Moral Mistakes Research Articles

0211 Experimental Sleep Restriction, Moral Absolutism, and Religiosity

Abstract Introduction Moral absolutism is the notion that “rights” and “wrongs” are independent of situational circumstances, and it is a core philosophy of many religious traditions. We tested whether active church members and Christian pastors showed resiliency to mild sleep restriction when reporting religious beliefs/cognitions, when logging spiritual behaviors, and when judging the deserved-punishments for moral mistakes. Methods We recruited 92 adults who identified as active in Christian churches (members and pastors). On a Monday, participants completed baseline religiosity, mood, and cognitive functioning measures and were then randomly assigned to adhere to early (10:30pm) or late (1:30am) bedtimes for four nights, with 7:30am waketimes, while wearing actigraphy and keeping a daily diary of spiritual behaviors. On Friday, participants repeated the baseline assessments, responded whether a series of biblical stories were literal versus figurative, and rated a series of vignettes about moral mistakes that were committed by in-group leaders (pastors) and out-group leaders (imams; vignettes counterbalanced). Results The late bedtime condition reduced actigraphy-defined sleep by 85 min/night (p<.001). Despite spending more time awake, this sleep restricted group reported engaging in fewer spiritual behaviors during the week (e.g., prayer time; p<.01). On Friday, the sleep restricted group had worse mood disturbances (p<.001), worse subjective sleepiness (p<.001), and altered perceptions of the meaning of the Garden of Eden and Noah’s ark biblical stories (p<.05). Fluid intelligence was unaffected (p=.78). When evaluating religious leaders who made moral mistakes, the sleep restricted participants were significantly less forgiving (p<.01); for example, well-rested participants thought such leaders were still “somewhat likely” to get into Heaven, but sleep-restricted participants rated the leaders as “not very likely” to get into Heaven (p<.01). The effects of sleep restriction were most prominent in participants who most frequently attended religious services and when rating out-group religious leaders (r = -.49; opposite patterns were noted when participants were well-rested). Conclusion In contrast to moral absolutism philosophies, very mild sleep restriction produced significant changes to religious cognitions (story interpretation), spiritual behaviors, and expressions of beliefs (likeliness of getting into Heaven), and expressions of virtues (decreased forgiveness). Support (if any) URSA Grant and National Science Foundation (1920730, 1943323).

Varieties of moral mistake

AbstractSome philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her act is permissible, this moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non‐moral facts of which one is aware, such that mistakenly believing that one's act is permissible when it is in fact wrong is itself morally blameworthy. Here I challenge the view that it is blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non‐moral facts of which one is aware. This view seems okay if we focus on examples of people mistakenly believing that their wrongful acts are permissible. But it is not remotely plausible when we consider other varieties of moral mistake – such as believing that one's action is required when it is in fact supererogatory, believing that one's action is wrong when it is in fact permissible, and believing false things about the moral properties of others’ actions and of merely possible actions. The upshot is that those who maintain that moral mistakes cannot excuse are sent back to the drawing board; we need a new explanation of why this would be the case.

Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment

In discussing the ways in which we hold each other accountable for immoral conduct, philosophers have often focused on blame, aiming to specify adequate responses to wrongdoing. In contrast, theorizing about the ways we can appropriately respond to minor moral mistakes – i.e., criticizable conduct that is bad but not wrong – has largely been neglected. My first goal in this paper is, thus, to draw attention to this blind spot and argue that a separate account of blameless moral criticism is desirable. My second goal is to propose one way to explicate the contrast between blaming and blameless moral criticism in terms of the contrast between moral anger and moral disappointment: while moral anger, as many argue, is an appropriate response to moral wrongdoing, moral disappointment, but not moral anger, is an appropriate response to these minor moral mistakes.

