Modern Counterinsurgency Research Articles

Settler colonial counterinsurgency: Indigenous resistance and the more-than-state policing of #NoDAPL

In 2016, the US-based private military contractor TigerSwan was denied a license to operate in North Dakota. Nonetheless, it coordinated a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign employing war-on-terror tactics, brutalizing Indigenous and allied water protectors associated with the Indigenous-led movement to stop the Dakota Access Pipeline (#NoDAPL) on Standing Rock Lakota territory. This article takes COIN as an analytic to show that US settler colonialism is a multilateral, internally conflicted, and anxious mode of power. The settler state both depends upon and disavows anti-Indigenous and anti-Black violence enacted by rogue civilian individuals and organizations, a phenomenon here termed ‘more-than-state policing’. The repression of #NoDAPL was not solely a boomerang by-product of the global war on terror but rather exposes an established infrastructure of settler colonial COIN intrinsic to US normal politics, in which Indigenous resistance and sovereignty are constructed as metastasizing, viral threats to settler colonial legitimacy. As modern COIN warfare has evolved from four centuries of North American settler colonial invasion and governance, settler colonial studies are key to grasping 21st-century topics of war, imperialism, securitization, resource extraction, and climate justice.

Rage and the Machines? Force Mechanization and Violence against Civilians

Abstract There is an ongoing discussion regarding the role of mechanized forces in counterinsurgency warfare. Proponents note that they boost counterinsurgents’ ability to fight while critics point out that they diminish their ability to gather information. This note adds to this discussion by focusing on violence against civilians, an outcome that theory suggests should be affected by mechanization via both of these channels. Results from quantitative analyses employing new data on mechanization and covering the period 1989–2016 indicate that mechanization is unrelated to the number of civilians killed by government forces but positively associated with that killed by rebels. These results are in line with the idea that mechanization increases counterinsurgents’ fighting but decreases their information-gathering abilities. By offering quantitative evidence that mechanized forces have a place in modern counterinsurgency, these results contribute to both academics’ and practitioners’ understanding of armed intrastate conflict.

Lost in transition: the myth of Mao and the origins of COIN

ABSTRACT Mao’s military teachings have greatly affected the development of modern counterinsurgency. Although the influence of Mao’s doctrine on modern counterinsurgency has been examined, scholarship has failed to highlight that the reception of Mao’s writings and deeds is based on a misreading of his theory and strategy. In the transition from Maoist people’s war to COIN, two aspects of the former were lost. Firstly, for Mao the use of force remained the decisive instrument in war. Secondly, whereas for COIN the security of the population is a crucial goal, for Mao the population was a mere instrument that could be sacrificed if the conditions of the conflict so required.

‘Lessons learned’ during the Interbellum: ‘Irish war’ and British counterinsurgency

ABSTRACT Historians generally view the Irish War of Independence as the first and largely unsuccessful experience for the British army in conducting modern counterinsurgency. This article argues that during the Interbellum the ‘Irish war’ became a starting point for the military thought about this type of conflict, although this did not become fully consolidated in the army’s thinking. Some important aspects of the British forces’ conduct in the ‘Irish war’ remained undervalued, not least because of the only official analysis of this conflict, ‘The Record of the Rebellion in Ireland’, was classified for a long time. It strongly challenges traditional and revisionist understanding of this conflict and its implications on the British way of counterinsurgency during the Interbellum. These contradictions between documentary evidence from archives and established methods of historical thinking, as well as correlations of archival material with our understanding of modern counterinsurgencies, will be contrasted and analysed in this article.

Introduction Vol 4 Issue 1

In this issue we have a set of diverse articles. They are diverse in their academic fields, research methods, and geographic areas. There is one article that comes from critical cultural studies and discusses the relationship between human rights and Asian cultural values in the Far East countries. Another is based in critical legal studies and focuses on procedural rights of the accused in criminal justice system of Pakistan. Yet another is based in international law and discusses how international human rights law has yielded grounds to the principle of diplomatic immunity in the case of Jamal Khashoggi. There is also an article from humanities field that throws light on human rights violations in Kashmir at the hands of Indian law enforcement agencies. Finally, we have one article that comes from peace and conflict studies, and it discusses the aspect of human security in modern counter-insurgency policy and practice.

