Monetary Policy Transparency Research Articles

Does Central Bank Transparency Matter for Inflation: Role of Inflation Targeting

This paper examines the relationship between central bank transparency and inflation for six inflation targeting (IT) and ten non-inflation targeting (non-IT) Asian economies. The propensity score matching and panel regression model are employed in the study. The empirical analysis shows that IT enhances central bank transparency. Further, we find that central bank transparency in IT significantly lowers inflation, suggesting that countries promoting greater monetary policy transparency can have a better advantage of experiencing low inflation. Our findings have policy implications for central banks in developing economies that are grappling with low transparency.

The investment of renewable energy: Is green bond a safe-haven to hedge U.S. monetary policy uncertainty?

This paper uses the bootstrap rolling-window Granger causality test to investigate the relationship between U.S. monetary policy uncertainty and green bond. The method addresses the limitations of ignoring the instability of coefficients and the time-varying relationship between the variables in previous literature. The results find both insignificant and significant relationship in the full period. One explanation of the insignificant relationship is that the changes of investor sentiment influence their judgment regarding to the monetary policy uncertainty and green bond, and thus the significance of the relationship between the variables. Besides, this paper finds the significant inter-relationship is time-varying. Specifically, in the sub-period when the market sentiment is low, the rising monetary policy uncertainty influences green bond price negatively. Meanwhile, the unexpected changes of green bond may also have both positive and negative effects on monetary policy uncertainty in different sub-periods. Thus, this paper proposes that the impact mechanism between the variables is effective when the investors are irrational. Furthermore, the findings may provide valuable implications for investors and governments, including adjusting investment strategy when the monetary policy is unclear, increasing monetary policy transparency, and monitoring speculative activity in green bond market. In addition, it is necessary to emphasize that the validity of the findings is limited to the U.S. and the period when investors’ sentiment experience large fluctuations. Finally, future research may consider expand the analysis to the green stock, as it is another important channel for renewable energy investment.

Time-varying parameters in monetary policy rules: a GMM approach

PurposeThe article aims to establish whether the degree of aversion to inflation and the responsiveness to deviations from potential output have changed over time.Design/methodology/approachThis paper assesses time variation in monetary policy rules by applying a time-varying parameter generalised methods of moments (TVP-GMM) framework.FindingsUsing monthly data until December 2022 for five inflation targeting countries (the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden) and five countries with alternative monetary regimes (the US, Japan, Denmark, the Euro Area, Switzerland), we find that monetary policy has become more averse to inflation and more responsive to the output gap in both sets of countries over time. In particular, there has been a clear shift in inflation targeting countries towards a more hawkish stance on inflation since the adoption of this regime and a greater response to both inflation and the output gap in most countries after the global financial crisis, which indicates a stronger reliance on monetary rules to stabilise the economy in recent years. It also appears that inflation targeting countries pay greater attention to the exchange rate pass-through channel when setting interest rates. Finally, monetary surprises do not seem to be an important determinant of the evolution over time of the Taylor rule parameters, which suggests a high degree of monetary policy transparency in the countries under examination.Originality/valueIt provides new evidence on changes over time in monetary policy rules.

Information overflow between monetary policy transparency and inflation expectations using multivariate stochastic volatility models

The forward-looking policy is useful for joint decision-making between public and monetary authorities. The study calculates the monetary policy transparency index, inflation expectations, and their volatility spillover effects at a data-driven angle. Optimization mechanisms of monetary policy transparency influencing inflation and inflation expectations volatility, and transparency index based on market participants’ optimization decisions are analysed. Multivariate stochastic volatility models for measuring the volatility of inflation and inflation expectations are analysed. Additionally, the relationships between inflation and inflation expectations volatility and transparency are tested empirically. Tests show that: first, the most suitable models for measuring volatility of inflation and inflation expectations are obtained. Second, monetary policy transparency has a negative effect on the volatility of inflation and inflation expectations. Third, there is a unidirectional Granger relationship from the volatility of inflation expectations to the volatility of inflation, and it indicates that the volatility of inflation expectations has an important guiding effect on that of inflation, and it is necessary to stabilize inflation expectations for stabilizing inflation. Fourth, improving monetary policy transparency can not only reduce inflation, inflation expectations, inflation volatility, inflation expectations volatility, but also reduce the sacrifice rate, that is, to stabilize the price level with less anti-inflation costs.

