Money In Elections Research Articles

Politics and Democracy in Nigeria: A Critical Examination and Analysis of the Use and Mis-use of Money in Elections

How important is money to politics? In other words, what important role does money play in politics? What explains the role of money in politics, and further its importance? How can the importance attached to the role of money in politics be scholarly demonstrated, and by what empirical yardsticks of presentations and analyses? The paper, with special focus on what it calls: “…the use and mis-use of money in politics”, seeks to, within the context of the Nigerian political system, investigate and analyze the role of money in politics. The research methodology combines historical cum analytical mode of data sourcing with evidence-based investigations organized around important thematic and sub-thematic issues and problems in the sub-field of psephology. The methodology, further advanced within the perspective of provocative and inquisitive scholarship, raises fundamental questions that were considered useful for the interrogation of the subject matter and the consequent organization of the accompanying research. For instance, how are money, politics and power related, and within what scholarly template of critical social science inquiry? Which influences the other and to what extent and degree of consequences and relationships? How can the relationships between and among these be measured and by what indices and criteria of strict scientific measurement and evaluation? The answers to the questions provide important findings/information with respect to the future of democracy in Nigeria when approached from the perspective of the cost of elections which tend to favour the highest bidders, the “money-bags” as called. The fact that the future of democracy becomes endangered under the circumstance, recommendations are consequently made on how to mitigate the cost of elections and further enhance democratic political practice.
 Green University Review of Social Sciences Dec 2021; 7(1-2): 35-64

How Should India Fund its Democracy? Lessons from the Global Experiences

Democracy costs money. From fighting elections and to running daily political activities, political parties and candidates seek donations from all possible sources including tapping illegal and interested money. This often results in corruption and subversion of governance. In addition, the expensive nature of elections acts as a huge barrier for a lot of aspiring candidates to enter politics, thus working as an “entry barrier”. In the absence of adequate funds, smaller and new parties particularly find it difficult to run decent election campaigns. In order to reduce the dependency on big money and encourage aspiring politicians to participate in the democratic process, a number of democracies have embraced the path of public subsidies and direct funding of political parties and political activities. By effectively targeting state subsidies, leading western democracies such as Germany and United Kingdom have made impressive strides in reducing the role of interested money in elections and have brought visible transparency in their electoral politics. Looking from the prisms of India’s tryst with public funding model, the paper attempts to study the effectiveness of different public funding models, understand the context of such reforms including the reform eco-systems, identify the variations in implementation, and prepare a list of doable for India.

ANALISIS TRANSPARANSI PERTANGGUNGJAWABAN ANGGARAN BADAN PENYELENGGARA PEMILU AD HOC PADA PEMILU 2019 DI KPU KABUPATEN TANJUNG JABUNG BARAT

The issue of money in elections is a crucial issue, because the realization of elections with integrity is determined by transparency and accountability in election finances. Several studies have found that the elections that have been held in Indonesia have not implemented the principles of transparency and accountability optimally. This study aims to analyze the transparency of the 2019 Election budget accountability by the Ad Hoc EMB’s in Tanjung Jabung Barat Regency. This research is descriptive qualitative with a case study approach. To analyze the data, it is done using the concept of transparency proposed by Koppell (2005). The results of the study indicate that although the budget management activities by Ad Hoc EMB’s have been carried out openly, the information presented in the budget accountability report is not yet fully complete and accurate, so that the implementation of the principle of transparency has not run optimally. This is a consequence of the uneven competence of human resources due to the lack of training related to election finance management. For this reason, it is necessary to increase the competence of human resources through technical guidance or the like to the maximum.