F. M. Dostoevsky’s Novel “Crime and Punishment” in the Context of Sacred History: Abraham, Christ, Mohammed

The article presents a detailed commentary on the famous statement of Rodion Raskolnikov, which actualizes the ambivalent semantics of the images of the “trembling creature” and the prophet. As the results of the narrative and textual analysis of “Crime and Punishment” show, this feature of word usage makes it possible to differentiate between the positions of the author and the hero. The article also proves that in the canonical text by Dostoevsky Raskolnikov’s thought is framed as a “foreign word,” graphically and punctuationally marked, as indicated by quotation marks, italics, an initial colon and an exclamation mark at the end. In the quoted text, Raskolnikov’s exclamation and the direct speech of the prophet in the interpretation of the hero of the novel alternate twice. The article shows how the author exposes his position to crushing “plot criticism,” debunking Raskolnikov’s religious and moral mistakes, including the opposition of Christ to Mohammed, which the author eliminates in the epilogue of the novel by mentioning Abraham, “the father of all believers.” His figure is a key one in the system of historical and spiritual kinship of the three world religions. In the context of anthropology and genealogy of the Sacred History, Raskolnikov’s last vision symbolizes his return to the “bosom of Abraham.” The hero, like a prudent robber in one of the variants of the iconographic plot, seems to be next to the “forefather.” As a result of the conducted historical, cultural and textual analysis, the author concludes that Dostoevsky, following Pushkin, reproduced the effect of the hero’s co-existence with the main figures of Sacred History in his novel.

How (and How Not) to Defend Lesser-Evil Options

Abstract Many philosophers believe in lesser-evil justifications for doing harm: if the only way to stop a trolley from killing five is to divert it away onto one, then we may divert. But recently, Helen Frowe has argued that we do not only have the option to pursue the lesser evil: in most cases, we are so obligated. After critically assessing Frowe’s argument, I develop three mutually compatible accounts of lesser-evil options, which permit, but do not obligate us to minimize harm. These are the Parity Account, the Prerogative Account, and the Permissible Moral Mistakes Account. Considerations of parity and prerogatives have arisen in this debate before, but in inchoate form. The Permissible Moral Mistakes Account introduces something new.

Conscientious objection and the referral requirement as morally permissible moral mistakes

Some contributions to the current literature on conscience objection in healthcare posit the notion that the requirement to refer patients to a non-objecting provider is a morally questionable undertaking in...

Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons

AbstractIt's one thing to do the right thing. It's another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non‐accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right‐Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View – fail to capture that non‐accidentality constraint: the first because it morally credits agents who make heavy‐duty moral mistakes; the second because it fails to generalise and is too conservative – a point which this paper gives renewed defence. The paper then goes on to defend and develop an alternative according to which moral worth is mediated by the agent's knowing how to respond to the reasons of the type which make acting in that way right. It's argued that this view avoids the problems for the alternatives, and it's shown that in order for the view to avoid collapsing into a problematic form of Reliabilism we'll have to think of states of knowing how as essentially successful in character.

Two Kinds of “Bad” Musical Performance: Musical and Moral Mistakes

AbstractThere are many ways in which a musical performance can be “bad,” but here the focus is on two: those performances that make you laugh, and those that make you angry. These forms of musical badness, however, are not primarily compositional deficits, but either (a) that the performer simply cannot competently deliver the music to their audience, inducing laughter, or (b) that the performer exhibits some form of disrespect, provoking anger. Such laughter or anger stems from failure of the expected relationship between a performer and their audience, that is, a social failure. After surveying a range of musical faults, the article examines the causes of laughter in general and in relation to some of examples of risible “bad” music. Similarly, the causes of social and moral anger in general are examined, and several cases of anger-inducing musical performances are presented. The article concludes with a consideration of the broader implications of these responses to “bad” music for theories of emotional expression in music, the relationship between aesthetic and moral judgments, and the centrality of musical performances as opposed to works in discussions of musical expression and value.

Memory and Counterfactual Simulations for Past Wrongdoings Foster Moral Learning and Improvement.

In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering, reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly their more severe transgressions, and they reported having frequently thought about morally better ways in which they could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward counterfactuals; Studies 1-3). The more that participants reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in which they could have acted, the stronger their intentions were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3). Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after committing a moral transgression strengthened reported intentions for moral improvement-relative to resimulating the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss the implications of these results for competing theoretical views on the relationship between memory and morality and for functional theories of counterfactual thinking.

Moral Disengagement: Mediator Between Moral Perfectionism and Machiavellian Behavior Among Undergraduates?

