Monetary Versus Research Articles

Gendered Corruption: People's Reactions to Victims of Monetary Versus Sexual Extortion.

This research addresses the important issue of the connection between corruption and gender-based violence, an area that has gained increasing attention in recent years. It provides a new perspective by comparing the perception of victims of monetary corruption versus sexual corruption. Through an experimental study, we exposed participants to a fictitious scenario in which they witnessed an event of sex-based (vs. money-based) extortion. The results showed that the victims' decision to cave into the extortion (both money or sex-based) led to higher feelings of moral outrage and blame toward them, and a weaker moral perception. Moreover, victims were considered less moral and more prone to reputational damage when described as caving into sex-based (vs. money-based) extortion. Finally, a moderated mediation model showed that the reputational damage suffered by the woman also significantly mediated the relation between the decision to cave into the extortion and the helping intentions toward her, but only when the corruption involved sexual payment. These findings provide insights into the perception of victims of both money-based and sex-based extortion, highlighting the significant role of reputational damage and stigma in the context of sextortion.

Effects of Monetary Versus Environmental Information Framing: Implications for Long-Term Pro-Environmental Behavior and Intrinsic Motivation

Monetary incentives can reduce the performance of pro-environmental behavior, but it remains unclear if they undermine pro-environmental intrinsic motivation. In this longitudinal intervention study, we investigated how monetarily versus environmentally framed behavioral information influences pro-environmental intrinsic motivation, intentions, and behavior. Clients of a local German energy provider ( N = 657) were randomly assigned to receive electricity saving tips, combined with a savings potential in € (monetary framing) or in CO2 (environmental framing). Both types of framed tips positively influenced long-term electricity saving intentions (after 9 months), compared with a control group (receiving no tips), but not behavioral change ( n = 285). Monetarily framed tips did not reduce pro-environmental intrinsic motivation (vs. a control group), but only environmentally framed tips increased pro-environmental intrinsic motivation, which mediated effects on intentions. Hence, environmental framing of behavioral interventions may be preferred when promoting long-term pro-environmental behavior without continuous monetary benefits. Otherwise, both framing strategies can be equally effective.

When Giving Money Does Not Work: The Differential Effects of Monetary Versus In-Kind Rewards in Referral Reward Programs

Customer referral reward programs have recently gained popularity as beneficial customer acquisition tools. This research aims to explore the impact of reward type, specifically with regard to the differential effects of monetary vs. in-kind rewards, on referral success. We find that although consumers prefer monetary rewards to in-kind rewards due to their greater economic value, the higher social cost associated with money offsets this benefit and even renders money an inferior incentive when the recommendation is not well justified. Through four experiments, we demonstrate that monetary rewards (vs. in-kind rewards) lead to less referral generation and acceptance, especially when the recommended brands are weak (Studies 1 and 4), and perceived social cost mediates the interactive effect of reward type and brand strength (Studies 1 and 3). Moreover, by increasing the economic benefit or decreasing the social cost associated with monetary rewards, we restore their roles as effective incentives. Compared with in-kind rewards, monetary rewards perform equally well when the reward becomes sufficiently large (Study 2), and they perform even better when both the recommender and the receiver are rewarded (Study 3). This research extends the literature on the psychological consequences of money and provides novel insights into the customer referral process.

Fiscal Sustainability and Monetary Versus Fiscal Dominance: Evidence From Brazil, 1991-2000

Under a monetary dominant (MD) regime, the primary surplus adjusts to limit debt growth, permitting monetary policy to be conducted independently of fiscal financing requirements. In Brazil, some evidence favors an MD regime for 1995–97, but not for the decade of the 1990s as a whole. While fiscal adjustments of 1999 yielded a primary surplus of about 3 percent of GDP, consistent with solvency, a credible MD regime would require further adjustments of the primary surplus if debt increases, growth falls, or interest rates rise.

Fiscal Sustainability and Monetary Versus Fiscal Dominance: Evidence from Brazil, 1991-2000

Under a monetary dominant (MD) regime, the primary surplus adjusts to limit debt growth, permitting monetary policy to be conducted independently of fiscal financing requirements. In Brazil, some evidence favors an MD regime for 1995-97, but not for the decade of the 1990s as a whole. While fiscal adjustments of 1999 yielded a primary surplus of about 3 percent of GDP, consistent with solvency, a credible MD regime would require further adjustments of the primary surplus if debt increases, growth falls, or interest rates rise.

