Moral Distinctions Research Articles

Are Private Brands Morally Inferior to National Brands?

This paper investigates the moral distinctions between private brands (or private labels) and national brands within the context of economic, sustainability and innovation impacts. Private brands, owned and controlled by retailers, increasingly dominate the market, raising ethical concerns. Key areas of analysis include economic effects on consumers and producers, sustainability practices and the ethical implications of innovation and image copying. The findings suggest that private brands are morally inferior to national brands due to their detrimental impact on sustainability and innovation. The paper concludes with proposed political interventions aimed at mitigating these ethical issues, highlighting the need for more stringent regulations to ensure fair practices and enhance sustainability within the industry.

Geography and ethics III: Description as a matter of moral concern

This report focuses on moral description. It considers how comparative practices often entangle moral geography in philosophical dilemmas, such as debates over moral relativism. Using examples from geographic work on language, algorithms, the appropriation of anti-colonial critique, and Indigenous data sovereignty, the report shows how and why descriptive praxis matters to accounts of moral geography. As the final installation of a three-part series of reports on ethics and geography, it draws together a broader critique of moral geography's initial distinctions and suggests a more constitutive view of ethics for geographic scholarship.

Faith and fate: Religious leaders’ Bible, heaven, hell beliefs and end-of-life choices

Controversies surrounding end-of-life choices may be due to differences in congregational affiliation and beliefs about the Bible, heaven, and hell. Focusing on religious leaders (N = 1541), this study investigated how these factors are associated with attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide, allowing a patient to die by withholding treatment, and withdrawing treatment in favor of pain relief. Religious leaders affiliated with White liberal or moderate denominations were more supportive of these end-of-life choices compared to those affiliated with Roman Catholic; White conservative, evangelical, or fundamentalist; and Black Protestant congregations. Literalist view of the Bible and belief in hell were significantly associated with less support across the three choices, whereas belief in heaven was significantly associated with less support for only physician-assisted suicide. This study highlights the varying significance of religious beliefs in understanding variations in views on end-of-life choices and sheds light on the moral distinction associated with various choices.

How are romantic cross-class relationships sustained?

How are romantic relationships across class maintained under broader conditions of class inequality? This article draws on in-depth interviews with 38 people who have partnered across class in Australia. It examines the emotional and interpersonal labour required to preserve such relationships within a highly differentiated class structure that is widely obscured in public and political life. We find, first, that for people in committed cross-class relationships where this difference was openly acknowledged, class difference was acutely felt and described in highly emotional, imprecise terms. Second, this heightened awareness of class difference stimulated elevated levels of class friction and class dissonance within these relationships. We detail these experiences, as they were narrated to us, before examining certain interviewees' efforts to understand and resolve these complexities. We highlight the collaborative work undertaken by one couple in particular to navigate feelings of class discomfort and class dissonance. Third, by focussing on the emotional terrain of intimate cross-class negotiations, we stress moments which have the potential to disrupt assumptions about class hierarchies and modes of moral distinction that take place within these relationships. Proceeding to tentatively valorise different forms of value-making and recognition within cross-class relationships, we also pay attention to the role of class in enabling this very capacity for adaptation.

Eugenics and genetic screening in television medical dramas

Medical dramas offer unique insights into the way popular media makes sense of genetic technology and the ethics of its applications. In this paper we evaluate the contrasting depictions in...

Contemporary visions of the next apocalypse: Climate change and artificial intelligence

The ancient Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions are the main sources of the eschatological compositions of the apocalypse. Through the combination of various symbolic elements and a prefigured narrative, apocalyptic visions offer a script that can be applied in diverse historical situations to deal with the uncertainty of the present, to justify political action and to allocate resources. In contemporary society, the high complexity and significance of the socio-natural and socio-technical operations in the domains of climate change and artificial intelligence create a fertile ground for the proliferation of apocalyptic eschatologies. The analysis shows that while the use of the apocalyptic script indeed motivates action in the present to avoid a future posited as unavoidable, it also generates strong moral and political distinctions that emphasize a unilateral projection of the future and undervalue alternative possibilities. The article concludes that apocalyptic eschatology promotes a ritualistic action in the present that evades the explanation of the complex causalities underlying climate change and artificial intelligence. The magnetism of the apocalyptic narrative lies in its ability to motivate action based on a recognizable architecture, but in doing so, it precludes alternative future options.

