Modern Argumentation Theory Research Articles

El preguntar y su papel en la argumentación

The ancient disciplines of argumentation (Socratic-Platonic-Aristotelian dialectics, medieval disputation) reserved a central place for the activity of questioning. This has not been much less the case in modern argumentation theory. This paper puts forwards, illustrate, and discuss eight propositions that aim at bringing back questions and questioning to its ancient position at the core of argumentation. Although for this purpose the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion is a very useful point of reference, the paper’s argument tries to show that questioning should be a priority for any argumentation theory.

Andrew Aberdein and Ian J. Dove, eds. The Argument of Mathematics. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science; 30. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013. ISBN: 978-94-007-6533-7 (hbk); 978-94-007-6534-4 (ebook). Pp. x + 393

The premise of this volume, that philosophy of mathematics and argumentation theory ought to have interesting things to tell one another, seems obvious. Mathematical proofs, after all, are the very model of good argumentation — rigorous in ways that other disciplines can only envy, persuasive to anyone competent to understand them, and having to do with matters of unquestionable importance. Only the last of these suggestions seems to me one that only mathematicians are sure to agree with. To date, though, there has been little learning across the divide. Indeed, there is considerable suspicion to be overcome on both sides: argumentation theory is often regarded as the wellspring of the ‘spot the howler’ approach to ‘informal logic’ that consigns philosophy instructors to teaching courses that involve students having the remarkably unchallenging job of finding fallacies on the internet or in the letters to the editor of the local newspaper; and, judging from some of the historical discussion in the articles in this volume, the founders of modern argumentation theory regarded mathematicians and logicians as blind both to obvious facts about the other aspects of mathematical practice besides the production of proofs and to the complicated nature of the relationship between mathematical proofs and derivations in formal systems of proof. Indeed, some argumentation theorists held the view that mathematical proofs are not arguments at all; so one contribution to the volume, Michael Dufour's ‘Arguing around mathematical proofs,’ is primarily an argument that they are.

On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern Argumentation Theory

Although he does not provide a general analysis of argumentation, Aristotle is a highly influential source of modern argumentation theory. In his treatises the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations and the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents complementary aspects of a theory of sound arguments that are seen as the most effective means of persuasion. Aristotle’s central notion of a deductive argument (sullogismos) does not include references to an addressee, the situative context or non-verbal aspects of communication, and thus differs from some modern views on argumentation. A deductive argument in the Aristotelian sense is a sequence of intellectual steps where the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises. Aristotle does not relativize or relax this notion but takes other factors into account by providing supplementary theoretical elements. For example, he reflects on acceptable premises (endoxa), the adjustment of rhetorical arguments to the horizon of the audience, methods of finding premises on the basis of argumentative schemes (topoi), the use of non-argumentative means of persuasion, and a framework of implicit discourse rules. Many of these themes are, albeit under a different name, still discussed in modern argumentation theory.

Review of M. Spranzi, The art of dialectic between dialogue and rhetoric: The Aristotelian tradition

In The art of dialectic between dialogue and rhetoric, Spranzi (2011) explores the relation between the art of dialectic and the philosophical search for principles of methods of inquiry. By providing a reconstruction of the tradition of Aristotelian dialectic, she aims at elucidating the ‘‘epistemic significance’’ (p. 1) of dialectic. The reconstruction addresses a limited number of authors, all of which are chosen for their relevance in answering the question as to how the dialectical method may be instrumental in acquiring knowledge. In the first two chapters of the book Spranzi discusses the seminal passages in Aristotle’s Topica, Sophistici elenchi and Rhetorica, as well as the contributions of Cicero, Boethius and several medieval authors. She then discusses the developments in the tradition of dialectic that took place in the Renaissance, devoting three separate chapters to the contributions of Agricola, Nifo, and Sigonio respectively. In the final chapter, she describes the relationship between modern argumentation theory and the Aristotelian tradition of dialectic. Among the authors discussed are Toulmin, Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Walton, and Freeman. As to the methodology of her reconstruction of the tradition of dialectic, Spranzi indicates that she focuses on ‘‘dialectica docens’’ rather than ‘‘dialectica utens’’ (p. 3). This means that she reconstructs only those passages in which the authors explicitly reflect on the relationship between dialectic and the advancement of knowledge and stays away from passages in which the authors explain the technicalities of the dialectical discussion procedure. The actual reconstruction of the tradition of dialectic starts in chapter 1, Aristotle and the art of dialectic. In line with the central aim of her research, Spranzi highlights those passages in the works of Aristotle in which he explicitly reflects on the connection between the art of debate and the pursuance of knowledge. Having explained the central concepts of Aristotle’s Topica, she distinguishes between

The argumentation in Galatians

Many exegetes set out to analyse not only rhetorical features in Galatians but also other features relating to Paul’s argumentation. Still, the use of insights from modern argumentation theory has been modest and no full-fledged argumentation analyses of Paul’s argumentation have yet been attempted. However, modern methods for argumentation analysis provide useful tools for such an undertaking. Using the pragmadialectical model of argumentation analysis, this paper illustrates how a modern approach can be used for Galatians. It is argued that by using a sophisticated method we can gain a more accurate understanding of Paul’s argumentation.

Incorporating rhetorical and plausible reasoning in a system for simulating argumentation

Abstract The article introduces argumentation theory, some examples of computational models of argumentation, some application examples, considers the significance and problems of argumentation systems, and outlines the significance and difficulties of the field. Also, the article describes a system which used rhetorical reasoning rules such as fairness, reciprocity, and deterrence which was used to simulate the text of a debate. The text was modelled using modern argumentation theory, and this model was used to build the system. The article discusses the system with regard to several aspects: its ability to deal with meaningful contradiction such as claim X supporting claim Y, yet claim Y attacking claim X; recursive arguments; inconsistency maintenance; expressiveness; encapsulation, the use of definitions as the basis for rules, and making generalisations using taxonomies. The article concludes with a discussion of domain dependence, rule plausibility, and some comparisons with formal logic.

Manipulations in argumentation

In public and political practice, argumentation involves verbal manipulations, which have not been sufficiently studied in modern argumentation theory. This paper proposes to analyse such manipulations as speech acts, by means of the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation.

The psychological burden of proof: On the evolutionary development of Richard Whately's theory of presumption

Previous analysis of Richard Whately's theory of presumption and burden of proof have been unable to resolve the apparent difficulty posed by his treatment of both legal (rule‐assigned) and psychological (audience‐determined) presumptions. Critics have either avoided this question entirely or have attempted to reconcile the dual forms of presumption in a legal interpretation of the theory, denigrating the psychological aspects, and suggesting that Whately was confused about his own system. In contrast, a chronological analysis of the evolution of Whately's doctrine, 1830–1846, produces evidence in favor of a broad psychological interpretation of the theory, having implications for modern argumentation theory.