Cooperative Game Theory Model Research Articles

Vibration based single-objective finite element model updating using cooperative game theory approach

This paper introduces a novel approach that focuses on application of cooperative game theory model for automated finite element model updating. The approach involves transforming the conventional single-objective optimization finite element model updating problem into a game theory problem. Among the different alternatives, a cooperative game model is considered to solve the transformed updating problem. This new approach overcomes the limitations of the conventional single-objective optimization formulation, which include challenges related to selecting appropriate weighting factor of residuals and analysing their influence on optimization results. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, an ultralight fibre reinforced polymer footbridge is considered. The numerical model of the footbridge is updated using the experimentally determined inherent properties (natural frequencies and mode shapes) using the proposed approach. A comparison with the conventional sensitivity-based weighted single objective method reveals that the inclusion of the weighting factor in the optimization process under the cooperative game model method allows for more efficient solution of the single-objective updating optimization problem, while maintaining accuracy and quality in the updated model.

Optimal Energy and Pollution Management for Multimicrogrids Coalition Based on a Cooperative Game Theory Model

In this manuscript, two issues of energy management as well as controlling the emission of pollution in multiple microgrids are followed. For this purpose, a three level optimization problem is developed for simultaneous energy and pollution management. In the proposed model, the combination of microgrids is modeled as a coalition that seeks to maximize the cumulative profits. On the other hand, in the proposed based on the game theory, participation in the pollution permit market is also considered. In the proposed model, it is assumed that the central operator is responsible for the optimal energy and pollution management of all microgrids. The problem facing the central operator is formulated in two levels. The bilevel model is formulated as an MPEC problem. The energy exchanged between the microgrids and upstream network and the share of each microgrid in the pollution permits are the output of the bilevel problem. On the other hand, an optimization problem (third level) is developed from each of the local operators’ points of view. In this problem, how to operate each of the microgrids is determined. The results of studies in this paper show that with the simultaneous management of energy and pollution, the total amount of pollution should be reduced by 8% compared to the case where only energy management is carried out. On the other hand, using the proposed model (three-level) compared to the two-level model, the cost of applying to the whole coalition is reduced by 5%.

Cooperative Game-Based Business Model Optimisation for a Multi-Owner Integrated Palm Oil-Based Complex

To achieve cleaner production in palm oil mills (POM), eliminating palm oil mill effluent (POME) via evaporation provides promising benefits towards palm oil sustainability. The incorporation of POME evaporation creates circular economy opportunities between mill, refinery and cogeneration system via converting mill-refinery effluent to oil recovered-solids and regenerated water, broadening biomass-to-energy potential to support energy-extensive evaporation and water integrations. Such industrial symbiosis scheme named as the integrated palm oil-based complex (POBC) could consider participation from different companies to provide desired processing facilities in achieving the optimal performance of POBC. For the new POBC scheme, the individual interest for each participating facility is hard to define due to the lack of basis for profit distribution. It is crucial to propose an optimal business model for POBC planning to demonstrate the financial allocation among possible partners based on the pooled incremental gains in the POBC coalition. The business model serves as a tool to persuade the companies in collaborating by quantifying their potential economic benefits and contributions for negotiation before forming the POBC. The cooperative game theory model has been useful in distributing cost savings within a coalition of individual plants. On that account, an integrated cooperative game-based optimisation approach is proposed to optimally distribute the profit gain and investment sharing between POM, palm oil refinery and biomass-cogeneration system to develop a feasible business model for a multi-owner POBC. Seven scenarios have been evaluated to generate optimal multi-owner POBC business models achieving 7-13 % improvements in economic potential. The average economic allocations of collaborating POM, refinery and cogeneration system are 91.8 %, 2.4 % and 5.8 % in the multi-owner POBCs.