The shared innocence of cycling and mixed martial arts: a reply to Pho and White

ABSTRACT Alexander Pho and Benjamin A. White respond to Nicolas Dixon’s critique of mixed martial arts (MMA) through a ‘companions in innocence’ argument. Taking up a counterexample that Dixon is quick to dismiss, the authors argue that MMA techniques are on a par with the ‘pain-leveraging’ tactics used by cyclists and that pressing for a moral distinction between cycling and MMA leads to absurd conclusions about other practices. So, because cycling is morally permissible, MMA is morally permissible. This companions in innocence argument fails. But cycling can be used to develop a better, though only partial, defense of MMA.

Euthanasia and End-of-Life Decisions: From the Empirical Turn to Moral Intuitionism.

Most medical learned societies have endorsed both "equivalence" between all forms of withholding or withdrawing treatment and the "discontinuity" between euthanasia and practices to withhold or withdraw treatment. While the latter are morally acceptable insofar as they consist in letting the patient die, the former constitutes an illegitimate act of actively interfering with a patient's life. The moral distinction between killing and letting die has been hotly debated both conceptually and empirically, most notably by experimental philosophers, with inconclusive results. This article employs a "revisionary" intuititionist perspective to discuss the results of a clinical ethics study about intensivists' perceptions of withhold or withdraw decisions. The results show that practitioners' moral experience is at odds with both the discontinuity and equivalence theses. This outcome allows us to revisit certain concepts, such as intention and causal relationship, that are prominent in the conceptual debate. Intensivists also regard end-of-life decisions as being on a scale from least to most active, and whether they regard active forms of end-of-life decisions as ethically acceptable depends on the overarching professional values they endorse: the patient's best chances of survival, or the patient's quality of life.

Reframing the Debate over Performance-Enhancing Drugs: The Reasonable Athlete Argument

ABSTRACT Two of the major arguments against performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), appealing to fairness and the protection of athletes’ health, have serious flaws. First, there is no relevant moral distinction between the use of PEDs and the use of other performance enhancers that introduce unfairness and that we accept nonetheless. Second, prohibiting PEDs for athletes’ own good ignores the fact that adult athletes are constantly making tradeoffs to improve performance and pursue excellence, including sacrificing their health. We should not paternalistically impose our values on them. On the other side, arguments to allow ‘safe’ PEDs provide no normative criterion to determine the acceptable level of risk, thus begging the question. The reasonable athlete argument solves both sets of problems: it justifies a ban on some performance-enhancing drugs based on health and fairness, while avoiding paternalism, and it also establishes a non-arbitrary standard to determine which drugs ought to be allowed. First, if unsafe PEDs were allowed, some athletes would refuse to take them out of concern for their health. This is a reasonable decision even though it would put them at a competitive disadvantage against athletes who choose to use unsafe PEDs. It would be unfair for clean athletes to suffer a competitive disadvantage for acting reasonably. Therefore, PEDs that pose significant health risks should be prohibited for all athletes. Second, it would be unreasonable for athletes to refuse, on principle, relatively safe and effective PEDs, so a blanket prohibition is also unjustified. Which drugs and which doses to allow should be determined not by athletes’ actual choices but by the hypothetical choices of the reasonable athlete. The resulting sport-specific drug policy would carve a justifiable middle path between complete prohibition and complete permission.

A moral or class divide for populist parties? ‘The people’ in the discourse of Podemos and Vox in Spain

ABSTRACT Do populist parties refer to class identities in their discourses or do they, as most populism literature assumes, mainly highlight a moral distinction between ‘people’ and the ‘elite’? To explore these questions, this research uses dictionary-based methods and discourse analysis to identify the various ways to reconstruct such identities in Spanish populist left (Podemos) and right (Vox) political parties between 2014 and 2023. Our findings reveal that both the populist left and populist right politicise class divisions as much as moral divides, even more so in the case of the left. Moreover, we observe significant differences in the class identities mobilised by Podemos and Vox and their evolution over time.

