Monopolistic Competition Research Articles

Trade and domestic policies under monopolistic competition

Abstract Should trade agreements constrain domestic policies? We analyse this question using a model with monopolistic competition (MC) and CES demand. We develop a welfare decomposition to show that welfare changes induced by trade and domestic policies can be decomposed into consumption- and production-efficiency, and terms-of-trade effects. We analyse the reasons to sign trade agreements and compare shallow and deep trade agreements, modelled according to GATT-WTO rules. Under MC, unlike deep trade agreements, shallow agreements with market access commitments may not achieve efficiency because terms-of-trade can be improved without reducing market access by increasing the set of foreign firms selling domestically.

Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm

Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm

Analysis of the Structure of the Pork Trade Market in the Traditional Market in Manggarai Area, East Nusa Tenggara Province

This research was conducted based on the consideration that meat is a commodity that is always needed by the community to meet their nutritional needs. This study aims to determine the influence between pork price variables and determine the market structure of the traditional pork trade industry in Manggarai district. This research took place from January to March 2024 at the Inpres Market and Puni Market. This study was quantitative descriptive and interviewed 49 respondents and continued with elasticity tests, market share, Herfindahl-Hirsrchman Index and Relative Deviation Intercepts. The results of the study show that the structure of the pork trade market in the traditional market of Ruteng City, Manggarai Regency, East Nusa Tenggara Province is included in the monopolistic competition market. Every pork trading business in Ruteng City produces similar goods but has differences in several aspects, namely service, performance and other factors. The policy taken by pork traders in the traditional market of Ruteng City is a non-price policy. These non-price policies include promotion policies, product policies, service policies and family policies. The results of the research on the estimation of the structure of the pork trade market can be concluded that the structure of the pork trade market is classified as a monopolistic competition market because every pork trading business in the city produces similar goods but has differences in several aspects, namely service, performance and other factors.

Business services in regional economies: exploring the co-evolution of supply, demand, and sectoral interactions

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to demonstrate how economic growth stimulates business-service providers to develop new service varieties, which, in turn, enhance the productivity of business-service buyers. This creates a coevolutionary process where service suppliers and customers interact, leading to an increase in the number of differentiated service offerings. We introduce a framework for local economies, wherein business-service sectors evolve in response to local demand potential, while non-business-service sectors grow based on each economy’s supply potential. Business service growth is more rapid in local economies with higher demand potential, while non-business-service sectors expand faster in areas where the business-service supply potential is greater. A key assumption is that business service firms operate in a monopolistic competition environment, where an increase in business-service capacity leads to an expansion in the variety of services offered. This, in turn, enhances the diversity of service offerings in municipalities with strong demand potential. Additionally, service providers not only deliver innovation-related information to client firms but also unintentionally disseminate knowledge within the region, fostering knowledge spillovers among firms.

The empirical measurement of competition and digitalization for the banking sector of Kyrgyzstan: Impacts of efficiency, profitability, and stability

This study investigates the competitive dynamics and digitalization within Kyrgyzstan's banking sector. The study analyzes the interplay between bank competition, digitalization, profitability, and stability using the two-step Generalized Method of Moments. Banking competition is assessed from 2012 to 2022 via the Lerner Index and the Boone Indicator. Furthermore, a novel method is employed to estimate the bank digitalization index based on the System Dynamics Approach. Findings indicate a competitive landscape marked by monopolistic competition, where digitalization enhances operational efficiency and competitive advantage. However, increased market power inversely affects digital adoption, suggesting monopolistic banks innovate less than their competitive peers. Further, the study highlights that intensified competition and digital adoption may encourage riskier bank behaviors, aligning with competition-fragility theory. Digitalization improves profitability, advocating for banks to adopt innovations to surpass competitors and improve financial performance. Policymakers are advised to foster a balanced competitive environment that encourages innovation without compromising bank stability.

Private ownership in monopolistic competition models

Motivated by empirical evidence, I study the properties of a monopolistic competition model with private ownership. Toward that goal, I consider a monopolistic competition model with additive preferences, homogeneous workers and homogeneous firms. I then introduce in such a standard framework a single additional ingredient: private ownership. Private ownership means that each firm is owned and managed by a single household called the entrepreneur, and this entrepreneur receives profits as sole revenues. In turn, private ownership changes the nature of entry. Free entry in the industry is no longer satisfied. Rather, the number of firms is now determined through occupational choice. Armed with this new framework, I provide a full characterization of a market equilibrium, and compare it to the standard model with collective ownership and free entry. Notably, I find new results concerning optimality, the transmission of aggregate shocks and the ability of the new model to replicate well-established empirical facts.

