Mortgage Interest Deduction Research Articles

More Tax, Less Refi? The Mortgage Interest Deduction and Monetary Policy Pass-Through

We study how the mortgage interest deduction (MID) affects refinancing. Households who deduct mortgage interest from their taxes face a lower post-tax mortgage rate, reducing the interest savings from refinancing net of taxes. We estimate the effect of the MID on refinancing using the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 as a natural experiment. The TCJA doubled the standard deduction, reducing MID uptake and value. We show that, following the TCJA, the refinancing rate amongst households who lose the MID increased by 25%. Our results suggest that reducing the MID may improve the pass-through of monetary policy when rates fall.

Distribution and use of tax support for housing in the Czech Republic

AbstractThis article focuses on mortgage interest deduction (MID) as an indirect tax support for acquiring one's housing. This form of support is the most widely used in the Czech Republic compared to other tax reliefs and causes the highest losses for the government budget. This paper provides quantitative evidence on how the MID was distributed among taxpayers in the Czech Republic in the period 2008–2019 in relation to taxable income and revenue losses for the government budget. Furthermore, it assesses the effectiveness of these tax measures in reducing socioeconomic inequalities among taxpayers. Research based on the application of the MID in tax returns has shown the effective distribution of the MID until 2017. Tax support for housing was used mainly by taxpayers with low taxable income, which is also the largest group. The essence of vertical equity has been fulfilled, which contributed to reducing the level of social inequality. This positive distributional effect has diminished over time. As of 2019, the highest share of public expenditure was redistributed to taxpayers with higher taxable income, indicating the existence of inequalities in the tax system. The different developments over time have shown that the use of the mortgage interest deduction cannot be assessed statically, as it evolves dynamically over time.

Fiscal policy as credit policy: Homeownership subsidization and the household debt boom

This paper revisits the policy drivers of the substantial household credit boom experienced in recent decades. While existing work has typically pointed to the retreat of the state, deregulating and substituting public safety nets by private credit, this paper brings the focus to the active use by governments of ‘fiscal policy as credit policy’ through homeownership subsidization. In this context, the paper introduces a new unique dataset of 550 homeownership subsidies adjustments in 51 advanced and emerging countries since 1990, which brings two important contributions. First, I show that these fiscal subsidies have been increasingly used since the 1990s and significantly contributed to the easy credit stance up to the global financial crisis in both advanced and emerging countries. Second, using panel fixed effects regressions, I find that these subsidies, and notably mortgage interest deductibility, are indeed significantly associated with household/mortgage credit expansion, with crucial distributional and financial stability implications.

Influence of a Mortgage Interest Deduction on Homeownership Attainment of European Households

This article provides new European evidence about the relation between the much discussed mortgage interest deduction (MID) and homeownership. We also examine which household-group, based on income or marital status, is (mainly) encouraged via this fiscal relief to own a home. To do so, we estimate multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions by using Eurostat EU-statistics on income and living conditions data in twelve countries over 2003-2018. Our quantitative study shows that an MID generally fails to advance its purpose of promoting homeownership, likely due to price capitalization. However, our results underscore that there is (substantial) variation across household groups. From the odds ratios, we conclude that the intended positive effect of an MID on homeownership probability occurs only for the highest-income households; those who need the most help with good-quality affordable housing are the most discouraged via this relief to become a homeowner. Since the continuation of an MID remains one of the contested issues in many national debates, our empirical findings provide useful insights for governments around the world that wish to promote homeownership through tax incentives.

Mortgage interest deductions? Not a bad idea after all

Mortgage interest deductions and other homeownership subsidies are widely believed to be harmful because they redistribute resources from lower-income renters to higher-income homeowners. We argue that renters actually benefit from these policies in general equilibrium for two reasons. First, the rental supply curve is relatively inelastic, which means that rents fall when these policies reduce rental demand. Second, many renters spend most of their income on housing, and these renters gain substantially from rent decreases. We calibrate a quantitative model to match empirical evidence on these factors and show they are strong enough that subsidizing homeownership actually increases welfare.

The geography of mortgage interest deductions

We investigate the heterogeneous impact of the US federal mortgage interest deduction (MID) on households’ location and tenure decisions. We develop a spatial general-equilibrium model featuring non-homothetic preferences in which households can choose whether to claim the MID or a standard tax deduction. Repealing the MID decreases homeownership rates more strongly in central areas because owner-occupiers migrate to the countryside. Welfare increases slightly because positive externalities from less congested housing markets and undistorted tenure decisions outweigh productivity losses in central locations. An increase in standard tax deductions, as implemented in 2018 by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, leads to a similar welfare increase.