To better understand Machiavellian behavior among undergraduate students, the current study examines moral disengagement as a mediator in the relationship between Machiavellian behavior and two dimensions of moral perfectionism (concern over moral mistakes perfectionism and personal moral standards perfectionism). Participants were 210 undergraduate students (64% female) from three universities in Tehran, Iran, aged between 18 and 27 years old. Structural equation modeling revealed that Machiavellian behavior was negatively associated with personal moral standards perfectionism and positively associated with moral disengagement. The results of the structural model showed a non-significant relationship between concern over moral mistakes perfectionism and Machiavellian behavior. However, multi-model analysis provided evidence that moral disengagement partially mediated the relationship between personal moral standards perfectionism and Machiavellian behavior. The findings also showed that there was a relationship between concern over moral mistakes perfectionism and Machiavellian behavior through moral disengagement. The results suggest that while moral perfectionism is often accompanied with moral disengagement, Machiavellian behavior may be an explanation for individuals with these traits.

On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered.

Making Peace with Moral Imperfection


 How can we rationally make peace with our past moral failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? Is it because we cannot do anything about the past, while the future is still open? Or is it that regret for our past mistakes is psychologically harmful, and we need to forgive ourselves in order to be able to move on? Or is it because moral mistakes enable our moral growth? I argue that these and other answers do not properly resolve the problem of temporal asymmetry in our attitudes toward moral imperfection, and I defend an alternative response, centered on our personal attachments and our biographical identity.

A Morally Permissible Moral Mistake? Reinterpreting a Thought Experiment as Proof of Concept

This paper takes the philosophical notion of suberogatory acts or morally permissible moral mistakes and, via a reinterpretation of a thought experiment from the medical ethics literature, offers an initial demonstration of their relevance to the field of medical ethics. That is, at least in regards to this case, we demonstrate that the concept of morally permissible moral mistakes has a bearing on medical decision-making. We therefore suggest that these concepts may have broader importance for the discourse on medical ethics and should receive fuller consideration by those working the field. The focus of the discussion we present is on a particular thought experiment originally presented by Sulmasy and Sugarman. Their case formed the basis of an exchange about the moral equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment. The analysis Sulmasy and Sugarman set out is significant because, contrary to common bioethical opinion, it implies that the difference between withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment holds, rather than lacks, moral significance. Following a brief discussion of rejoinders to Sulmasy and Sugarman’s article, we present a constructive reinterpretation of the thought experiment, one that draws on the idea of suberogatory acts or “morally permissible moral mistakes.” Our analysis, or so we suggest, accounts for the differing moral intuitions that the case prompts. However, it also calls into question the degree to which this thought experiment can be thought of as illustrating the moral (non)equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment. Rather, we conclude that it primarily illuminates something about the ethical parameters of healthcare when family members, particularly parents, are involved in decision-making.

The Fact-Value Dichotomy: A New Light on an Old Problem

Two highly visible, but conflicting concepts of morality have found widespread acceptance in philosophy. Socrates identified goodness with wisdom, holding lack of knowledge responsible for all moral mistakes. David Hume contrasted prescriptive with descriptive judgments, leading him to the conclusion that the former, unlike the latter, are not rationally supportable. It has often been missed that the acceptance of both, Socrates’ teachings and Hume’s law, generates a conflict, as elements of these two concepts contradict each other. It would appear prima facie obvious that mankind has learned from history how to coexist and make societies more just. Hence, there must be an empirical component contained in morals. Today, we have data that are reflective of certain elements of social justice. Measurables like crime rate, range between high and low income brackets, unemployment et cetera can serve as quantitative indicators for individual components that contribute to social justice. Such evidence corroborates at least a restriction on Hume’s stance, if not an outright negation. Because there are rational and empirical elements underlying morality, thought models need to be calibrated against the real world for validation. The discussion, what constitutes progress and social justice, must consult history and research—not ideology—as sources of justification. Philosophy and the sciences must cross-fertilize each other.

Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes

Does it ever happen that there are things we shouldn’t do and the reasons we shouldn’t do them are moral reasons, yet doing them is not morally wrong? Surprisingly, yes. I argue for a category that has not been recognized by moral theorists: morally permissible moral mistakes. Sometimes (but far from always) a supererogatory action is the thing a person should do; in failing to act, one makes a morally permissible moral mistake. Recognizing the category of morally permissible moral mistakes solves a puzzle about supererogation, expands the universe of possible moral views, and shows some apparently inconsistent moral views to be consistent.

