Moral Praise Research Articles

Celebritizing Dr. Fauci: Risk, Public Affection, and the “Total Package” of Scientific Expertise

ABSTRACT In the earliest days of COVID-19, Dr. Anthony Fauci earned a reputation that transcended the typical boundaries of public trust. Among progressive science advocates—particularly in social media spaces—Fauci developed an admiring fandom who saw him as a symbol and distillation of official scientific knowledge. In this essay, I combine insights from scholarship on ethos, public feeling, and risk to unpack the implications of Fauci’s “celebritization” on rhetorical understandings of expert-public relationships and the construction of risk and expertise. Specifically, I examine tweets from one viral X (formerly Twitter) account, the Anthony Fauci Fan Club (@FauciFan), to show how fans augment Fauci’s expertise through affection and moral praise, while carefully reiterating his (and science’s) reluctant, apolitical orientation and empirical commitments. These emotional engagements, I argue, constitute a potent form of tactical risk communication whereby publics claim a voice in larger discourses, and which acknowledges the entangled relationship between facts and feelings.

Praise Is for Actions That Are Neither Expected nor Required.

In six studies, we examined two foundational questions about moral praise. First, what makes an action praiseworthy? In Study 1, participants reported that actions that exceed duties (compared with dutiful actions) deserve greater praise and are perceived as less likely to happen. Second, what do observers infer from praise? Praise may communicate information about local norms. In Study 2, we found that-in general-participants expect praise to increase the likelihood of a behavior. However, in Studies 3-6, participants inferred that moral behavior that receives praise is less common and is less required and expected of people. These inferences led individuals to judge that someone would be less likely to perform a behavior that was praised. These studies provide insight into the lay beliefs and communicative function of moral praise.

Supplemental Material for Anticipated Affect Predicts Moral Praise and Character Judgments

Supplemental Material for Anticipated Affect Predicts Moral Praise and Character Judgments

Anticipated affect predicts moral praise and character judgments.

In four preregistered studies (total N = 5,067), we investigated whether people use their own anticipated affective responses to a situation to make judgments about the praiseworthiness of helping and the moral character of helpers. We found that helpers in more affectively arousing scenarios were seen as more morally motivated, received greater praise, and were seen as having more positive moral character, even when controlling for the perceived benefits of helping. Describing helpers as unemotional reduced the effect of observers' anticipated affect on character judgments. These results suggest that when making praise and character judgments, people not only consider the consequences of a helper's actions but also the emotions they experience when engaging in them-and that they use their own anticipated emotional experience to do this. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Tirta Baruna Symbolization In The Javanese Philosophy Of Leadership Characters: The Leadership Of Sultan Hadiwijaya

Baruno is one of the most complex leadership philosophies in Hasta Brata that exist today, because Javanese philosophy has several advantages as a concept of leadership. Samudra as a symbol of leadership character with oceanic properties are able to receive water from any river, either dirty or clean water and then process all the water content of the river in the water depth. Baruna are the noble qualities of the universe according to Javanese philosophy, can be a guide for every leader. This research is a case study of character Sultan Hadiwijaya using the historical method, which includes: (1) Heuristic, namely, activity preparing stable-traces of the past (2) Criticism of history, namely investigating whether traces of it true, both form and content (3) Interpretation, namely establishing the interconnected meanings of the facts obtained. Sultan Hadiwijaya is a Pajang leader who have eyes and mind widely. Accepting opinions from around as a sign of a leader's respect for others. Leaders do not swallow the input that comes, but think carefully all the opinions that exist, leaders are able to gain new knowledge from the surrounding. An ideal leader, ie (1) extensive knowledge, (2) good skills, and (3) Attitude or moral praise.

Partitioned Prosociality: Why Giving a Large Donation Bit-by-bit Increases Moral Praise

Partitioned Prosociality: Why Giving a Large Donation Bit-by-bit Increases Moral Praise