Young Households’ Diminishing Access to Homeownership Attainment in Europe

This multi-country article focuses particularly on homeownership among the young. After all, relying on European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data in twelve European countries, we can see that in contrast to the aggregate homeownership rate of ‘all’ households (i.e., no matter what age the households’ heads are) that has remained relatively stable, the aggregate homeownership rate of young households (with heads aged 0–35 years) has fallen substantially in Europe in recent decades. Multiple analyses and quantitative comparisons confirm the stylized fact that acquiring a home has indeed become a challenge for young adult households (also no matter the income quartile in which they fall); rather than that, however, their lowering homeownership rates are simply due to changing sociodemographic characteristics (such as having children later in life and staying longer in education). Moreover, it is unveiled that young tenants and lower income young households are especially disadvantaged with regard to access to the housing market. Through our actual research, we aim to answer the question: Has the government’s fiscal policy strengthened or weakened the declining trend in young people’s homeownership? After all, some evidence exists of an MID having a perverse effect, i.e., capitalizing on higher housing prices. However, multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions reveal that the use of a mortgage interest deduction (MID) has had a significant positive effect on young adults’ homeownership probability—with the strongest effect for the highest incomes. We believe that all the above results are—in the first place—relevant for governments that are willing to stimulate homeownership. They indicate that some (additional) policy interventions are indeed needed, next to or instead of granting an MID, and that the focus of housing policy should also (and more) be on tenants and those with lower incomes.

Who Benefits From Homeowner Tax Preferences?

This paper relies on estimates from a microsimulation model to analyze the distributional impacts of the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing by race and income. Compared to other homeowner tax advantages, which are more equally distributed than tax burdens, the mortgage interest deduction is more unequally distributed than tax burdens. Although current tax policy is more progressive than a tenure-neutral tax policy that treats homeowners and renters the same, a tenure-neutral tax policy yields larger reductions in after-tax income inequality. Among median-income households, white households receive a larger share of homeownership tax benefits than Black households, relative to each racial group’s share of the overall tax burden. Residential location explains the largest portion of the racial gap in the imputed rent exclusion, while household income explains the largest portion of the racial gap in the mortgage interest deduction and capital gains tax exclusion.

The geography of US homeownership tax expenditures

US homeowners receive income tax deductions for mortgage interest payments and state and local property taxes, pay no income tax on their home's imputed rental income, and may exclude most of the capital gains earned from a home sale. This paper characterizes the geographic distribution of the tax expenditures from these tax preferences using a new method that exploits household-level microdata from the 2019 Census Public Use Microdata Sample to simulate homeownership tax expenditures at the Public Use Microdata Area level. I estimate that in the 2018 tax year, $226.05 billion in taxable revenue was lost to the mortgage interest deduction ($28.20 billion), the property tax deduction ($9.51 billion), the exclusion of net imputed rental income ($134.82 billion), and the partial exclusion of housing-related capital gains ($53.52 billion). Large metropolitan areas and neighborhoods with high housing prices receive subsidies in excess of the cost of funding homeowner tax preferences, while the burden of homeowner tax preferences falls heavily on rural areas. If federal income tax law reverted to what existed just prior to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, these geographic disparities would be exacerbated.

Hidden Foreign Aid

Few issues in global politics are as contentious as foreign aid - how much rich countries should give, in what ways, to whom. For years, it has been a commonplace that U.S. policies are stingy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) routinely ranks the United States far behind its industrialized peers in official development assistance (ODA), measured as a percentage of gross national income (GNI). An endless parade of critics has implored the government to do more; some suggest that the Bush Administration's support for the Monterrey Consensus, which sets a goal of increasing assistance to 0.7% of GNI, commits it to do more. Against these allegations of miserliness, executive officials and certain sympathetic scholars have begun to argue that the published statistics are misleading because they fail to account for individual and corporate philanthropy. What the OECD misses, this argument runs, is the exceptional extent of Americans' private generosity. What both sides of the debate have missed, this Article proposes, is not the role of the private sector in generating foreign aid but the role of tax expenditures in subsidizing it. Better known as tax breaks or loopholes, tax expenditures are deviations from the normal tax structure "designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons." They take the form of deductions, exemptions, exclusions, deferrals, credits, or preferential rates. Economically, these "expenditures" may be seen as equivalent to direct government outlays: if U.S. taxpayers saved $70 billion last year from, say, the mortgage interest deduction, the government therefore gave a $70 billion (implicit) subsidy to homeownership. Stanley Surrey pioneered the theory of tax expenditures in the late 1960s, and the concept is now widely, though not universally, credited. Since 1974, Congress has required the annual publication of a tax expenditure budget.

Homeownership and taxes: How the TCJA altered the tax code's treatment of housing

AbstractThe federal government has long promoted homeownership through various provisions in the US income tax code. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) renewed interest and debate about the treatment of housing via the tax code, particularly with respect to the mortgage interest deduction and the limitation on deductions for state and local taxes. We document the extent that the TCJA magnifies the long‐standing unequal treatment of debt and equity financing of homeownership in the tax code. Our analysis indicates that most households no longer benefit from mortgage interest and property tax deductions. We also show how the limitations on the deduction of state and local taxes alter the costs associated with homeownership across geographic areas, and we provide detailed calculations of the average and marginal tax rates at which housing‐related expenses are deducted. The former are relevant to the tenure choice decision, the latter to the quantity demanded decision. Finally, we document that the lost tax savings associated with the inability to benefit from mortgage interest and property tax expenditures are often small relative to the primary tax benefit owners still enjoy: the nontaxation of the return on equity invested in the home.

Implicit Legislative Bias: The Case of the Mortgage Interest Deduction

Implicit Legislative Bias: The Case of the Mortgage Interest Deduction

Implications of a Mortgage Interest Credit for the United States

The US mortgage interest deduction (MID) allows homeowners to deduct the interest paid on their mortgages from their federal tax returns, provided that they itemize deductions. Since the benefit depends on a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, which increases with income, the MID is an “upside-down subsidy” that becomes more valuable for higher-income homeowners. I analyze the implications of converting the US MID to a mortgage interest credit (MIC) and evaluate the effects on federal revenue and the distribution of income. I argue that a MIC could be better targeted at low- and middle-income taxpayers on the margin of homeownership while also being more progressive and less expensive than the current MID.

The influence of a mortgage interest deduction on house prices: evidence across tax systems in Europe

In a large majority of European countries, a tax relief on mortgage interest payments is granted in order to enhance homeownership. Although there is a common belief stating that a mortgage interest deduction (MID) is capitalized into house prices, empirical evidence remains scarce. Therefore, our paper is about the influence of this fiscal relief on house prices. The scope of our analysis includes fourteen European countries, for which an unbalanced panel dataset over the period 1990–2015 is constructed. All our regression results support the hypothesis that a MID has had a significant price-increasing effect in the selected countries over the observed period. However, this result does not hold for a MID in the countries where a dual income tax (DIT) is applied, suggesting a significant difference between tax systems. These results are relevant for governments because there has been much debate about whether and to what extent countries should limit its MID over the last decades.

Do People Respond to the Mortgage Interest Deduction? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Denmark

Using a major reform that scaled back the mortgage interest deduction for middle- and high-income households in Denmark, we study how tax subsidies affect housing decisions. We present four main findings. First, the mortgage deduction has a precisely estimated zero effect on homeownership for high- and middle-income households. Second, the mortgage deduction has a clear effect on housing demand at the intensive margin, inducing homeowners to buy larger and more expensive houses. Third, the deduction has sizeable effects on household financial decisions, inducing them to increase indebtedness. Finally, the reduction of the tax subsidy lowered equilibrium house prices. (JEL G21, G51, H24, K34, R21, R31)

Evolution in the Tax Code: (Almost) the End of Homeowner Tax Savings?

The federal government has long promoted homeownership through various provisions in the U.S. income tax code. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) renewed interest and debate about the treatment of housing via the tax code, particularly with respect to the mortgage interest deduction and the limitation on deductions for state and local taxes. We document the extent that the TCJA magnifies the long-standing anti-mortgage debt bias in the tax code. Our analysis reveals that ongoing discussions about the effects of eliminating the mortgage interest deduction are largely irrelevant because most households no longer benefit from this deduction. We also demonstrate how the limitations on the deduction of state and local taxes alters the costs associated with homeownership across geographic areas, and we provide detailed calculations of the average and marginal tax rates at which housing related expenses are deducted. Finally, we calculate how the major tax benefit of owner-occupied housing — the nontaxation of net implicit rental income varies across income groups and locations.

The Mortgage Interest Deduction: Revenue and Distributional Effects

Conventional estimates of the size and distribution of the mortgage interest deduction (MID) in the personal income tax fail to account for potentially important responses in household behavior, and thus overstate the increase in revenues and the progressivity associated with eliminating the MID. Were the MID to be eliminated, households would sell financial assets to pay down their mortgage debt, and the smaller holdings of these taxable assets would offset some of the revenue gains from taxing mortgage interest. We build on previous work that estimates the consequences of removing the MID using a framework that allows for portfolio rebalancing. Our estimates of the revenue loss of the MID are robust to various assumptions about household rebalancing behavior and the ratio of the conventional estimate to the rebalancing estimate is relatively stable over time. Based on these findings, we provide a rule of thumb for policymakers for estimating behavioral responses to changes in the MID.

There and Back Again: A Commentary on Social Welfare Policy in the Wake of 2020

There and Back Again: A Commentary on Social Welfare Policy in the Wake of 2020

Tax Deductibility, Market Frictions, and Price Discrimination: Evidence from the Mortgage Market.

This study shows that borrowers who benefit from the mortgage interest deduction pay an interest rate that is on average 11.6 basis points higher than that of otherwise similar borrowers. This result implies that mortgage originators capture between 7 to 15 percent of this government subsidy. Consistent with a model of first-degree price discrimination, this additional markup increases with borrowers’ marginal tax rate and with market frictions such as concentration, search cost, and leverage in bargaining. Thus, the study suggests that interest deductibility functions as price support in credit markets characterized by high market frictions.

The Geography of Housing Subsidies

We investigate the heterogeneous impact of the US federal mortgage interest deduction (MID) on households’ location and tenure decisions. We develop a spatial general-equilibrium model at the county level featuring an endogenous itemization of housing subsidies. We find that repealing the MID decreases homeownership rates more strongly in central areas because owner-occupiers migrate to the countryside. Welfare increases because positive externalities arising from less congested housing markets and undistorted tenure decisions outweigh productivity losses. A MID repeal is preferred to an increase of standard tax deductions as implemented in 2018 by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.