Mortgage Leverage Research Articles

The real effects of borrower-based macroprudential policy: Evidence from administrative household-level data

We analyze the effects of borrower-based macroprudential policy at the household level. We exploit administrative Dutch tax and housing records in conjunction with the introduction of a mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) limit. We find that the regulation sharply reduces mortgage leverage with bunching at the LTV limit. While (regulation) affected households reduce total leverage and interest expenses, they also decrease cash balances to satisfy the LTV limit, generating an important solvency-liquidity trade-off. Nevertheless, affected households experience less financial distress after the introduction of the LTV regulation. Moreover, these households experience better liquidity management and smoother consumption following income loss. Overall, our results highlight the key financial stability and real effects of borrower-based macroprudential policy.

Macroprudential Policy and mortgage leverage decisions—Evidence from micro data

This paper examines the behavioral responses of mortgage loan borrowers to Macroprudential Policy (MPP) its transmission channel, and the lag effect. We also explore the effectiveness of lender-based instruments Using borrower-level loan data from an Indian bank with a national presence from 2010 to 2021, we find that MPP tightening leads to a decline in borrower leverage. The impact is primarily channeled through downpayment changes rather than the cost of housing. The heterogeneous analysis reveals that the relaxation in MPP norms to promote affordable housing has helped middle-income groups in their mortgage decisions. A disaggregated analysis shows that risk weights have a stronger impact than LTV limits and provisioning requirements, suggesting that banks are capital-conscious in their lending decisions. Overall, the findings stress that MPPs, especially the timely intervention concerning risk weights have been effective in managing the borrowing risk thereby ensuring stability in the mortgage market.

The Role of Housing Mortgage Leverage in Stock Asset Pricing: Evidence from the Chinese A-share Market

The Role of Housing Mortgage Leverage in Stock Asset Pricing: Evidence from the Chinese A-share Market

Regulating Mortgage Leverage: Fire Sales, Foreclosure Spirals, and Pecuniary Externalities

This paper introduces a dynamic general equilibrium model to study how the distribution of leverage and foreclosure affect house prices. In the model, exogenous income shocks drive endogenous foreclosure and equilibrium house prices. The model shows how foreclosure sales, through their effect on housing supply, amplify and propagate house price drops. A calibration shows consumption and housing need to be sufficiently complementary to fit the data. Since leverage plays a key role in foreclosure, a regulator can reduce systemic risk by placing a cap on leverage. Counterfactual experiments show that in a world with less leverage, the same economic shock leads to less foreclosure and less severe, shorter busts in house prices.

Credit cycles with market-based household leverage

We develop a general equilibrium model in which households’ mortgage leverage is determined by supply and demand forces, where the price of credit impacts the quantity of leverage households choose. Mortgages are supplied by financial intermediaries, who offer households a menu of mortgage contracts whose pricing varies with intermediaries’ equity capital. In the model, growth in the demand for safe assets that replicates the falling interest rates in the 2000s causes an empirically realistic boom in household borrowing, debt-financed consumption, and house prices. This boom results in a larger bust in asset prices and household borrowing in future financial crises.

Selection, Leverage, and Default in the Mortgage Market

Abstract We ask whether the correlation between mortgage leverage and default is due to moral hazard (the causal effect of leverage) or adverse selection (ex ante risky borrowers choosing larger loans). We separate these information asymmetries using a natural experiment resulting from the contract structure of option adjustable-rate mortgages and unexpected 2008 divergence of indexes that determine rate adjustments. Our point estimates suggest that moral hazard is responsible for 40$\%$ of the correlation in our sample, while adverse selection explains 60$\%$. We calibrate a simple model to show that leverage regulation must weigh default prevention against distortions due to adverse selection.

Mortgage Leverage and House Prices

I measure the effect of mortgage debt-to-income restrictions on house prices using a change in the eligibility requirements imposed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. I show that in 1999 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s debt-to-income rules diverged, leading to tighter lending standards in places where local lenders had pre-existing relationships with Freddie Mac. Locations with tighter debt-to-income requirements experience an immediate relative reduction in house prices, showing that changes in lending standards have powerful effects. The effect builds over time and leads to a smaller house price boom and bust in these locations during the 2000s.