Normality and the Treatment-Enhancement Distinction

There is little debate regarding the acceptability of providing medical care to restore physical or mental health that has deteriorated below what is considered typical due to disease or disorder (i.e., providing “treatment”—for example, administering psychostimulant medication to sustain attention in the case of attention deficit disorder). When asked whether a healthy individual may undergo the same intervention for the purpose of enhancing their capacities (i.e., “enhancement”—for example, use of a psychostimulant as a “study drug”), people often express greater hesitation. Building on prior research in moral philosophy and cognitive science, in this work, we ask why people draw a moral distinction between treatment and enhancement. In two experiments, we provide evidence that the accessibility of health-related interventions determines their perceived descriptive or statistical normality (Experiment 1), and that gains in descriptive normality for such interventions weaken the moral distinction between treatment and enhancement (Experiment 2). In short, our findings suggest that the tendency to draw a moral distinction between treatment and enhancement is driven, in part, by assumptions about descriptive abnormality; and raise the possibility that normalizing novel biomedical interventions by promoting access could undermine people’s selective opposition toward enhancement, rendering it morally comparable to treatment.

Introduction, Summary, Questions for the Future

Introduction, Summary, Questions for the Future

Are Rights of Nature Manifesto Rights (And is That a Problem)?

That nature, including insentient entities such as trees, rivers, or ecosystems, should be recognized as right-holders is an enticing thought that would have substantial practical repercussions. But the position finds little support from moral conceptions of rights and moral distinctions that have judicial relevance in the sense of providing normative reasons for legislation and assessing existing laws. An alternative to viewing rights of nature as proper rights resting on valid moral claims that ought to be legally recognized is to regard them as ‘manifesto’ rights. Such rights are based on political demands and hold even if there is no one with a corresponding duty to fulfill them. I investigate whether rights of nature can be considered manifesto rights. Some objections to regarding rights of nature as manifesto rights will be considered, such as difficulties of delimiting the borders of an environmental entity and making successful analogies with existing (human) rights based on interests and needs. It will be suggested that while some of those challenges can be mitigated by custodianship, it is not clear what needs of insentient entities in nature would justify such claims. It is found that rights of nature depend substantially on legitimate custodians both for delineation of the entity in question and for establishing interest-like characteristics. But rights of nature are not manifesto rights when there is a legitimate custodian having the possibility of evoking duties in others. However, the need for a legitimate custodian in delimitation and establishing normatively relevant characteristics of specific environmental entities defeats universal appeals to rights of nature.

Moral Difference and Moral Differences

The idea that human beings have a distinct moral worth—a moral significance over and above any moral worth, such as that may be, possessed by other animals—has a long history and has traditionally been taken for granted by philosophers and theologians. However, in a variety of quarters in recent philosophy, this idea has come into disrepute, seeming to indicate a mere prejudice in favour of our own species. For example, Peter Singer has argued that such a position is mere speciesism, a prejudice of a kind with racism and sexism in that it involves making moral distinctions between our own and other species that cannot be morally justified. What on such views is needed to justify any such distinction is a difference in terms of the morally relevant properties possessed by our own species as compared with other species. I will call this view the moral property view. Insofar as other species share with us morally relevant properties, for example the capacity to suffer cognitive ability and so on, it is mere prejudice not to accept moral requirements with respect to them as we do with respect to our own species. While on the surface such a view may seem morally enlightened, it indicates what will seem to many problematic moral judgments with respect to severely disabled human beings. In this paper, I will respond to these concerns by suggesting a different basis for the idea of human moral distinctiveness, one that draws on recent work by Wittgensteinian moral philosophers and which denies what I called above the property view. According to this view, while our shared life with other animals involves the recognition of their moral significance, our shared life with other human beings involves recognising that human beings as human beings have a distinctive moral value.

Attitudes, intentions and procreative responsibility in current and future assisted reproduction.

