Model Of Indirect Reciprocity Research Articles

Cooperation Dynamic through Individualistic Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism in a Multi-Dynamic Model

This research proposes a new variant of Nowak and Sigmund’s indirect reciprocity model focused on agents’ individualism, which means that an agent strengthens its profile to the extent to which it makes a profit; this is using agent-based modeling. In addition, our model includes environmentally related conditions such as visibility and cooperative demand and internal poses such as obstinacy. The simulation results show that cooperators appear in a more significant proportion with conditions of low reputation visibility and high cooperative demand. Still, severe defectors take advantage of this situation and exceed the cooperators’ ratio. Some events show a heterogeneous society only with conditions of high obstinacy and cooperative demand. In general, the simulations show diverse scenarios, including centralized, polarized, and mixed societies. Simulation results show no healthy cooperation in indirect reciprocity due to individualism.

Second-order effects of mutation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

Second-order effects of mutation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

Inequality leads to the evolution of intolerance in reputation-based populations

This work studies the impact of economic inequality on the evolution of intolerance through a reputation-based model of indirect reciprocity. Results show that economic inequality is a powerful enhancer of intolerance, inducing the escalation of out-group discrimination even without the presence of new intolerant mutants. It also generates behavior modifications within tolerant disfavored minorities: their members either relax punishments against the uncooperative or prioritize helping the wealthy, even suffering discrimination in return. On the other hand, the redistribution of wealth is proven as a viable solution to avoid the spread of intolerance as long as it increases equality and is implemented before intolerance permeates part of the population.

A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity

Reputation is one of key mechanisms to maintain human cooperation, but its analysis gets complicated if we consider the possibility that reputation does not reach consensus because of erroneous assessment. The difficulty is alleviated if we assume that reputation and cooperation do not take binary values but have continuous spectra so that disagreement over reputation can be analysed in a perturbative way. In this work, we carry out the analysis by expanding the dynamics of reputation to the second order of perturbation under the assumption that everyone initially cooperates with good reputation. The second-order theory clarifies the difference between Image Scoring and Simple Standing in that punishment for defection against a well-reputed player should be regarded as good for maintaining cooperation. Moreover, comparison among the leading eight shows that the stabilizing effect of justified punishment weakens if cooperation between two ill-reputed players is regarded as bad. Our analysis thus explains how Simple Standing achieves a high level of stability by permitting justified punishment and also by disregarding irrelevant information in assessing cooperation. This observation suggests which factors affect the stability of a social norm when reputation can be perturbed by noise.

The evolution of moral rules in a model of indirect reciprocity with private assessment

Moral rules allow humans to cooperate by indirect reciprocity. Yet, it is not clear which moral rules best implement indirect reciprocity and are favoured by natural selection. Previous studies either considered only public assessment, where individuals are deemed good or bad by all others, or compared a subset of possible strategies. Here we fill this gap by identifying which rules are evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) among all possible moral rules while considering private assessment. We develop an analytical model describing the frequency of long-term cooperation, determining when a strategy can be invaded by another. We show that there are numerous ESSs in absence of errors, which however cease to exist when errors are present. We identify the underlying properties of cooperative ESSs. Overall, this paper provides a first exhaustive evolutionary invasion analysis of moral rules considering private assessment. Moreover, this model is extendable to incorporate higher-order rules and other processes.

Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation game by regarding each player’s reputation and behaviour as continuous variables. Through perturbative calculation, we derive a condition that a social norm should satisfy to give penalties to its close variants, provided that everyone initially cooperates with a good reputation, and this result is supported by numerical simulation. A crucial factor of the condition is whether a well-reputed player’s donation to an ill-reputed co-player is appreciated by other members of the society, and the condition can be reduced to a threshold for the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation which depends on the reputational sensitivity to a donor’s behaviour as well as on the behavioural sensitivity to a recipient’s reputation. Our continuum formulation suggests how indirect reciprocity can work beyond the dichotomy between good and bad even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.

Indirect reciprocity with simple records

Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: Image-scoring models fail to provide robust incentives, while social-standing models are not informationally robust. Here we provide a model of indirect reciprocity based on simple, decentralized records: Each individual's record depends on the individual's own past behavior alone, and not on the individual's partners' past behavior or their partners' partners' past behavior. When social dilemmas exhibit a coordination motive (or strategic complementarity), tolerant trigger strategies based on simple records can robustly support positive social cooperation and exhibit strong stability properties. In the opposite case of strategic substitutability, positive social cooperation cannot be robustly supported. Thus, the strength of short-run coordination motives in social dilemmas determines the prospects for robust long-run cooperation.