An Analysis of Countries’ Bargaining Power Derived from the Natural Gas Transportation System Using a Cooperative Game Theory Model

A large consumption of natural gas accompanied by reduced production capabilities makes Europe heavily dependent on imports from Russia. More than half of Russian gas is exported by transiting Ukraine, so in the context of the underlying conflict between the two, this is considered uncertain. Therefore, in this article, we modeled the natural gas transportation system using cooperative game theory in order to determine the bargaining power of the major players (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and Norway) by using a form of the Shapley value. We described the interaction between countries as network games where utilities from transport routes are considered and proposed three scenarios where the gas flow from Russia to Ukraine is either diminished or completely interrupted, with the purpose of finding out how the bargaining power on this market is shifted in case of network redesign. In this context, we included in the analysis the scenario where the Nord Stream 2 pipeline will be finished. Results showed that Russia dominates the market in any scenario, and by avoiding Ukraine, its position is even further strengthened. Moreover, Germany’s position remains stable considering its diverse imports and large storage capabilities, and its bargaining power increases in the case of diminishing or avoiding the Ukrainian gas pipelines.

Resource management and joint-planning in fragmented societies

Does the division of a society into identity groups increase the risk of unsustainable resource use? This study considers the theory that diversity leads to degradation by preventing joint-planning across a community of resource users. A cooperative game theory model is used to derive conditions that should make this problem appear. When resource users can plan extraction choices together, sufficient uncertainty about the value of a shared resource (“environmental uncertainty”) will incentivize them to stably make decisions in as large a group as possible. However, that is only true when players are also pessimistic about the behavior of community members not directly involved in joint planning with themselves. If those conditions are met, the probability that a community will deplete their shared resource rises as they fragment into more and more identity groups that do not make decisions together. In sum, this study demonstrates that a combination of pessimism about the behavior of non-coalition members and sufficient environmental uncertainty give rise to a negative effect of social diversity. Among other things, these findings may help explain the mixed effectiveness of some conservation policies, and improve our understanding of how events that prime inter-group tensions can have downstream sustainability consequences.

Application of Game Theory in Integrated Energy System Systems: A Review

With the rapid development of society, global energy is in short supply. China has put forward an integrated energy system focusing on interconnecting energy resources and harnessing their complementary advantages to address the energy crisis, thus no longer pursuing the production, transportation and supply of a single source of energy. In the continuous development of integrated energy systems, the elements of participation and interaction are becoming more complex. Game theory, which can effectively solve the problems arising from multi-agent trading, is naturally introduced to the integrated energy system. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the introduction of game theory into the integrated energy system. First, the development of integrated energy is briefly introduced, game scenarios in integrated energy systems is proposed, and game scenarios considering the energy supply side, distribution network, demand side and common planning and dispatching problems in integrated energy systems are summarized. Secondly, main game theory models in the integrated energy system are summarized, such as cooperative game theory model, the non-cooperative game theory model and the Stackelberg game theory model. Finally, the future prospect and challenge for the application of game theory in integrated energy systems is proposed. The new game models are introduced to the integrated energy system, and a mixed game is considered to solve related problems. It is hoped that this work can serve as a reference for the researchers in this field.

Channel-Aware Potential Field Trajectory Planning for Solar-Powered Relay UAV in Near-Space

The near-space communication relay platform has a broad application prospect and development potential in the field of over-the-horizon communication support. In this paper, we investigate a throughput oriented, real-time path planning method for the high-altitude Solar-Powered UAV (SP-UAV) to ensure high quality communication of long-range mission UAVs. Firstly, based on the spatial distribution, the Channel State Information (CSI) and the potential field theory, we design the channel-aware-aided relay SP-UAV which is capable of adaptively changing its position, while maximizing the total throughput of the communication system. Secondly, in the feedback loop design, a cooperative game theory model is introduced to formulate a feedback-aided strategy for adjusting the weighting factors, which can further improve the whole communication performance. Specifically, to ensure the real-time performance, a low complexity algorithm and the real-time updated system conditions are applied in calculating the planning trajectory of the relay UAV. Simulation results show that compared with the relay UAV with a fixed cruise trajectory, our proposed scheme achieves better network throughput and has good tracking adaptability.

