Moral Properties Research Articles

Seeing Wrongness

Abstract This paper examines the plausibility of an attention-based version of moral perceptualism (amp). According to amp, our perception of moral properties is characterized by perceptual attentional patterns that reflect a sensitivity to morally salient features. First, I argue that the explanation for the empirical evidence offered to support amp primarily hinges on cognitive processes rather than perceptual ones. Second, while I acknowledge the critical importance of attention in recognizing moral properties, I contend that we must expand amp’s explanatory scope to address the question of what drives this attention. I propose an account of our (in)sensitivity to wrongness that builds on amp’s core statement. In this account, the notion of salience structure of information, defined by the varying accessibility of both perceptual and cognitive representations, plays a central explanatory role.

The study of value orientations of modern Kazakhstani youth as the main determinant of a changing person in a changing world

Despite the strengthening of the world globalization processes accompanied by the development of individualistic values and devaluation of basic values, today we witness that contrary to this there is a strengthening of universal values, primarily related to the increase of spirituality in general. In our opinion, this paradox is caused, first of all, by the events that are taking place in the world today - coronovirus, military actions unleashed by Russia, various natural cataclysms and others. This leads not only to the actualization of the study of value orientations, but also to a change in the paradigm of their research. The study of the peculiarities of value orientations of modern youth is of particular importance, since it is demanded by the actual requirements of the social situation of development of the changing personality of the new generation, formed at the turn of the century - XX and XXI, having no experience of Soviet education and upbringing. Object of the research: students studying at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. Empirical base of the study: Kazakh National University named after Al-Farabi. The study involved 131 students (1-4 courses) studying at the Faculty of Philosophy and Political Science (FPS). The conducted research showed that modern Kazakhstani students (by the example of students of KazNU named after Al-Farabi) have developed more values of Self-Transcendence (Self-Transcendence), including universalism and kindness. The formed values fully manifest themselves in the sphere of moral consciousness, moral actions and personal moral (spiritual) properties, which is confirmed by statistically revealed interrelations. The scientific and practical significance of the study lies in the fact that its results reflect, on the one hand, the formation and ongoing transformation of values in modern youth, on the other hand - the conflict between the way things should be and the way they want to be, what guidelines are set by external social reality. Consequently, the value orientations of modern Kazakhstani students are conditioned by the social situation of development of a changing personality in a changing world.

The Separability Thesis

Abstract Debates over the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties have persisted for decades in Aesthetics. One question that consistently arises in any discussion of aesthetic properties is whether they are fundamentally evaluative or descriptive in character. Aesthetic properties are often treated as parallel to moral properties which means many philosophers take it for granted that aesthetic properties are fundamentally evaluative. There are some philosophers, like Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson, who take the road less traveled and treat aesthetic properties as primarily descriptive in character. In this paper, I outline Levinson’s intriguing view that the evaluative aspect of an aesthetic property can be canceled leaving us with the descriptive essence of the property. I refer to this as the separability thesis. It contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the property. I go on to defend the separability thesis from a powerful challenge developed by Rafael De Clercq. Ultimately, I contend that while De Clercq’s argument is clever and insightful it fails to undermine the separability thesis.

What Attentional Moral Perception Cannot Do but Emotions Can

Jonna Vance and Preston Werner argue that humans’ mechanisms of perceptual attention tend to be sensitive to morally relevant properties. They dub this tendency “Attentional Moral Perception” (AMP) and argue that it can play all the explanatory roles that some theorists have hoped moral perception can play. In this article, I argue that, although AMP can indeed play some important explanatory roles, there are certain crucial things that AMP cannot do. Firstly, many theorists appeal to moral perception to explain how moral knowledge is possible. I argue that AMP cannot put an agent in a position to acquire moral knowledge unless it is supplemented with some other capacity for becoming aware of moral properties. Secondly, theorists appeal to moral perception to explain “moral conversions”, i.e., cases in which an experience leads an agent to form a moral belief that conflicts with her pre-existing moral beliefs. I argue that AMP cannot explain this either. Due to these shortcomings, theorists should turn to emotions for a powerful and psychologically realistic account of virtuous agents’ sensitivity to the moral landscape.