Moral perfectionism and moral values, virtues, and judgments: Further investigations

In a first psychological investigation of moral perfectionism, Yang, Stoeber, and Wang (2015) adapted items from the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale to differentiate perfectionistic personal moral standards and concern over moral mistakes. Examining a sample of Chinese students, Yang et al. found that personal moral standards showed unique positive relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments, whereas concern over moral mistakes did not. The present study aimed to replicate Yang et al.'s findings in a sample of Western students (N=243), additionally including measures of moral identity and moral disengagement. Furthermore, the study examined whether moral perfectionism explained variance in moral attitudes beyond general perfectionism. Results largely replicated Yang et al.'s findings. Personal moral standards (but not concern over moral mistakes) showed unique positive relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments and a unique negative relationship with moral disengagement. Furthermore, moral perfectionism explained significant variance in moral attitudes beyond general perfectionism. The present findings suggest that moral perfectionism is a personality characteristic that is relevant in both Asian and Western cultures and explains individual differences in moral attitudes beyond general perfectionism.

Making Moral Mistakes: What Ethical Failure Can Teach Students About Life and Leadership

Learning from ethical failures is critical for overall character development as well as an important aspect in the formation of student leaders. This chapter examines types of ethical failure that students often confront in college. The author includes a personal moral failure that occurred when he was a student leader.

The Possibility of an Ongoing Moral Catastrophe

This article gives two arguments for believing that our society is unknowingly guilty of serious, large-scale wrongdoing. First is an inductive argument: most other societies, in history and in the world today, have been unknowingly guilty of serious wrongdoing, so ours probably is too. Second is a disjunctive argument: there are a large number of distinct ways in which our practices could turn out to be horribly wrong, so even if no particular hypothesized moral mistake strikes us as very likely, the disjunction of all such mistakes should receive significant credence. The article then discusses what our society should do in light of the likelihood that we are doing something seriously wrong: we should regard intellectual progress, of the sort that will allow us to find and correct our moral mistakes as soon as possible, as an urgent moral priority rather than as a mere luxury; and we should also consider it important to save resources and cultivate flexibility, so that when the time comes to change our policies we will be able to do so quickly and smoothly.

Moral perfectionism and moral values, virtues, and judgments: A preliminary investigation

Moral perfectionism has a long tradition in philosophical inquiry, but so far has been ignored in psychological research. This article presents a first psychological investigation of moral perfectionism exploring its relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments. In three studies, 539 university students responded to items of the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al., 1990) adapted to measure personal moral standards (PMS) and concern over moral mistakes (CMM) and completed measures of moral values, virtues, and forgiveness, gratitude, and wrong behavior judgments. When partial correlations were computed controlling for the overlap between PMS and CMM, PMS showed positive correlations with moral values, virtues, reciprocal helping, forgiveness, and condemnation of wrong behaviors. In contrast, CMM showed a positive correlation only with indebtedness and a negative correlation with self-reliance. The present findings, while preliminary, suggest that moral perfectionism is a personality characteristic that may help explain individual differences in moral values, virtues, and judgments.

Empathy in Our Moral Assessment of Violence: A Comparative Analysis of the Approaches of Seneca, Sontag and Butler.

Questions concerning the relationship between emotional and moral response, and between emotional reaction and effective political reaction have been a matter of discussion for Seneca, Judith Butler and Susan Sontag. This paper aims to compare their attempts at laying the foundations of our moral assessment of notions of shared human vulnerability as a way of rethinking the cycles of retributive violence. Susan Sontag has focused her attention on how photographs can convey the sufferings of those depicted so that they may influence our evaluation of war and, most importantly, our capacity to react in accordance with that evaluation. Judith Butler, in turn, has drawn our attention to the question of our ethical duties towards those who remain anonymous or who are regarded as distant, and the problem imposed by the controversial reliability of mainstream media on registering and reporting the sufferings of war, imprisonment and immigration. In light of these questions, Seneca’s programmatic attempt at establishing a way of actively responding to others’ sufferings based on the recognition of our own enormous capacity to fail, as opposed to the pity and sorrow that they may (or may not) cause us, is a valuable approach to consider. Awareness of human failure is regarded by Seneca as the foundation for stopping retributive violence and a call for humanitarianism, as it appeals to a common standpoint from which one may understand – and condemn – the other’s point of view. Here I would like to emphasise how certain aspects of Seneca’s attempt at establishing mindfulness of our own capacity to err and to suffer from other’s errors as the starting point for his claim for humanitarian reaction to the moral mistakes of others, bares some resemblance to Butler’s attempt at making the notion of ‘vulnerability’ the basis of claims for non-military political solutions to violence.