Model Of Price Competition Research Articles

The Effect of Entry Regulation on Process Innovation in the Swiss Mail Industry

Summary We develop an industry specific model of price competition with product differentiation to analyze the effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the Swiss mail industry. We consider the four most prominent scenarios: Regulated monopoly, end-to-end competition, worksharing without bypass, and work-sharing with bypass. Based on model calibration with data from the Swiss letter market, we find that the incentives to invest in process innovations decrease with deregulation. However, even accounting for this fact, the efficiency gains of a partial liberalization, i.e. worksharing, ensure an increase in social welfare.

Competition in Prices and Service Level Guarantees

In this paper we study the implications of service level guarantees (SLGs) in a model of oligopoly competition where providers compete to deliver a service to congestion-sensitive consumers. The SLG is a contractual obligation on the part of the service provider: regardless of how many customers subscribe, the firm is responsible for investing in infrastructure, capacity, or service quality so that the congestion experienced by all subscribers is equal to the SLG. First, we analyze a game where firms compete by setting prices and SLGs simultaneously. We establish that this game can be reduced to standard oligopoly models of price competition, greatly simplifying the analysis of this otherwise complex competitive scenario. Notably, we find that when costs in the original game are convex, the resulting equivalent pricing game also has convex costs. Further, for a broad class of models exhibiting constant returns to investment, the resulting pricing game is equivalent to a standard price game with constant marginal costs; many loss systems, such as those modeled by the Erlang loss formula, exhibit constant returns to investment. We then consider another commonly used contractual agreement between firms and customers: firms first set prices and investment levels simultaneously, and then consumers choose where to subscribe. In this case, firms provide the best possible service given their infrastructure, but without an explicit guarantee. Using the Nash equilibria of the games played by firms, we compare this competitive model with the model where firms set prices and SLGs, in terms of the resulting prices, service levels, firms' profits, and consumers' surplus.

Bertrand–Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms

We examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity, are free to supply less than the quantity demanded, and there is discrete pricing. If firms are symmetric then, for a large class of residual demand functions, there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever, for a fixed grid size, the number of firms is sufficiently large. Moreover, this equilibrium price is within a grid-unit of the competitive price. The results go through to a large extent when the firms are asymmetric, or they are symmetric but play a two-stage game and the tie-breaking rule is ‘weakly manipulable’.

The role of warehouse club membership fee in retail competition

There are several explanations as to why warehouse clubs charge membership fees and how the fees play a role in the competitive landscape of the retail grocery market. We provide another insight into the nature of the membership fee using a model of price competition between a warehouse club and a supermarket. We show that the warehouse club's membership fee is an optimal competitive reaction to the supermarket's promotional activity. The more frequent the promotion is, the lower is the membership fee. However, the larger the promotion depth is, the higher is the fee. We show that the cherry-picker segment plays a key role behind these results. Our analysis not only provides a justification of warehouse club membership fees by discovering its duality with the cherry-picker segment but also gives managers several guidelines on yearly fee and retail price decisions.

Efeitos perversos de fusões acima de qualquer suspeita: um modelo de integração de produtores de bens complementares

According to common wisdom, mergers between complementary-goods firms should not raise anti-competitive concerns. Regulatory authorities rarely challenge them indeed. In this paper, I offer an alternative perspective in a model of price-competition in a complementary oligopoly industry with differentiated goods. The sign of the change in the consumer surplus, after the merger between the quality leaders of the respective complementary goods, depends however upon the consumers' valuation distribution over these products. A family of elliptic-arc distributions, parameterized by the elliptic small semi-axis, is used to derive the result.

Bargaining and Fixed Price Offers: How Online Intermediaries are Changing New Car Transactions

This paper develops a model of oligopolistic price competition to analyze the impact of online intermediaries such as Autobytel.com on the price setting process in the automobile market. The roles of dealer search costs, the fraction of buyers using the intermediary, the value of the item being sold, and heterogeneity in buyer bargaining abilities are explored. The model provides theoretical insights relevant to the empirical literature addressing the role that intermediaries like Autobytel play in online markets. For example, we present conditions under which the price offered through the intermediary is either higher or lower than offline (bargained) prices.

Bargaining and Posted Prices: What Does the Internet Change?

The Internet has introduced a variety of online buying services that expand the reach of sellers and reduce search costs for buyers. In markets in which traditional outlets tend to establish prices through bargaining, these online intermediaries have also altered the price setting process. Perhaps the most well known example is Autobytel.com which provides referral services in the automobile market. By using Autobytel, a buyer can obtain a posted price as an alternative to bargaining with a car dealer ship. To understand the effect of online referral systems on the price setting process, we construct a theoretical model of oligopolistic price competition in which one dealership has an exclusive contract with a referral intermediary. We show that posted prices offered through the referral system are not necessarily lower than offline prices (bargained prices). Our model provides theoretical insights relevant to results in the empirical literature addressing the role that Autobytel and other infomediaries play in online markets.

