Moral Proof Research Articles

Kant as a carpenter of reason: the highest good and systematic coherence

ABSTRACT What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with ‘bündiges’ thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of ‘bündig’, which is a forgotten term from the carpentry trade, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labour costs.

Demoralization and Hope: A Psychological Reading of Kant’s Moral Argument

Abstract Kant’s “primacy of the practical” doctrine says that we can form morally justified commitments regarding what exists, even in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds. In this paper I critically examine three different varieties of Kant’s “moral proof” that can be found in the critical works. My claim is that the third variety—the “moral-psychological argument” based in the need to sustain moral hope and avoid demoralization—has some intriguing advantages over the other two. It starts with a premise that more clearly coheres with Kant’s mature account of moral motivation, and it invokes plausible empirical-psychological theses to motivate a commitment to the full-blown classical deity—the result Kant clearly wanted. From the point of view of its structure, I think this third variety of moral argument also has the most by way of contemporary interest.

Is the Universe Moral?

Abstract Kant argues against the ontological argument for the existence of God but replaces it with a moral theism. This article analyses Kant’s moral proof with emphasis on the Critique of the Power of Judgement, and his historical and political writings. It argues that at the heart of this argument is the idea of progress. The concrete content of the moral law is the idea of a just world. Such a just world would be impossible without the idea of God, since there would be no harmony between nature and freedom. It contrasts Kant’s concept of time and history with Heidegger’s. The difference between them is a reversal of modality. For Kant, actuality determines possibility. If I cannot imagine a just word as actual, then I would fall into moral despair. The idea of God grounds this actuality. For Heidegger, possibility is higher than actuality. Since history has no teleology, then no idea of God is required.

Towards the Highest Good: Endless Progress and Its Totality in Kant’s Moral Argument for the Postulate of Immortality

AbstractKant’smoral proofof the postulate of immortality in theCritique of Practical Reasonis often dismissed as a failed argument that trades on illicit conceptual shifts. I argue that Kant’s argument is more interesting and less problematic than is usually thought. I first examine its role in the secondCritique’sDialectic.I then point out that the standard interpretation, according to which the argument presupposes God’s intuitive grasp of the moral equivalence between the disposition to pursue holiness and its attainment, faces a number of philosophical and textual problems. I offer an alternative reading that avoids these problems. In particular, I stress the importance of Kant’s mathematized conception of the relationship between infinite progress towards an ideal goal and its attainment and argue that appealing to this conception allows Kant to meet a well-known criticism that his proof illegitimately substitutes the endless progress towards holiness for holiness itself.

Classical and Non-Classical Versions of the Ontological Argument

The article is devoted to the interpretation of the ontological argument as a theoretical construction that is connected with understanding of the reflexive relationship of thinking and existence. The author concludes that the consistent implementation of this approach requires an appeal to the historically transitory forms of the ontological argument which reconstructs the logic of the evolution of reflexive systems. The ontological argument is considered as a developing theoretical construct. Therefore, theoretical constructs conceptualized as non-classical versions of the ontological argument will constantly re-emerge. Emergence of the first non-classical version of the ontological argument is related to need of overcoming apriority of introduction of the idea of the absolute being which is typical for Cartesianism. This issue was realized in the Kantian doctrine of transcendental ideas, which presented mind as an independent essence that creates its own content. Thus, the metaphysical construction, conditionally referred to as “the moral proof of the existence of God,” is revealed in the paper as a non-classical variant of the ontological argument. However, while Kant could be content with faith in reality of other subjectivity as an object of moral action, Fichte’s scientific doctrine demanded a proof of objective reality of the concept of the other I. This issue was identical to a basic problem of an ontological argument. “The ontological argument of the other I” offered by Fichte was devoid of mysticism as it is indissolubly connected with the disclosure of the social nature of the human subjectivity. The last step in formation of the concept “non-classical version of the ontological argument” was taken in Hegelian philosophy, where the reflexive relations between the multitude of I’s were transformed to reflexive interconnection between God and man. The versions of ontological argument are considered in the paper as necessary stages which any theoretical model of reflexive systems has to pass in its formation.

