Moro National Liberation Front Research Articles

Competing nationalisms, tactical alliances: The Communist Party of the Philippines’ stance on the Bangsamoro struggle during the anti-Marcos resistance

ABSTRACT Focusing on hostile relations between Muslims and Christians, most accounts of secessionism in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao leave out the revolutionary solidarity expressed by a non-Muslim force, the Filipino communist movement, toward the Bangsamoro struggle. Despite their common beginnings during the upsurge of radical struggles during the Global Sixties, historical narratives of the two armed groups are usually discussed separately in the historiography of the martial law period in the Philippines (1972–1986). Using Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) documents from the University of the Philippines Main Library’s Philippine Radical Papers archive, this article interrogates the CPP’s stance on the Bangsamoro struggle as led in the main by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) during the years of the anti-dictatorship resistance. Despite embracing competing nationalisms based on opposed understandings of the character of the Bangsamoro struggle, the CPP endeavored to build tactical alliances in the face of a common enemy in the Marcos dictatorship. Amid the persistence of neocolonial conditions in much of the Global South and rise of neofascist nationalisms today, this vision of solidarity offers important lessons for contemporary struggles on the limits and potentials of “Third World” nationalisms that emerged during the Global Sixties.

Successes and failures of conflict governance: Lessons from Aceh, Indonesia and Moro, Philippines

The purpose of this study is to analyze ethnic conflict management in Aceh (Indonesia) and Moro (Philippines) conflicts. The Aceh conflict was considered resolved after the signing of the Helsinki agreement, which was mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an international NGO based in Finland, on 15 August 2005 between Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Meanwhile, the Moro (Philippines) conflict is still ongoing despite the TRIPOLI agreement signed and mediated by the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on 23 December 1976 and also with the MILF in 2001. This research method uses a qualitative approach. Primary data was obtained through interviews with figures who were considered competent in the Aceh conflict and the Moro conflict. The results of this study show that CMI in Aceh has succeeded in changing the situation of ethnic conflict into a situation that can reduce and reduce escalation and direct conflict actors towards conflict resolution. Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building have been played well by CMI involving the international community such as ASEAN and the European Union to manage the conflict. Meanwhile, in Moro the OIC failed to bring the conflict actors to solve their problems. The Philippine government lacks a robust vision, framework, and the necessary political will to effectively address the Moro conflict, which is of concern to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Legitimising Martial Law: Framing The 1974 Battle of Jolo (Sulu, Philippines) in the Bulletin Today Newspaper

After President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law on 21 September 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim secessionist rebel group based in the Mindanao and Sulu archipelago waged war against the Manila-based government leading to armed clashes with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). One of their most violent battles happened on 7 February 1974, after rebels invaded the town of Jolo, the provincial capital of Sulu in the southern Philippines. With the help of state-controlled media like Bulletin Today, this battle became an avenue for the Marcos dictatorship to legitimise its authoritarian rule. Analysing frames of the Bulletin Today newspaper on the 1974 Battle of Jolo, this study argues that in an authoritarian regime where the government controlled the flow of information, media framing played a crucial role in suppressing the rebellion which aimed to generate support from the public. Through a close reading of Bulletin Today newspaper issues from February to April 1974, this study unpacks how the Marcos-controlled media filtered, fabricated, and censored news and editorial articles to frame the 1974 Battle of Jolo to strengthen the dictator Marcos’ authoritarian legitimacy and image-making project. This study suggests that the Marcos government discredited the MNLF by labelling them as Maoist Muslims. Attaching such connotations to the secessionist group, the regime framed the group as bearers of harmful behaviour and a threat to the goals and values that Filipino society upholds. The Bulletin Today also underlined the competence of the Philippine military and the constabulary in dealing with the crisis. However, the regime also censored pertinent information about the battle, including their role in the bombing and burning of Jolo.