‘The extraordinary successes which the Russians have achieved’ - the Conquest of Central Asia in Callwell’s Small Wars

ABSTRACT Charles Callwell’s Small Wars (1896, 1899, 1906) is widely considered both an ur-text for modern counter-insurgency studies, and a primer for the racialized late-Victorian approach to war against ‘savages’: either way it is usually only considered within a British context. Alongside the numerous examples Callwell used from British colonial campaigns, he frequently referred to those of other European powers – notably the Russian conquest of Central Asia. This article will seek to analyse Callwell’s views of Russian colonial warfare, establish the sources on which he relied, and evaluate his accuracy and the effect which the Russian example had on his thinking.

Book Review: MLR Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles and Paradoxes

Book Review: MLR Smith and David Martin Jones, <i>The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles and Paradoxes</i>

The political impossibility of modern counterinsurgency: strategic problems, puzzles, and paradoxes

The political impossibility of modern counterinsurgency: strategic problems, puzzles, and paradoxes

The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes. By M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 272p. $45.00

The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes. By M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 272p. $45.00

The political impossibility of modern counterinsurgency: strategic problems, puzzles and paradoxes. By M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones.

The political impossibility of modern counterinsurgency: strategic problems, puzzles and paradoxes. By M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones.

Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls

Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought.

British counter-insurgency: a historiographical reflection

The article aims to offer a survey of the historiographical analysis of British counter-insurgency practices and campaigns since the publication of Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency, edited by the author and the late John Pimlott in 1985. It is argued that the volume in question was influential at a time when there was little academic interest in counter-insurgency in Britain. Moreover, the subject generally had been little studied in Britain in the past beyond work by a handful of military writers and theorists. Arguably, the analytical framework followed in Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency holds its value even after over a quarter of a century. Since the 1980s, however, it has become apparent that the subject is of increasing academic interest, not least in terms of the ongoing debate on the nature and application of the concept of ‘minimum force’ in British campaigns.

War and the Allegory of Medical Intervention: Why Metaphors Matter

Metaphors help people make sense of their environment. They are particularly useful in reasoning about complex and unfamiliar situations (Chilton 1996:48). There is a long history of analogy between medicine and warfare. In the field of medicine, infectious and malignant diseases are a “threat” that people hope to “evade.” If the body is infected or overrun by the disease, medical experts wage a counter attack. If the patient survives, they are said to have “won the battle” (Sontag 1990; Mongoven 2006). In the context of international politics during the Cold War, communism was declared to be a “malignant parasite” (Kennan, quoted in Neocleous 2008:118). More recently, metaphors of illness, patient, and physician—constituting a strategic allegory of medical intervention—have appeared as characters in the narrative of modern counterinsurgency. Military doctrine, given its rather grim and instructional nature, may seem like an odd host for metaphorical prose. Yet, the point of doctrine is to produce common language and understanding for the conduct of military operations. Military doctrine “codifies how the institution thinks about its role in the world and how it accomplishes that role on the battlefield” (Nagl 2007:xiv). In the case of counterinsurgency, however, the battlefield is neither a meeting place between two armies, nor simply a realm of military activity. If one looks carefully at what counterinsurgency emphasizes, it is the close integration of military activity and civilian expertise, with a specific population-centric, rather than enemy-centric, focus. Though targeted violence is customary, what distinguishes counterinsurgency is its emphasis on cultural awareness, communication, security sector reform, humanitarian response, and reconstruction (Bell 2011). Hence, counterinsurgency is a dramatically integrated and holistic enterprise. Communicating counterinsurgency's holistic framework has, at least partly, been achieved through the allegory of …

