that when market rates go up and down, the value of the portfolio is not affected, the model finds the optimal pairs of coupon/maturity bonds over a range of yields, that satisfy the constraints. It develops the conditions for a delta‐hedged portfolio of bonds and MSR under an investor's or a portfolio manager's value constraint K. The share α of the MSR's value and the share β of the bond's value had to be such that a zero‐delta portfolio that satisfies the constant value of the portfolio can be created. The paper “optimized” α by requiring simultaneously that α′=0 and also that α″=0, for a fixed y given by the market that will guarantee that the function α satisfies simultaneously the two conditions: α′=0 and α″=0. These two conditions will yield equations in the parameters of c and n. The “optimization” problem for arbitrary y's is solved, and n and c for the appropriate bond are found to be added to the MSR portfolio.FindingsMaple software is used to simulate a portfolio of MSR that is delta hedged with bonds, whose appropriate coupon and maturity are found with the model developed under the constraint of a zero‐gamma, in order to avoid costs related to the rebalancing of such portfolio. The optimal hedge ratio with gamma and vega constraints for an MSR portfolio is developed by finding the different combinations of coupon/maturity bonds that satisfy the constraints under different yields (the “triples”).Practical implicationsThe optimal triples (c, n, y) are obtained in order to optimize α and simultaneously α′=0 and α″=0. For example, for a yield of 16.1 percent, a bank with a portfolio of MSR based on the data used, should add to it, bonds with a 6.33 percent coupon that matures in 7.55 years.Originality/valueThis paper is the first to the authors' knowledge to derive the different triples (yield, coupon, maturity) of bonds that when combined with MSR create a portfolio that is dynamically hedged against interest rate risk and prepayment risk, and therefore eliminates the need of periodic rebalancing of a portfolio of MSR, which is costly.

Delta hedging of mortgage‐servicing portfolios under gamma constraints

PurposeInterest only strips are created by stripping the interest portion of cash flows generated in mortgage‐backed securities or simply by servicing portfolios of mortgages. A number of financial institutions have significant amounts of mortgage‐servicing rights (MSR) which need to be delta (dynamic) hedged. Because MSR have a positive duration when prepayment effect is stronger than discount effect, it is possible to delta hedge a portfolio of MSR with other fixed income securities such that the value of the portfolio is not affected by increases or decreases in market rates. The purpose of this paper is to address this issue.Design/methodology/approachThe paper develops the delta‐hedge‐ratio of MSR within a dynamic approach, using three different securities. To lower the cost of the delta hedge, the authors compare three hedge ratios dynamically, in order to obtain the portfolio that needs the least delta hedge.FindingsThe model enables the reduction of the amount of portfolio rebalancing and therefore reduces the cost of MSR portfolio hedging.Practical implicationsThe paper develops the gamma‐hedge‐ratio function for each of the three securities. The lowest gamma corresponds to the hedged portfolio that needs the least re‐balancing.Originality/valueThis paper is innovative with the introduction of a delta‐hedge‐ratio function of interest and prepayment rates.

New FASB Statement Requires Initial Fair Value Treatment for Servicing Assets and Liabilities - Look for Increases in Gain on Sale Revenues at Mortgage Companies

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently issued Statement No. 156 - Accounting for Servicing of Financial Assets, an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140 (SFAS 156) which requires, if servicing assets and liabilities are separately recognized, their initial measurement at fair value. Subsequent measurement may be at the lower of cost or market (accounting method required under old guidance) or at fair value, with changes in fair value recognized in the income statement. The fair value election for subsequent measurement is irrevocable and may be made on a class-by-class basis. This standard may be adopted currently (early adoption is as of January 1, 2006) and must be adopted for 2007. Moody's believes the standard will both positively and negatively affect the quality of the financial information creditors and fixed income investors use in their decision making. The financial statements of mortgage companies, especially the mono-line mortgage companies, are likely to be significantly impacted by the new standard due to the change to fair value measurement at initial recognition for their mortgage servicing rights (MSRs). Recent disclosures support our belief that the large mortgage companies are the most likely candidates to elect fair value treatment for subsequent measurement of servicing assets and liabilities under the new standard.

Valuation of Mortgage Servicing Rights with Foreclosure Delay and Forbearance Allowed

We develop a bivariate binomial model to price Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSRs). Our model is an improvement over previous MSR pricing models by explicitly incorporating the realistic assumptions that there are additional costs involved in servicing delinquent loans. In addition to the Hilliard et al. mortgage-pricing tree, we extend additional sub-branches to model the borrower's decision of prepayment, cure, and foreclosure after a loan becomes delinquent. We then investigate how the value of the Mortgage Servicing Right varies with interest rate volatility, house price volatility, delinquency options, deficiency judgments, default penalties, forbearance periods, and speed of adjustments factors.

Home Equity Line of Credit Securitization

With interest rates near their historic lows and with real estate prices continuing to climb, homeowners seem increasingly eager for home equity lines of credit (HELOC) to borrow a portion of the increasing equity in their homes. HELOC production is filling a larger portion of lenders9 balance sheets. As a result, lenders are increasingly looking to the securitization markets to provide financing for these loans and to reduce their exposure to these first and second trust deeds. In this article, the author looks at the HELOC market and discusses some issues securitizers have faced along with how they have addressed these issues. In particular, issuers that securitize convert loans primarily into cash along with the following typical retained interests: transferors9 interest (sellers9 interest), subordinated bonds/over-collateralization (OC), spread accounts (if any), interest only (IO) securities, and mortgage servicing rights (MSR). The author discusses account and servicing issues for each of those retained interests.