Monetary Policy In Open Economies Research Articles

Financial crises, bailouts and monetary policy in open economies

I jointly study the optimal bailout policy and monetary policy in open economies that borrow in foreign currency from international lenders. A policy dilemma emerges during financial crises. Policymakers trade off the benefit of more bailouts alleviating firms’ financial constraints against the cost of larger currency devaluation, which tightens firms’ financial constraints. I embed the optimal bailout in an otherwise standard “sudden stop” model with nominal rigidities. The model sheds light on the role of bailouts and currency mismatch in driving the exchange rate dynamics, firms’ balance sheets and economic recovery. Quantitatively, the model matches key business cycle moments. A welfare evaluation shows that there are in general welfare gains from the systemic bailout policy despite ex ante moral hazard problems of firms.

Currency misalignments, international trade in intermediate inputs, and inflation targeting

In the literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies, the presence of local- currency pricing provides a rationale for targeting CPI inflation rather than PPI inflation. In this paper, we reexamine this conclusion by incorporating international trade in intermediate inputs into Engel (2011). We find that the cooperative monetary policymaker should target the final-goods output gaps, the PPI inflation rates at both stages of production, the currency misalignments at both stages of production, and the vertical relative price gaps. Welfare analysis shows that the monetary policymaker should target the weighted average intermediate-goods PPI (WPPI) inflation rather than CPI inflation for most combinations of price stickiness at both stages of production.

Monetary Policy and Redistribution in Open Economies

This paper develops an open-economy heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model in which households differ in their income, wealth, and real and financial integration with international markets. We use the model to reassess classic questions in international macroeconomics from a distributional perspective. Our analysis yields two main takeaways. First, heterogeneity in households’ international integration plays a central role in driving the unequal consumption responses to external shocks, more so than income and wealth. Second, the conduct of monetary policy in open economies faces a stabilization-inequality trade-off, with fixed exchange rate regimes leading to amplified but more equal consumption responses to external shocks.

Money Matters: Global Banks, Safe Assets and Monetary Autonomy

This paper depicts an often neglected channel of transmission of monetary policy, namely international safety appetite, as an important source of production and risk-taking international monetary spillovers. The model features a local economy with exogenous financial frictions that lead firms to need both local and foreign financing to pay for their factors of production. Global and local risk-averse banks supply firms with risky loans while buying safe assets to governments to hedge themselves against equity shocks. Monetary policy shocks of a hegemon currency issuer affect returns obtained by banks for the risky loans they concede, altering these agents' risk pricing and balance sheet composition. Main results outline that global monetary policy tightening reduces the returns of risky global loans, inducing global banks to reduce risky loan creation, ultimately decreasing both production and consumption volatility internationally. Two more secondary results arise. First, local monetary authorities may counteract global monetary policy spillovers, but this will entail a trade-off between boosting production and reducing consumption volatility. Second, both global and local expansive monetary policy increase the demand for global safe assets, relaxing the budget constraint of monopolistic global safe asset issuers. Understanding the international safety appetite mechanism of transmission appears to be of critical importance as it may impact the effectiveness of monetary policy in open economies as well as its optimal design.

Foreign-currency exposures and the financial channel of exchange rates: Eroding monetary policy autonomy in small open economies?

Foreign-currency exposures on an economy’s external balance sheet may jeopardise financial stability when the exchange rate depreciates. In fact, theory suggests that in such an environment it may be optimal for monetary policy in a floating regime to reduce exchange rate variation by mimicking foreign monetary policy in order to dampen financial cycles rather than focusing exclusively on stabilising the business cycle. We explore whether there is evidence in the data for monetary policy in small open economies facing such a trade-off between financial stability and macroeconomic stabilisation that gives rise to “fear-of-floating”. In a panel data set for 26 advanced and emerging small open economies with floating regimes for the time period from 2000 to 2017 we document evidence that is consistent with fear-of-floating, i.e. that small open economy monetary policy responds to base-country monetary policy even after controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals. We find that this fear-of-floating is particularly pronounced in the presence of foreign-currency exposures. Specifically, fear-of-floating is stronger when the foreign-currency exposures arise through debt rather than non-debt instruments, which is consistent with existing evidence documenting that these instruments are more fickle and sensitive to swings in investor sentiment. Moreover, the evidence for fear-of-floating is stronger when base-country monetary policy is tightened, suggesting that fear-of-floating typically arises in the face of immediate threats to financial stability due to depreciation pressures in the presence of foreign-currency exposures, rather than as preemptive action to mitigate the build-up of such vulnerabilities when the currency is appreciating.

Política monetaria de economias abiertas: El rol del tipo de cambio en Mexico

Monetary policy in open economies: the role of the exchange rate in Mexico This paper analyzes the role of the exchange rate in Mexico during the inflation targeting regime. The framework is based on the New Keynesian Macroeconomics, and the empirical evidence in the estimation of a Vector Error Correction model and the statistical analysis of the inflation targeting in Mexico and Latin America. The results describe to the Mexico’s monetary policy as a hybrid system, where the nominal interest rate (policy instrument) and appreciations of the real exchange rate (intermediate instrument), have as their primary objective, the inflation stabilization within a numerical goal.