Optimization of energy exchange in microgrid networks: a coalition formation approach

In this paper, we elaborate a new strategy based on cooperative game theory models to encourage and manage the interactions in a MicroGrid network. The proposed strategy optimizes the cooperation and the energy exchange in a distributed μGrid network. The strategy consists of a two stage algorithm: Coalition formation algorithm which was specifically created to approximate the optimal set of coalitions that return considerable savings. And the Matching game to manage the energy exchange inside each coalition. The performance of our strategy was verified through simulations. These latter show that the losses can be considerably decreased by the use of the proposed strategy: the rate of the loss reduction can reach up to 20% if the two stages are applied on the network. Moreover, the strategy proved to have a fast convergence which makes it operational for real implemented networks.

Sharing economy in organic food supply chains: A pathway to sustainable development

Increasing operational and logistical costs, lower yields, and market barriers adversely impact the competitiveness of organic farmers in developing countries. While agricultural cooperatives have recently gained significant popularity in organic food supply chains (OFSCs), there remains a considerable degree of skepticism regarding their contributions toward sustainable development. The current study investigates the role of the sharing economy (SE) in enabling organic smallholders to overcome their specific set of challenges by sharing resources and aggregating peer-to-peer activities using an SE-based cooperative platform. Using a cooperative game theory (CGT) modelling approach, we jointly address the production-inventory planning and pricing problems of multiple competing OFSCs—in the presence of a conventional food producer—in two scenarios: the non-cooperative (benchmark) and the SE-based cooperative. We present a novel solution algorithm to solve the formulated mathematical models and to characterize the behavior of key decision makers. After computing the coalitional synergy achieved with the SE-based mechanism, we implement different CGT models to fairly distribute the generated profit among OFSC coalition members. The results reveal that, when designed and implemented appropriately, the proposed SE-based mechanism is capable of concurrently delivering greater financial gains with higher sustainable development benefits due to its underlying peer-to-peer sharing features.

Multi-stakeholder policy modeling for collection and recycling of spent portable battery waste.

Policies have been structured for collection and recycling of spent portable battery waste within a framework of stakeholders (recycling council body, producer, recycler and consumer) especially for those battery units that are discarded worldwide because of their expensive cost of recycling. Applicability of stakeholders' policies in their coalition framework have been reviewed and critically analyzed using the Shapley value of cooperative game theory models. Coalition models for 'manufacturer and recycler' indicated the dominating role of manufacturers over the recyclers, and waste management is highly influenced by producer responsibility. But, the take-back policy enables recyclers' dominance role in the management and yields maximum benefit to both recyclers and consumers. The polluter pays principle has been implemented in formulating policies to key stakeholders, 'manufacturers' as well as 'consumers', of battery products by the introduction of penalties to encourage their willingness to join the Environment, Health and Safety program. Results indicated that the policies of the framework have the potential to be implemented within a marginal rise in battery price by 12% to 14.3% in the range of recycling cost per tonne of US$2000 to US$5000. The policy of the stakeholders' framework presented in the study could be an important aid to achieve high collection and recycling rates of spent portable batteries.

Improving Humanitarian Operations through Technology‐Enabled Collaboration

Humanitarian supply chains involve many different entities, such as government, military, private, and non‐governmental organizations and individuals. Well‐coordinated interactions between entities can lead to synergies and improved humanitarian outcomes. Information technology (IT) tools can help facilitate collaboration, but cost and other barriers have limited their use. We document the use of an IT tool to improve last‐mile supply distribution and data management in one of many camps for internally displaced persons after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and we describe other current uses of technology in camp management. Motivated by these examples and the interest among humanitarian organizations in expanding the use of such tools to facilitate coordination, we introduce a cooperative game theory model and explore insights about the conditions under which multi‐agency coordination is feasible and desirable. We also outline an agenda for future research in the area of technology‐enabled collaboration in the humanitarian sector.