Naturalising Moral Naturalism

Naturalist moral realists seem to have landed themselves a raw metaethical deal. Insofar as they identify moral properties in something external to human agents, they struggle to account for the deep practical hold that moral considerations have upon us, and stand accused of failing to take morality seriously as a normative phenomenon. And insofar as their method of identifying which natural properties are the moral ones is fairly permissive, they seem to over-generate admissible moralities, classifying as permissible a range of behaviours that we regard as morally perverse. In this paper, I argue that naturalist moral realists can make progress in addressing both concerns by drawing upon a variety of empirical resources. The former problem is mitigated by paying closer attention to deep-rooted features of human sociality, and by focusing upon the ways in which moral norms themselves build upon affective response. The force of the latter challenge is diminished once we appreciate that the naturalist can distinguish good moral norms from dreadful ones on principled grounds. None of this entails that the naturalist moral realist is home and dry. However, my arguments do suggest that her opponents strongly underestimate the resources at her disposal.

A Dilemma for Theistic Non-Naturalism

Non-naturalism is the view that there are sui generis, non-natural moral properties. This paper poses a dilemma for theists who accept this view. Either God explains why non-moral properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties obtain, or God does not explain this. If the former, then God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness. If the latter, then God’s sovereignty, stature, and importance are undermined, and an unacceptable queerness is introduced into the world. This paper concludes that theists have good reasons to reject non-naturalism on account of the unacceptable consequences of accepting either horn.

Moralisation of medicines: The case of hydroxychloroquine

The concept of moralisation of health behaviours was introduced in social psychology to describe the attribution of moral properties to habits and conditions like smoking or being a vegetarian. Moral properties are powerful motivators for people and institutions, as they may trigger blame, stigma, and appraisal, as well as the polarisation of interest and scientific hype. Here I extend the concept and illustrate how medicines and treatments can be seen as if they had moral properties, too, when they come to be regarded as good or bad in the moral sense, and not just in the instrumental sense of benefiting or harming health. I propose the hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) controversy of 2020 as an example of moralisation of a medicine. HCQ and chloroquine are anti-malarial drugs, whose off-label use for Covid-19 was hotly discussed in the early months of the pandemic, both in the media and within the scientific community, and eventually dismissed when robust evidence came out. The point of the paper is to show that moralisation of health products and treatments may influence individual and institutional decisions in significant ways, and also affect research. For these reasons, it should be carefully monitored and critically assessed.

Can Rational Reflection Save Moral Knowledge from Debunking?

AbstractIn this essay, I reply to an influential objection to evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism. According to this objection, our capacity for autonomous rational reflection allows us to grasp moral truths independently of distorting evolutionary influences, so those influences do not prevent us from having moral knowledge. I argue that rational moral reflection is not, in fact, autonomous from evolutionary influences, since it depends on our evolved, pre-reflective grasp of moral properties. I then consider and reject the suggestion that realists can supply an autonomous foundation for rational moral reflection or do without any such foundation. Next, I address the allegation that my arguments have skeptical implications for rational reflection in non-moral domains. Finally, I conclude with a gesture toward a more promising route for realists who oppose debunking arguments.

How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?

According to contentful moral perception (CMP), moral properties can be perceived in the same sense as tables, tigers, and tomatoes. Recently, Heather Logue (2012) has distinguished between two potential ways of perceiving a property. A Kantian Property (KP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access involves a detection of the property via a representational vehicle. A Berkeleyan Property (BP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access to the property involves that property as partly constitutive of the experience itself. In this paper, I set aside generalized arguments in favor of one view or another, and instead ask whether proponents of CMP have reasons to understand moral perception as Kantian or Berkeleyan. I explore three possible explanatory differences—(a) explaining the intrinsic motivating force of moral perceptions, (b) providing a metasemantics for moral properties, and (c) providing an epistemology of the normative authority of moral properties.

Percepción Moral y Conocimiento Práctico en el Estoicismo

In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.

