Moral Foreign Policy Research Articles

Twenty Years on, It's All Academic: Progressive South African Scholars and Moral Foreign Policy After Apartheid

This fortieth anniversary edition of Politikon is an opportune moment to examine one of the abiding themes of South African foreign policy since the end of apartheid, that of the tension between moral foreign policy and state interests. This article, situated within the literature on norm diffusion and norm localisation, seeks to examine the influence of South African leftist academics and the establishment of the ‘moral’ route in South African foreign policy after the ending of apartheid in 1994. It is suggested that the rise of an epistemic community, along with the liberation struggle history of the African National Congress (ANC), facilitated the internalisation of certain global human rights norms, but it is less clear the extent to which these norms were inhibited from becoming ‘settled’ norms or solidified in the wake of national liberation in South Africa. Many commentators have questioned the ‘loss of moral compass’ of South Africa's foreign policy after Mandela. This article seeks to analyse which norms academics were able to build, and how these norms encountered domestic and international opposition in the process of their becoming entrenched. This will go some way to resolving the puzzle of South Africa's ‘switch’ from principled state to pragmatic actor that has accompanied the country's profile in recent years.

Critical reflections of Indian foreign policy: Between Kautilya and Ashoka

India is seen as an exceptional power among some policymakers and academics — a bastion of certain normative values standing for the marginalised in the global South. Examples of India's supposed moral foreign policy abound. However, a closer examination of India's foreign policy since its independence in 1947 suggests that India's foreign policy calculations tend to be infused with classical realism. Case studies of India's position on non-alignment during the Cold War, India's relations with Israel and South Africa, and its position within IBSA all point to realpolitik rather than any attempt to change the status quo in favour of some notion of ‘Southern solidarity’. This article concludes that the future of India's foreign policy will be determined even less by ideological underpinnings and more by situational factors such as its economic imperatives and its regional security situation. This historical overview of India's foreign policy sees the triumph of realism over idealism.

Zero Is the Wrong Number

only one strategic mistake, but it is a major one. It concerns the greatest security threat to the United States, other free nations, and world peace—nuclear arms in the hands of terrorists, as well as rogue and failing regimes. President Obama’s strategy calls for leading by example in dealing with these weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It assumes that after the United States and Russia re-commit themselves to nuclear disarmament, other nations will be inspired either to give up their nuclear arms or refrain from acquiring them. This goal, referred to in short as the “zero strategy” (for zero nuclear weapons), is dangerous if implemented, distracts the international community from more certain and pressing goals, and is extremely unlikely to move those who do need to be inspired, cajoled, or otherwise made to forgo nuclear arms. How did this usually sure-footed president slip on such a vital issue? The strategy that calls for the United States and Russia to lead the parade to nuclear disarmament was formed and then run up the flagpole by four highly regarded statesmen: two Republicans, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, and two Democrats, Sam Nunn and William Perry. In January 2007, they issued a collective proclamation, subsequently endorsed by a number of leading American specialists in nuclear weapons policy, calling for a world free of nuclear arms. The Quad, as the four authors of the zero strategy are often called, are all senior veterans of the Cold War. But perhaps this anachronistic experience is a hindrance. (Indeed, one critic called them “dinosaurs.”) To move their strategy forward, the Quad outlined their view in a position paper endorsed by 36 experts in the nuclear weapons field. The Quad focused largely on Russia and the United States, and mainly on their strategic nuclear weapons, calling for reductions in the number of warheads arming the two powers’ strategic bombers and missiles. Such a move would effectively extend the principal U.S.-Russian treaty that covers these weapons and that is about to expire. The Quad also favors an increase in the warning and decision time before either country could launch their nuclear warheads. Currently, American and Russian missiles remain on alert at levels equaling the Cold War. This means that large parts of their nuclear arsenals are armed and pre-targeted, and that either country could launch their nuclear weapons within minutes of detecting an attack. The foundations of the Quad’s position date back to a much earlier period in the Amitai Etzioni is university professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University and the author of Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 2007).