How competition play a role in dental pricing? A study on French medico-administrative and tax reports dataset

ObjectivesFrench dentists charge additional fees for dental prostheses. This paper aims to provide new information on the determinants of dental price setting and inform public decision-making in the context of the widespread rejection of prosthetic dental care for financial reasons. We focus on the competitive mechanism in the dental prosthetics market and measure the impact of the density of professionals and competitors' prices on the fees charged by dentists. MethodsWe use data merging from an administrative health insurance database and information from tax declarations of French dentists. We test the effect of competitor prices and competition on individual price-setting using instrumental variables. The database obtained included 29,220 dentists. ResultsPractitioners’ prices grow with competitors’ prices (+1€ in competitor prices entails an increase of + 0.37€ in the practitioner's price). Women set lower prices, and having a young child in the household predicts an increase in price of 6.8€ (p-value=0.014). Rural areas present lower fees than urban areas (+11.4€ (p value=0.000)). ConclusionProsthetic prices are strategic complements that are compatible with the application of monopolistic competition in the dental care market. We encourage the regulator to develop competitive mechanisms, for example, through a public offer at moderate prices.

The small open economy in a generalized gravity model

To provide sharp answers to basic questions in international trade, a standard approach is to focus on a small open economy (SOE). Whereas the classic tradition is to define a SOE as an economy that takes world prices as given, in the new trade literature it is defined instead as one that takes foreign-good prices and export demand schedules as given. We develop a gravity model that nests all its standard microfoundations and show how to take the limit so that an economy that becomes infinitesimally small behaves like a SOE. We then derive comparative statics and optimal policy for the SOE. Ignoring standard tax indeterminacies, optimal policy is characterized by export taxes and import tariffs equal to the (inverse) foreign demand and supply elasticities, respectively, and employment subsidies determined by the scale elasticity (under perfect competition) or markups (under monopolistic competition).

The integrative analysis of pharmaceutical sector and its market with a competition law lens

The pharmaceutical industry is widely recognized as a crucial sector that contributes significantly to the country's economic growth, and the importance of Competition Law in this industry is widely acknowledged. However, this market is also susceptible to various unlawful transactions and monopolistic competition, given that medicine is an essential item that every consumer needs, and market players often take advantage of this to trade their products and achieve monopolies or control product prices. To address these issues, the Competition Act, 2002 was instituted, and various regulations were implemented to regulate market competition across different sectors. The importance of public health is a major consideration in the pharmaceutical industry, and it is crucial to understand how competition law is applied in this sector. This article aims to shed light on the interplay between IP rights and competition law in the pharmaceutical sector and provide insight into how the development of the industry has spurred competition in the market. Additionally, the article will offer some suggestions.

Antitrust Laws and the Future of Market Competition

Purpose: The general objective of the study was to investigate antitrust laws and the future of market competition. Methodology: The study adopted a desktop research methodology. Desk research refers to secondary data or that which can be collected without fieldwork. Desk research is basically involved in collecting data from existing resources hence it is often considered a low cost technique as compared to field research, as the main cost is involved in executive’s time, telephone charges and directories. Thus, the study relied on already published studies, reports and statistics. This secondary data was easily accessed through the online journals and library. Findings: The findings reveal that there exists a contextual and methodological gap relating to antitrust laws and the future of market competition. Preliminary empirical review revealed that while existing antitrust frameworks had been instrumental in promoting competition and preventing monopolistic practices, they faced significant challenges in the digital age. The rapid evolution of technology and the rise of digital platforms had created new competitive dynamics that traditional antitrust laws struggled to address. The dominance of a few tech giants led to market concentration, reducing the scope for competition and innovation. The study highlighted the inadequacies of current antitrust enforcement in dealing with digital platforms, data control, and network effects. Additionally, it emphasized the need for international cooperation and a balanced approach to antitrust enforcement that considered both competition and innovation to ensure that the benefits of the digital economy were widely shared. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm, Contestable Market Theory and Innovation and Monopolistic Competition Theory may be used to anchor future studies on antitrust laws and the future of market competition. The study recommended updating theoretical frameworks to include factors like data control and network effects, and adopting more flexible and adaptive approaches in antitrust enforcement. It advocated for the creation of specialized regulatory units focused on digital markets, equipped with the necessary resources and expertise. The study also highlighted the importance of international cooperation in antitrust enforcement to address cross-border anti-competitive practices effectively. Furthermore, it suggested continuous dialogue with industry stakeholders to develop more informed policies and emphasized the role of consumer education in promoting competitive markets. These recommendations aimed to enhance antitrust laws and ensure robust market competition in the digital age.