Measuring monetary policy transparency in Uruguay

The adoption of inflation-targeting regimes has led central banks to devote considerable efforts to improve their transparency. Following this trend, several authors have developed tools to measure and compare the levels of transparency of central banks. This paper undertakes this task for the Central Bank of Uruguay by applying two different transparency indexes. The first one was designed in the mid-2000s and has been applied in a sample with a significant number of countries. The second index is based on a new approach that seeks to reflect the best practices of the most advanced inflation-forecast-targeting regimes.

Monetary policy transparency and real exchange rate adjustment

AbstractWe study the effect of different attributes of monetary policy transparency on real exchange rate adjustment by estimating the half‐life of the real exchange rate. After controlling for sample‐selection bias, results from the panel error‐correction model suggest that the economic aspect of transparency facilitates real exchange rate adjustment in non‐industrial countries. The driving force behind this finding is that economic transparency enhances nominal exchange rate adjustment. However, none of the different attributes of monetary policy transparency significantly affect real exchange rate adjustment in industrial countries. Failure to control for sample‐selection bias over‐rejects the null hypothesis.

Expectations and the Central Banker: Making Decisions the Market Expects to See?

This paper develops a simple model to examine conditions under which a monetary policy-making authority is tempted to ‘follow the market’. In doing so, we explore the implications of increased market consensus on the practice of monetary policy and show that inefficiency in policymaking is most likely precisely when there is a very high consensus that economic fundamentals are weak or strong. In addition, our results also shed light on (i) why interest rates may not be high enough even when the central bank's information suggests a rise in asset prices may be due to a ‘bubble’ shock; (ii) why a central banker may be reluctant to adopt a loose monetary policy even when investors seem to be very pessimistic about the path of future output; and (iii) why, contrary to conventional models, we sometimes observe an upward revision of private sector‘s forecasts of inflation when the central bank tightens its monetary policy. The results have implications for the transparency of monetary policy.

Monetary policy uncertainty, market structure and bank risk-taking: Evidence from China

We identify the impact of monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) on bank risk-taking by exploiting the regional heterogeneity of bank market structure in China. Our findings show that a bank facing more competition will take more risks following an increase in MPU, compared with a bank facing less competition, thus confirm a positive impact of MPU on bank risk-taking. In addition, we find that MPU positively affects bank risk-taking by deteriorating its profitability and balance sheet. These findings suggest that the central bank can alleviate bank risks by enhancing the transparency of monetary policy.

Inflation anchoring and growth: The role of credit constraints

Can inflation anchoring foster growth? To answer this question, we use panel data on sectoral growth for 22 manufacturing industries from 39 advanced and emerging market economies over 1990–2014 and employ a difference-in-differences strategy based on the theoretical prediction that higher inflation uncertainty particularly depresses investment in industries that are more credit constrained. Industries characterized by high external financial dependence, liquidity needs, and R&D intensity, and low asset tangibility, tend to grow faster in countries with well-anchored inflation expectations. The results, based on an IV approach—using indicators of monetary policy transparency and central bank independence as instruments—confirm our findings.

CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION DESIGN: TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY OF MONETARY POLICY

The object of the article is central bank communication design (particularly target audience, channels and instruments) and central banks’ transparency measurement. The purpose is to summarise the central bank communication policy's conceptual basics and clarify how transparent the NBU’s monetary policy is. Methodology. The paper applies the Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) and Al-Mashat et al. (2018) methods of transparency measurement, using the NBU’s published documents and website data as of 2021. Results. It has been emphasized that communication design should be based on central bank’s communication objectives, information demand from defined stakeholders and target groups, capabilities of application of channels and instruments. Ensuring confidence in monetary policy calls for simplified language and format that reflects the general public's interest. The shift to the growing role of the type of communication channel and interaction of central bank with the general public are marked out. The meaning of transparency, criteria, and indices (Eijffinger-Geraats, Dincer-Eichengreen, Crowe-Meade, Cournede-Minegishi, CBT-IT index) are under consideration. According to Dincer and Eichengreen, the NBU’s transparency index reaches almost a perfect score of 12 (out of 15), affirming NBU’s political and policy transparency improvements. The NBU’s CBT-IT transparency index scores 11.45 (out of 20), which points to the need to eliminate gaps of the FPAS designed to support full-fledged inflation- forecast-targeting (3.2 out of 9) in the light of improvements in the monetary policymaking process (5.75 out of 7) and transparency about monetary policy objectives (2.5 out of 3). Practical implications. The enhancement of the NBU’s transparency level reflects the development of its communication policy as transparency of monetary policy requires constant and coherent messages via diversified channels and instruments for a defined target audience, following a clear purpose of strategic communication. Value/originality. It has been highlighted that central bank communication design is the basis for financial market participants' trust, favouring monetary policy transparency.

