Monetary Chaos Research Articles

Preventing rumor spread with deep learning

The spreading of false rumors through online media is a serious social problem. The current process of fact-checking mostly relies on the responses of crowds or journalists to perform investigations, which can be performed after a rumor has widely spread. This study proposes a bi-directional encoder representations from transformers (BERT)-based model that only takes a claim sentence of a rumor, which can be used to identify false rumors before it goes viral. By evaluating the proposed model with the rumor dataset that is collected from Snopes and Politifact, this study demonstrates the effectiveness of the model that can accurately identify false rumors with only a given claim text. We also reveal that the performance of the models that are trained from the rumors in specific categories (e.g., business, politics) can be improved by transfer learning. Transfer learning uses the model parameters that are trained from a category as an initial state of the model for another category. Our analysis shows that a pre-trained model from a category that deals with a broad range of topics (e.g., fauxtography) is a useful source that can be transferred to other categories (e.g., entertainment). We believe that the proposed model can help mitigate potential social risks such as social turmoil or monetary chaos that are caused by false rumors, as the rumors can be detected before they go viral.

Facing Inflation Alone: Juan de Mariana and His Struggle against Monetary Chaos

Facing Inflation Alone: Juan de Mariana and His Struggle against Monetary Chaos

Monetary reform in Rusia 1922-1924.

The article offers a chronological and analytic review of the monetary reform in the Soviet Russia in the period 1922-1924. The author thoroughly discusses the economic and monetary situation in Russia before the reform, starting with the period before the First World War, during the war, the revolution and the civil war that followed. A special emphasis is given to the representatives of the new, Bolshevik government headed by Lenin. The article offers a detailed description how the new government managed to cope with such a monetary chaos, with several currencies of different value and stability, and introduce a monetary reform with a hard currency as one of the most important preconditions of the stability of entire economy and economic development.

Testing for deterministic monetary chaos: Metric and topological diagnostics

The evidence of deterministic chaos in monetary aggregates tends to be contradictory in the literature. We revisit the issue of monetary chaos by applying tools based on both the metric (correlation dimension and Lyapunov exponents) and topological (recurrence plots) approaches to chaos. For simple-sum and divisia monetary aggregates over an expanded sample period, the empirical evidence from both approaches is negative for monetary chaotic dynamics.

Economic Action and Social Structure: ‘Cambisme’ in Kinshasa

In the recent literature on institutions and social capital, there has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of social structure in explaining the performance of economic markets. Approaches to how this ‘social structure’ is conceived differ widely, however. This article examines the social structure and partitioning of the market in foreign currency in Kinshasa, based on fieldwork in the mid–1990s, and finds remarkable similarities with Geertz’s seminal paper on the functioning of peasant markets and his description of the bazaar economy in Sefrou. The case study is also instructive as it highlights the day–to–day reality of hyperinflation and monetary chaos.

Privatisation in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

(1997). Privatisation in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 49, No. 6, pp. 1057-1070.

The monetary dynamics in the Yugoslav hyperinflation of 1991–1993: The Cagan money demand

The Yugoslav hyperinflation of 1991–1993 is one of the highest and the longest episodes ever recorded. The monetary dynamics of the hyperinflation is well characterized by the Cagan model. With revealed cointegration between real money and inflation, the model is accepted irrespective of the underlying expectations formation process and it implies stationary velocity shocks. Employing cointegrated VAR, the exact rational expectations Cagan model is rejected and an informal test within the same framework shows that the Yugoslav public exhibited a lower degree of forward-looking behavior relative to that in other classical hyperinflations. This enabled the government to extract non-decreasing seigniorage by increasing money growth and inflation above expected rates and suggests an explanation for the ever-increasing money growth in spite of the resulting monetary chaos.

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article: Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market. Edited by George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen. Mergers and Acquisitions. Edited by Alan J. Auerbach. Dynamic Fiscal Policy. By Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Public Intervention and Industrial Restructuring in China, India and Republic of Korea. By Amiya Kumar Bagchi. The Economics of Education and the Education of an Economist. By Mark Blaug. Monetary Chaos in Europe: The End of an Era. By Brendan Brown. The Political Economy of Central America since 1920. By Victor Bulmer‐Thomas. Exchange Rates and the Open Economy. Edited by K. Alec Chrystal and Robert Sedgwick. Unemployment, Hysteresis and the Natural Rate Hypothesis. Edited by Rod Cross. Managing Industrial Change in Western Europe. Edited by Francois Duchêne and Geoffrey Shepherd. The Slump in Europe: Reconstructing Open Economy Theory. By Jean‐Paul Fitoussi and Edmund S. Phelps. Economic Choice under Uncertainty: A Perspective Theory Approach. By J. L. Ford. The Dynamics of a Capitalist Economy: A Multi‐Sectoral Approach. By Richard M. Goodwin and Lionello F. Pmzo. Financial Deregulation: A Comparative Study of Australia and the United Kingdom. By Maximilian Hall. Surveys in the Economics of Uncertainty. Edited by John D. Hey and Peter J. Lambert. Privatization and Ownership. Lloyds Bank Annual Review. Volume 1. Edited by Christopher Johnson. The Individual in the Economy: A Survey of Economic Psychology. By Stephen E. G. Lea, Roger M. Tarpy and Paul Webley. The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850–1914. By R. C. Michie. Economic Methodology and the Freedom to Choose. By Patrick J. O'Sullivan. Political Economy: A Synthesis of Kaleckian and Post Keynesian Economics. By Peter J. Reynolds. The Economics of François Quesnay. By Gianni Vaggi. Socialism in England. By Sidney Webb. Policy Options for the Singapore Economy. By Lim Chong Yah and Associates.

BOOK REVIEWS

Brendan Brown, Monetary Chaos in Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1988) 320 pp., £35.00.I.M. Destler and John S. Odell (eds), Anti‐protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade PoliticsTheodore R. Malloch, Issues in International Trade and Development Policy

Money, Spending, and the Great Depression

The Great Depression of the 1930s represented a major turning point in the development of economics. Prior to the Depression, classical and neoclassical economists emphasized the ability of self-regulating market forces (i.e., prices) to rectify market disequilibria. Persistent disequilibria, such as long term excess supplies of labor, were thought possible only if price adjustments were systematically blocked. Since the 1930s, however, the primary concern of macroeconomics has been the possibility that a market economy may spontaneously generate states of underemployment disequilibrium which market forces alone cannot correct, at least in any acceptable period of time. Despite the fact that the Depression caused a radical turnabout in economists' approach to macroeconomic problems, the factors responsible for its origin and severity have long been in dispute. In the 1930s Keynes argued that the instability of his day originated in the private sector where it was caused by fluctuations in the level of business investment [11]. In 1963 Friedman and Schwartz challenged the Keynesian view with the assertion that monetary shocks were the true cause of the Depression. In particular, they blamed the Federal Reserve for failing to prevent the waves of bank failures that occurred between 1930 and 1933. These failures and the resulting monetary chaos were presented as the catalysts that turned a normal recession into a major depression [8]. Recently Peter Temin [16] has argued that the case for monetary instability as the major cause of the Depression is not supported by the existing evidence. He puts forth the alternative hypothesis that an autonomous and largely unexplained fall in consumption was the precipitating factor. Temin has designated the view that monetary forces were the major cause of the Depression as the monetary hypothesis. The view that the private sector was at fault he terms the spending hypothesis. While these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, advocates of either one tend to see one factor as pri-

Tomorrow's convertibility: aims and means of international monetary policy

The European convertibility decisions of last December, despite being long overdue and ill-prepared, mark an important step forward on the long road from the international monetary chaos of the last decades toward a new international monetary order. The present article explores some of the means by which the new convertibility could be given more solid foundations and contribute, at the same time, to a more rapid and balanced growth of the world economy. The author first argues against two plausible yet illusory solutions to the immediate difficulties that may arise from the impending shortage of international reserves and liquidity - an upward revaluation of gold and freely fluctuating exchange rates. The internationalisation of foreign exchange reserves under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund is then advocated as a workable and viable system which would facilitate the adjustment of the Fund’s lending operations to the legitimate requirements of an expanding world economy and help stabilise the world monetary system against the vicissitudes of national monetary management in the present key currency countries. JEL: E42, E52, F31, F33, F36

Trade Barriers in Central Europe

THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN economic policy of the years I919-39 may be considered to be a major cause of the downfall of Europe. It was not in itself the main reason for the evolution of Naziism and for the subsequent disaster: the forces underlying the development of these political ideas were not economic ones. But Naziism could not have won its victories if the small nations had not been worn down by the economic depression, and the depression might have been checked in time if economic cooperation had been a reality rather than a slogan. The characteristic feature of Central European economics was the disruption of the economic unit which had been the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. Its political dismemberment was probably inevitable since the empire was unable to satisfy the non-economic needs of its population. But the new governments failed to solve the economic problems which emerged after the political freedom had been achieved. The monarchy had been an almost self-sufficient unit, depending on the exchange of the Western industrial and Eastern agricultural products. The trade between the socalled states of succession was, for all economic purposes, to be treated' as domestic rather than as foreign: for instance, Austria exported as late as I93I, in spite of all the new trade barriers, about 25 per cent of her total output and 45 per cent of her industrial production. However, the new rulers insisted on an autarchistic policy as if economic interdependence had been a threat to political freedom. There were many reasons for this attitude. First, the nationalism of the liberated races who hated their old enemies, their neighbors, more than they loved their own well-being: they paid gladly twice as much for goods provided they were produced by fellow Czechs, Magyars, Austrians, Yugoslavs, Poles, r Roumanians, rather than by the despised Roumanians, Poles, Yugoslavs, Austrians, Magyars, or Czechs, respectively. Secondly, the socialism of the emerging working classes who did not want foreign trade to interfere with their domestic experiments: well-meant but costly achievements in social security had to be protected by excluding the products of cheaper labor from less developed countries, or industrialization was to be promoted by preventing imports from more advanced communities. The conservative farmers who remained comparatively free from nationalistic and socialistic ideas, but insisted on planting wheat in steep mountain valleys and lacked capital for modern equipment, needed protection from foreign competition, too. All parties combined to erect barriers against the outside world while the economists, brought up in the tradition of the Austrian school of economics, talked of the blessings of free trade. These nations were not satisfied with the traditional means of tariffs and subsidies. During the period immediately following the first world war, the governments resorted to super-inflation in order to build up their new machinery. In the resulting monetary chaos, their resources were necessarily concentrated on the task of getting the most urgent food and fuel, and all other imports were sup-