Reforming campaign finance laws in Ghana: A 'political party bank' proposal

All over the world, the issue of financing democratic institutions is a huge concern. In developing countries in Africa, several commentaries and suggestions have inundated the subject. Central to these suggestions is the idea of state funding of political parties. Given that there are many political parties in Ghana, any notion of State financing of political parties does not appeal to many. But as democracy has come to stay in Ghana, the phenomenon of elections and financing would continue to nag for attention. Two issues to this are; whether it is necessary to deregulate the use of money in elections because of democratic free speech or whether to regulate given democratic and equal political participation. The paper uses a qualitative, doctrinal, and comparative legal methodology to make a case for 'political party banks' as an option in political party financing.

Does Money Matter for Electability? Lesson Learned From the 2014 Legislative Election in Indonesia

Reform toward open-list elections in Indonesia has transformed the nature of campaigning to become more personalized. This has raised questions regarding the role of money in elections and calls for stricter campaign finance regulation. However, the merits of limits on campaign finance depend on whether and how campaign finance affects incumbents and challengers differently. Literature on this issue has produced ambiguous results, with only few studies conducted in a developing country democracy. This study estimates the effect of campaign money, along with other factors including list position and incumbency status, on the probability of a candidate being elected in the 2014 legislative election in Indonesia. Our econometric estimations confirm that campaign money effectively raises the probability of candidates being elected. The probability of getting elected will increase up to approximately 5 percentage points for each additional IDR 100 million of campaign money. Campaign money is positive and significant for both incumbents and challengers, with the magnitude being bigger for incumbents. However, the effect of diminishing returns of campaign money is slightly stronger for incumbents. Since raising additional campaign funding benefits incumbents more than it does for challengers, this study suggests the enforcement of campaign spending limits to create a more level playing field in Indonesia’s legislative elections.

Voting with the shilling: The 'Money Talks Factor' in Kenya's Public Policy and Electoral Democracy

The influence of money in elections has become an important ingredient in determining electoral outcomes worldwide. The use of money in political activities has adversely affected the nature of public policy, governance, competition, the rule of law, transparency, equity and democracy. Although there are laws, policies and guidelines governing the use of money during elections, there is little political will to implement them. This paper examines how money, or the lack thereof, determines electoral outcomes in multi-party democracies with a focus on Kenya, employing both the hydraulic theory and the push-and-pull paradigm. The study found that in most cases, victory in elections follows those with money; in other cases, it is the potential for victory that attracts money from self-interested donors. The study calls on electoral bodies such as the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission to honour their mandate and demand compliance with set laws and regulations in a bid to entrench governance and create a level playing field for contestants.

Does money have a conservative bias? Estimating the causal impact of Citizens United on state legislative preferences

Recent work has suggested that the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United (2010), eliminating restrictions on independent campaign expenditures, increased the election probabilities of Republican state legislative candidates (Klumpp et al. in J Law Econ 59(1):1–43, 2016). Left unexplored has been whether the Court’s ruling in Citizens United increased not only the number of Republican state legislators, but also the conservatism of their estimated policy preferences, net of any effects on election probabilities. We attempt to distinguish between the possible electoral and preference effects of Citizens United. Our estimates consistently suggest that Citizens United led not only to greater likelihoods of election for Republican state legislative candidates, but also to larger within-district increases in their conservatism. The estimates, which are robust to a series of matching and placebo exercises, may provide support for the claim that more money in elections has contributed to greater conservatism among state-level Republican officeholders.

Typologies of Party Finance Systems: A Comparative Study of How Countries Regulate Party Finance and Their Institutional Foundations.

This study catalogues party finance laws in multiple countries and identifies institutional factors that correspond to laws countries choose to adopt. Using data from international sources, we assessed differences in the regulation of money in elections in over 120 states. We classified countries into four types of party finance regimes along two axes: one that reflects regulations affecting party income and a second that reflects rules intended to make party finance more transparent. We found that two institutional factors are associated with the extent of government regulation in financing politics: the type of legal system and the use of proportional representation. Our study provides a new conceptual framework to categorize party finance regimes based on various types of regulations and the linkages between institutional factors and the extent of regulation. This conceptual typology offers a method to assess relationships between finance systems and political outcomes.