The role of intermediate goods in international monetary cooperation

This paper investigates the implications of intermediate goods for optimal monetary policy in open economies, and particularly focuses on the welfare gains that result from monetary cooperation. In a relatively standard two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with input-output relations, this paper demonstrates that introducing intermediate goods can amplify the welfare gains caused by cost-push shocks by an order of magnitude larger. A detailed analysis of equilibrium dynamics highlights a new channel that is absent in the previous literature: non-cooperative central banks respond differently to shocks in the intermediate goods market versus shocks in the final goods market, even if these shocks generate the same distortions when the two central banks cooperate. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that increasing the degree of openness in the intermediate goods market can reduce the welfare gains from monetary cooperation. This casts doubt on whether the recent trend in international economic integration justifies the potential need for international monetary cooperation.

Financial Crises, Bailouts and Monetary Policy in Open Economies

Financial Crises, Bailouts and Monetary Policy in Open Economies

The Role of Intermediate Goods in International Monetary Cooperation

This paper investigates the implication of intermediate goods on optimal monetary policy in open economies, and in particular, focusing on the welfare gains from monetary cooperation. In a relatively standard two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with input-output relations, I demonstrate that introducing intermediate goods can amplify the welfare gains caused by cost-push shocks by an order of magnitude larger. A detailed analysis on the equilibrium dynamics highlights a new channel that is absent in the previous literature: non-cooperative central banks respond differently to shocks in the intermediate goods market versus shocks in the final goods market, even if these shocks generate the same distortions when the two central banks cooperate. Furthermore, I find that increasing the degree of openness in the intermediate goods market can reduce the welfare gains from monetary cooperation. This casts doubt on whether the recent trend in international economic integration may justify the potential need for international monetary cooperation.

Optimal Monetary Policy in Inflation Targeting Open Economies

This paper presents a simple framework for analysing the operation and effectiveness of monetary policy in open economies in the spirit of aggregative approaches that are the mainstay of intermediate macroeconomic theory. Combining standard macroeconomic relations with precepts from international finance, it provides new lessons for the conduct of monetary policy under inflation targeting. It first confirms the classic Mundell‐Fleming result that monetary policy is only effective as a short run stabilization instrument under floating exchange rates, yet goes further in showing that countercyclical monetary policy is incompatible with inflation targeting under fixed exchange rates. Second, it highlights the importance of anchoring inflation expectations as a means of inflation control. Third, it suggests how central banks should react to changes in the monetary stance abroad. Lastly, it demonstrates how monetary policy should respond to productivity improvement at home under floating exchange rates.

International Trade Finance and the Cost Channel of Monetary Policy in Open Economies

International Trade Finance and the Cost Channel of Monetary Policy in Open Economies

Optimal monetary policy in open economies revisited

This paper revisits optimal monetary policy in open economies, in particular, focusing on the noncooperative policy game under local currency pricing in a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We first derive the quadratic loss functions which noncooperative policy makers aim to minimize. Then, we show that noncooperative policy makers face extra trade-offs regarding stabilizing real marginal costs induced by deviations from the law of one price under local currency pricing, and that optimal monetary policy seeks to stabilize CPI inflation rates and more so under noncooperation than it does under cooperation. As a result of the increased number of stabilizing objectives, welfare gains from cooperation emerge even when two countries face only technology shocks. Still, gains from cooperation are not large, implying that frictions other than nominal rigidities are necessary to strongly recommend cooperation as an important policy framework to increase global welfare.

Asymmetric Monetary Policy Rules for an Open Economy: Evidence from Canada and the UK

We present an analytical framework to examine the open economy monetary policy rule of a central bank under asymmetric preferences. The resulting policy rule is then empirically examined using quarterly data with regard to Canada and the UK from 1983q1 to 2007q4. Our empirical investigation shows that the open economy policy rule receives support from the data and that the monetary policy makers in the UK and Canada have asymmetric preferences. Robustness checks based on model calibration provide support for the suggested policy rule.

Optimal Monetary Policy in Open Economies Revisited

This paper revisits optimal monetary policy in open economies, in particular, focusing on the noncooperative policy game under local currency pricing in a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We first derive the quadratic loss functions which noncooperative policy makers aim to minimize. Then, we show that noncooperative policy makers face extra trade-offs regarding stabilizing the real marginal costs induced by deviations from the law of one price under local currency pricing. As a result of the increased number of stabilizing objectives, welfare gains from cooperation emerge even when two countries face only technology shocks, which usually leads to equivalence between cooperation and noncooperation. Still, gains from cooperation are not large, implying that frictions other than nominal rigidities are necessary to strongly recommend cooperation as an important policy framework to increase global welfare.