Information and Drug Prices: Evidence from the Medicare Discount Drug Card Program

In early 2004, the U.S. Government initiated the Medicare Discount Drug Card Program, which created a market for drug cards that allowed their subscribers to obtain discounts on their prescription drug purchases. Pharmacy-level prices for several drugs were posted on the program website weekly from May 29, 2004 to December 31, 2005, as the largest undertaking in the history of government-sponsored information release aimed at promoting competition by facilitating access to prices. A large sample of pharmacy-level drug price data collected from the Medicare website for several weeks indicate that the program generated significant dispersion in prices across drug cards that persisted over time. Moreover, the time-path of prices was non-monotonic: the prices declined initially and rose later as the program matured. In contrast, contemporaneous control prices unrelated to the program that were collected from on-line drug retailers rose steadily over time, indicating that the program prices evolved in a way different from the general evolution of prices outside the program. In view of the institutional aspects of the program which prevented consumers from changing their card choices at will, the evolution of prices can be reconciled with models of dynamic price competition with consumer switching costs as in Klemperer (1987a,b). The estimates of savings under the program are also provided.

Price competition in e-tailing under service and recognition differentiation

The Internet has significantly increased the bargaining power of consumers. Many online shopping search engines allow consumers to find most retailers that sell a specific product, compare product prices, and review detailed store ratings. With competition just a click away, online retailers have little control over where consumers would shop. Offering the lowest price alone does not always guarantee that consumers will come and buy at your site. Other non-price attributes, such as service quality and a merchant’s brand recognition, also play important roles in helping online retailers to build competitive advantages. In this paper, we present a model of price competition that assumes e-tailers can mainly differentiate themselves by providing different levels of service and by establishing a different online recognition. Closed-form equilibrium solutions are obtained for the different scenarios that may arise in this model. Based on such solutions, we give managerial insights on how e-tailers should position themselves when parameters such as service cost, service levels, and recognition are varied.

Hassle Costs, Price-Matching Guarantees and Price Competition: An Experiment

In this study, we experimentally investigate whether the collusion-facilitating nature of price-matching guarantees survives the reasonable modification of hassle costs incurred by buyers to enact these guarantees. Hviid and Shaffer [1999] (HS) argue that the presence of an arbitrarily small number of positive hassle costs buyers undermines incentives for collusion in symmetric markets. To evaluate the impact of hassle costs, we develop four stylized one-shot price competition models that have sharp testable predictions. While the first model directly captures the implications of HS, the last three models deal with the theoretical analysis of hassle costs in symmetric markets by introducing varying proportions of positive and zero hassle costs buyers, previously unexplored in the literature. Although theory predicts that the competitive price should emerge in equilibrium in all four models, we find significant price differences in the experiment.

Price Competition in E-tailing under Service and Recognition Differentiation

The Internet has significantly increased the bargaining power of consumers. Many online shopping search engines allow consumers to find most retailers that sell a specific product, compare product prices, and review detailed store ratings. With competition just a click away, online retailers have little control over where consumers would shop. Offering the lowest price alone does not always guarantee that consumers will come and buy at your site. Other non-price attributes, such as service quality and a merchant's brand recognition, also play important roles in helping online retailers to build competitive advantages. In this paper, we present a model of price competition that assumes e-tailers can mainly differentiate themselves by providing different levels of service and by establishing a different online recognition. Closed-form equilibrium solutions are obtained for the different scenarios that may arise in this model. Based on such solutions, we give managerial insights on how e-tailers should position themselves when parameters such as service cost, service levels, and recognition are varied.

Does Parallel Behavior Provide Some Evidence of Collusion?

Antitrust authorities often consider parallel pricing and market share stability to be clues of illegal collusion. To analyze whether this inference is correct, I develop a model of price competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary over time. In many cases parallel pricing does not distinguish between a competitive and a collusive outcome. However, in some cases perfect parallel pricing is compatible only with a competitive equilibrium, and therefore provides some evidence that firms did not collude. I also show that the competitive equilibrium is characterized by a higher market share stability than a collusive equilibrium.

Wettbewerb als Rangordnungsverfahren: Wettbewerbliches Handeln in in gesellschaftlicher Interaktion / Competition as a Ranking Procedure: Competive Behaviour in Societal Interaction

