Model Of Reflective Equilibrium Research Articles

Overlapping consensus in pluralist societies: simulating Rawlsian full reflective equilibrium

The fact of reasonable pluralism in liberal democracies threatens the stability of such societies. John Rawls proposed a solution to this problem: The different comprehensive moral doctrines endorsed by the citizens overlap on a shared political conception of justice, e.g. his justice as fairness. Optimally, accepting the political conception is for each citizen individually justified by the method of wide reflective equilibrium. If this holds, society is in full reflective equilibrium. Rawls does not in detail investigate the conditions under which a full reflective equilibrium is possible or likely. This paper outlines a new strategy for addressing this open question by using the formal model of reflective equilibrium recently developed by Beisbart et al. First, it is argued that a bounded rationality perspective is appropriate which requires certain changes in the model. Second, the paper rephrases the open question about Rawlsian full reflective equilibrium in terms of the model. The question is narrowed down by focusing on the inferential connections between comprehensive doctrines and political conception. Rawls himself makes a demanding assumption about which connections are necessary for a full reflective equilibrium. Third, the paper presents a simulation study design that is focused on simplicity. The results are discussed, they fit with Rawls’s assumption. However, because of the strong idealisations, they provide a useful benchmark rather than a final answer. The paper presents suggestions for more elaborate study designs.

Does reflective equilibrium help us converge?

I address the worry that reflective equilibrium is too weak as an account of justification because it fails to let differing views converge. I take up informal aspects of convergence and operationalise them in a formal model of reflective equilibrium. This allows for exploration by the means of computer simulation. Findings show that the formal model does not yield unique outputs, but still boosts agreement. I conclude from this that reflective equilibrium is best seen as a pluralist account of justification that cannot be accused of resulting in an “anything goes” relativism.

Die rol van die ouerhuis in die intergenerasionele geloofsvorming van die jeug in belang van ’n geïntegreerde jeugbediening

The role of the parental home in the intergenerational faith formation of the youth for the sake of an integrated youth ministry. This article deals with the following question: What is the role of parents in the intergenerational faith formation of the youth for the sake of an integrated youth ministry? Several studies nationally and internationally have convincingly pointed out that parents have the biggest influence on their children’s faith formation. However, parents are currently still not sufficiently inclusively involved or supported in youth ministry. Osmer’s fourfold reflective equilibrium model forms the frame for how this article is structured. Nel’s theory of inclusive youth ministry is used as a theological framework from which the role of parents in intergenerational faith formation is investigated. The empirical research (quantitative, as well qualitative) was conducted among 175 parents and 10 ministers coming from 29 congregations in the Noordelike, Oostelike, Hoëveld- and Goudland synods of the Dutch Reformed Church. These congregations all have a family and/or intergenerational focus in their (youth) ministry. The research has shown that youth ministry cannot by means of programmes, structures and even relationships in any way replace the important role played by parents in the lives of their children, regardless of what happens in the youth ministry. When the parental home and youth ministries do not act as partners in the faith formation process, it does not only lead to weak faith, but also to a lack of commitment, unsustainability and ultimately alienation. Youth ministries can therefore not function effectively without an integrated ministry, which includes the parental home. With all the challenges threatening their capacity, the parental home can also not function effectively as faith mediators without an inclusive youth ministry. The research thus clearly indicates that Nel’s theory of inclusive youth ministry, is not only noteworthy, but it is also in the long term, necessary to work towards the congregation’s eschatalogical sustainability.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: Youth ministries do not involve parents as the core part of their ministry. When youth ministries integrate parents into their ministry, children will be better guided in their faith formation. This adjustment calls for a paradigm shift in the focus of traditional youth ministry. Intergenerational faith formation in this study was approached within the framework of Practical Theology, Congregational Development and Youth Ministry.