The transparency of monetary policy and the effect of exchange rate pass-through

The work is devoted to the study of the influence of changes in the transparencyof monetary policy on the effect of exchange rate pass-through in consumer prices. Based on econometric modeling of cross-country panel data, it is shown that an increase in the transparency of communication between the central bank and the population leads to a decrease in the elasticity of domestic prices with respect to the exchange rate in countries that target inflation and adhere to other monetary policy regimes. The effect is observed for both developed and developing economies; it is stronger in the second case. The obtained result can be interpreted as an argument in favor of the advisability of the Bank of Russia transition from a verbal description of its future actions to the publication of a quantitative forecast of the interest rate trajectory.

The effect of central bank transparency on inflation persistence

In this paper, we examine the effect of central bank transparency on inflation persistence, using panel data analysis. The existing literature has shown a significant impact of central bank transparency on macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, but not many efforts have been made about its effect on inflation persistence. We use yearly data for 14 countries and the Eurozone (ECB). We find that monetary policy transparency has a negative statistically significant impact on inflation persistence, while controlling also for important variables such as GDP growth, interest rates, economic openness and unit labour cost.

Talking in a language that everyone can understand? Transparency of speeches by the ECB Executive Board

Using novel data on speeches held by members of the European Central Bank's Executive Board, we investigate whether monetary policy transparency has increased over time. With respect to the general public as the target audience, our findings suggest that the European Central Bank successfully improved the frequency and clarity of information provision since its inception. The increase in transparency is gradual, rather than being induced by changes in the Executive Board's composition or major economic events such as the Great Recession. However, the clarity of speeches in recent years is still fairly low. Moreover, our findings indicate that clarity decreased under Christine Lagarde's presidency following the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic. We conclude that while the European Central Bank was able to increase transparency over time, further improvements in clarity are required to make monetary policy truly accessible to the broad public.

<i>Assessment of Transparency of Modern Monetary Policy</i>

<i>Assessment of Transparency of Modern Monetary Policy</i>

Validity of the Expectations Hypothesis of the Term Structure of Interest Rates: The Case of Saudi Arabia

Abstract We examine and test the validity of the expectation hypothesis of the term structure (EHTS) of interest rates in Saudi Arabia using the traditional single equation approach, Campbell and Shiller methodology, Error Correction Model, and monthly data over the period June 1983 to December 2014. The results of the single equation approach indicate that the test of validity of the expectation hypothesis cannot be rejected for all maturities. We also find that the validity of the EHTS of interest rates is supported through the stationarity of the term spreads between short- and long-term interest rates. Moreover, the cointegration test reveals the existence of a cointegration relationship between short- and long-term interest with ( 1 − 1 ) $\left(1-1\right)$ cointegrating vector, suggesting the validity EHTS of interest rates. Policy implications based on the empirical results suggest that the transparency of monetary policy in Saudi Arabia and the effective role of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) in conducting monetary policy increase the predictive power of market participants of future movements of short-term interest rates.

Does transparency of central banks communication affect credit market? Empirical evidence for advanced and emerging markets

This study examines the effect of the transparency of central banks communication on credit market. In particular, this study investigates how central banks’ effort to provide more detailed information about their objectives regarding the price stability (monetary policy transparency) and financial stability (financial stability transparency) policies are able to mitigate information asymmetry on credit market, through the net interest margin charged by the banks to engage in financial intermediation (credit spread). The findings denote central bank transparency is able to reduce the credit spread. Additionally, the evidence suggests the effect of central bank transparency on the credit spread is greater in emerging markets, where there is less information available on credit market. In brief, transparency in central banks communication is an important tool to mitigate the information asymmetry in the credit market.