COMPETITION AS A KEY PROPERTY OF THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS MARKET

Competition in the agricultural sector results from the unity of conflicting factors: the maximum freedom of activity of market forces and the significant influence of the state on the processes taking place in the industry, which ensures the overall efficiency of social production. Regulation of competition in the agricultural market in developed countries is a developed and expensive system. Currently, it is impossible to provide the same robust support to the agricultural sector in the country, but the principles and methods used for this can be taken into account. Different types of competition are developing in the agri-food market. Intra-industry competition is possible only if production and sales costs are reduced and weak, technically backward enterprises are pushed out of the market. Interindustry competition leads to the redistribution of capital and other resources between industries, taking into account the rate of return. Participation in agriculture in this competition is only possible with state support due to the low speed of capital turnover and high capital intensity in this field. Intra-industry competition initiates technical progress, and inter-industry competition contributes to the structural development of the agricultural industry. To a certain extent, agricultural product markets are characterized by perfect competition, and food markets are characterized by monopolistic competition. It is emphasized that competition covers all spheres of commodity production, distribution, market exchange, and consumption. It manifests differently in each branch of the economy, which is determined by the specifics of their activity. Conducted studies of competition in the market of agricultural raw materials and food indicate the need to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic agricultural products and ensure consumer, quality, and price characteristics of agricultural products, raw materials, and food that are comparable to the world level, regardless of orientation to domestic or foreign markets. It is noted that competition in agriculture is characterized by many competitors on the market and obstacles in the production and sale of agricultural products.

Corporate Tax Rates, Allocative Efficiency, and Aggregate Productivity

Abstract This paper quantifies the impact of effective corporate tax rates on aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). Using Chilean manufacturing data, we document a large dispersion in the effective tax rate faced by firms and a mass of firms facing a 0 percent tax rate. We integrate these findings into a standard monopolistic competition model, where firms are subject to corporate taxation and also face output and capital wedges, which represent all other distortions present in the economy. We find that eliminating corporate tax rates increases TFP between 4 and 11 percent. We consider counterfactual policies in which firms face a uniform flat tax rate and find a monotonically decreasing relationship between the level of the tax rate and TFP.

Distortionary effects of PPP loans on business competition

We study the effects of PPP loans on business competition. We start by introducing temporary cash subsidies into a model of monopolistic competition with differentiated products and heterogeneous production costs. We test the predictions of our model in a sample of U.S. airport hotels for which we observe daily demand, prices, output, and profits. Consistent with model predictions, less profitable businesses were more likely to apply for PPP loans. Businesses with active PPP loans reduced prices, boosting output and profits relative to non-PPP competitors. Those relative differences were reversed once PPP loans expired. We calculate that, for every dollar of PPP subsidies, PPP hotels earned 72.4 cents in extra profits and non-PPP competitors lost 71.4 cents in aggregate. Our results suggest that the PPP initiative distorted competition, imposing significant costs on businesses that chose to forgo these loans.

Demand Uncertainty, Selection, and Trade

This paper examines the role of uncertainty on elasticities of trade flows with respect to variable trade costs in a canonical model of trade with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. We identify two channels through which uncertainty impacts trade: through export participation thresholds (the selection effect) and the distribution of shocks governing export selection (the dispersion effect). While the selection effect dampens trade elasticities under uncertainty, the dispersion effect is ambiguous. We develop a methodology for using customs firm-level data to quantify trade elasticities under uncertainty, and the magnitude of each of the two channels through which uncertainty impacts trade. We find that uncertainty amplifies trade elasticities, on average, indicating that the dispersion effect of idiosyncratic firm-level shocks dominates -- though the effect is heterogeneous across industries. The overall magnitude of the endogenous selection mechanism on trade elasticities is small, indicating that the main drivers of trade in this class of trade models are overwhelmingly incumbent firms.

Banking competition in Indonesia: does Fintech lending matters?

PurposeThis paper aims to examine how the rise of financial technology (Fintech) lending affects bank competition. Moreover, this study also identifies the structure of Indonesian commercial banking sector and the different behaviour of competition among bank groups (based on their size, type and ownership) and the joint impact of COVID-19 due to the rise of Fintech lending.Design/methodology/approachUsing an unbalanced panel data set of 118 commercial banks in Indonesia over the period 2018–2022, both static panel and 2SLS/IV data analysis were used and found that random effect model is the best model.FindingsThe results show that the Indonesian commercial banking sector can be considered as monopolistic competition. Moreover, using the Lerner index reveals that the entry of the Fintech lenders increases bank competition. Furthermore, there were different responses to the impact of Fintech lending on bank competition among state-owned banks, private banks, regional development banks and foreign banks. Greater efficiency and stability lead to greater market power. In the meantime, higher level of asset growth, capitalisation and cost-to-income ratio increase the competition. Lastly, higher bank credit growth and lower inflation boost overall bank competitiveness.Practical implicationsThis study highlights some policy recommendations for commercial banks to be aware of the coming of Fintech lenders because they have started to increase the market competition. The government should create a more collaborative ecosystem between banks and Fintech lending to anticipate unhealthy competition.Originality/valueThis study will contribute to the literature by expanding the determinants of bank competition by considering the rise of Fintech lending in the market.