Ineffectiveness in Prosociality

The theme of this year’s symposium, Creating a Better World Together, calls for scholars across the field of management to aid in our understanding of how individuals and organizations can help to lead “the world from darkness to better days”. In order for individuals and organizations to positively impact the world, scholars need to better understand both (i) how to sustain individual and organizational motivation to continuously engage in prosocial ventures and (ii) how to help ensure that individuals’ and organizations’ prosocial ventures actually make (continuously) positive impacts on the world. The present symposium presents some of the latest research on the psychology of prosocial and charitable behaviors, each project aiming to shed light on previously unknown barriers to effective prosociality: prosociality that actually helps the world, prosocial appeals that actually foster helping behavior, and prosocial behavior that actually fosters moral praise. We believe that a better understanding of the psychology behind prosocial and charitable behaviors—especially when and why such helping behaviors and appeals backfire—is critical when trying to effectively Create a Better World Together. The Negative Effects of Giver Spotlighting on Recipients of Aid Presenter: Samantha Kassirer; Northwestern Kellogg School of Management Presenter: Maryam Kouchaki; Northwestern Kellogg School of Management When You Try Your Best to Help but Don't Succeed Presenter: Yu Tse Heng; U. of Virginia Presenter: Ryan Fehr; U. of Washington, Seattle Weather to Help: How Sunlight (and the Stock Market) Influence Prosocial Behavior Presenter: Polly Kang; NUS Business School Presenter: Maurice Schweitzer; U. of Pennsylvania Zero-Sum Beliefs Increase Stress by Undermining Expectations of Prosocial Behavior Presenter: Michael White; Columbia Business School Presenter: Genevive Gregorich; Columbia Business School Presenter: Shai Davidai; Columbia Business School Presenter: Modupe Akinola; Columbia U. Partitioning Prosocial Acts to Increase Moral Praise Presenter: Rebecca Schaumberg; The Wharton School, U. of Pennsylvania Presenter: Stephanie Lin; INSEAD

The Epistemology of Moral Praise and Moral Criticism

AbstractAre strangers sincere in their moral praise and criticism? Here we apply signaling theory to argue ceteris paribus moral criticism is more likely sincere than praise; the former tends to be a higher-fidelity signal (in Western societies). To offer an example: emotions are often self-validating as a signal because they're hard to fake. This epistemic insight matters: moral praise and criticism influence moral reputations, and affect whether others will cooperate with us. Though much of this applies to generic praise and criticism too, moral philosophers should value sincere moral praise and moral criticism for several reasons: it (i) offers insight into how others actually view us as moral agents; (ii) offers feedback to help us improve our moral characters; and (iii) encourages some behaviors, and discourages others. And so as moral agents, we should care whether moral praise and moral criticism is sincere.

CƏLALƏDDİN RUMİ YARADICILIĞINDA TƏRBİYƏ PROSESİNİN VASİTƏ VƏ ÜSULLARINA BİR NƏZƏR

For the first time the essence, components, means and methods of upbringing - the main base of creativity of Mevlana Jalaladdin Rumi became the object of analysis and research in the article . It is noted that Mevlana skillfully used in educational work such methods as moral conversations, examples, recommendations, advice, praise, applause, instructions, persuasion and training, encouragement and punishment, which are widely used in educational work. He protudes from a unified position, considering it is necessary to adhere to unity in terms of eliminating the contradictions that appear in this process. It also emphasizes that the exemplary life path of the prophets, imams and Sufis had such a great influence on Mevlana's personal life that he became an example for his students and the Turkic peoples in general and had a great positive impact on their upbringing. It is an indisputable fact that Mevlana not only expressed his thoughts, instructing those who were around him (his sons Sultan Veled, Alaaddin, Amir Alim Chelebi and daughters Maliku, Kimya and others), but he also served as an example with his behavior and life style. Key words: Mevlana Jalaladdin Rumi; educational methods used in the works of Mevlana Jalaladdin Rumi; means and methods, Word and the power of the word; rules of etiquette.

Urban Infrastructure and the Problem of Moral Praise

Most components of urban infrastructure remain hidden. Due to this condition, we do not think about them in a way that pays attention to the full scope of moral possibilities. For instance, when such topics are forced from the periphery of our thinking to the forefront of our minds, it is usually in terms of figuring out who to blame when they fail to function properly. In turn, one could argue that we only care to talk about an action’s moral status that pertains to infrastructure when it becomes a hazard. While this point deserves examination, the more significant issue is that we lack the moral language required to have conversations about moral praise regarding public works. The purpose of this paper, then, is to flesh out how to discuss morality and infrastructure regarding moral praise.

A Theory of Moral Praise.

How do people judge whether someone deserves moral praise for their actions? In contrast to the large literature on moral blame, work on how people attribute praise has, until recently, been scarce. However, there is a growing body of recent work from a variety of subfields in psychology (including social, cognitive, developmental, and consumer) suggesting that moral praise is a fundamentally unique form of moral attribution and not simply the positive moral analogue of blame attributions. A functional perspective helps explain asymmetries in blame and praise: we propose that while blame is primarily for punishment and signaling one's moral character, praise is primarily for relationship building.

