Multilateral Negotiation Model Research Articles

A complex contract negotiation model based on hybrid intelligent algorithm

Intelligent negotiation plays an important role in e-commerce. In the research of multi-attribute negotiation, the non-linear relationship between attributes is usually neglected. Multi-attribute multilateral negotiation model with such complex relationship is more practical. In this paper, the building of a multilateral negotiation model of complex contracts with nonlinear dependencies between attributes by applying Multi-Agent System and hybrid intelligent algorithm is studied. And the approximate optimal solution of Nash equilibrium within a certain accuracy range is given. Finally, through simulation examples of multilateral negotiation with two attributes of price and quality, the correctness and validity of the method are verified. The research provides new ideas for intelligent negotiation research.

An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations

I develop a model of the multilateral negotiations that are frequently observed when one party wishes to trade with one of several others offering potentially different amounts of surplus to be split. The model’s intuitively sensible equilibrium outcomes differ qualitatively from those in other models of these negotiations. I demonstrate one application of the model that provides empirical predictions about how the choice of transacting via negotiations or auctions is affected by factors including the number of trading partners, uncertainty when making the choice, and costly participation in the trading process. More generally the model provides a tractable foundation for analyzing strategic problems in settings featuring multilateral negotiations, including investment, product design, mergers, and hold-up.

Corporate Governance - A Broader Perspective

In this paper it is argued that the notion of market-based corporate governance approach should be broadened to include the problem of owner-controlled firms and large block-holders and should be generalized to a model of multilateral negotiations and influence-seeking among a number of different stakeholders. In practice such a model should incorporate checks and balances between various stakeholders and outside constraints and must take into account how the political and legal system of a country affects this balance. In fact, even if there is theoretical reason to believe that ownership with its incumbent benefits and costs belongs to equity, this view is not dominant in most economies outside United Kingdom and United States of America. The broader notion of corporate governance offers hope for understanding better the developing economies in particular - and other economies in general - where anonymous stock markets are not likely to promote the necessary entrepreneurial activity and corporate restructuring. It suggests that other mechanisms, such as product market competition, peer pressure, or labor market activity, may compensate for this weakness, or more realistically, may be more promising targets for legal or political reform than the stock market.

Pre-Distribution: A Model of Equity Bargaining with Endogenous Investments

This article sets forth a model of multilateral negotiations with alternating offers and voting in which members bargain over the distribution of equity shares prior to making investment decisions that determine the surplus to distribute. We challenge the classical assumption embedded in the divide-the-dollar setting that the fund to distribute is exogenoulsy given. Bargaining over productive incentives is fundamentally a different problem that yields a distinct set of equilibrium payoffs. The proposer faces a trade-off between rent-sharing and rent-generation subject to the constraint of receiving a majority vote. If he attempts to offer small equity shares to coalition partners, the size of the pie might shrink, rendering his large ownership percentage unfruitful. In equilibrium, the proposer forms a minimum winning coalition by offering two types of shares. Some members are incentivized to invest in the common project and they receive a share that yields a payoff greater than the ex ante value of the game, thus the proposer's rent-seeking incentives are mitigated by the production constraints. The remaining coalition partners are offered a share that buys their vote without inducing investment. We provide a new view on efficiency in bargaining games which relates to the approved incentive scheme, and not only the timing of the approval.

An Alternating-Offers Model of Multilateral Negotiations

I develop an infinite-horizon alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations, a common means of exchange whose strategic complexity has hindered previous modeling efforts. Multilateral negotiations occur in numerous settings in which one party wishes to trade with one of several others, but for concreteness I consider a buyer facing multiple sellers offering potentially different amounts of surplus to be split. The basic model provides surprising insights about introducing competition to an initially bilateral setting, while straightforward extensions provide empirical predictions about how the buyer's choice of conducting procurement via multilateral negotiations or auctions is affected by factors including the number of sellers, uncertainty when making the choice, and costs of participating in the procurement process. More generally the model provides a tractable foundation for analyzing strategic problems in settings featuring multilateral negotiations.

New Credit Mechanism for Semicooperative Agent-Mediated Joint Activity–Travel Scheduling

Joint activities have been investigated primarily in the context of household-based models of travel demand. The joint decision requires agreement about several issues. Each participant, on the one hand, tries to cooperate with others to reach an agreement on the joint activity and, on the other hand, tries to maximize his or her own benefit. Given such a semicooperative environment, the methods of joint activity scheduling cannot be directly extended. Negotiation is a suitable approach to reach an agreement on multiple issues and decide on a joint activity. This study adopted a multiplayer, multi-issue, multilateral negotiation model by which agents sequentially submitted proposals in consecutive rounds until a deadline. A new credit mechanism for the agents under conditions of incomplete information was proposed. Credit encouraged agents to do favors by compromising in return for agreement on other issues. Some preliminary experimental results show how three agents focusing on four issues related to a joint activity come to an agreement on those issues. The study demonstrates that the number of agreements is improved and that the average number of rounds before an agreement is reached is much smaller than that in a process in which no credit system is used.

Adaptive Agent Negotiation for Software Process Modeling

Most Software process models are predefined. When applied in changing environments, they have to be adapted manually. To this end, this paper proposes an adaptive multilateral negotiation model for software process modeling, namely AMNM-PA. AMNM-PA uses Agents to represent the entities involved in software processes, such as organizations, teams, persons, etc. and dynamically and adaptively constructs software process models for given software projects by negotiating among the Agents. AMNM-PA is based on non-stationary finite-horizon Markov decision processes and uses the model-independent Q learning algorithm to choose negotiation strategies, thus supports the dynamic and adaptable negotiation in changing and unknown environments meeting the requirement for environmental adaptability of the software process modeling. AMNM-PA has been implemented in the software process management system SoftPM.

An intelligent agent negotiation strategy in the electronic marketplace environment

E-commerce will strongly penetrate the market if coupled with appropriate technologies and mechanisms. Mobile agents may enhance the intelligence and improve the efficiency of systems in the e-marketplace. We propose a dynamic multi-lateral negotiation model and construct an efficient negotiation strategy based on a ranking mechanism that does not require a complicated rationale on behalf of the buyer agents. This strategy can be used to extend the functionality of autonomous intelligent agents, so that they quickly reach to an agreement aiming to maximise their owner’s utility. The framework proposed considers both contract and decision issues, is based on real market conditions, and has been empirically evaluated. Moreover, it is shown that in a linear framework like the one we employ, more elaborate ranking mechanisms do not necessarily improve efficiency.

Experimental Evaluation of a Model for Multilateral Negotiation with Fuzzy Preferences on an Agent-based Marketplace

This paper presents a multilateral negotiation model on an agent-based job-marketplace developed at Europe-University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. The negotiation model is based on many negotiation issues, a fuzzy utility scoring method and simultaneous negotiation with many negotiation partners in an environment of limited negotiation time. Although the proposed negotiation model deals with agent-based negotiation in the specific context of personnel acquisition, it can be applied with some modifications to other agent-based e-marketplaces. The negotiation model presented is evaluated with the help of some simulation experiments. The observed results provide an insight into the interrelation between negotiation tactics and time constraints on the one side and achieved utility degrees and the number of closed contracts on the other side.