Why we Need an "Accord" for Federal Reserve Credit Policy: A Note

The 1951 Accord between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve was one of the most dramatic events in U.S. financial history. The agreement liberated monetary policy from the commitment, dating from World War II, to support government bond prices. It reasserted the principle of Federal Reserve independence so that monetary policy might serve primarily as an instrument for macroeconomic stabilization. The Federal Reserve, however, executes both monetary and credit policies, and no Accord has yet been established for its credit policies. The reason is that, until recently, fiscal concerns have not threatened the misuse of Fed credit policies in the way that bond price supports did for monetary policy. Large federal budget deficits, a deposit insurance crisis, or significant foreign exchange market intervention could change that.1 Just as the 1951 Accord greatly improved monetary policy, an Accord for Fed credit policy established today, while fiscal concerns are still relatively small, could yield significant benefits in the future. 1. MONETARY VERSUS CREDIT POLICY Distinguishing between monetary and credit policy is straightforward.2 Monetary policy refers to changes in the stock of high-powered money, that is, currency plus bank reserves, accomplished by open market operations in domestic securities or foreign exchange. For example, a central bank takes a monetary policy action if it increases bank reserves by purchasing securities. Credit policy, on the other hand, changes a central bank's assets while holding the stock of high-powered money fixed. For example, a central bank takes a credit policy action when it uses funds obtained by selling Treasury securities to acquire other assets. Credit policies also include regulation and supervision of the banking system, but such aspects of policy will not be discussed here. 2. THE ACCORD PRINCIPLES FOR CREDIT POLICY The 1951 Accord established the principle that monetary policy should be used to stabilize the macroeconomy, regardless of the fiscal concerns of the Treasury. It restored the idea that a fully independent central bank contributes importantly to economic stability.3 Independence insulates the Fed from shortrun inflationary pressures to stimulate employment and help finance the Treasury. It also frees the Fed from having to get Congressional or Treasury approval for its policy actions, enabling the Fed to react quickly to short-run macroeconomic or liquidity shocks. Congress bestows such independence only because it is necessary for the central bank to do its job effectively. Hence, the presumption ought to be that the Fed should perform only those functions that must be carried out by an independent central bank. Monetary policy is both necessary and sufficient to pursue macroeconomic stabilization policy and to deter system-wide liquidity crises. Credit policy directs funds promptly to illiquid institutions when macroeconomic conditions do not call for a change in high-powered money. This suggests the following Accord principles for Fed credit policy: (1) liquidity assistance should not fund insolvent institutions; (2) credit policy should not fund expenditures that ought to get explicit Congressional authorization; (3) Congress should not direct the Fed to transfer assets to the Treasury in order to reduce the Federal deficit. Three Fed credit policies discussed below illustrate the above concerns. First, liquidity assistance potentially provides funds to insolvent institutions and raises the cost of deposit insurance. Second, Fed credit policy may inappropriately finance sterilized foreign exchange market intervention and some foreign expenditures of the Treasury. Third, the transfer of Fed surplus assets to the Treasury, as directed by Congress, potentially weakens Fed independence. In each case, an Accord for Fed credit policy would help implement the above principles. 3. LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE As a rule, the Fed finances liquidity assistance to depository institutions with funds acquired by selling Treasury securities-leaving high-powered money unchanged. …

Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy Effects: A Review of the Debate

This paper reviews empirical findings, econometric issues,and theoretical results bearing upon the "monetary vs. fiscal policy" debate that began with the 1963 Friedrnan-Meiselman study.The main substantive conclusions are not very dramatic.The clearest is that an open-market increase in the money stock has a stimulative effect on aggregate demand, a conclusion that in turn implies that a money-financed increase in government expenditures (or reduction in taxes) is more stimulative than it would be if bond financed.This conclusion is based on empirical results obtained from St. Louis-type estimates and large scale economebic models and is supported by theoretical analysis involving both Ricardian and non-Ricardian assumptions. In the case of pure fiscal policy actions -- i.e.,bond-financed tax cutsor bond-financed expenditure increases --theory suggests that the latter should be at least as stimulative as the former and probably to a positive extent; evidence is mixed but not obviously inconsistent with this prediction.With respect to the textbook issue concerning the relative effects of pure monetary and fiscal actions, the evidence seems to support the notion that a sequence of $k open-market purchases, one each period, will be much more stimulative than a single but unreversed $k/period bond-financed increase in expenditures. The importance of this last issue is debatable.

Consistent Empirical Results with Almon's Method: Implications for the Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy Debate

Consistent Empirical Results with Almon's Method: Implications for the Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy Debate

Further Evidence as to the Relative Effects of Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy

Further Evidence as to the Relative Effects of Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy

The Almon Lag Technique and the Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy Debate

Abstract This article discusses possible problems associated with the Almon lag technique, caused by misspecification of the length of the lag or the degree of the polynomial. It is argued that the choice of the lag length is particularly treacherous. Finally, two studies of the relative importance of fiscal and monetary policy are reexamined, and it is shown how insufficient attention to these problems has significantly affected their conclusions.

Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy at Full Employment

Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy at Full Employment

Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy at Full Employment

Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy at Full Employment