Hybrid Warfare and Its Metaphors

According to Roberto Esposito, modernity is marked by an immunitary logic in which defending against contagion is a central preoccupation. To immunize is to seek the negative protection of life; it is intended to safeguard life through the introduction of the pathogen from which protection is sought. Though immunization is normally associated with the health sciences, for Esposito it is constitutive of the entanglement of biology and politics.1 One aspect of this interconnection was insightfully investigated by Susan Sontag in her exploration of the medical discourses surrounding disease. Concerns about the spread of syphilis and tuberculosis during and at the close of the First World War led to public education campaigns in which disease was cast as an invasion of the body. At this time, metaphors became a credible and precise means of conceptualizing disease.2 Though it was in her initial analysis of the discourse surrounding cancer that Sontag discovered the military metaphor, she later ruminated that infectious disease - the prime modern example being HIV/AIDS, which is said to come from outside, to hide within cells and to elude detection - is the example par excellence of the militaristic framing of disease.3 Indeed, it is the permanent vulnerability to infection from an outside agent that renders infectious disease permissible to a violent imaginary involving a struggle to the death, a battle, a war. Yet just as disease is fantasized as an enemy and its treatment a fight, the inverse is also apparent: in some instances warfare is articulated though the lexicon of medicine and therapy. Some forms of warfare cast the enemy as a disease of the social body against which protection can be procured. This essay considers the interconnection between biology and politics by examining how, in military thought, the metaphors of infectious disease and its treatment and prevention - culminating in the paradigm of immunity, as Esposito calls it - are deployed to characterize insurgency and its remedy.To claim that war is articulated through lexicon of medicine and therapy is counter to the reasonable view that war is a destructive battle to the death. Yet, although war is always destructive, almost all wars of today are not only rationalized on humanitarian grounds but call for the integration of humanitarian means into the struggle at hand. In recent years new counterinsurgency doctrines have emerged among the U.S., UK, and Canadian militaries that claim such credentials. Though building on lessons of the past, twenty-first-century counterinsurgency is a unique entity. As the form of conflict it confronts is said to be hybrid in character, involving the convergence of combatants and noncombatants, kinetic and nonkinetic, physical and psychological weaponry - it proposes a similarly hybrid model of warfare that calls on military and civilian expertise, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, that form a wide network of contemporary internationalism. Indeed, a key marker of contemporary counterinsurgency is its incorporation of the aspirations and techniques of mainstream international development and humanitarianism into the battlespace of war.4 Unlike the general thrust of conventional warfare which promises, rather straightforwardly, an economy of fatality and destruction, modern counterinsurgency evinces an elaborate politics of life. Though death lingers in the corpus of counterinsurgency, it posits an ideal of its own which emphasizes the betterment of the population in whose midst it is exercised. Thus the use of medical discourse in counterinsurgency is formative in articulating a politics of life and regeneration, amid the death and destruction that accompanies war.The characteristics of modern counterinsurgency add to the increasingly prominent role of the life sciences in shaping the politics of international security. Interdisciplinary, international research has begun to explore the ways in which security is being redefined as a medical problem and deepening connections between the psychiatric sciences and modes of warfare. …

Between treaty and treason: Dutch collaboration with warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War, a case study on the collaboration with indigenous power-holders in colonial warfare

Recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the local operating environment often is dominated by indigenous power-holders. As counterinsurgents seek to establish control over the local population, collaboration with these agents has become an essential aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency. Although the practice of constructing collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders might be perceived as unconventional by today's counterinsurgents, the approach itself goes back to the colonial era in which modern counterinsurgency has its roots. This article explores the dynamics, benefits, and dangers of collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders by analysing an infamous episode in Dutch colonial history, the case of the collaboration between Dutch colonial authorities and warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War (1873–1913). This relationship ended in disaster for the Dutch as Uma departed their side at the moment he had become their pivotal asset in the local political landscape. The article explains that the Dutch succeeded to co-opt Uma, but failed to control him as they lacked the will and means to do so. Furthermore this case study provides an insight in the way the Dutch colonial authorities dealt with the complex process of intelligence-gathering in a fragmented indigenous society.

Civilianising warfare: ways of war and peace in modern counterinsurgency

This article examines the emergence of counterinsurgency doctrine in Coalition interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. While counterinsurgency is complimentary to the tenets forwarded by its classical military predecessors in several respects, the article shows that it is also more than a refashioning of conventional military practice. Counterinsurgency is intimately tied to institutional practices that shape global liberal governance. It can be traced to dominant trends in international humanitarian, development and peace interventionism since the end of the Cold War and it deepens the links between the social development of war-affected populations and the politics of international security. Rather than simply a shift in military practice, counterinsurgency is distinguished by its investment in civilian modes of warfare. Counterinsurgency retells the narrative of intervention as part of the evolution of political and economic liberalisation, marking a passage from interventionary force to post-interventionary governance. Modern counterinsurgency, it is concluded, exposes the widening indistinction between contemporary modes of peace and those of war in international relations.