Too-Many-Oids: The paradox in constructing an organoid ethics framework

Background: The field of organoid ethics is complex and multifaceted, and the need for flexibility and adaptability in the face of its moral complexity is of great importance. Certain kinds of organoids may be deemed morally controversial due to their intrinsic characteristics (e.g., brain organoids, embryoids, or organoid intelligence models) and debates are underway over their possible moral standing. Furthermore, different domains of organoid applications, such as transplantation, precision medicine, or disease modeling have fundamentally different moral concerns. Methods: In this paper, we argue that it is a mistake and near impossible to develop an overarching, all-in-one ethical framework that can sufficiently cover the myriad of organoid moral contexts. We first identify different ontological categories of organoid technologies along with morally problematic properties. We then present different moral contexts in which the organoid technologies are applied. Results: Constructing an organoid ethics framework that can both consider all the relevant moral properties and contexts, and be a useful ethical lens for moral examination may lead to a paradox; the more relevant moral contexts the framework tries to incorporate, the more abstract and less useful the framework becomes. Conclusions: It may be more useful for bioethicists to take on more collaborative and contextual approaches for organoids ethics.

Between the Placement Problem and the Reconciliation Problem. Philosophical Naturalism Today

Scientific naturalism—the conception according to which the natural sciences, and possibly physics alone, set the limits of ontology and epistemology—is characterized by a strong monistic tendency. For this reason, all versions of scientific naturalism face the so-called “placement problem”, which concerns the features of the ordinary view of the world that, at least prima facie, do not fit into the scientific view of the world (think of consciousness, moral properties, free will, and intentionality). To address this problem, scientific naturalists use three strategies: reductionism, eliminativism, and mysterianism—none of which, it is argued, produces satisfying results. Liberal naturalism opts instead for a pluralistic attitude in both ontology and epistemology but accepts a constraint according to which one should accept no entity or explanation that is incompatible with the scientific worldview. Liberal naturalism faces the “reconciliation problem”, which concerns the relationship between the scientific and the ordinary views of the world once one denies ontological and epistemological priority to either of them. Three strategies for addressing this problem are presented: according to the first, the ordinary worldview and the scientific world are categorically distinct; according to the second, the former emerges from the latter; according to the third, between them there is a relation of global supervenience. Other objections to liberal naturalism are finally presented and addressed.

Toward a Perceptual Solution to Epistemological Objections to Nonnaturalism

Stance-independent nonnaturalist moral realism is subject to two related epistemological objections. First, there is the metaethical descendant of the Benacerraf problem. Second, there are evolutionary debunking arguments. Standard attempts to solve these epistemological problems have not appealed to any particular moral epistemology. The focus on these epistemologically neutral responses leaves many interesting theoretical stones unturned. Exploring the ability of particular theories in moral epistemology to handle these difficult epistemological objections can help illuminate strengths or weaknesses within these theories themselves, as well as opening up potentially unexplored avenues for responding to deeply entrenched concerns about our epistemic access to the moral properties. In this paper, I assess the prospects of an empiricist and perceptualist model of moral knowledge for responding to epistemological arguments against non-skeptical moral realism. I argue that such a view has powerful responses to these objections that are not open to other moral epistemologists. The upshot is that if some version of the view is correct, then the realist has less to fear from Benacerraf and evolutionary debunking–style epistemological objections. Insofar as one is already a committed realist, then, this provides some indirect support for moral perceptualism.

Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value

Erik Wielenberg has argued that robust realism can account for the “common-sense moral belief” that “some things distinct from God are intrinsically good”. By contrast, theological stateism cannot account for this belief. Hence, robust realism has a theoretical advantage over all forms of theological stateism. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Wielenberg distinguishes between R and D-supervenience. The coherence of Wielenberg’s robust realism depends upon this distinction. I argue that this distinction undermines his critique of theological stateism. I will make three points. First, once you utilize the distinction between R and D-supervenience, his argument for the incompatibility of theological stateism and intrinsic value fails. Second, theological stateism is compatible with intrinsic value. The historical example of theological utilitarianism, expounded by thinkers George Berkeley and William Paley, shows someone can accept that moral properties simultaneously R supervene upon God’s will and D supervene upon the natural properties of actions. Third, robust realism and theological stateism are in the same boat regarding intrinsic value once we distinguish between R and D-supervenience.