Feature selection with neighborhood entropy-based cooperative game theory.

Feature selection plays an important role in machine learning and data mining. In recent years, various feature measurements have been proposed to select significant features from high-dimensional datasets. However, most traditional feature selection methods will ignore some features which have strong classification ability as a group but are weak as individuals. To deal with this problem, we redefine the redundancy, interdependence, and independence of features by using neighborhood entropy. Then the neighborhood entropy-based feature contribution is proposed under the framework of cooperative game. The evaluative criteria of features can be formalized as the product of contribution and other classical feature measures. Finally, the proposed method is tested on several UCI datasets. The results show that neighborhood entropy-based cooperative game theory model (NECGT) yield better performance than classical ones.

Models of coalition formation among cooperative agents: The current state and prospects of research

This paper describes the main approaches for the construction of models of coalition formation among rational cooperative agents. The taxonomy of papers in this rapidly developing interdisciplinary research field is presented. Different approaches are compared based on the authors' experience, from the point of view of their applicability to real world tasks. Special attention is paid to models of cooperative game theory.

Cooperative Management of Groundwater Resources in the Presence of Environmental Externalities

This paper investigates how cooperation among users can achieve a better management of groundwater in the presence of environmental externalities. Cooperation allows users to internalize the damages caused by their activities and reduce extractions. The paper develops a game theoretical framework to assess the value of cooperation in an aquifer that is divided into three sub-aquifers that are being overly exploited. Two types of externalities are modeled: first, water extractions in each sub-aquifer impact water levels in neighboring sub-aquifers (extraction externality). Second, the three sub-aquifers are also connected to an ecosystem and thus decisions in each sub-aquifer affect the health of the ecosystem (environmental externality). A cooperative game theory model is applied. The model empirically shows how the uncontrolled extractions in each sub-aquifer affects neighboring groundwater users but also cause severe impacts to the linked ecosystem. The model is tested empirically in one of the most important aquifers in Spain, the Eastern la Mancha aquifer. The results illustrate how both extraction and environmental externalities interact in affecting the likelihood of cooperation among the users. The paper estimates the value of cooperation and its stability with and without the environmental externality.

THE ROLE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE MARKET PROCESS: A SIMULATION STUDY

We review the major existing theoretical propositions of several economic schools of thought on the role of entrepreneurship and its equilibrating vs. disequilibrating effect in the economy. We then introduce a cooperative game theory model of the market process in which we provide formal definitions of creation and discovery entrepreneurship, and employ a computer simulation of this model that allows us to visualize and analyze the dynamic entrepreneurial market process through time. Based on this formal analysis, we suggest important refinements of existing theoretical propositions regarding the economic nature of entrepreneurship that can help build stronger micro-foundations for entrepreneurship theory.

Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions—or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental structure.

Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in...

A cooperative game theory analysis for transmission loss allocation

This paper presents an analysis and discussion, based on cooperative game theory, for the allocation of the cost of losses to generators and demands in transmission systems. We construct a cooperative game theory model in which the players are represented by equivalent bilateral exchanges and we search for a unique loss allocation solution, the Core. Other solution concepts, such as the Shapley Value, the Bilateral Shapley Value and the Kernel are also explored. Our main objective is to illustrate why is not possible to find an optimal solution for allocating the cost of losses to the users of a network. Results and relevant conclusions are presented for a 4-bus system and a 14-bus system.

A Cooperative Game Theory Model of Quantity Discounts

Quantity discounts offered by a monopolist are considered in the context of a bargaining problem in which the buyer and the seller negotiate over the order quantity and the average unit price. All-units and incremental quantity discounts that permit transaction at a negotiated outcome are described. The effects of risk sensitivity and bargaining power on quantity discounts are discussed for alternative bargaining models.