Credit Cycles with Market Based Household Leverage

We develop a general equilibrium model in which households’ mortgage leverage is determined by supply and demand forces, where the price of credit impacts the quantity of leverage households choose. Mortgages are supplied by financial intermediaries, who offer households a menu of mortgage contracts whose pricing varies with intermediaries’ equity capital. In the model, growth in the demand for safe assets that replicates the falling interest rates in the 2000s causes an empirically realistic boom in household borrowing, debt-financed consumption, and house prices. This boom results in a larger bust in asset prices and household borrowing in future financial crises.

Selection, Leverage, and Default in the Mortgage Market

We ask whether the correlation between mortgage leverage and default is due to moral hazard (the causal effect of leverage) or adverse selection (ex ante risky borrowers choosing larger loans). We separate these information asymmetries using a natural experiment resulting from the contract structure of option adjustable-rate mortgages and unexpected 2008 divergence of indexes that determine rate adjustments. Our point estimates suggest that moral hazard is responsible for 40% of the correlation in our sample, while adverse selection explains 60%. We calibrate a simple model to show that leverage regulation must weigh default prevention against distortions due to adverse selection.

Macroprudential Policy and Household Leverage: Evidence from Administrative Household-Level Data

We analyze the effects of borrower-based macroprudential policy at the household-level. For identification, we exploit administrative Dutch tax-return and property ownership data linked to the universe of housing transactions, and the introduction of a mortgage loan-to-value limit. The regulation reduces mortgage leverage, with bunching in its limit. Ex-ante more-affected households substantially reduce overall leverage and debt servicing costs but consume greater liquidity to satisfy the regulation. Improvements in household solvency result in less financial distress and, given negative idiosyncratic shocks, better liquidity management. However, fewer households transition from renting into ownership. All of these effects are stronger for liquidity-constrained households.

House Price Beliefs And Mortgage Leverage Choice

AbstractWe study the relationship between homebuyers’ beliefs about future house price changes and their mortgage leverage choices. Whether more pessimistic homebuyers choose higher or lower leverage depends on their willingness and ability to reduce the size of their housing market investments. When households primarily maximize the levered return of their property investments, more pessimistic homebuyers reduce their leverage to purchase smaller houses. On the other hand, when considerations such as family size pin down the desired property size, pessimistic homebuyers reduce their financial exposure to the housing market by making smaller downpayments to buy similarly-sized homes. To determine which scenario better describes the data, we investigate the cross-sectional relationship between house price beliefs and mortgage leverage choices in the U.S. housing market. We use plausibly exogenous variation in house price beliefs to show that more pessimistic homebuyers make smaller downpayments and choose higher leverage, in particular in states where default costs are relatively low, as well as during periods when house prices are expected to fall on average. Our results highlight the important role of heterogeneous beliefs in explaining households’ financial decisions.

The Role of Housing and Mortgage Markets in the Financial Crisis

Ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, there is widespread agreement that the boom in mortgage lending and its subsequent reversal were at the core of the Great Recession. We survey the existing evidence, which suggests that inflated house-price expectations across the economy played a central role in driving both the demand for and the supply of mortgage credit before the crisis. The great misnomer of the 2008 crisis is that it was not a subprime crisis but rather a middle-class crisis. Inflated house-price expectations led households across all income groups, especially the middle class, to increase their demand for housing and mortgage leverage. Similarly, banks lent against increasing collateral values and underestimated the risk of defaults. We highlight how these emerging facts have essential implications for policy.

The Leverage Cycle in the Mortgage Market

The recent boom and bust in house prices coincided with a boom and bust in mortgage leverage. At the peak of the boom, regions with the greatest rise in house prices also had the greatest rise in leverage. During the bust, regions with the greatest drop in house prices also had the greatest drop in leverage. During the peak of the housing boom, most highly leveraged borrowers had second mortgages for the portion of the loan with LTV >80%. When house prices began to drop, most second mortgages disappeared.

Does the tax relief for homeownership have effect on household mortgage leverage?

This article presents results of the analysis of the relationship between the tax relief for the homeownership and the household mortgage debt. The advantageous treatment of housing is provided especially by a personal income tax if owner-occupiers do not report imputed rents as income but can deduct mortgage interest costs. This preferred tax status is justifi ed by the existence of positive externalities and a desire to enhance housing opportunities available to citizens. However, evidence that the housing policy via the taxation achieves its objectives is still weak. Moreover the tax provisions for the homeownership benefi t rather higher-income households. Furthermore there are indications that the housing taxation encourages levered property purchases and thus contributes to the household debt growth. Since the household indebtedness can have adverse effects on households and macroeconomic performance we focused on the issue whether the income tax relief for homeowners that fi nance their dwellings via a mortgage does affect the household leverage. We constructed the variable capturing especially the mortgage interest payments deductibility. We employed the multiple regression and data for the former 15 EU member countries (except Greece) for the period 2004-2013. We estimated two models for two representative taxpayers who vary in a family status using the panel data analysis with fi xed effects. From our results we inferred that the income tax relief for the homeownership might not have infl uenced the mortgage leverage signifi cantly in the selected European countries in the given period. The mortgage debt was affected rather by the economic level, price of own housing, mortgage interest payments or demographic structure.