Computational models of ethical decision-making: A coherence-driven reflective equilibrium model

There are scientific and technical challenges that must be addressed in developing systems that interact with humans and work along with other agents in complex, dynamic, and uncertain environments where ethical concerns may arise. In such systems relationships between users and autonomous components will be driven as much by issues such as trust, responsibility, and acceptability, as technical ones such as planning and coordination. This paper provides a comprehensive review and classification of existing methods in machine ethics, resulting in delineation of specific challenges and issues. To address the identified challenges, we introduce a method that leverages the method of reflective equilibrium and the multi-coherence theory as a unifying constraint satisfaction framework to simultaneously assess multiple ethical principles and manage ethical conflicts in a context-sensitive manner.

Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Consistency Reasoning

It is more than a half-century since Nelson Goodman [1955] applied what we call the Reflective Equilibrium model of justification to the problem of justifying induction, and more than three decades since Rawls [1971] and Daniels [1979] applied celebrated extensions of this model to the problem of justifying principles of social justice. The resulting Wide Reflective Equilibrium model (WRE) is generally thought to capture an acceptable way to reconcile inconsistency between an intuitively plausible general principle and an intuitively plausible judgment about a particular case. Recently a different model for reconciling moral inconsistency has emerged: Moral Consistency Reasoning [Campbell and Kumar 2012, 2013a; Kumar and Campbell 2012; Campbell 2009: 86–7; Campbell and Woodrow 2003; Wong 2002]. MCR applies when two moral judgments give opposing assessments of (what appear to be) relevantly similar particular cases. Though WRE and MCR are strikingly different, each arguably captures a rationally acceptable method for reconciling moral inconsistency. Moreover, as will be shown, they function in complementary ways. Are they parts of a more comprehensive model of moral reasoning in the face of inconsistency that would explain the attractions of each?This essay first spells out the relevant differences between the models and then formulates a more general model of moral reasoning in the face of inconsistency. §1 reviews the emergence of Goodman's model that he offers in the spirit of epistemology naturalized, almost a decade before Quine coined the term [1969a]. §2 analyses six salient features of WRE to be compared with six contrasting features of MCR in §3. §4 presents the general model.

Wide Reflective Equilibrium as a Normative Model for Responsible Governance

Soft regulatory measures are often promoted as an alternative for existing regulatory regimes for nanotechnologies. The call for new regulatory approaches stems from several challenges that traditional approaches have difficulties dealing with. These challenges relate to general problems of governability, tensions between public interests, but also (and maybe particularly) to almost complete lack of certainty about the implications of nanotechnologies. At the same time, the field of nanotechnology can be characterized by a high level of diversity. In this paper, we discuss and compare two models for framing public policy in relation to technology regulation: the first is a deliberative model based on foresight knowledge and the second the wide reflective equilibrium model, developed by political philosopher John Rawls. In both models, the aim is to find consensus on (a framework for) policy measures and regulation. On the basis of a critical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both models, some tentative conclusions are drawn for effective policy making and implementation based on soft law.

Exploring Responsibility Rationales in Research and Development (R&D)

The present article explores the rationales of scientists and engineers for distributing moral responsibilities related technology development. On the basis of a qualitative case study, it was investigated how the actors within a research network distribute responsibilities for these issues. Rawls’ Wide Reflective Equilibrium model was used as a descriptive framework. This study indicates that there is a correlation between the actors’ ethics position and their responsibility rationale. When discussing how to address ethical issues or how to distribute the responsibility for addressing them, actors with similar normative background theories referred to the same type of normative arguments. It was found that these deliberative processes could best be interpreted in terms of an interplay between different layers of morality. The case suggests that people seek coherence between these layers rather than work through them one-directionally. By distinguishing between rationales for distributing responsibilities and the actual distributions, possible sources of misunderstanding can be identified. The benefit from acknowledging these different rationales is that it enables actors to recognize the legitimacy of other people’s opinions, ultimately contributing to a responsibility distribution that is both complete and accepted by all as justified.