Financal Frictions and Policy Cooperation: A Case with Monopolistic Banking and Staggered Loan Contracts

Do financial frictions call for policy cooperation? This paper investigates the implications of simple financial frictions, monopolistic banking together with staggered loan contracts, for monetary policy in open economies in the linear quadratic (LQ) framework. Welfare analysis shows that policy cooperation improves social welfare in the presence of such financial frictions. There also exist long-run gains from cooperation in addition to these by jointly stabilizing inefficient fluctuations over the business cycle, that are usually found in models with price rigidities. The Ramsey optimal steady states differ between cooperation and noncooperation. Such gains from cooperation arise irrespective of the existence of international lending or borrowing.

Monetary policy in open economies: Practical perspectives for pragmatic central bankers

This paper reviews and interprets some of the key policy implications that flow from a class of DSGE models for optimal monetary policy in the open economy. The framework suggests that good macroeconomic outcomes in open economies are possible by focusing inflation targeting that is implemented by a Taylor type rule, a rule that in equilibrium is reflected in the exchange rate as an asset price. Optimal monetary policy will not be able deliver a stationary (‘stable’) nominal exchange rate – let alone a fixed exchange rate or one that remains inside a target zone – because, absent a commitment device, optimal monetary can’t deliver a stationary domestic price level. Another feature in the data for inflation targeting countries that is consistent with monetary policy via Taylor type rule is that it will tend push the nominal exchange rate in the opposite direction from PPP in response to an ‘inflation’ shock—the ‘bad news god news’ result of Clarida and Waldman (2008. Is Bad News about Inflation Good News for the Exchange Rate. In: John Campbell, (Ed.), Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press), Clarida and Waldman (2014. Bad News About Inflation is Good News for the Nominal Exchange Rate Under Optimal Monetary Policy: DSGE Theory and a Decade of Empirical Evidence). This is so even though in the long run of these models the nominal exchange rate must in expectation obey PPP.

Exchange Rates, Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Risk Aversion

This paper proposes a theoretical model for determining the exchange rate based on the interaction between international bond markets with different maturities. The model accommodates the presence of risk premia between short- and long-term bonds. The difference in risk premium between international bond markets produces imbalances between their yields and is responsible for the differences in equilibrium between the future spot exchange rate and the corresponding forward price. These departures from the expectations hypothesis of the international term structure of interest rates lead to unintended effects on the efficacy of monetary policy in open economies. The existence of imbalances in the risk premium between countries can be considered by monetary authorities as an alternative tool for conducting monetary policy and boosting real output.

Financial Stability in Open Economies

This paper investigates the implications for monetary policy of financial markets that are internationally integrated but have intrinsic frictions. When there is no other distortion than financial market imperfections in the form of staggered international loan contracts, financial stability, which here constitutes eliminating the inefficient fluctuations of loan premiums, is the optimal monetary policy in open economies, regardless of whether policy coordination is possible. Yet, the optimality of inward-looking monetary policy requires an extra condition, in addition to those included in previous studies on the optimal monetary policy in open economies. To make allocations between cooperative and noncooperative monetary policy coincide, the exchange rate risk must be perfectly covered by the banks. Otherwise, each central bank has an additional incentive to control the nominal exchange rate to favor firms in her own country by reducing the exchange rate risk.

Open Economy Monetary Policy Reconsidered

The standard policy rule of the Mundell-Fleming model states that under a flexible exchange rate regime with perfectly elastic capital flows, monetary policy is effective and fiscal policy is not. The rule ignores the effect of a change in the nominal exchange rate on the domestic price level. The price level effect is noted in some textbooks, but not formally analyzed. When subjected to a rigorous analysis, the interaction of the exchange rate and the domestic price level substantially changes the standard policy rule. The logically correct statement would be, with a flexible exchange rate and perfectly elastic capital flows, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the marginal import propensity and the sum of the trade elasticities. Typical values for these parameters suggest that the effectiveness of monetary policy under flexible exchange rates can be low even if capital flows are perfectly elastic. Because these same parameters have the opposite effect on fiscal policy, the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary interventions under a flexible exchange rate is an empirical issue that cannot be determined a priori.

The Role of Financial Market Structure and the Trade Elasticity for Monetary Policy in Open Economies

Imperfect international risk sharing and exchange rate volatility matter for how monetary policy should optimally be conducted in an open economy through affecting policymakers’ terms of trade considerations. I study these motives for a classical and long‐standing question in international monetary economics: the size of potential gains from international policy coordination. In a relatively standard model I allow for various degrees of risk sharing by considering different assumptions on international financial markets, and a large region for the crucial parameter of the trade elasticity. When incomplete markets give rise to high volatility of international prices and poor risk sharing—such as in Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008)—gains from policy coordination are an order of magnitude larger than previous studies, working under the assumptions of complete markets, suggest.