Medical Rules Of Engagement Negative Patients: The Dilemma Of Forward Surgical Teams In Counterinsurgency Operations

By definition, Forward Surgical Teams (FSTs) are located far forward in the battlespace to allow for emergent treatment of life and limb threatening trauma sustained by United States and coalition forces as well as those injured according to the medical rules of engagement (MROE). While official doctrine dictates that MROE negative patients are not entitled to care by American military medical assets, experience has shown that some FSTs do not always adhere to that doctrine during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Medical civic action programs (MEDCAPS) have been used in modern COIN conflicts in an attempt to gain favor with and influence the host nations? local population. However, the results have frequently been counterproductive to the intended mission. The FST, by doctrine, is not equipped to take part in traditional MEDCAPS. The focus of this paper is to explore the potential role of the FST in COIN operations. Possible roles for the FST in COIN include improving the host nation medical capabilities through education and training. Further, surgery can be a useful commodity to gain positive influence with or to trade for intelligence from key local national leaders.

The Ashgate research companion to modern warfare

Contents: Introduction, George Kassimeris and John Buckley Part I Strategy and Conduct of War: The Western way of war, Jeremy Black Strategic thought: the relevance of Clausewitz, Antulio J. Echevarria II Development of modern counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, James S. Corum Air power: the quest to remove battle from war, Joel Hayward Sea power, Andrew Lambert Land warfare: attrition and manoeuvre, John Buckley. Part II Aspects of Modern War: After the RMA: contemporary intelligence, power and war, John Ferris Cyberwar, Myriam Dunn Cavelty 20th century military spending patterns, Jari Eloranta The politics of the contemporary trade in major conventional weapons, Mark Pythian Turning war into business: private security companies and commercial opportunism, Chris Kinsey Women in the armed forces of Western democracies, Helena Carreiras Women and World War II, Lucy Noakes. Part III Morality and Law: Ethics and the enduring relevance of just war theory in the 21st century, David Whetham Lying down with dogs: the inadequacy of Machiavellianism as a basis for US foreign policy, Thomas M. Kane Civilization and savagery, Brett Bowden International law: military force and armed conflict, Christopher P.M. Waters and James A. Green Humanitarian intervention: genocide, crimes against humanity and the use of force, Steven Haines 'Forgetful warriors': neglected lessons on leadership from Plato's Republic, George R. Lucas. Part IV Perceptions and Representations of Warfare: Land of ghosts? Memories of war in the Balkans, Patrick Finney Cinema and the Cold War: an international perspective, Tony Shaw Music as an inspiration for combat among American soldiers in Iraq, Jonathan Pieslak Media war and media management, Stephen Badsey From psychological warfare to information operations and back again, Philip M. Taylor Small wars and telecommunication, Thomas Rid Index.

From Middle Power to Peacebuilder: The Use of the Canadian Forces in Modern Canadian Foreign Policy

Traditionally, Canadian foreign policy was committed to maintaining a middle ground between large and minor powers. Canada dedicated itself to ensuring its national security and participated heavily in international institutions to do so. Canadian Forces' participation in the NATO mission in Afghanistan since 2001 may prove that the ideas of middlepowermanship and peacekeeping have been replaced as the dominant Canadian military strategies in favor of peacebuilding. As the timeline for Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan approaches, it is time to determine how successful the shift in Canadian military practice has been and what its consequences may be for Canada on the international stage. By examining Canada's traditional role as a middle power and comparing that role with Canada's modern counterinsurgency strategy, we argue that, until the Canadian Forces are given the adequate tools, Canadian military policy should adhere to the traditional peacekeeping model and not be overly eager to erode national military power.

Using the Natives against the Natives: Indigenes as ‘Counterinsurgents’ in the British Atlantic, 1500–1800

A key component of most modern counterinsurgency efforts (hereafter, COIN) is not merely to pacify or appease a local population, but to actively use the locals as part of the solution. 1 Large por...