Pemindahan Penduduk Secara Paksa Dalam Konflik Bersenjata Di Filipina Dan Akibat Hukumnya Menurut Hukum Humaniter Internasional

Introduction: Population transfer or displacement is the movement of a large group of people from one area to another, In armed conflict it is often a form of forced migration carried out by state policy or international authorities and most often on ethnic or religious grounds.Purposes of the Research: The purpose of this study is to determine and analyze the regulations prohibiting the forcible transfer of civilians in International Humanitarian Law. To know and analyze the legal impact of forcible transfer of civilians in International Humanitarian Law. Methods of the Research: The research method used in this research is normative juridical. This type of research is descriptive analytical. The sources and legal materials used are primary legal materials, secondary legal materials and tertiary legal materials. The technique of collecting legal materials through literature studies which are then processed and analyzed qualitatively.Results of the Research: The results show that the transfer of civilians in armed conflict to be used as hostages or for the purpose of winning the war at the expense of the civilian population as a living shield is a form of forced migration that is prohibited either by expulsion or other coercive actions from the area where they live without being given a reason permitted by international law. The word coercion here is not limited to physical coercion, but can include threats of violence or psychological pressure (8 paragraph (2) letters (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute and Geneva Convention IV on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). Forced population transfer or migration carried out by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to make civilians as hostages and shields in the non-international armed conflict in the Philippines.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS FOR MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) COMMUNITY IN MAGUINDANAO PROVINCE

This study aims to determine the ARMM programs and projects implementation to MNLF identified communities in the province of Maguindanao during the year periods of 2013 to 2017. Specifically, this study attempts to determine the programs and projects of ARMM to MNLF identified communities; how the implementing offices and agencies of ARMM implement these programs and projects to the MNLF-respondents; the extent of benefits do MNLF respondents have obtained from these programs and projects in terms of: (a) Livelihood (b) Health and (c) education; the problems encountered by the MNLF-respondents during the implementation of these programs and projects; and the prepared alternatives/solutions to these problems. This study further used the combination of “Quantitative and Qualitative” analysis of data. The respondents were the MNLF-Field Commanders and identified MNLF community leaders in Maguindanao Province. The Purposive Sampling was used because only One Hundred Fifty-Six (156) MNLF Commanders and Leaders under Prof. Nur Misuari were used as sample respondents. The findings show that there are serious problems that need to be addressed by the national government on the implementation of the MOU signed by the OIC-GPh-MNLF tripartite process structure to monitor the implementation of the 1996 Peace Agreement and the security, governance, economic activities, including the delivery of social services in the conflict-affected areas. Thus, the government specially, ARMM is tasked to formulate and oversee programs and projects implementation in the cities, provinces and municipalities to improve the lives of the Moros and MNLF combatants regardless of race, tribes and group or faction organization affiliation. Hence as concluded further, various socio-economic activities of the ARMM government found out failed or maybe failed again.
  
 Keywords: Implementation, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Programs and Projects, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Maguindanao Province

The logics of insurgency in the Bangsamoro

ABSTRACT Over sixty years of conflict in the Southern Philippines, between the government and separatist groups, have made Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago an area prone to violence. Armed groups in Bangsamoro and their historical antecedents have often local origins. Even the original rebellion of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) from which the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) emerged, the largest rebel force in the area and current leader of a transition government in the Bangsamoro, was a coalition of armed elements across Mindanao that organized together before becoming a stronger united front. The following article will describe the evolution of the armed rebellion in Mindanao and analyse its subsequent trajectory, proposing four reinforcing lenses to understand the various Moro insurgencies and explain local splintering and contradictions within the rebel movement.