Realist dependence and irrealist butterflies

In this paper, I argue that a realist account of the modality of moral supervenience is superior to a non-cognitivist account. According to the recommended realist account, moral supervenience amounts to strong supervenience where the outer ‘necessary’ is conceptual and the inner metaphysical. It is argued that non-cognitivism faces a critical choice between weak and strong supervenience where both options are implausible on this view. However, non-cognitivism seems to have an important advantage: It can explain why the outer ‘necessary’ is conceptual by reference to the function of moral language to influence behaviour. In the main part of the paper, I argue that realism is able to explain why ‘necessary’ in moral supervenience needs to be understood in the recommended manner by reference to the connection between moral properties and moral reasons. Moreover, I argue that the realist account has other attractive features. In contrast to non-cognitivism, it can unify the normative sphere by being generalizable to other normative notions. In addition, it can be part of an explanation of why moral language can have the function to influence behaviour.

Varieties of moral mistake

AbstractSome philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her act is permissible, this moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non‐moral facts of which one is aware, such that mistakenly believing that one's act is permissible when it is in fact wrong is itself morally blameworthy. Here I challenge the view that it is blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non‐moral facts of which one is aware. This view seems okay if we focus on examples of people mistakenly believing that their wrongful acts are permissible. But it is not remotely plausible when we consider other varieties of moral mistake – such as believing that one's action is required when it is in fact supererogatory, believing that one's action is wrong when it is in fact permissible, and believing false things about the moral properties of others’ actions and of merely possible actions. The upshot is that those who maintain that moral mistakes cannot excuse are sent back to the drawing board; we need a new explanation of why this would be the case.

Meeting Harman’s Challenge

Gilbert Harman, in a well-known thought experiment, evokes the intuition that moral value can be perceptually seen. However, Harman dismisses the intuition, contending that moral concepts and judgments are the products of agent psychology and do not map onto mind-independent objects. Robert Audi, attempting to account for moral perception himself, fails to meet Harman’s challenge since his own ontological commitments do not allow for objects that moral concepts can map onto. This paper will offer an alternate theory of moral perception that maps moral concepts onto mind-independent entities, thereby meeting Harman’s challenge. To accomplish this, I offer that moral properties are not supervenient but are relational properties which possess their own non-reducible phenomenology.

Integrating Islamic Ruling and the Medical Concept: A Study of the Hermaphrodite Inheritance

Determining the gender of the heirs is important in the ruling of Islamic inheritance. Hence, Muslim jurists made efforts in determining the gender of hermaphrodites. Taking the safer position, the common practice is for the inheritance to be divided into two: the greater part of the share is withheld and the lesser portion is given out to the hermaphroditic inheritors along with their heirs until their gender is certified. This typically leads to disagreements among the jurists, hence, subsequently leading to a tedious process of certification. This protracted disagreement combined with a much prolonged certification process may harm the inheritors’ right due to the delay in judgement. This research aims to define the biological identity of a hermaphrodite and determine his sex according to the medical concept, as well as integrating the methods adopted by Muslim scholars to solve the issue of hermaphrodite inheritance. Both descriptive and analytical approaches are used in ensuring accurate knowledge transfer and trust in attribution. This research has found that the medical definition of a hermaphrodite is the most accurate and the most correct to end the dispute when dividing inheritance. Hence, this opens a wider area for further research that relies on medical information as evidence to be taken when studying Islamic legal rulings in ensuring the cohesion of society by preserving the rights of its members and maintaining their material and moral properties.

Unexceptional Moral Knowledge

Abstract The article defends moral realism against epistemological objections by arguing that if there are moral truths, some of them are known. The claim that moral properties are unknowable because causally inert is shown to be ineffective: none of the main current theories of knowledge requires a causal connection, and anyway moral properties have not been shown to be causally inert. It is explained why a posteriori moral knowledge need not derive from combining a priori moral knowledge with a posteriori non-moral knowledge. The possibility of moral knowledge by perception and by testimony is briefly defended. The role of recognitional capacities for instances of moral properties is emphasized.

Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics

Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics