Modern Naval Warfare Research Articles

Target threat assessment model based on PCA-BP neural network

Abstract In this paper, the air threat received in modern naval warfare is taken as the background, and based on the threat assessment index, PCA and BP neural networks are used to establish a target threat assessment model. Through simulation and analysis, the threat values of different incoming targets are derived, and the data results of this model and other models are compared. It is concluded that the results of this model are basically consistent with the original values, and the error is significantly smaller than that of the other models, which realizes the real-time dynamic detection of threatening targets, and provides a strong support for the subsequent combat program.

WDFA-YOLOX: A Wavelet-Driven and Feature-Enhanced Attention YOLOX Network for Ship Detection in SAR Images

Ships are important targets for modern naval warfare detection and reconnaissance. The accurate detection of ships contributes to the maintenance of maritime rights and interests and the realisation of naval strategy. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) image detection tasks play a vital role in ship detection, which has consistently been a research hotspot in the field of SAR processing. Although significant progress has been achieved in SAR ship detection techniques using deep learning methods, some challenges still persist. Natural images and SAR images significantly diverge in imaging mechanisms and scattering characteristics. In complex background environments, ships exhibit multiscale variations and dense arrangements, and numerous small-sized ships may be present, culminating in false or missed detections. To address these issues, we propose a novel SAR ship detection network, namely, a Wavelet-Driven Feature-Enhanced Attention–You Only Look Once X (WDFA-YOLOX) network. Firstly, we propose a Wavelet Cascade Residual (WCR) module based on the traditional image processing technique wavelet transform, which is embedded within an improved Spatial Pyramid Pooling (SPP) module, culminating in the formation of the effective wavelet transform-based SPP module (WSPP). The WSPP compensates for the loss of fine-grained feature information during pooling, enhancing the capability of the network to detect ships amidst complex background interference. Secondly, a Global and Local Feature Attention Enhancement (GLFAE) module is proposed, leveraging a parallel structure that combines convolutional modules with transformer modules to reduce the effect of irrelevant information and effectively strengthens valid features associated with small-sized ships, resulting in a reduction in false negatives in small-sized ship detection. Finally, a novel loss function, the Chebyshev distance-generalised IoU loss function, is proposed to significantly enhance both the precision of the detection box and the network convergence speed. To support our approach, we performed thorough experiments on the SSDD and HRSID, achieving an average precision (AP) of 99.11% and 96.20%, respectively, in ship detection. The experimental results demonstrate that WDFA-YOLOX has significant advantages in terms of detection accuracy, generalisation capability, and detection speed and can effectively realise more accurate detection in SAR images, consistently exhibiting superior performance and application value in SAR ship detection.

SIMULATION MODEL OF A MISSILE STRIKE

Abstract. As modern naval warfare systems and tactics continue to evolve, it is crucial to employ contemporary tools capable of assessing their potential across various combat scenarios. This study model simulates interactions between anti-ship missiles and naval forces during landing operations. Our research seeks to develop a robust method for quantitatively analyzing the impact of anti-ship missiles on naval vessels under diverse combat conditions. The model's scalability allows for the incorporation of emerging naval tactics and procedures, maintaining its relevance and utility in dynamic strategic environments. It supports enhancements in precision through statistical analysis and ongoing assessments of new weaponry and technological advancements. By simulating a broad range of missile types, naval strategies, warship classes, aircraft, reconnaissance systems, and electronic warfare capabilities, the model provides insights into the strategic utility of anti-ship missiles. Our findings aim to optimize the allocation of military resources by accurately determining the necessary missile quantities to thwart enemy naval landings, thereby enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of defensive operations. Keywords: Anti-ship missiles, missile guidance, naval landing, simulation framework, missile damage estimation.

Study on International Law Issues Related to the Use of Mines in Maritime Blockade Operations

Mines are an important weapon in modern naval warfare, playing a crucial role in the execution of maritime blockade tasks by armed forces. Facing potential future maritime armed conflicts, how to implement a maritime blockade using mines and how to counter enemy mines will be essential challenges in naval battles. A thorough understanding and mastery of the legal issues involved in mine warfare is a necessary prerequisite for the scientific use of mines in blockades. Additionally, conducting operations strictly in accordance with the law helps belligerents gain more international public opinion support during maritime blockade operations. This paper mainly focuses on the international legal rules related to the use of mines in maritime blockades, exploring legal issues that may arise during blockade missions and proposing targeted countermeasures and suggestions.

A New Paradigm in the Modern Naval Warfare: A2/AD Approach

Deniz Harp Tarihi boyunca hasımlar harekât sahasında birbirlerinin serbestçe manevra icrasını önlemeye dönük tedbirler almıştırlar. Geçmişteki erişimi engelleme girişimleri hem dost kuvvetleri himaye etmek hem de düşmanın sahada avantajlı mevkiler elde etmesinin önüne set çekmek için kullanılmıştır. Günümüzde küresel boyuttaki güç aktarım kabiliyetiyle ABD Donanması hava, uzay ve deniz üstünlüğünü sürdürmek için çatışma alanına güvenle konuşlanmaya bağımlı hâle gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Çin, Rusya ve hatta İran ABD'nin Baltık, Karadeniz, Basra Körfezi ve Batı Pasifik'e güç aktarımını sekteye uğratmak için tasarlanmış güçlü bir erişimi engelleme ve bölgeden men etme (A2 / AD) kapasitesine sahip bölgesel bir güç olarak ortaya çıktılar. Bu makalede dünyada ABD'nin güç aktarım kapasitesine karşı geliştirilen A2/AD Konsepti’nin içeriğine ışık tutmanın yanında tarihsel arka planıyla birlikte günümüzdeki örnekleri üzerinden analiz edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır.

Numerical simulation study of corrosion behavior of Ni-P coating under multiple working conditions

The research on marine corrosion protection is very important in modern naval warfare. In this paper, combined with the working environment and usage requirements of underwater equipment, a 3D modeling is carried out based on a certain type of underwater equipment, and the model was divided into regions according to the difference between the base material, and the electrochemical corrosion protection was established through the finite element simulation software COMSOL Multiphysics. The simulation model was used to simulate and analyze the corrosion laws of various parts of the equipment under three different working conditions. According to the simulation results, the corrosion rate of the equipment under the protection of Ni-P chemical coating is much lower than the natural corrosion rate and the corrosion rate in seawater with a 30% concentration of Na2SO3 corrosion inhibitor, and the Ni-P chemical coating has a good anti-corrosion effect. This paper puts forward suggestions for the follow-up improvement and development of the corrosion protection research of this type of underwater equipment and provides a reference for the research on the corrosion behavior of other metals.

Flow characteristics on helodeck of a generic frigate ship model through experiment and CFD

In light of modern Naval warfare strategy demanding high degree of stealth in design, the external geometry of frontline warships has undergone a paradigm shift. These changes in geometry have led to a modified aerodynamic environment around the ships, which has detrimentally affected helicopter operations from frontline warships such as Frigates and Destroyers. Accordingly, studies are in progress across several nations, to understand the helo operating environment on such ship forms, using modern experimental and numerical techniques with an aim towards creation of accurate virtual models in CFD and arrive at novel solutions for improving the helodeck design without compromising on stealth. Working in this direction, investigations have been undertaken on Internationally accepted Simplified Frigate Ship SFS2 which is currently being used for research purposes by many advanced countries, with minor simplifications to the representative form. The airwake on the helodeck for the ship model is experimentally mapped through a grid of over 1500 points in wind tunnel, over seven planes, using a five-hole pitot probe. The results in terms of contour and vector plots have been analysed in line with the findings of literature survey. On the numerical front, the environment of the experiments has been modelled in ANSYS FLUENT for the modified SFS2 model and a validation study is undertaken through use of a large databank generated through the wind tunnel experiments. Transition SST turbulence model is identified as the most suitable model for the analysis of this class of flows.

The Role of Naval Aviation in Modern Naval Warfare

The Role of Naval Aviation in Modern Naval Warfare

Warship Combat Decision Support System Based on Data Mining Technology

Abstract Taking the modern naval warfare as background, there are some outstanding problems, such as the efficiency of situation analysis and understanding, the automation level of operational plan making and the timeliness of decision making. This paper proposes a warship combat decision support system based on data mining technology, the framework of the system is introduced, and several key problems are analyzed. The result of our research will supply auxiliary support to the commander, which will increase the intelligence level and scientific level of warship combat decision, and improve the velocity, efficiency of the decision.

光电对抗技术在现代海战中的应用研究

光电对抗技术在现代海战中的应用研究

Private Warfare in the Age of Sail

Modern naval warfare is the exclusive province of government. Until relatively recently, however, governments tolerated — even encouraged — private sector participation in maritime hostilities. Naval and merchant vessels were not strongly differentiated from one another, and neither type of vessel was well suited to all-weather, year-round duty at sea. When combined with rudimentary (and relatively costly) systems of taxation, this gave monarchs an incentive to focus their naval ventures during good weather months and to rely on merchant ships as important supplements to the Crown’s navy. Thus, until the eighteenth century, privately owned and operated merchant vessels were used as men-of-war, and they served in the war on enemy trade into the nineteenth century. We seek to explain the observed variation in the key contractual provisions of privateer contracts by examining over 60 contracts from the period 1744 to 1807, gathered from the files of the Public Record Office in London. We suggest reasons for many of the general patterns seen in the contracts; notably, we believe we have a remarkably simple yet powerful explanation for the enormous variation observed in the distribution of the prizes between the owners and crew. We also provide a clearer picture of the variation in the distribution of prize shares among crew members, using measures of inequality to compare different privateers’ allotments. Most importantly, we have developed a method of using contractual provisions to infer the expectations of privateers regarding the prizes they were likely to capture. We are then able to use these estimates to infer expected total earnings of seafarers at all levels of the chain of command. One implication of these estimates is that crew serving on privateers could expect to earn substantially more than men serving on merchant ships. For able seamen the privateering premium was at least fifty percent; for higher ranks it likely was even greater.

Introduction: the military revolution at sea

The 36th annual conference of the International Commission of Military History featured a roundtable debate entitled ‘The military revolution at sea: trends and developments in early modern naval historiography’. Four scholars debated whether early modern naval warfare witnessed a revolution similar to the one some specialists believe took place in land-based warfare, and, if so, what its characteristics were. John Guilmartin argues that there were in fact four revolutions at sea that proceeded sequentially at times and in parallel at others, and were essentially driven by technological innovations. Gijs Rommelse focuses on the relationship economic change, state formation and maritime warfare. Michel Vergé-Franceschi explored the psychological and social dimensions of the naval revolution. Nicholas Rodger argues that the concept of ‘fiscal-naval state’ is a much more appropriate term to describe developments in early modern naval warfare than ‘naval revolution’.

Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century (review)

Reviewed by: Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century C. C. Felker (bio) Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century. By Michael A. Palmer . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005. Pp. 400. $29.95. Naval histories, Michael Palmer observes, have been replete with portraits of the great commanders. Where they have gone lacking, though, is explaining how admirals from Nelson to Nimitz actually exercised command. In Command at Sea, Palmer examines more than five hundred years of Western naval warfare, and offers a most engaging and sophisticated argument on the relationship between technology, warfare, and the naval culture. The predominant historical challenge facing commanders at sea, Palmer contends, has been uncertainty. In Clausewitzian parlance, uncertainty was "the fog of war," those unforeseen aspects of a land battle that could turn victory into defeat. At sea the issue was no less critical. As European states began projecting power at sea in the sixteenth century, naval commanders faced the thorny problem of maintaining control of wooden warships at the mercy of wind, seas, the enemy, and their own subordinate commanders. Early attempts to organize ships into tight, line-ahead formations proved useful for small numbers of ships. But as navies expanded, Age of Sail commanders faced what seemed a Hobson's choice. They could give their subordinates latitude to use their initiative within the broad guidelines of the fleet commander. Or they could find a means to centralize command and control. Many commanders looked to technology, in the form of signaling systems, to alleviate their fear of losing control of their fleets. The Enlightenment's emphasis on science and rationality served to spur the development of more sophisticated numerary signaling systems, which were codified in signal books and distributed to all the ships in the fleet. For naval officers who felt that their commands were being threatened by forces beyond their control, technology beckoned. Palmer's work is a cautionary tale on the relationship between warfare, technology, and the persons who use it. The signaling system, while enhancing a commander's control over his fleet, paradoxically restrained his ability to gain decision in battle. Palmer cites examples of key sea battles to illustrate how signaling technology complicated naval warfare. Nelson becomes a preeminent illustration of the advantages of decentralized command and control. Yet Palmer points out that many British naval officers ignored Nelson's unenlightened irrationalism for the comfort of the signal book. The emergence of steam and steel navies provided no clearer resolution. Commanders saw in sophisticated signaling systems such as submarine cables and wireless technology solutions to the uncertainty created by the increased speed and engagement ranges of warships. Yet the paradox of technology persisted, exacerbated [End Page 648] by a lack of operational experiences, or what Clausewitz viewed as the "lubricant of friction." Royal Navy officers consequently suffered their greatest disappointment at Jutland, where John Jellicoe's rigid control of his fleet prevented any chance for decisive victory. Watching all of this were American naval officers, new to the intricacies of modern naval warfare. These officers initially resisted the lure of technology and adopted decentralization as their doctrinal mantra. The navy's success against Japan demonstrated that individual initiative was still relevant in naval warfare. But Palmer points out that even the U.S. Navy's confidence in decentralized command could not withstand the march of technology. Nuclear weapons and defense unification replaced communications as the bane of decentralization. Unfortunately, missing in Palmer's cold war chapter is mention of the navy's Composite Warfare Concept, a brave attempt to keep alive the spirit of Chester Nimitz and Arleigh Burke. But Palmer's conclusion accurately illustrates that, in the wake of jointness, satellite communications, data links, and SLBMs, even the U.S. Navy eventually found itself becoming a more centralized organization. Magnificently researched and cogently argued, Command at Sea offers a superb analysis of the paradox inherent in technology, warfare, and the naval culture. Palmer makes a successful case that the Age of Sail, a period rich in sea battles, merits so much attention. And though his examination of the twentieth century is brief, his narrative clearly illustrates the historical continuity...

Casualties from Guided Missile Impact in Warships from Another Point of View

From Kamikaze to Exocet, by learning from history a tool for casualty calculation in modern naval warfare is available, indicating absolute casualty figures per SS guided missile hit. The figures 35 wounded and 30 killed per hit ought to be used.

MK 92 FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM

ABSTRACTThe MK 92 Fire Control System (FCS) & a new, integrated, highly reliable and light‐weight U.S. Navy Fire Control System for missile and gun control. This system, which is in production for the FFG, PCG, PGG and PHM Ship Classes, provides the detection and automation required for modern naval warfare. Search radar data & presented at a very high rate at the operator's console, a highly integrated man‐machine interface. Utilization of monopulse and “track‐while‐scan” techniques result in multiple target tracking capability.The system console(s) offer a self‐contained command and control capability and, in addition, standard digital computer channels provide the versatile interface with the ship's command and control, integrating the complete engagement process. Error cancellation techniques are employed to obtain high performance accuracy even under severe environmental conditions. The low manning requirement for both operation and maintenance is a key system attribute for all applications.Comprehensive “at‐sea” evaluations, performed by the U.S. Navy, demonstrated successful system operation in all modes of surveillance, multi‐target tracking and simultaneous missile and gun engagements.The “at‐sea” performance record of the FCS MK 92 was cited by the Chief of Naval Operations to have established new standards for Naval Surface Weapons Systems.

Duel Between the First Ironclads , and: Thunder at Hampton Roads (review)

BOOK REVIEWS181 South—all made him an influential and respected leader of the New South. Professor Hattaway has provided a heavily-researched and sound treatment of Lee's life. The only criticism which this reviewer might offer is that the author failed to answer an important question regarding Lee's career. Given the fact that Lee's real service to the South was his post-war leadership, the question is perhaps of only secondary importance. Yet it remains to puzzle the reader. Given Lee's broad experience in all three arms of Confederate service , why was he then, and why has he now remained a somewhat obscure figure? Thomas L. Connally University of South Carolina Duel Between the First Ironchds. By William C. Davis. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1975. Pp. x, 201. $8.95.) Thunder at Hampton Roads. By A. A. Hoehling. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976. Pp. xvi, 232. $9.95.) The historic meeting of the Monitor and Merrimack on March 9, 1862, which ushered in modern naval warfare, has attracted more attention than any other single naval engagement of the Civil War. In Duel Between the First Ironchds William C. Davis has written the definitive study of the Monitor and the Merrimack. Far more than the title indicates, this work is a complete history of these ironclads from their origins to their destruction. It places them in their historical context and evaluates their impact on naval warfare, all of which is done with considerable storytelling ability. The account of the Monitor is centered around the contributions of its egotistical designer and builder, Swedish-born John Ericsson, and its captain during the historic engagement, John L. Worden. Ericsson's genius, Davis maintains, was that he brought together a number of unproven ideas, both old and new, to create an innovative vessel which had speed, shallow draft for operating on southern rivers, offensive and defensive strength, and the revolving turret, the result of which was a "milestone in naval architecture." Worden is presented as an unimaginative but well-liked captain who, in spite of the misgivings of Ericsson, proved to be a capable commander of the Monitor. The man primarily responsible for construction of the Merrimack was John Brooke, an "inventive mind" whose simple design made the best of Confederate resources. The result was an "ersatz ironclad " which demonstrated that wooden vessels, regardless of armor, could not withstand an ironclad assault. The captain of the Merri- 182CIVIL WAR history mack, Franklin Buchanan, a reluctant Confederate who caused ill feeling on both sides before finally joining the South, nevertheless, proved to be an energetic commander of a vessel that was almost "impossible to maneuver." Davis concludes that the lessons of the historic battle were not wasted on the British. Realizing that it would take an ironclad to stop another ironclad, the British Admiralty immediately ordered that no more wooden ships be constructed. To the consernation of Confederate diplomats, however, the British were far more interested in the Monitor, which demonstrated that mobility, profile, and gun movement could be a match for sheer size and weight. A. A. Hoehling's book, Thunder at Hampton Roads, is aimed at the general reader. Though covering essentially the same subject, it differs from Davis's book in that its account of the vessels takes the story down through the rediscovery of the Monitor off Cape Hatteras in 1973. Hoehling has attempted to tell the story of these historic vessels in the words of the participants, and therein lie both the strengths and weaknesses of his book. He is successful in recreating some of the drama of the period such as the race between the Union and Confederate authorities to complete their ironclads, and the mounting fear in Lincoln's cabinet as rumors told of the coming of the Merrimack to break the Union blockade at Hampton Roads. His portraits of John Ericsson and Franklin Buchanan capture the spirit of the times, and his account of the subsequent careers of the major characters is one of the book's better features. But the numerous quotes from the sometimes archaic style of the Civil War period, the frequent injection of extraneous material, the...

German meteorological activities in the Arctic, 1940–45

Between 1940 and 1945 the German navy undertook a series of expeditions to the arctic regions in order to obtain regular synoptic weather reports, the international exchange of which had practically ceased upon the outbreak of war in 1939. During these years the German naval meteorological service [Wetterdienst des Oberkommandos der Kriegsmarine] organized and dispatched some thirteen parties, whose task it was to provide the information required to meet the exigencies of modern naval warfare and to enable forecasts of the influence of the “polar front” on European weather to be made. Owing to the strategic situation these activities were confined to Svalbard, East Greenland and Zemlya Frantsa-Iosifa (Franz Josef Land). The German air force sent one expedition to Spitsbergen and two to Hopen (Hope Island) but on the whole the Luftwaffe preferred to employ aircraft flying from bases in northern Norway to obtain operational data, making special flights as and when required.

Climate and Weather in Modern Naval Warfare

The professional sailor is necessarily a student of many subjects that at first one might hardly suspect of interesting him. One of the more obvious is Geography, for he is essentially a traveller and like all sensible travellers he reads about the country he is going to visit for the first time. He arms himself with some knowledge of the history, customs, occupations?and, in particular, the climate of the country; for not only does climate affect all the other aspects but it may necessitate special precautions or arrangements with regard to the ship and its crew, as also may the climates of the regions passed through. And if the visit is made not as a friend but as an enemy, a knowledge of weather likely to affect operations becomes of first importance. Never was this truer than to-day when the success of an attack depends so largely upon the efficient use of the aircraft that extend the eyes and the arms of the Fleet for several hundred miles.

Climate and Weather in Modern Naval Warfare: Discussion

Climate and Weather in Modern Naval Warfare: Discussion

NUTRITIONAL ASPECTS OF FEEDING IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

In approaching the topic of this paper, may I remind the reader that there is no more important single factor in building and maintaining high morale and keenness in naval personnel than an acceptable diet of high nutritive value. In fact, the import of optimum nutrition, in relation to physical fitness, can hardly be overemphasized. Modern naval warfare presents enormously increased hazards and a continuous state of tension, increased tremendously by the advent of air power, a heavy toll being laid on the physical and nervous stamina of the operating personnel. Not only must the food supply be adequate in quantity, but the variety must satisfy the requirements of a well balanced ration. This poses a difficult problem which can be met only by careful preplanning and skilful supervision. The administrative responsibility for the subsistence activities of the Navy lies in the Supply Corps, which procures, stores, issues, prepares and