GENERAL ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM MODELS

The article examines the possibilities and limitations of empirical models of general economic equilibrium and makes their classification. Computable general equilibrium models are divided into two groups: the first group is based on the equilibrium price model (G. Scarf's approach), the second is based on a multi-sectoral model of economic growth (L. Johansen's approach). Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are also divided into two groups: the first group is based on the model of the real business cycle (the approach of F. Kydland and E. Prescott), the second is based on the model of various behavior of firms in conditions monopolistic competition (the approach of J. Rotemberg and M. Woodford). Within each group, empirical models were studied according to the following criteria: the scale of the economy, its openness; application for current and future assessments; socio-economic phenomenon under study.

India’s Banking Market Structure: Impact Assessment of Bank Consolidation

The present study aims to extend the existing literature on measuring competition by including recent bank consolidation in India. Unlike existing literature, the study goes in-depth to account for the asymmetric behavior of bank competition owing to ownership, size, scale, efficiency, and pre/post-global financial crisis. The study takes the unbalanced panel data of Indian banks from 1995-2021 and utilizes the nonstructural approaches- Lerner Index, PRH statistic, and Boone Indicators to measure the bank competition. The study finds the asymmetric level of competition across ownership, size, profitability, and inter-temporal- before and after the global financial crisis. It finds that the smallest banks experienced lower competition during 2006-2021, whereas the largest banks behaved competitively. Similarly, the lowprofit banks have noted a higher level of competition than the high-profit-making banks, indicating the role of structure in bank performance. The less efficient banks have reported higher competition. Using PRH statistics, it was found that the Indian banking industry experiences monopolistic competition. The findings hail that the private sector banks and more extensive holdings are exhibiting a higher level of competition compared to the public sector banks. For the Boone indicator, the study finds a modest level of competition in line with the World Bank's estimation.

Monopolistic competition under frictional entries

Abstract In this theoretical article, I develop a new theory of monopolistic competition models by introducing the notion of frictional entries. Frictional entries define a general sticky relationship between profits and entries, find large empirical support, and can encapsulate the standard free-entry condition and the entry condition with fixed costs as particular cases. I determine a steady-state equilibrium of such a new theory, and I find three results. First, I show that the new framework leads to a smaller mass of varieties, larger individual consumption/quantity, higher prices/markups, and larger aggregate consumption/production than traditional models. Second, I find that the new model predicts prices and markups that vary with income, even if preferences are additive. Last, I show that the presence of frictional entries can amplify TFP shocks and so can be considered as a new source of volatility for macroeconomic models.

Institutional Ownership and Concentration of Capital in Pharmaceutical Companies: Evidence from Iran

Background: Institutional owners influence the direction of policy and the performance of owned companies. This research was motivated by the presence of pharmaceutical companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange and the uncertainty surrounding the extent and influence of institutional owners on the policy direction and performance of the companies. Methods: This was a descriptive-analytical and cross-sectional study. The descriptive phase of the study involved measuring sales figures, market value, and market share of pharmaceutical companies listed on the stock exchange. In the analytical phase, the network of shareholders' relationships was analyzed with Gephi version 0.1 and Microsoft Excel version 2016, followed by the calculation of the capital concentration index and market share. Results: Estimates indicated that approximately 45% of the pharmaceutical companies in Iran were publicly traded in stock exchange. In 2020, the total value of these companies in the Iranian capital market reached 9.79 billion USD. Out of this amount, 45% (equivalent to 4.4 billion USD) was offered in Tehran Stock Exchange. The concentration of final shareholders, with a Herfindahl–Hirschman index(HHI) index of 0.036, signified a monopolistic competition market. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical capital market could be classified as an oligopoly market (with a value of 58.3) when analyzing only the direct shareholders at level 2. Additionally, the six main holding companies at this level collectively possess 67% of the pharmaceutical capital market. Conclusion: Based on the results, the importance of institutional owners, such as the Social Security Organization (SSO), in the decision-making process regarding the Iranian pharmaceutical market can be acknowledged. The decisions about integration and supply chains which aimed at improving the productivity of the pharmaceutical market, need to be thoroughly examined by the institutions mentioned in this research.

Desirable banking competition and stability

Every financial crisis raises questions about how the banking market structure affects the real economy. Although low bank concentration may reduce markups and foster riskier behavior, concentrated banking systems appear more resilient to financial shocks. We use a nonlinear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to compare the transmissions of shocks under different competition and concentration configurations. The results reveal that oligopolistic competition amplifies the effects of the shocks relative to monopolistic competition. The transmission mechanism works through the markups, which are amplified when banking concentration is increased. The desirable banking market structure is determined according to financial stability and social welfare objectives. Moreover, we find that depending on policymakers’ preferences, a banking concentration of five to eight banks balances social welfare and bank stability objectives in the United States.