Mahalnya Ongkos Politik dalam Pemilu Serentak Tahun 2019

The amount of money circulating in the 2019 Election has the potential to increase from the 2014 general election. This is based on several things. First, the system and mechanical elections have not changed from 2014. This means that the personal side or orientation of the election competition is still based on legislative candidates rather than political parties. Second, the orientation of the 2019 Legislative Election competition remains based on the popularity and personality of candidates. Third, to be elected, every legislative candidate will still try to increase its popularity, increase campaign activities, and personally finance it. In Indonesia, one of the crucial topics in each general election is about money management in elections. The role and function of money in elections is very important in studies in the social sciences, especially political science, law, and economics. This issue then brings various consequences for election participants, election organizers, and from the voter side so that the phenomenon of the widespread practice of money politics is also a major issue in the implementation of each election.

How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from Access-Seeking PACs

Interest groups contribute much less to campaigns than legally allowed. Consequently, prevailing theories infer these contributions must yield minimal returns. I argue constraints on PAC fundraising may also explain why interest groups give little. I illuminate one such constraint: access-seeking PACs rely on voluntary donations from affiliated individuals (e.g., employees), and these PACs alienate donors with partisan preferences when giving to the opposite party. First, difference-in-differences analysis of real giving shows donors withhold donations to access-seeking PACs when PACs contribute to out-partisan politicians. Next, an original survey of corporate PAC donors demonstrates they know how their PACs allocate contributions across parties, and replicates the observational study in an experiment. Donors’ partisanship thus limits access-seeking PACs’ fundraising and influence. This provides a new perspective on why there is little interest group money in elections, and has broad implications for how partisan preferences and other internal constraints shape interest group strategy.

The Integrity of Elections in Asia: Policy Lessons from Expert Evaluations

There is an evolving debate about how to strengthen elections in Asia, amidst widespread concerns about electoral malpractice in the region. While contests in some countries match or surpass international standards of electoral integrity, there are deep‐seated problems of violence and conflict, corruption and clientelism, or vote rigging and fraud in others. This review of policy practice draws on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI Release 6.0) to map the state of electoral integrity in Asia and to draw lessons for public policy. The empirics rely on the assessment of 535 experts who evaluated 47 elections in 27 countries in South, Southeast, Northeast, and Central Asia between July 2012 and December 2017. The review identifies three cross‐cutting challenges for electoral integrity in Asia. Policymakers and other stakeholders should (i) curb incumbent advantage enshrined in electoral laws regulating candidate registration and voting district boundaries; (ii) introduce regulation of political finance in order to reduce the influence of money in elections; and (iii) increase the transparency of the electoral process by encouraging nonpartisan domestic election monitoring and advocacy.

How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from Access-Seeking PACs

Interest groups contribute much less to campaigns than legally allowed. Consequently, prevailing theories infer these contributions must yield minimal returns. I argue constraints on PAC fundraising may also explain why interest groups give little. I illuminate one such constraint: access-seeking PACs rely on voluntary donations from affiliated individuals (e.g., employees), and these PACs alienate donors with partisan preferences when giving to the opposite party. First, difference-in-differences analysis of real giving shows donors withhold donations to access-seeking PACs when PACs contribute to out-partisan politicians. Next, an original survey of corporate PAC donors demonstrates they know how their PACs allocate contributions across parties, and replicates the observational study in an experiment. Donors' partisanship thus limits access-seeking PACs' fundraising and influence. This provides a new perspective on why there is little interest group money in elections, and has broad implications for how partisan preferences and other internal constraints shape interest group strategy.