A Comparative Analysis of Inflation Dynamics Models in Nigeria

This study empirically developed a multivariate autoregressive distributed-lag (ARDL) model and a univariate autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model for inflation in Nigeria, ascertained the stability of the models, and compared the performance of the models. This study used quarterly time series data from 1988 to 2017. The data were sourced from the publications of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).The study applied the ordinary least squares (OLS) method with the aid of EViews software for estimation purposes. The study found that: (1) ARDL (4, 2, 2, 1) and ARIMA (2, 1, 3) were the most appropriate models of inflation in Nigeria under model identification, identification, estimation, and diagnostic checking; (2) inflation in Nigeria was largely expectations-driven; and (3) inflation in Nigeria was influenced by the exchange rate, interest rate, and broad money supply (liquidity) both in the short-run and in the long-run.The study recommended that: (1) a “one-model-fits-all” for inflation rate dynamics in Nigeria should be discouraged and that different models should employed to complement one another; (2) regulatory authorities should ensure a high degree of transparency in monetary policy making and implementation; and (3) efforts should be made by the regulatory authorities to control money supply and ensure exchange rate and interest stability, in order to stem inflationary tendencies.

A Text Mining Analysis of Central Bank Monetary Policy Communication in Nigeria

This paper employs text-mining techniques to analyse the communication strategy of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) during the period 2004-2019. Since the policy communique released after each meeting of the CBN’s monetary policy committee (MPC) represents an important tool of central bank communication, we construct a corpus based on 87 policy communiques with a total of 123, 353 words. Having processed the textual data into a form suitable for analysis, we examined the readability, sentiments, and topics of the policy documents. While the CBN’s communication has increased substantially over the years, implying increased monetary policy transparency; the computed Coleman and Liau readability index shows that the word and sentence structures of the policy communiques have become more complex, thus reducing its readability. In terms of monetary policy sentiments, we find an average net score of -10.5 per cent, reflecting the level of policy uncertainties faced by the MPC over the sample period. In addition, our results indicate that the topics driving the linguistic contents of the communiques were influenced by the Bank’s policy objectives as well as the nature of shocks hitting the economy per period.

Do monetary policy transparency and central bank communication reduce interest rate disagreement?

AbstractYes. This study produces evidence that monetary policy transparency and communication policy of the Bank of England have information content in reducing disagreement about interest rate forecasts. Different from most extant studies employing the transparency index derived from official documents of the central banks, this study extends the literature by using a recently developed market‐based monetary transparency index. Moreover, this study analyzes forecast disagreement in a multivariate perspective based on survey data of short‐ and long‐term rates over short and long horizons. This study characterizes several patterns on forecast disagreement related to maturities of interest rates, forecast horizons, recessions, forward guidance, credibility, transparency, and communication policy. Interestingly, disagreement among the Monetary Policy Committee in policy rate decisions is associated with lower disagreement among professional forecasters on interest rate outlook, whereas neither announcement of changes in policy rates nor publication of inflation reports affects forecast disagreement. These results have important implications for monetary policymakers in managing market expectations of interest rates.

The similarity of European central banks in terms of transparency and effectiveness

Research background: The previous studies on monetary policy transparency suggest that the dependence between the degree of transparency and monetary policy effectiveness exists. In this examination, we tackle this issue for the most recent sample with the application of novel transparency measure, which is de-signed to cover forward-looking policy approach.
 Purpose of the article: We aim at evaluating forward-looking transparency of the European central banks and juxtapose it with their effectiveness in achieving monetary policy goals: price stability and output stabilization. The sample covers the central banks of the following countries: Sweden, the UK, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. We also search for the patters of similarity in our sample.
 Methods: We apply a novel, index-based transparency measure to assess central banks? transparency. We also estimate inflation gap and the output gap. The methods used are based on data and statistical analysis. The comparison of the behaviour of individual central banks is carried out for the variables measuring transparency and inflation and output gaps. The similarity of the performance of individual central banks is assessed with the use of measures of the distance between objects, including our own measure.
 Findings & Value added: Our results suggest the existence of different degrees of similarity in the sample, but some common tendencies can be found as well. For example, central banks with comparable transparency degree are found more similar. Novelty of the examination is related to our methodology: transparency and similarity measures applied and the most recent time span covered.