Reflective Equilibrium as a Normative Empirical Model

People who work and live in a certain moral practice usually pos- sess a specific form of moral wisdom. If we manage to incorporate their moral intuitions in ethical reasoning, we can arrive at judgements and (modest) the- ories that grasp a moral experience that generally cannot be found outside the said practice. To achieve this goal, we need a legitimate way to balance moral intuitions, ethical principles and general theories. In the present contribution, we describe a version of the model of Reflective Equilibrium, which we call the Normative-Empirical Reflective Equilibrium (NE-RE). RE provides a frame- work for ethical thinking that includes both (practical) moral experience and normative theory. After an outline of the model, we focus on the role of empirical research and illustrate how empirical data on moral intuitions can add to the compre- hensiveness of the set of moral beliefs in NE-RE. Subsequently, we describe how coherence among the elements of an NE-RE can be understood and measured. Finally, we address an important question for any method of moral reasoning: what is the status of the outcome of the reasoning process? This is a matter of justification. We argue for a so-called good reasoning-justified outcome strategy in NE-RE. This strategy is built on a reasoning process in which the reason-giving force of each element is tested and weighed. The thinker has to work towards a coherent view in which only the elements with sufficient jus- tificatory power are retained. If the thinker decides that the elements fit together into a coherent view, a reflective equilibrium is reached. NE-RE is an attempt to describe a model for moral reasoning that can profit from the moral wisdom present among experienced agents through the use of empirical research.

Toward Honest Ethical Pluralism

I give the label “ethical pluralism” to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maximally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules or principles to agents – should any exist – who adhere to a competing valid moral view. Given the usual conception of accepting a moral view, an ethical pluralist cannot honestly accept a traditional moral view. Consequently, I argue, an ethical pluralist is committed to the view that all traditional moral views are invalid. Given the likelihood of ethical pluralism, this conclusion is alarming. I set forth a weak conception of accepting a moral view that is designed to allow an ethical pluralist honestly to accept a traditional moral view. In particular, my conception is designed to explain how someone can (a) be guided by the view that she accepts; (b) accept her own moral view while rationally not accepting competing views that she thinks are equally valid; and (c) not be prepared to prescribe morally to those who are following other valid views. Central to my formulation are what I call a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people’s wrong behavior, together with acceptance of decisive moral reasons for oneself that are generated by the valid moral view that one accepts.

Should health care professionals encourage living kidney donation?

Living kidney donation provides a promising opportunity in situations where the scarcity of cadaveric kidneys is widely acknowledged. While many patients and their relatives are willing to accept its benefits, others are concerned about living kidney programs; they appear to feel pressured into accepting living kidney transplantations as the only proper option for them. As we studied the attitudes and views of patients and their relatives, we considered just how actively health care professionals should encourage living donation. We argue that active interference in peoples’ personal lives is justified - if not obligatory. First, we address the ambiguous ideals of non-directivity and value neutrality in counselling. We describe the main pitfalls implied in these concepts, and conclude that these concepts cannot account for the complex reality of living donation and transplantation. We depict what is required instead as truthful information and context-relative counselling. We then consider professional interference into personal belief systems. We argue that individual convictions are not necessarily strong, stable, or deep. They may be flawed in many ways. In order to justify interference in peoples’ personal lives, it is crucial to understand the structure of these convictions. Evidence suggests that both patients and their relatives have attitudes towards living kidney donation that are often open to change and, accordingly, can be influenced. We show how ethical theories can account for this reality and can help us to discern between justified and unjustified interference. We refer to Stephen Toulmin’s model of the structure of logical argument, the Rawlsian model of reflective equilibrium, and Thomas Nagel’s representation of the particularistic position.

Intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism

a common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our common moral intuitions. understanding the role that heuristics play in moral judgments undermines this objection. it also indicates why we should not use john rawls' model of reflective equilibrium as the basis for testing normative moral theories.

Balancing rationalities: gatekeeping in health care

Physicians are increasingly confronted with the consequences of allocation policies. In several countries, physicians have been assigned a gatekeeper role for secondary health care. Many ethicists oppose this assignment for...