Labour and the Politics of Internationalism, 1906-1914

Historians have traditionally characterized the early Labour party as an insular, ‘labourist’ organization out of sync with the mainstream of European socialism and indifferent to foreign affairs and internationalism. However, this perspective is deeply misguided, as Labour's ‘Big Four’—MacDonald, Snowden, Hardie and Glasier—used their positions of authority in the Labour Party, Independent Labour Party (ILP) and the British Section of the International to place foreign policy and socialist internationalism at the heart of their efforts to further the Labour alliance. This article explores two aspects of the ‘politics of internationalism’: first, the Labour leadership's use of socialist internationalism to legitimate the Labour alliance with trade unions in the face of criticism from the ILP left wing; second, the party's portrayal of itself as a more faithful exponent of a Gladstonian moral foreign policy than the Liberal government. Labour and the ILP were crucial allies in the revisionist and pragmatic wing of the Second International, and these ties allowed the ‘Big Four’ to portray the Labour coalition as in keeping with democratic socialist strategy in Europe. At the same time, historians should explore the possibility that Labour's parliamentary and public interventions on foreign affairs aimed to undermine Liberalism on its left flank by exploiting radical concerns over the Liberal government's foreign policy, particularly its dealings with Russia, to portray Labour as the defenders of the Gladstonian tradition in foreign affairs and, hence, as the only conscionable choice for progressives in the twentieth century.

The global importance of ‘illiberal moderates’, an exchange: partners in peace to precede a concert of democracies

The following is an exchange concerning the concept of ‘illiberal moderates’ and its implications for a new global architecture as well as for a worldview that sees the evolution of a global core of shared values which favour domestic and international security, in sharp contrast to the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. The original statement was published in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Etzioni 2006). A more extensive treatment can be found in Part III of Security first: for a muscular, moral foreign policy (Etzioni 2007b), which examines texts of four religious and two secular belief systems as well as review of relevant public opinion polls and ‘traveller notes’. Here follows a brief summary of the main thesis, followed by comments from prominent scholars and Etzioni's response to these comments.

Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy

Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy

A Sound Principle, but Not a Playbook

Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy, by Amitai Etzioni, offers a promising effort to transcend the sterile debate between realism and idealism in U.S. foreign policy by arguing that the pursuit of security is a precondition to the longer-term objective of promoting democracy and human rights. Although conceptually appealing as a way to prioritize among potentially competing objectives, the book struggles with thorny problems of implementation that plague real world policy makers, including how to deal with the nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran, how to improve counterterrorism cooperation by ambivalent partners like Pakistan and when to intervene in the case of failed states.

Emphasizing Principles for a Moral Foreign Policy

In Security First, Amitai Etzioni insightfully diagnoses the problems with existing American foreign policy and prescribes creating security and valuing life as corrective guiding principles. Peacebuilding scholars would welcome Etzioni's focus, arguing that an efficacious state and a sense of nation help achieve his goals. In addition, developing respect for the dignity of all citizens in war-torn societies is an important ingredient to moving forward. Etzioni's stress on developing a “moral culture,” which emerges from the dominant indigenous religion, is more problematic, however. Frequently, major religions have threatened the security and life chances of religious and other minorities, as well as of women and girls. Since using religion as a cornerstone undermines the idea of Security First and the Primacy of Life, the U.S. would be better served and more ethical advocating the inclusion of liberal principles in states' founding documents, even if those promises cannot be immediately realized.

Trading with the Enemy: Ireland, the Cold War and East–West trade, 1945–55

Using Ireland's foreign economic policy on East-West trade as a case study, this article challenges the claims by other historians that Ireland became the object of American hegemonic pressure in the early Cold War. The analysis shows that the Irish government remained a minor, but fiercely independent actor in the Cold War confrontation. While Irish policy-makers resisted entering into any agreement with the United States that would force Ireland to support its Cold War strategy or restrict trade with the Soviet bloc, they also rejected the advances of communist countries to expand bilateral trade. Nevertheless, domestic political considerations rather than external pressure shaped Irish foreign economic policy on East-West trade. This stance reflected countervailing conceptions of Irish foreign policy: the idealistic notion of Ireland as a Catholic country pursuing a moral foreign policy, its commitment to neutrality and a realistic appraisal of Ireland's embeddedness within the West.

Security first: for a muscular, moral foreign policy

The need for drastic change in American foreign policy is clear, argues Etzioni, and he proposes an approach that is both pragmatic and morally sound Rarely have more profound changes in American foreign policy been called for than today, begins Amitai Etzioni in the preface to this book. Yet Etzioni's concern is not to lay blame for past mistakes but to address the future: What can now be done to improve U.S. relations with the rest of the world? What should American policies be toward recently liberated countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, or rogue states like North Korea and Iran? When should the United States undertake humanitarian intervention abroad? What must be done to protect America from nuclear terrorism? The author asserts that providing basic security must be the first priority in all foreign policy considerations, even ahead of efforts to democratize. He sets out essential guidelines for a foreign policy that makes sense in the real world, builds on moral principles, and creates the possibility of establishing positive relationships with Muslim nations and all others. Etzioni has considered the issues deeply and for many years. His conclusions fall into no neat categories-neither liberal nor conservative-for he is guided not by ideology but by empirical evidence and moral deliberation. His proposal rings with the sound of reason, and this important book belongs on the reading list of every concerned leader, policy maker, and voter in America.