Extensive changes in the electoral system of India for legitimacy and responsible representatives in politics

This article introduces the election commission of India (ECI) constitutional status and importance and role of the Indian political system. In addition, analyzing the elections in 70 years independent state in India. This article explains the major issues and problems of Indian freedom and fair election process. Mainly this article exposing the “how good representatives are contesting elections and coming to political power”. In addition, analyzing the “criminalizing the politics” and suggesting the how to eliminate it. Recent times, many commissions suggesting changes in the election process, these changes are accepting and implementing the ECI. This article mainly focuses Money Effect in Indian Electoral System and Reducing Election Cost. When Shrink the money in elections and encouraging the free and fire elections in India politics automatically democracy run successfully. These changes were TV and electronic and print media and in the 21st century as many people as part of life and social websites (like Facebook), WhatsApp etc.). This article explains “citizen participation” of fire elections and the significant role of the election commission successful of Indian democracy through the comprehensive changes in coming elections. Article concluding some suggestions of radical changes in Indian electoral process for best democracy in the world.

The 'Brave Little State of Vermont' Can Overcome Citizens United All by Itself

Supreme Court decisions in Citizens United v. F.E.C. (2010) and McCutcheon v. F.E.C. (2014), and legislation passed by Congress in 2014 each drastically increased the amount of money in politics. Vermont can take action now to restrain the corrupting effects of money in elections without running afoul of Citizens United. With a result joined by all nine justices, in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, the Supreme Court distinguished from the First Amendment reasoning in Citizens United and approved legislative recusal as a method to prevent corruption. Recusal rules straightforwardly address the heart of the problem of corruption of democracy while entirely avoiding entanglement in the convoluted and mostly improvised First Amendment reasoning in the line of cases beginning with Buckley v. Valeo and continuing with Citizens United. Although outrage over Citizens United was initially directed toward advocacy of a constitutional amendment to permit restoration of election spending restrictions, the Supreme Court decision in Nevada Commission on Ethics means that updating our recusal rules provides a far easier and faster way for Vermont to begin to stamp out the corrupting influence of money on elections. A model updated recusal rule is presented.

Super PAC!: money, elections, and voters after Citizens United

Introduction. 1. Citizens United. 2. Rise of the Super PAC. 3. Money in Elections. 4. Does it Matter Where Money Comes From? 5. Super PAC Ads in the 2012 Presidential Election. 6. Public Opinion of Campaign Finance After Citizens United. 7. Prospects for Campaign Finance Reform.

Civil Society, Indian Elections and Democracy Today

Civil society in Independent India has perhaps never been as active as it is today, except in the years before and during the emergency. We explore the role it has played in strengthening and deepening democracy. We focus largely on the work done on introducing transparency, and on raising voter awareness. As a result of this work, a lot of public data is available on the extent of crime and money in elections and politics. We analyze this and point out some implications for democracy and good governance. A brief outline of developments since Independence shows that the number of parties has grown considerably along with crime and money. As the number of parties, it became possible to win elections with a lower vote share, making it easy for big money to influence or buy a smaller fraction of votes. Meanwhile as population grew, an elected MP now represents over 15 lakh voters on average, and an MLA over 2 lakh. This is the largest number by far anywhere in the world. The data on candidates and elected representatives’ criminal and financial record is analyzed in this context. It shows that the chances of winning increase considerably for candidates with more wealth. Unfortunately it also shows that those with serious criminal cases pending against them also have a higher chance of winning. The average wealth of over 62,800 candidates analyzed is Rs.1.37 crores, which goes up to Rs. 2.03 crores for third place candidates, Rs.2.47 crores for runners up, Rs.3.8 crores for winners, Rs.4.27 crores for winners with a criminal record, and Rs.4.38 crores for winners with serious criminal cases. Meanwhile, data from India’s largest ever citizen survey of over 262,000 people on various aspects of governance show that people are unhappy with Government. There are gaps in the roles civil society has played so far, and some strategic choices it needs to make. We discuss the way forward in this context. If this is done well, change is possible.