Moral Worth: Having It Both Ways

It is commonly recognized that one can act rightly without being praiseworthy for doing so. Those who act rightly from ignoble motives, for instance, do not strike us as fitting targets of moral praise; their actions seem to lack moral worth. Though there is broad agreement that only certain kinds of motives confer moral worth on our actions, there is disagreement as to which ones are up to the task. Many theorists confine themselves to two possibilities: praiseworthy agents are thought to be motivated by either (1) the consideration that their actions are morally right, or (2) the considerations that explain why their actions are morally right (where the ‘or’ is exclusive). Though there is an important element of truth in these proposals, each has limited explanatory purchase. In this paper, I develop a pluralist conception of moral worth that acknowledges both sorts of motives as grounds for moral praise.

Objections to the God Machine Thought Experiment and What they Reveal about the Intelligibility of Moral Intervention by Technological Means

The first aim of the paper is to proffer a series of objections to the God machine thought experiment, as presented by Savulescu and Persson, The Monist, 95(3), 399-421, (2012). The second aim is to show that these objections must be overcome by any form of direct moral intervention by technological means, not just the God machine. The objections raised against the god machine involve (i) questioning its intelligibility in light of established views on the relationship between beliefs, desires, intention and intentional action, (ii) pointing out the seeming inability of individuals to attribute warranted moral praise to others or themselves in the case of abstentions from grossly immoral acts (iii) identifying a problematic ‘slippery slope’ argument, and (iv) questioning the rationale underlying the Freedom Lover’s intention to enrol on a moral enhancement course, as well as arguing that that Savulescu and Persson’s notion of ‘complete freedom’ is too stringent.

Both Rewards and Moral Praise Can Increase the Prosocial Decisions: Revealed in a Modified Ultimatum Game Task.

Unlike other creatures, humans developed the ability to cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers and a tendency to comply with social norms. However, humans deviate from social norms in various situations. This study used the modified ultimatum game to explore why humans deviate from social norms and how their prosocial behavior can be promoted. In Study 1, participants were asked to imagine working with an anonymous counterpart to complete a task and obtain a certain amount of money (e.g., ¥10). The computer divided the money randomly in favor of the participant (e.g., 9:1 or 8:2). Participants should decide whether to accept or reject such a self-benefiting division. In the non-risk condition, an absolutely fair redivision of money would take place if participants reject self-benefiting division (e.g., 5:5 or 6:4). By contrast, in the risk condition, other-benefiting redivision of money (e.g., 1:9 or 2:8) would take place if participants rejected the self-benefiting division. Results involving 40 college students showed the main effect of condition. The frequency of accepting self-benefiting division in the risk condition was higher than that in the non-risk condition. As such, compliance with social norms is based on the preservation of material resources. In Study 2, we used economic or moral rewards to compensate for economic loss following compliance with the norm. Results involving 28 college students revealed a significant effect of compensation. The rewards, including moral praise, effectively decreased selfish choices. These findings extend previous studies on social norm compliance by emphasizing the importance of internal, fairness-based balance between material and moral needs, as well as the role of moral praise in promoting prosocial behavior.

Divine Command and Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro

While Socrates was in his own way a deeply religious man, the Euthyphro is often thought to provide a refutation of the divine command theory of morality: the theory that what is morally good is good because it is divinely approved. Socrates seems to suggest that what is holy or pious (ὅσιος) is pleasing to the gods because it is holy, and not holy because it pleases them. Thus the dialogue is sometimes presented as showing that what is morally good and bad must be independent of the divine will. I argue that matters are not so simple, since there are several ways in which the gods could help determine which acts are good, for instance, by disposing certain human affairs which are relevant to moral decisions. Moreover, Socrates suggests that he has obligations to the gods themselves, and these obligations would have to depend in part on what pleases them. It follows that the dilemma which Socrates poses to Euthyphro (pious because loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because pious) does not offer two mutually exclusive alternatives. There are various ways for the preferences of such gods to help determine which acts are adequate for moral praise or blame. It could therefore hardly be the case that religious doctrines, if true, are irrelevant to the content of morality. Knowledge of the gods’ preferences, if such knowledge were available, would be of importance to moral theory. Socrates himself does not deny this, nor should we.