From Rhetoric to Reality

This article was awarded the Marvin Gelber prize for 2001. Established in recognition of the abiding interest of Marvin Gelber in international affairs and of his many years of service to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the prize is awarded annually to a superior essay by a junior Canadian scholar on a subject in the area of international affairs and foreign policy.Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, Brown University. The article was written when the author was a student at the University of Toronto.ON 3 DECEMBER 1997, 122 STATES came together in Ottawa to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction. The United States, one of the countries at the forefront of the fight to deal with the problem of landmines, was not one of them. Canada, which had been virtually silent on landmines up until at least 1995, in the end spearheaded the fast-track diplomatic process that ended in the Ottawa convention. How did this come about?A comparison of personalities, non-governmental organization (NGO) campaigns, the foreign services, the relative importance of the military, and negotiating strategy leads to several interesting conclusions. First, it seems clear that the debate in Canada centred around landmines as a humanitarian issue and their effect on civilians. In the United States, the debate remained an arms control issue; ban proponents never successfully redefined it in humanitarian terms. In Canada, the redefinition made it possible to take the ban outside of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD), the consensus-driven body that traditionally had responsibility for landmines and other booby traps. For Canada, too, the Ottawa Process (as the initiative came to be known) was a way in which a middle power could distinguish itself on the world stage with a 'moral' foreign policy. The United States, by contrast, preferred to keep the issue in a forum it could control. It also had to deal with the tension between its military duties as a superpower and a traditional desire to pursue a moral foreign policy. These factors all led to the decision by Canada to seize the initiative and by the United States to concentrate its efforts on demining rather than on signing the ban.Because the Ottawa Process is a relatively recent event, little scholarly research has been done on the subject, especially in the United States. Much of the literature in Canada was commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), in whose best interest it is to portray Canada in a positive light; moreover, many of the authors participated in the policy process as government officials, civil servants, or activists. Possible biases must, therefore, be taken into account in the work of these authors. Furthermore, the government that presided over the Ottawa Process is still in power, and many of the people involved in the process are still in the civil service. Lloyd Axworthy, who as the minister of foreign affairs played a pivotal role in the process, left office only recently. The participants cannot, in many cases, be completely candid in their interpretations of the policy process because they are still officials of the Canadian government. On the other hand, because the process is so recent, it is possible to interview participants for memories and interpretations not yet blurred by too many intervening years.(1)The origins of the campaign to eliminate landmines can be traced back to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Originally, the issue was one of high politics, concerned only with state security, and precluded any civil society involvement. At the end of the cold war, the security discourse broadened, providing room for a counter discourse that portrayed landmines as a humanitarian issue. Once considered a useful defence for states, landmines began to be portrayed as a danger to civilians long after conflicts were over and as a hindrance to development, in part because their presence prevented aid agencies from moving into the regions where they were most needed. …

The Kantian Project in Modern International Legal Theory

Developments over the last 50 years in the institutional nature of international law and the political situation it regulates have led to a revival of Kant’s approach to international legal theory. Kant’s argument requires, first, that a distinction is made between just and unjust states for the purposes of regulation by international law and, secondly, that international law must be institutionally designed to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes. Fernando Teson’s A Philosophy of International Law — which is the subject of this review — represents the fullest defence of Kant’s international legal theory yet. It is argued in this review that Teson’s work contains two problems. First, Teson does not defend the methodological and justificatory basis of Kantian theory which is, on most accounts, the categorical imperative, and his allusion to an empirical methodology is problematic. Secondly, Teson does not sufficiently develop the second of Kant’s major theses, which concerns the maintenance of peace by international legal institutions. In fact, Teson’s argument can be best understood as an account of a Kantian approach to a moral foreign policy rather than a Kantian conception of international law.

New Zealand's moral foreign policy 1935–1939: the promotion of collective security through the League of Nations

New Zealand's moral foreign policy 1935–1939: the promotion of collective security through the League of Nations