Procreative obligations are often discussed by evaluating only the consequences of reproductive actions or omissions; less attention is paid to the moral role of intentions and attitudes. In this paper, I assess whether intentions and attitudes can contribute to defining our moral obligations with regard to assisted reproductive technologies already available, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and those that may be available in future, such as reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis, in a way compatible with person-affecting constraints. I propose the parent-child relationship argument, which is based on the moral distinction between creating and parenting a child. Hence, I first argue that intentions and attitudes can play a role in defining our moral obligations in reproductive decisions involving PGD. Second, I maintain that if we accept this and recognize reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis as person-affecting procedures, we should be committed to arguing that prospective parents may have moral reasons to prefer reproduction via such techniques than via sexual intercourse. In both cases, I observe an extension of our procreative responsibility beyond what is proposed by the consequentialist person-affecting morality.

Failure and moral distinction in a Ukrainian marketplace of ideas

AbstractThis essay examines the generative effects of claiming moral failure within a Ukrainian liberal movement for media reform in post‐Maidan, pre‐invasion Ukraine. The reformers wished to reorganize news reporting around the ideals of autonomy, balanced objectivity, impartiality, and corrigibility, which they believed underpinned Western media. They decried most Ukrainian media as failing such standards, highlighting the individual moral failure of journalists bankrolled by oligarchs in return for favourable media representation. In turn, those from whom the reformers tried to distinguish themselves morally mocked them as ‘grant‐eaters’ for their dependence on Western democracy promotion grants. This tussle pitted material success against yearnings for moral and professional probity. Developing Selka's idea of moral distinction, I argue that while the reformers’ pursuit of virtuous difference was sincere, their structural vulnerability vis‐à‐vis the mainstream media also made morality more salient as the basis for agonistic differentiation.

Taiwan and the WHO: negotiating the deconstruction of racialized discourse during the COVID-19 pandemic

Abstract Racialized and politicized discourses on individuals and countries have accompanied the emergence and spread of COVID-19. Adopting critical discourse analysis (CDA) and investigating the WHO's news releases, press conferences and the Taiwanese government's formal responses, this article examines three discursive events involving the deconstruction of racialized discourses during the pandemic by the WHO, the WHO's Director-General and Taiwan. Specifically, I focus on the following: the WHO's calls on the international community to cease using the term ‘China virus’; Dr Ghebreyesus' calls on Taiwan to cease leveling racist insults against the Black community; and the Taiwanese government's refutation of racist allegations by deconstructing racialized meanings and highlighting its marginal status in the global health system due to international politics. The findings demonstrate the different ways each subject framed moral and immoral practice, highlighted or downplayed racialized discourse, and applied moral vs immoral distinction to manipulate and reinforce the audience's thoughts. This article contributes to the field of international relations and its connection with racism by showing how racial injustices ‘travel’ between places and are negotiated and re-politicized in the global health sphere.

Move towards ethical consumption- A reflection of moral responsibility or distinction?

Move towards ethical consumption- A reflection of moral responsibility or distinction?

What is forensic psychotherapy, and why is it so important?

The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic Manual considers suicidal behaviour as an appropriate problem for psychiatric attention, but not homicidal behaviour. There is no scientific basis for this distinction. It is clearly a moral distinc-tion, in which for purely arbitrary and irrational reasons homicide is defined as a moral evil that deserves punishment, unlike suicide, which is considered (appro-priately) as a symptom of illness that deserves treatment. And yet moral value judge-ments are clearly not scientifically testable hypotheses, unlike medical diagnoses and treatments. The distinction here is between moral philosophy and medical science. The fatal flaw with moral value judgements is that they are of no help to us if our goal is to learn what causes violence, and how we can prevent it, which is where forensic psychotherapy comes in.

A Portrait of the Modern Butler as an Emergent Professional Type in Mainland China

Abstract This article analyses the emergent professional type of modern butler in mainland China from an Eliasian figurational perspective, against the backdrop of the changing power balances between social groups along with the rise of China’s High Net Worth Individuals in the post-reform era. It paints a portrait of the modern butler by drawing on ethnographic observation and interviews conducted at a butler training institute. This emergent professional type’s characteristic costumed appearance, stringent morality, communicative tact, signature pride, and art of service, are analytically linked to the figurational position of the new economic elites through thick description, as forms of vicarious cultural and moral distinction made desirable by the changing social dynamisms.