Governmental Capacity and Statehood in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

During the process of achievement of autonomy through peaceful negotiation, started in the 1970s, such political formation as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established. Nevertheless, this process was accompanied by inner disturbances: clashes, popular unrest and terrorist attacks. The politically active part of the Moro people was divided into groups consisted of supporters of various measures - from moderately liberal to extremely radical. Although nowadays the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 1 and Abu Sayyaf 2 represent diametrically opposed positions, since MNLF is a Philippine government‘s ally, while Abu Sayyaf is a terroristic group, they originated from common source and share the discontent around the existing order towards the Moro people in the Philippines. In spite of the fact that autonomy of ARMM was extended, the significant part of its Moro population is still seeking for an ultimate separation from the Philippines. On the one hand, decentralization and autonomy includes a number of benefits, e.g. , ―increased public sector efficiency, accountability, and effectiveness, increased citizen participation, local ownership, and durable peace‖ 3. On the other hand, an abrupt separation can lead to institutional disarray, economic decline, deterioration of social problems, and even anarchy, unless the separated territory is prepared to the self-government. In that context ―being prepared‖ implies conforming the criteria of the state (or approaching to them) and having corresponding own institutions to manage the political formation self-sufficiently. Depending on the approach of understanding of the state, the last condition can be included in its criteria.

Writing Malaysia and the Moro Identity: An Analysis of the Moro National Liberation Front’s Foreign Policy

Writing Malaysia and the Moro Identity: An Analysis of the Moro National Liberation Front’s Foreign Policy

THE MUSLIM MORO CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES: EFFECTS ON PHILIPPINES-MALAYSIA BILATERAL TIES, 1970-2010

This article aims to examine the rebellion in the southern Philippines carried out by the Moro Islamic community and the impacts that have shaped bilateral ties between the Philippines and Malaysia between 1970 and 2010. Malaysia was brought into the turbulence of conflict as a large influx of Muslim refugees fled from the Philippines to Sabah, Malaysia due to the rebellion in Mindanao and in the Sulu archipelago. During the height of the conflict in the 1970s, Muslim refugees and illegal migrants predominantly comprising of the Suluk and Bajau ethnic groups, entered Sabah in large numbers. Their influx sparked security, financial, social and economic problems in Sabah. The Philippine government accused the Sabah Chief Minister at the time for harbouring the Islamic separatists. This article also discusses Malaysia’s commitment to negotiations as a third party facilitator in the peace process between the government of the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).Keywords: Moro, MNLF, MILF, refugees, third party facilitator

From “bandit” to “Amir”—The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf Group as a Jihadi Organization in the Philippines

While terrorism and violence tend to move in parallel, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has brought this to new heights in its quest to attain an Islamic State in southern Philippines. Though small compared to other Islamist organizations, namely the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, its violent acts—kidnapping, beheading of hostages, among others—have more than made up for its size. In fact, it has been the most brutal terrorist movement in the Philippines. Partly due to this and the allegiance of its leadership to the equally brutal transnational terrorist group, Islamic State, its leader Isnilon Hapilon was designated as the Amir of Southeast Asia. The group was responsible for the Marawi Siege, which ran for five months from May to October 2017, and is considered the worst terrorist‐linked bloodbath in the country. The deaths of pro‐Islamic State leaders such as Hapilon are unlikely to change this key DNA of the ASG and of terrorism in the Philippines in the near future.

Consequences of Excluding Armed Groups from Peace Negotiations: Chad and the Philippines

Abstract This article examines the relationship between inclusion/exclusion of armed groups and the achievement of durable peace, using process tracing in two case studies: the peace process between the government of Chad and the rebel group Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad, and the one between the government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front. The cases support theoretical arguments that excluded armed actors are more likely to renew armed confrontation after the peace accord. The study further elaborates the causal link: included armed rebels tend to negotiate for private benefits such as government posts and amnesty but also moderate their stances and emerge committed to the agreement; excluded armed actors lack any such commitment and still have unresolved grievances. They are thus more likely to renew armed action against the government.