Zusammenfassung Angeregt durch eine ergebnislos endende Kontroverse in diesem Jahrbuch über die unterschiedliche Rolle, die der Staat im Rahmen seiner Kompetenz für die marktwirtschaftlich Ordnung hat und die andererseits der interstaatliche Systemwettbewerb verlangt, nimmt der Beitrag den heute ausufernden Gebrauch des Wettbewerbsbegriffs zum Anlaß für die Entwicklung einer ordnenden Taxonomie des Wettbewerbsbegriffs. Die Zielsetzung eines jeden Wettbewerbs sieht der Beitrag in der Entdeckung einer Rangordnung unter den Wettbewerbern. Das ist sicher plausibel im Falle des Sports, der Politik und in sozialen Gemeinschaften. Der Beitrag zeigt am Beispiel des Preiswettbewerbs, in welchem Sinne der wirtschaftliche Wettbewerb ebenfalls als Rangordnungsverfahren zu verstehen ist. Neben dem wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb werden mehrere Varianten des Reputationswettbewerbs unter ihren unterschiedlichen institutionellen Vorbedingungen dargestellt. Die Absicht des Beitrags besteht in dem Versuch, der Perspektive der spontanen wettbewerblichen Interaktion in einer freien Gesellschaft einen analytischen Zugang zu vermitteln.

Hassle Costs, Price-Matching Guarantees and Price Competition: An Experiment

In this study, we experimentally investigate whether the collusion-facilitating nature of price-matching guarantees survives the reasonable modification of hassle costs incurred by buyers to enact these guarantees. Hviid and Shaffer [1999] (HS) argue that the presence of an arbitrarily small number of positive hassle costs buyers undermines incentives for collusion in symmetric markets. To evaluate the impact of hassle costs, we develop four stylized one-shot price competition models that have sharp testable predictions. While the first model directly captures the implications of HS, the last three models deal with the theoretical analysis of hassle costs in symmetric markets by introducing varying proportions of positive and zero hassle costs buyers, previously unexplored in the literature. Although theory predicts that the competitive price should emerge in equilibrium in all four models, we find significant price differences in the experiment.

05/01575 A price competition model for power and reserve market auctions

05/01575 A price competition model for power and reserve market auctions

Do Strategic Conclusions Depend on how Price is Defined in Models of Distribution Channels?

Models of distribution channels have defined retailer and manufacturer pricing decision variables in different ways, such as absolute retail price or absolute retail margin and absolute manufacturer price or absolute manufacturer margin. This article examines whether this choice of definition affects the equilibrium outcomes from such models. It shows that the equilibrium outcomes do not change with these definitions if manufacturers are modeled as Stackelberg pricing leaders to their retailer. However, if manufacturers are modeled as Bertrand-Nash competitors to their retailer or as Stackelberg pricing followers to their retailer, the equilibrium outcomes change depending on how the retailer's pricing decision variables are defined. Moreover, if in these two cases manufacturers and retailer are allowed to define their own pricing decision variables, then (1) manufacturers are indifferent about choosing among absolute prices, absolute margins, and percentage margins, but (2) the retailer chooses percentage margins. These results have implications for both theoretical and empirical models of price competition in distribution channels.

Dynamic price competition

We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a result, the model captures phenomena such as learning by doing and habit formation in consumption. We characterize Markovian equilibria for finite and infinite horizon versions of the model and show that the stationary infinite horizon version of the model possesses an efficient equilibrium where all the sellers receive an equilibrium payoff equal to their marginal contribution to the social welfare.

Price Competition between International Airline Alliances

This paper develops a model of price competition between two international airline alliances, with consumers' preferences vertically differentiated by the number of stops. Alliances benefit the interline passengers. Alliances with antitrust immunity do not benefit interline passengers more than those without antitrust immunity, in contrast to the Cournot-type settings. While antitrust immunity leads to higher fares for non-stop travel between hubs of alliance partners, granting it might be necessary to induce consolidation between carriers. Formation of alliances with antitrust immunity is consistent with the proposed model, even though such is likely to decrease individual carriers' profit.

Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria

This paper examines the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a Bertrand model of price competition where firms supply all demand. When firms are asymmetric we prove existence and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. For symmetric firms, we show that an equilibrium is necessarily unique. We also examine whether this unique equilibrium outcome is implementable through a sequential move game where the firms take turns at announcing prices. Finally we examine the limiting property of such equilibria as the number of firms go to infinity.

Competitive pricing of mixed retail and e-tail distribution channels

In addition to regular retail distribution channels, a firm nowadays can avail themselves of such information technology (IT) as the Internet to distribute products directly “on line” (referred to as an “e-tail” distribution channel). The mix of retailing with e-tailing has added a new dimension of competition to the firm's distribution channels. The central issue of this competition is the competitive pricing policies between retail and e-tail distribution channels. In this paper, we consider the price competition between these two channels under two market game settings: the Bertrand and the Stackelberg price competition models. In the Bertrand competition, the manufacturer and retailer simultaneously select e-tail and retail price, respectively, while in Stackelberg competition, the manufacturer as a leader selects the e-tail price, then the retailer selects retail price. We obtain both the Bertrand and Stackelberg equilibrium pricing policies, and compare the profit gains under these two competitions. Based on our results, we propose an appropriate strategy for the manufacturer to adopt when adding an e-tail channel. We also show that an optimal wholesale price exists under a different market structure that could be used to encourage the retailer to accommodate the additional e-tail channel.