The Financial Incumbency Advantage: Causes and Consequences

In this article, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of incumbency on campaign contributions in the U.S. House and state legislatures. In both settings, incumbency causes approximately a 20–25 percentage-point increase in the share of donations flowing to the incumbent’s party. The effect size does not vary with legislator experience and does not appear to depend on incumbent office-holder benefits. Instead, as we show, the effect is primarily the result of donations from access-oriented interest groups, especially donors from industries under heavy regulation and those with less ideological ties. Given the role of money in elections, the findings suggest that access-oriented interest groups are an important driver of the electoral security of incumbents.

What's Money Got to Do with It? Fostering Productive Discussions about Campaign Finance

Schools throughout the United States provide instruction on democracy, voting, and major institutions of government, but often excluded from the curriculum is a central reality of our political system: the role of money in elections. This article provides background information and pedagogical strategies to help teachers foster productive discussions on this issue. First, we summarize recent increases in U.S. election spending and five schools of thought on how to address this trend. Then we present various classroom discussion and assessment strategies for supporting students’ learning about our current campaign finance system and its potential alternatives. These processes can facilitate students’ development of important civic knowledge and skills and also fulfill a variety of state and national standards.

Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure

In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court swept away long-standing limits on corporate spending in federal elections, but it also strongly affirmed the constitutionality of robust disclosure and disclaimer requirements. In the wake of that decision, many proponents of campaign finance regulation have turned their attention to disclosure as the best remaining mechanism by which to regulate money in elections. At the same time, opponents of campaign finance regulation — including the legal team behind Citizens United — have trained their sights on disclosure, filing new challenges to existing disclosure require- ments in a number of state or federal courts, although so far with only limited success.Relying on the Longitudinal Elite Contributor Database (LECD) — an original database developed by one of the authors to track the population of unique individual campaign contributors from 1980 through 2008 — this essay tests the Supreme Court’s rhetoric about disclosure, and some of the premises of our current policy debates about money in politics, against the realities of the FEC’s existing disclosure regime. In particular, we find that compliance with existing disclosure regulations is inconsistent and that the current regime fails to identify the most potentially influential players in the campaign finance system. In so doing, the current system fails to provide basic facts about how candidates (and committees) finance their campaigns. We suggest that much of what the Court and reformers assume about disclosure is wrong — that their views are premised on an effective and well-functioning disclosure regime that in fact bears scant resemblance to the system of disclosure maintained by the FEC. Correcting these misunderstandings will be critical to crafting better reform proposals. And the stakes could not be higher: disclosure may well be the only constitutionally viable and politically feasible method of regulating money in elections in a post-Citizens United world.

Towards the De-Criminalization of Elections and Politics

We study the role of crime and money in elections and politics in the context of several recent far reaching judgments of the Supreme Court and the Central Information Commission. Based on publicly available data of over 62,800 candidates who contested National and State Assembly elections from 2004 to 2013, we show that both crime and money play an important role in winning elections. Thus average assets go up from Rs.1.37 crore per candidate to Rs.2.03 crores for third place candidates, Rs.2.47 crores for runners up, Rs.3.8 crore for winners, Rs.4.27 crore for winners with some criminal record, and Rs.4.4 crore for winners with serious criminal records. About 30% of elected representatives in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies have criminal cases against them. Similarly, while only 12% of ‘clean’ candidates without any criminal record win, 23% of those with a criminal record, and again, 23% of those with serious criminal records win. Several candidates and winners have multiple cases, and on average there is 1 serious case for every 5 candidates and 1 for every 2 winners. Women candidates and representatives clearly show a much lower level of criminal records. With rising inequality, proliferation of political parties leading to winners with smaller percentages of the votes, and the role of big money in elections, votes can be easily ‘bought’. We end with some tentative recommendations for improving the situation. These include legal, and administrative changes, and the role that civil society and voters can play. We look at options of moving beyond the current first past the post ‘British’ system to other systems including the American Presidential system, the European proportional representation system, the French style run-off elections and the Japanese system of multi member constituencies. Immediate electoral political considerations might promote ad hoc changes that would lead us astray. A long public debate and discussion is needed to try and evolve a reasonable consensus.