Moral Testimony Research Articles

Appealing to consequences, or authority? The influence of explanations on children's moral judgments across two cultures

Recent research shows that children's moral judgments can be influenced by testimony, but it remains unclear whether certain types of testimony are more influential than others. Here we examined two specific types of moral testimony - one that appealed to the authority of the speaker and one that appealed to the consequence of the action - and measured how each type of testimony moved children's judgments about harm. Chinese (N = 181; 45.3 % girls; all ethnically Chinese, middle-class) and U.S children (N = 198; 55.6 % girls; predominantly White, middle-class) were presented with countervailing testimony that justified novel, distress-inducing actions as acceptable, either by appealing to the speaker's authority or by reasoning about the positive consequences of the action. Both types of explanations significantly influenced children's moral judgments, leading children from both cultures to judge harm-related actions as more morally permissible. However, with age, children across both cultures became less receptive towards authority-based explanations. Neither type of explanation affected adults' (N = 180, recruited online from across China and the U.S.) moral judgments. Together, these findings provide developmental evidence on the types of explanations that influence children's moral judgments about actions that cause harm.

Moral testimony and epistemic privilege

AbstractHow should we, as philosophers, respond to the pure moral testimony of people in marginalized positions? Some philosophers argue that marginalized people have an epistemic advantage concerning their experiences of marginalization, such that, if we are non‐marginalized, then we should defer to their moral testimony concerning these experiences. We might accept this as a requirement for ordinary conversation but doubt that any such requirement obtains when we do philosophy, since philosophy requires a critical stance. This paper argues that philosophers should also defer in such cases. It concludes that non‐marginalized philosophers can only properly address certain moral propositions concerning the experiences of marginalized people if they engage in ongoing philosophical discussions with such people, starting from a position of trust.

The development of intent-based trust in moral testimony

Research has shown that by age 5–6 years, children fully integrate information about agents’ mental states into their verbal moral judgments: When asked to say whether an agent is morally good or bad, they rely on the agent’s intentions more than on its action’s outcomes. Research has also shown that from an early age, children use a plethora of social and moral cues when deciding whom to trust in learning and testimony situations. Here, for the first time, we asked if and how children’s trust in informants who relay information about the moral character of a novel agent is influenced by the valence of the intentions underlying the informants’ prior actions. Italian children aged 6 to 10 years (n = 219, 112 female) were first presented with two puppets and asked to judge them. One puppet accidentally caused harm (neutral intention, negative outcome), the other attempted but failed to do so (negative intention, neutral outcome). Next, the puppets gave contrasting testimonies about whether a novel agent was good or bad. Findings revealed that the tendency to trust the assessment of the well-intentioned puppet concerning the novel agent emerged at age 8, whereas younger children simply showed to believe that the novel agent was good, regardless of the testimonies they received. These results suggest that despite the ability to generate intent-based moral judgments emerges at age 5–6, the tendency to rely on intentions underlying past actions of informants when assessing informants’ testimonies about the moral character of a third party undergoes significant change in childhood.

Deference or critical engagement: how should healthcare practitioners use clinical ethics guidance?

Healthcare practitioners have access to a range of ethical guidance. However, the normative role of this guidance in ethical decision-making is underexplored. This paper considers two ways that healthcare practitioners could approach ethics guidance. We first outline the idea of deference to ethics guidance, showing how an attitude of deference raises three key problems: moral value; moral understanding; and moral error. Drawing on philosophical literature, we then advocate an alternative framing of ethics guidance as a form of moral testimony by colleagues and suggest that a more promising attitude to ethics guidance is to approach it in the spirit of ‘critical engagement’ rather than deference.

Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy

Testimony of oppression is testimony that something constitutes or contributes to a form of oppression, such as, for example, “The stranger’s comment was sexist.” Testimony of oppression that is given by members of the relevant oppressed group has the potential to play an important role in fostering a shared understanding of oppression. Yet, it is frequently dismissed out of hand. Against the background of a recent debate on moral testimony, this paper discusses the following question: How should privileged hearers approach testimony of oppression if they aim to do so in an ethically and epistemically sound way? Should they defer or try to understand? Both strategies constitute ways of learning from testimony of oppression. However, they differ in important respects and exclude each other. Because testimony of oppression is often based on personal experience, empathizing with the speaker can play an important role in trying to understand testimony of oppression. While the fact that empathy can change your mind and the advantages of understanding over knowledge support trying to understand as the right approach to testimony of oppression, considerations of the “limits of empathy” and the value of deference support deferring. I argue that, on balance, these contrasting arguments allow for a limited defense of the role of empathy in learning from testimony of oppression. We should try to understand testimony of oppression by empathizing with the speaker, but not treat our ability to understand as a condition on accepting a speaker’s claim.

Show, Don’t Tell: Emotion, Acquaintance and Moral Understanding Through Fiction

Abstract This paper substantiates a distinction, built out of Gricean resources, between two kinds of communicative act: showing and telling. Where telling that p proceeds by recruiting an addressee’s capacity to recognize trustworthy informants, showing does not. Instead, showing proceeds by presenting an addressee with a consideration that provides reason to believe that p (other than the reason provided by an informant’s credibility), and so recruits their capacity to respond to those reasons. With this account in place, the paper defends an account of one way in which authors can show their readers that certain moral states of affairs obtain both inside, and outside of, their fictions. It is argued, moreover, that this kind of showing gives addressees access to more than just reasons for moral belief–it also gives them access to the sorts of reasons that enable agents to increase their moral understanding. In virtue of these latter capacities, the showing identified is a way of communicating about morality that is markedly different from the sort of moral testimony that many philosophers have been increasingly interested in of late.

MEDIA AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION BASED ON LOCAL WISDOM IN COVID 19 DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN SUMENEP DISTRICT

The purpose of this study was to find out how social and media construction was built as part of the early Covid-19 mitigation efforts by the Sumenep district government and how the institutional role of volunteer groups in efforts to cope with the Covid-19 disaster in Sumenep district. This research is a qualitative-descriptive research by taking the research subject of person and paper. The subjects of the paper are written documents in the form of legislation or other library materials that have relevance to the research data, while the subject persons are stakeholders and community groups at the research location (Batang-Batang and Bluto). The results of this study indicate that the handling of the Covid 19 disaster in Sumenep Regency was carried out with several steps including 1) strengthening community involvement through coordination meetings with village heads, community leaders and leaders of religious organizations, 2) stimulus policies in the form of giving gifts to the community (sembako, and door prizes). , 3) involvement of ulama figures through moral testimony, 4) pick-up technique for villagers

Discursive Integrity and the Principles of Responsible Public Debate

This paper articulates a general distinction between two important communicative ideals—expressive sincerity and discursive integrity—and then uses it to analyze problems with political debate in contemporary democracies. In the context of philosophical discussions of different forms of trustworthiness and debates about deliberative democracy, self-knowledge, and moral testimony, the paper develops three arguments for the conclusion that, although expressive sincerity is valuable, we should not ignore discursive integrity in thinking about how to address problems with contemporary political debate. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of a strategy for improving discursive integrity within public political debate by reflecting on which principles of responsible public debate would promote better democratic decision making.

Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance

ABSTRACT I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts—Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy—fail. Having argued for these claims, I propose a new pessimist alternative.

Moral Testimony and Re-Conceived Understanding: A Reply to Callahan

Abstract In the article ‘Moral Testimony: A Re-Conceived Understanding Explanation’, Callahan argues that her re-conceived view of understanding can explain the issue with deference to moral testimony better than the more traditional understanding-based accounts. In this paper, I argue that Callahan fails to give a more successful explanation of the problem with moral testimony for two reasons. First, I argue that Callahan fails to adequately prove her claim that deference to testimony disincentivizes her re-conceived understanding. Second, I take issue with Callahan's claim that this re-conceived understanding is distinctly important in the moral domain. I also offer a more promising route for Callahan to take in explaining the problem with moral testimony.

Moral Testimony, Knowledge and Understanding

AbstractThis article explains why relying on moral testimony leaves an agent short of moral understanding. Hills’ version of that thesis and Sliwa’s contrary thesis are criticised, and their whole debate about whether moral knowledge is necessary and sufficient for moral understanding is found questionable. Following a line of thinking in Gaita’s philosophy, the assumption that the object of moral understanding must be a true proposition is rebutted and a more personal approach to moral understanding is developed. Relying on testimony for your moral beliefs leaves you short of moral understanding because you fail to make the beliefs your own.

Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony

AbstractRecent discussions of moral testimony have focused on the acceptability of forming beliefs on the basis of moral testimony, but there has been little acknowledgement of the limits to testimony's capacity to convey moral knowledge. In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot be testimonially acquired.

On the Moralization of Moral Theory

Abstract In the concluding lines of Part Three of The Claim of Reason, Stanley Cavell writes: ‘If the moralist is the human being who best grasps the human position, teaches us what our human position is, better than we know, in ways we cannot escape but through distraction and muddle, then our first task in subjecting ourselves to judgment is to tell the moralist from the moralizer’ (Cavell 1979, hereafter ‘CR’, p. 326). Cavell then proceeds to characterize the moralizer as one who is ‘speaking in the name of a position one does not occupy, confronting others in positions of which one will not imagine the acknowledgement’ (CR, p. 326). Beginning with an exposition of Cavell’s notion of ‘moral position’, I will offer an interpretation of the distinction he draws between the moralist and the moralizer; I will then explain how the moral philosopher’s (attempted) use of morally significant words may come to resemble the moralizer’s; and then I will argue that contemporary English-speaking moral philosophy as represented by the recent debates concerning ‘moral testimony’, or ‘moral deference’, has been failing its moralist aspirations, and that, by Cavell’s lights, the morality reflected in those debates is, in essence, that of the moralizer.

Guided by Voices. Moral Testimony, Advice, and Forging a ‘We’

Guided by Voices. Moral Testimony, Advice, and Forging a ‘We’

McGrath, Sarah. Moral Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 240. $65.00 (cloth).

McGrath, Sarah. <i>Moral Knowledge</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 240. $65.00 (cloth).

Remembering what is right

According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle’s on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather than moral epistemology. That is because it is best explained by appeal to claims about the constitution of moral knowledge as a state of mind, rather than requirements on belief formation. The paper also provides reason to suspect that the focus on testimony is something of a red herring.

First-Personal Moral Testimony: a Defence

Several authors have discussed and defended what is sometimes called the Asymmetry Thesis in social epistemology: that while reliance on testimony is essentially incontrovertible in epistemology, it is uniquely problematic for moral knowledge. This conclusion results, I argue, from considering the wrong sort of moral testimony: namely, ‘third-personal’ rather than ‘first-personal’ testimony. First-personal moral testimony is an inescapable part of the constitution of legitimate moral norms, and its role cannot be deflated as a form of mere information to be taken up in private deliberation. The consequences of this argument for forms of hypothetical contractualism, in particular, are profound.

Moral Understanding and Cooperative Testimony

AbstractIt is has been argued that there is a problem with moral testimony: testimony is deferential, and basing judgments and actions on deferentially acquired knowledge prevents them from having moral worth. What morality perhaps requires of us, then, is that we understand why a proposition is true, but this is something that cannot be acquired through testimony. I argue here that testimony can be both deferential as well as cooperative, and that one can acquire moral understanding through cooperative testimony. The problem of moral testimony is thus not a problem with testimony generally, but a problem of deferential testimony specifically.

Why don't we trust moral testimony?

AbstractIs there a problem with believing based on moral testimony? The intuition that there is a problem is a starting point for much research on moral testimony. To arbitrate between various attempts to account for intuitions about moral testimony, we need to know the exact nature of those intuitions. The current study investigates this empirically. The study confirms an asymmetry in the way we think about testimony about moral and descriptive matters and explores the extent to which this asymmetry is explained by different metaphysical beliefs about the relevant domains, or beliefs about the relative background levels of deception or disagreement.

VI—Should We Believe Philosophical Claims on Testimony?

AbstractThis paper considers whether we should believe philosophical claims on the basis of testimony in light of related debates about aesthetic and moral testimony. It is argued that we should not believe philosophical claims on testimony, and different explanations of why we should not are considered. It is suggested that the reason why we should not believe philosophical claims on testimony might be that philosophy is not truth-directed.