Virtue Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Confucian Conceptions of Moral Praise and Blame

This essay discusses how Confucianism can deal with two related issues of virtue ethics and moral responsibility: praise and blame. We normally praise a person because the person has done something difficult, but a virtuous person does the virtuous things effortlessly, delightfully, and with great ease. Thus the question arises regarding whether such actions are indeed praiseworthy. We can blame a person for doing something wrong only if the person does it knowingly. However, according to virtue ethics, anyone who has genuine moral knowledge acts virtuously, and anyone who does not act virtuously, or acts viciously, only because the person does not have the genuine moral knowledge. Thus the question arises regarding whether such actions are blameworthy.

VI-Agency and Two-Way Powers

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two-way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise- and blameworthiness.

Virtue Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Confucian Conceptions of Moral Praise and Blame

This essay discusses how Confucianism can deal with two related issues of virtue ethics and moral responsibility: praise and blame. We normally praise a person because the person has done something difficult, but a virtuous person does the virtuous things effortlessly, delightfully, and with great ease. Thus the question arises regarding whether such actions are indeed praiseworthy. We can blame a person for doing something wrong only if the person does it knowingly. However, according to virtue ethics, anyone who has genuine moral knowledge acts virtuously, and anyone who does not act virtuously, or acts viciously, only because the person does not have the genuine moral knowledge. Thus the question arises regarding whether such actions are blameworthy.

Tiger Mothers and Praise Junkies: Children, Praise and the Reactive Attitudes

In this article, I look at some discussions of praising children in contemporary parenting advice. In exploring what is problematic about these discussions, I turn to some philosophical work on moral praise and blame which, I argue, indicates the need for a more nuanced response to questions about the significance of praise. A further analysis of the moral aspects of praise suggests a significant dimension of the parent-child relationship that is missing from, and obscured by, the kind of parenting advice exemplified by the discussions of praise with which I began.

Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?

The claim that neuroscientists have proved that - or at least produced powerful evidence that - free is an illusion has received a lot of press. Here are just two examples:Free will is not defining feature of humanness, modern neuroscience implies, but is rather an illusion that endures only because biochemical complexity conceals mechanisms of decision making. (Science News, Dec. 6, 2008; Siegfried [2008])Researchers have found patterns of brain activity that predict people's decisions up to 10 seconds before they're aware they've made a choice. . . . The result was hard for some to stomach because it suggested that unconscious brain calls shots, making free an illusory afterthought. (ScienceNOW Daily News, April 14, 2008; Youngsteadt [2008])In Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will (Mele 2009), I argue that scientists - neuroscientists and others - have not proved that free is an illusion and have not produced powerful evidence for that claim. Manuel Vargas has suggested that in that book I ignore a serious scientific to free (2009). The alleged is identified in section 1 . It is me topic of this article.Scientists who argue for illusion thesis about free arrive at that conclusion by way of some pretty striking empirical propositions that they infer their data. For example, Benjamin Libet contends that brain produces unconscious decisions to act about a third of a second before person becomes aware of them (1985, 2004), and Daniel Wegner argues that are never among causes of corresponding actions (2002, 2004, 2008). In Effective Intentions I review me experiments that are claimed to support striking empirical propositions such as these and I explain why propositions are not justified by data. Because these empirical propositions play a central role in reasoning that leads such scientists as Libet and Wegner to their conclusions about free will, if my arguments that propositions are not justified by data hit their mark, they undermine scientific arguments at issue about free will. For example, it may be plausible that a person whose conscious intentions never play a role in producing corresponding behavior never acts freely; but if we lack good reason to believe that our conscious intentions never play a role of this kind, this particular line of argument for thesis that free is an illusion is out of running (at least until powerful evidence for claim about conscious intentions is produced).1. What Threatens Free Will?In a review ?? Effective Intentions, Manuel Vargas suggests that the core threat to free might arise not striking empirical propositions that I discuss there, but instead from bare fact that there are neurological antecedents to conscious decisions. . . . What is really at stake is whether our conscious intentions, even given some role in production of action, can be picked out of causal nexus and treated as special or 'free' (2009). He offers following diagnosis of what scientists I disagree with might be thinking:[They] are sometimes motivated by what philosophical literature labels as intuitions - idea that for us to act with a free we must be ultimate origins of strands of causal nexus. On one way of putting things, source theorists think that free acts cannot have causal antecedents that extend back in time prior to decisions of agent or agent's free formulation of relevant characterological inputs to that decision. . . . Acknowledging that our actions have causal roots in pre-conscious brain activity, as Mele does, just highlights fact of our causal embeddedness. It does nothing to block basic worry of how we could be kinds of beings that stop buck enough to count as free, or as deserving of moral praise and blame. …