Analyzing the semantic content and persuasive composition of extremist media: A case study of texts produced during the Gaza conflict

While terrorism informatics research has examined the technical composition of extremist media, there is less work examining the content and intent behind such media. We propose that the arguments and issues presented in extremist media provide insights into authors' intent, which in turn may provide an evidence-base for detecting and assessing risk. We explore this possibility by applying two quantitative text-analysis methods to 50 online texts that incite violence as a result of the 2008/2009 Israeli military action in Gaza and the West Bank territories. The first method--a content coding system that identifies the occurrence of persuasive devices--revealed a predominance of moral proof arguments within the texts, and evidence for distinguishable `profiles' of persuasion use across different authors and different group affiliations. The second method--a corpus-linguistic technique that identifies the core concepts and narratives that authors use--confirmed the use of moral proof to create an in-group/out-group divide, while also demonstrating a movement from general expressions of discontent to more direct audience-orientated expressions of violence as conflict heightened. We conclude that multi-method analyses are a valuable approach to building both an evidence-based understanding of terrorist media use and a valid set of applications within terrorist informatics.

Hegel and Onto-Theology

Postmodernism and religion. The discussion continues to become increasingly rich and complex. In the background of much of it is Heidegger's critique of onto-theology, in which Hegel is one of his two prime paradigms. He introduced this term in 1949 in relation to Aristotle's completion of his ontology with a theology of the Unmoved Mover. When he returned to it in 1957, it was in the context of a seminar on Hegel's Science of Logic. There he described onto-theology as allowing God to enter philosophical discourse only on philosophy's terms and in the service of its project and complained, in the spirit of Pascal and Kierkegaard, that this God was religiously otiose. What he says there specifically about Hegel will best be understood after we see in what sense Hegel is a pantheist.It is possible to date quite precisely the time when Hegel abandoned theism for good. Ironically, it was in 1795 in correspondence with his two friends from seminary days at Tübingen. Schelling and Hölderlin had become Fichte enthusiasts, as we see from letters they sent to Hegel early that year. On the basis of prepublication access to Fichte's 1794 Wissenschaftslehre, Schelling wrote on January 5,Philosophy is not yet at an end. Kant has provided the results. The premises are still missing. And who can understand the results without the premises? … Kant has swept everything away, but how is the crowd to notice? One must smash it to pieces before their very eyes, so they grasp it in their hands. The great Kantians now everywhere to be seen have got stuck on the letter … [;] the old superstition of so-called natural religion as well as of positive religion has in the minds of most already once more been combined with the Kantian letter. It is fun to see how quickly they get to the moral proof. Before you can turn around the deus ex machina springs forth, the personal individual Being who sits in Heaven above! Fichte will raise philosophy to a height at which even most of the hitherto Kantians will become giddy … . Now I am working on an ethic á la Spinoza (HL 29).

"Evidence of the existence of God" in the language of philosophy

The history of "evidence of the existence of God" is closely intertwined with the history of classical philosophy. Most philosophers, beginning with Plato and ending with Hegel, were very careful about these ancient creatures of religious thought, and even if they destroyed them, like Kant, then immediately, in another form, they restored (Kant's famous "moral proof"). The proposed article is intended to emphasize this content of "philosophical" philosophy, expressed in a theological form, and to show that "proof of the existence of God" in the language of philosophy means certain logical arguments that, if properly processed, could constitute a philosophical speculative method.

The Non-Moral Element in Kant's ‘Moral Proof’ of the Existence of God

In a discussion in this journal of Kant's ‘moral proof’ of the existence of God Peter Byrne describes what he takes to be the ‘fundamental incoherence’ of Kant's position. Kant, it is well known, wishes to hold together two claims concerning our epistemological relationship to God: the claim that we can have no ‘theoretical knowledge’ of God's existence; and the claim that we nonetheless have ‘moral certainty’ of God's existence. The first claim arises out of the Kantian criticism of the pretensions of speculative metaphysics, a criticism developed most rigorously in the Critique of Pure Reason. The second claim, in turn, arises out of Kant's so-called ‘moral proof which appears in skeletal form in the firstCritique and acquires more detail edelaboration in the Critique of Practical Reason.

MORAL PROOF

Philosophical BooksVolume 21, Issue 4 p. 193-198 MORAL PROOF Jenny Teichman, Jenny Teichman new hall cambridgeSearch for more papers by this author Jenny Teichman, Jenny Teichman new hall cambridgeSearch for more papers by this author First published: October 1980 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1980.tb01855.xCitations: 4Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume21, Issue4October 1980Pages 193-198 RelatedInformation

Kant's Moral Proof of the Existence of God

During his lifetime Kant offered a number of versions of his moral proof of the existence of God, but the classic statement of his argument is normally taken to be that found in the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason. It is to this argument that the phrase ‘Kant's moral proof’ is normally taken to refer.