Moro Muslims In Southern Phillippines: The Rise of Abu Sayyaf and the Genealogy of Conflict In Southeast Asia


 The main problem of Moro Muslims in Southern Philippines are now the right to self-determination but it also include poverty, underdevelopment, low education, unemployment, discrimination, and violent conflict. Upon the Spanish colonization for more than three centuries (1521-1898), the Moros were controlled by the United States for almost five decades (1898-1942). Japan colonised them for three years before they were integrated to the Republic of Philippines in 1946. Their struggle for independence still continues today represented by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), establihsed in the late 1960s and led by Nur Misuari, and by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) led by Salamat Hasyim in 1981. The birth of the MILF was a response to dissatisfaction with the MNLF that was considered less assertive in fighting for Bangsamoro's rights and too accommodative to the Philippine government. In early 1990s, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) led by Abdulrajak Janjalani emerged to respond the situation. In later development, it rises to become a prominent group involved in a long-standing conflict and terror in this landmark of Southeast Asia region.

Peacebuilding Model of Third-Party Mediation in the Philippines: Comparing Malaysia and the OIC

Many nation-states have increasingly found themselves in a situation where they are unable to sort out their domestic conflicts without third party mediation. This is particularly true for a country like the Government of the Philippines (GPH) who has been fighting violent protracted internal conflicts for many decades against Bangsamoro revolutionary groups. Therefore, with respect to the above, the purpose of this article is to compare peacebuilding models of third party mediation to the Bangsamoro conflicts with particular focus between Malaysia and the Organization of Islamic Conference, presently Cooperation (OIC). Its approach is primarily an eclectic, by concentrating on the strengths and weaknesses of the peacebuilding models of the third party mediation as employed by both Malaysia and OIC. The article is divided into two major parts. The first part discussed both Malaysia and OIC’s diplomatic approaches in dealing with the Bangsamoro conflict, while the second part explained inclusivity versus exclusivity of both Malaysia and the OIC respectively. The study found that Malaysia’s model is more durable and successful when compared to OIC’s. In fact, Malaysia’s quiet diplomacy and less confrontational approach with greater inclusivity were more effective compared to elitist and confrontational approach of the OIC’s mediation to the Bangsamoro conflicts. Indeed, the Government of the Philippines and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (GPH-MILF) peace process is one of the most inclusive peace processes in the world. It may have some who were left out in the peace process, but they were all consulted by both Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as opposed to OIC mediated Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (GRP-MNLF) peace negotiations. Therefore, it is pertinent to conclude that there is nothing that resembles the inclusivity of the GPH-MILF peace process that characterized the exclusivity of the GRP-MNLF peace process.

The Moro National Liberation Front Combatants Experiences on Integration to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine National Police

The study was conducted in order to identify important aspects of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Combatants experiences during the integration process in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine national Police. Specifically on defining the MNLF experiences reintegration without disarmament and demobilization and also assessing the elements that contributed to the integrees’ satisfaction in the integration process. The study was conducted at the cities of Cotabato, Marawi, and Tacurong and the municipalities of Parang, and Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao. There were one hundred selected respondents coming from different units of the AFP and PNP. The descriptive qualitative method of research was employed. Interview and focus group discussion and document analysis were the principal techniques for data gathering. The interview guide schedule was used to gather data on respondents’ profile, problems encountered, and policy drawn from the study. Findings show that the experiences of the respondents particularly on emotional feelings during the selection process were excitement, apprehension, fear and surprise. Other experiences of the respondents during the selection process were hardship in obtaining and accessing of personal documents and lack of educational qualification. Methodologies of the training were easy for the MNLF integrees and they were satisfied with the performance of their trainers. Support from the national Government are Continuing Education Program, livelihood program, provision of arms, ammunition and other combat paraphernalia and training program. Finally, the peace brought about by the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) including MNLF integration, was only tentative. It was effective in the MNLF areas of South Western Mindanao not in MILF-controlled areas in central Mindanao.

Philippines: In Search for Self-Determination. The Political History and Armed Struggle of the Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao

Philippines: In Search for Self-Determination. The Political History and Armed Struggle of the Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao

ISIS Defeat In The Middle East: It's Impact On The Increase Of ISIS Power In The Southeast Asia (Case Study: The Increasing Number Of ISIS Member In Indonesia)

This study intended to discover on the increase of number of Islamic States and Syria (ISIS) member in Indonesia. Post ISIS defeat their existence in Middle East, it caused ISIS tried to expand their influenced and began to build other region, such as Southeast Asia as their base of struggle. This article has focused on how to impact the increasing of ISIS in the Philippines to Indonesia, especially is Marawi. We analyzed from border aspect because Marawi is the nearest border with Indonesia’s territory. The existence of ISIS in Indonesia was also inseparable from the strengthening of ISIS in Marawi, Southern Philippines. ISIS in Marawi is challenging to be paralyzed by the Philippine Government. Although President Duterte is going to crush ISIS in Philippine within a year, if Philippines prefer to fight ISIS by itself, without cooperation with another state in South East Asia region, it may lack on the probability of the mission tend to gain success. In fact, ISIS Philippines as a part of a group of which afiliated with the MNLF Movement (Moro National Liberation Front), MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and Abu Sayyaf. They have bailed out at ISIS after the MNLF made several deals with the government and the Abu Sayyaf suffered a lot. There are some subsections in this paper, first, analyze on ISIS and factors caused the increase the number of ISIS member in Indonesia. Second, in regards the territorial border among Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, we applied terms of cooperative security, to analyze to what extent this states could improve their strategy for strengthening border security to avoid ISIS spread their power in this territory.

When Peace Leads to Divorce: The Splintering of Rebel Groups in Powersharing Agreements

While research has already focused on power-sharing agreements by assessing specific effects of political, economic, territorial and military provisions, some provisions might be more important than others. This paper argues that the content of an agreement is crucial for the cohesion of a signatory rebel group since these are strongly affected by resource-distribution and the way in which the underlying conflict is managed. Investigating on the Free Aceh Movement and the Moro National Liberation Front, this study concludes that the implementation of power-sharing is decisive. When inner-core provisions and single factions are addressed, groups tend to stay united.

Ulamas' and Professionals' Perceptions on the Islamic Inheritance Law under P.D. 1083

The study was undertaken primarily to determine the perceptions of Ulamas and professionals on the level of awareness or knowledge and the level of acceptance of the Islamic Inheritance Law as codified in the Muslim Code of the Philippines. Using quantitative -qualitative methods, the 478 respondents Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, starting in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, including Moro National Liberation Front (MILF)-controlled territory, up to Zamboanga del Sur, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi participated the wide-range survey. Questionnaire, interview, focus group discussion, and observation were utilized in gathering the data. It was found that the respondents' level of awareness or knowledge on the Islamic Inheritance Law was only moderate. However, their knowledge of the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah as the primary sources of the law garnered a high level of awareness. As revealed in the interviews and focus group discussions, the overall moderate acceptance of the law is attributed to certain factors that could be broadly categorized into two sets: external and internal. A positive link between the respondents' level of awareness/knowledge and their level of acceptance of the Islamic Inheritance Law was found. This implies that an increase in the level of awareness may bring about an increase in the level of acceptance of the law.

Civil war interventions and their benefits: unequal return

Chapter One: Introduction: The Syrian Case Chapter Two: The Benefits of Civil War Intervention Chapter Three: El Salvador and Cold War Chapter Four: The Moro National Liberation Front and the Philippine Government Chapter Five: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Minority in the Eelam War I (1983-1987) Chapter Six: Conclusion: Benefits for the few?

Not Enough Pieces of the Cake? The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the Mindanao Final Agreement

Civil wars frequently end with the signature of a peace agreement, which often includes power-sharing provisions. While most research focuses on their provisions, little research has been done on the question of how the content of peace agreements affects the groups signing them. Instead, research commonly depicts the conflict parties as unitary actors. This study tries to fill this research gap by asking how the content and implementation of the Mindanao Final Agreement affected the cohesion of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The analysis concludes that the implementation of power sharing is decisive. The failed inclusion and the low implementation of economic and territorial provisions had major effects on the cohesion of the MNLF.