House Price Beliefs and Mortgage Leverage Choice

We study the relationship between homebuyers' beliefs about future house price changes and their mortgage leverage choices. From a theoretical perspective, whether more pessimistic homebuyers choose more or less leverage is ambiguous and depends on their willingness to reduce the size of their housing investment. When households primarily maximize the levered return of their property investment, more pessimistic homebuyers reduce their leverage to purchase smaller houses. On the other hand, when considerations such as family size pin down the desired property size, pessimistic homebuyers reduce their financial exposure to the housing market by making smaller downpayments to buy similarly-sized homes. To determine which scenario better describes the data, we empirically investigate the cross-sectional relationship between beliefs and leverage choices in the U.S. housing market. Our data combine mortgage financing information and a housing market expectations survey with anonymized social network data from Facebook. The survey shows that an individual's belief distribution about future house price changes is affected by the recent house price experiences of her geographically distant friends, allowing us to use these experiences as quasi-exogenous shifters of individuals' house price beliefs. We find that more pessimistic homebuyers make smaller downpayments and choose higher leverage, in particular in states where default costs are relatively low, as well as during periods when house prices are expected to fall on average. Overall, our results provide evidence for an important role of heterogeneous beliefs in explaining individuals' financial decision-making.

The Effects of Macroprudential and Fiscal Policy on Mortgage Debt: Evidence from the Netherlands

This paper studies the effects of LTV limits, PTI limits and the mortgage interest deduction on mortgage debt exploiting a series of policy changes in the Netherlands. As intended, regulatory loan limits reduce mortgage leverage ratios and they also induce bunching at the loan limits. Loan limits and restrictions of the mortgage interest deduction trigger large declines in mortgage volumes. The leverage- and volume responses are larger for young, borrowing-constrained households. The repeal of the mortgage interest deduction for non-amortizing mortgages decimates the market for non-amortizing mortgages. The PTI tightening is also associated with a substantial rise in the fraction of mortgages that have very short periods during which the interest rate is fixed. This unintended risk-shifting pattern to quasi- adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) may increase income risk. The reform of the mortgage interest deduction, which boosts amortization, is also associated with a significant decline in principal amounts at origination. Overall, this paper highlights the distributional effects as well as the unintended potential consequences of macroprudential and fiscal policies aiming to reduce mortgage debt.

Regulating Mortgage Leverage: Fire Sales, Foreclosure Spirals and Pecuniary Externalities

The US housing boom was accompanied by a rise in mortgage leverage. The subsequent bust was accompanied by a rise in foreclosure. This paper introduces a dynamic general equilibrium model to study how leverage and foreclosure affect house prices. The model shows how foreclosure sales, through their effect on housing supply, amplify and propagate house price drops. A calibration to match the bust shows consumption and housing need to be sufficiently complementary to fit the data. Since leverage plays a key role in foreclosure, a regulator can reduce systemic risk by placing a cap on leverage. Counterfactual experiments show that in a world with less leverage, the same economic shock leads to less foreclosure and less severe, shorter busts in house prices. A 90% cap on loan-to-value ratios in 2006 predicts house prices would have fallen 12% rather than 18% as in the data. The regulator faces a trade-off in that less leverage means less housing for constrained households, but also fewer foreclosures and less severe busts in house prices. A regulator with reasonable preference parameters would choose a cap of 95%.

Identifying the determinants of mortgage default in Colombia between 1997 and 2004

This paper examines the relationship between mortgage default decisions and relevant observable variables in Colombia between 1997 and 2004. We estimate a discrete choice model of default using a panel of individual mortgage characteristics and payment information. We show that home prices and debt balances are the main determinants of mortgage default. We account for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity using Survey data and simulation techniques. Including controls for the distribution of income shows that income was not important but helps clarifying the relevance of mortgage leverage in the determination of the observed default rates.