Withhold-judgment and punishment promote cooperation in indirect reciprocity under incomplete information

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that can promote cooperation among populations in which individuals cannot repeatedly interact. Indirect reciprocity evaluates each individual's behaviour through social norms, based on which the reputation for each individual can be labelled. In the traditional models, it is usually assumed that all individual reputations are observable and are common knowledge to everyone in the population. In this paper, we relax this assumption and discuss an indirect-reciprocity model under incomplete information in which individuals have private opinions of others. Moreover, based on the observation that some people may have reservations about the current behaviour of an actor, which does not change their previous impressions on him, we generalize this phenomenon as withhold-judgment. We introduce punishment strategy and nine second-order social norms including withhold-judgment and explore how cooperation evolves in both public and private reputation scenarios. We find that social norms that allow for withhold-judgment can maintain high levels of cooperation. Although in the private reputation scenario, there is a situation in which more and more individuals have divarication over time, causing the reputation system to collapse, social norms that allow for withhold-judgment are still robust even if there are noise, variation, and incomplete information. In addition, we find that the introduction of punishment can promote cooperation, but in some situations, punishment will have a negative impact on social welfare.

Reputation auction games for cooperative communications over green wireless networks

Realizing energy-efficient wireless communications is essential in facilitating the development of green next-generation wireless networks. Existing studies have shown that cooperative communications can significantly reduce total energy consumption within a network. Most of these studies assume that all nodes in the network transmit cooperatively. However, in practical networks, nodes may act selfishly and refuse to participate. Accordingly, this study proposes a novel reputation auction framework based on an indirect reciprocity concept to stimulate node cooperation in green wireless networks and to provide a means to adapt to changing network dynamics. The proposed framework comprises two sealed-bid auction schemes in which node reputations in single- and multiple-relay transmission scenarios, respectively, are allocated in an efficient and fair manner to generate energy savings from application of the indirect reciprocity model. An analytical model is proposed to evaluate the outage probability of the proposed schemes. The results derived using this model agree with those obtained from computer simulations. Also, an adaptive scheme is proposed to combine the advantages of single- and multiple-relay transmission. Simulations show that the proposed framework achieves higher energy efficiency and a lower outage probability than non-cooperative schemes. Furthermore, the adaptive scheme outperforms other schemes in terms of outage probability.

Social Norms of Cooperation With Costly Reputation Building

Social norms regulate actions in artificial societies, steering collective behavior towards desirable states. In real societies, social norms can solve cooperation dilemmas, constituting a key ingredient in systems of indirect reciprocity: reputations of agents are assigned following social norms that identify their actions as good or bad. This, in turn, implies that agents can discriminate between the different actions of others and that the behaviors of each agent are known to the population at large. This is only possible if the agents report their interactions. Reporting constitutes, this way, a fundamental ingredient of indirect reciprocity, as in its absence cooperation in a multiagent system may collapse. Yet, in most studies to date, reporting is assumed to be cost-free, which collides with many life situations, where reporting can easily incur a cost (costly reputation building). Here we develop a new model of indirect reciprocity that allows reputation building to be costly. We show that only two norms can sustain cooperation under costly reputation building, a feature that requires agents to be able to anticipate the reporting intentions of their opponents, depending sensitively on both the cost of reporting and the accuracy level of reporting anticipation.

Effects of ability difference and strategy imitation on cooperation network formation: A study with game theoretic modeling and multi-agent simulation

Using game theoretic modeling and multi-agent simulation, this study examines cooperation networks in business ecosystems. Business ecosystems generally involve various stakeholders, which develop complex and interdependent relations. Many related studies qualitatively assess these issues from actual case studies, but it is difficult to clarify the general mechanism that forms an ecosystem. In this study, particularly addressing cooperative behavior between agents in business ecosystems, we construct a game theoretic model of cooperation network formation based on Nowak's model of indirect reciprocity and Heider's balance theory. Multi-agent simulation demonstrates that in case agents have different abilities, a cooperation network is likely to collapse because low-ability agents leave the cooperative network. Furthermore, if the agents are able to imitate strategies, then simulation similarly demonstrates that cooperation is insufficiently constructed because of a delay of increasing evaluation values. However, the surviving cooperation network under the conditions of ability difference and strategy imitation forms strong cooperative relations. This result can be regarded as a strong coupling, whereas loosely coupled relations, as demonstrated by Iansiti and Levien, are desirable in terms of the health of ecosystems. Finally, we present discussion of how to form business ecosystems in terms of ability differences and strategy imitation.

Indirect Reciprocity, Resource Sharing, and Environmental Risk: Evidence from Field Experiments in Siberia.

Integrating information from existing research, qualitative ethnographic interviews, and participant observation, we designed a field experiment that introduces idiosyncratic environmental risk and a voluntary sharing decision into a standard public goods game. Conducted with subsistence resource users in rural villages on the Kamchatka Peninsula in Northeast Siberia, we find evidence consistent with a model of indirect reciprocity and local social norms of helping the needy. When participants are allowed to develop reputations in the experiments, as is the case in most small-scale societies, we find that sharing is increasingly directed toward individuals experiencing hardship, good reputations increase aid, and the pooling of resources through voluntary sharing becomes more effective. We also find high levels of voluntary sharing without a strong commitment device; however, this form of cooperation does not increase contributions to the public good. Our results are consistent with previous experiments and theoretical models, suggesting strategic risks tied to rewards, punishments, and reputations are important. However, unlike studies that focus solely on strategic risks, we find the effects of rewards, punishments, and reputations are altered by the presence of environmental factors. Unexpected changes in resource abundance increase interdependence and may alter the costs and benefits of cooperation, relative to defection. We suggest environmental factors that increase interdependence are critically important to consider when developing and testing theories of cooperation

Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is often claimed as one of the key mechanisms of human cooperation. It works only if there is a reputational score keeping and each individual can inform with high probability which other individuals were good or bad in the previous round. Gossip is often proposed as a mechanism that can maintain such coherence of reputations in the face of errors of transmission. Random errors, however, are not the only source of uncertainty in such situations. The possibility of deceptive communication, where the signallers aim to misinform the receiver cannot be excluded. While there is plenty of evidence for deceptive communication in humans the possibility of deception is not yet incorporated into models of indirect reciprocity. Here we show that when deceptive strategies are allowed in the population it will cause the collapse of the coherence of reputations and thus in turn it results the collapse of cooperation. This collapse is independent of the norms and the cost and benefit values. It is due to the fact that there is no selection for honest communication in the framework of indirect reciprocity. It follows that indirect reciprocity can be only proposed plausibly as a mechanism of human cooperation if additional mechanisms are specified in the model that maintains honesty.

Reputation Effects in Public and Private Interactions.

We study the evolution of cooperation in a model of indirect reciprocity where people interact in public and private situations. Public interactions have a high chance to be observed by others and always affect reputation. Private interactions have a lower chance to be observed and only occasionally affect reputation. We explore all second order social norms and study conditions for evolutionary stability of action rules. We observe the competition between “honest” and “hypocritical” strategies. The former cooperate both in public and in private. The later cooperate in public, where many others are watching, but try to get away with defection in private situations. The hypocritical idea is that in private situations it does not pay-off to cooperate, because there is a good chance that nobody will notice it. We find simple and intuitive conditions for the evolution of honest strategies.

Selective Cooperation in the Supermarket : Field Experimental Evidence for Indirect Reciprocity.

Numerous laboratory experiments suggest that mechanisms of indirect reciprocity might account for human cooperation. However, conclusive field data supporting the predictions of indirect reciprocity in everyday life situations is still scarce. Here, we attempt to compensate for this lack by examining the determinants of cooperative behavior in a German supermarket. Our methods were as follows: Confederates of the experimenter lined up at the checkout, apparently to buy a single item. As an act of cooperation, the waiting person in front (the potential helper) could allow the confederate to go ahead. By this means, the potential helper could take a cost (additional waiting time) by providing the confederate with a benefit (saved waiting time). We recorded the potential helpers' behavior and the number of items they purchased as a quantitative measure proportional to the confederate's benefit. Moreover, in a field experimental design, we varied the confederates' image by manipulating the item they purchased (beer vs. water). As predicted, the more waiting time they could save, the more likely the confederates were to receive cooperation. This relationship was moderated by the confederates' image. Cost-to-benefit ratios were required to be more favorable for beer-purchasing individuals to receive cooperation. Our results demonstrate that everyday human cooperation can be studied unobtrusively in the field and that cooperation among strangers is selective in a way that is consistent with current models of indirect reciprocity.

Promotion of cooperation in social dilemma games via generalised indirect reciprocity

This paper presents a novel generalised indirect reciprocity approach for promoting cooperation in social dilemma games. Here, players decide upon an action to play in the game based on public information (or “external cues”) rather than individual-specific information. The public information is constantly updated according to the underlying learning model. Comprehensive simulation experiments using the N-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift (SD) games show that generalised indirect reciprocity promotes high levels of cooperation across a wide range of conditions. This is despite the fact that the make-up of player groups is continually changing. As expected, the extent of cooperative behaviour observed in the “constraint-relaxed” N-player SD game is significantly higher than the N-player PD game. Our proposed generalised indirect reciprocity model may shed light on the conundrum of cooperation between anonymous individuals.

How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for 2 [formula omitted] 2 prisoner’s dilemma game works for emerging cooperation

We built a new indirect reciprocity model based on binary image scores, where an agent’s strategy and norm co-evolve. The norm, meaning what behavior is evaluated as “good” or “bad,” stipulates how image scores of two agents playing a game is altered, which has been presumed to be a fixed value in most previous studies. Also, unlike former studies, our model allows an agent to play with an agent who has a different norm. This point of relaxing the freedom of the model pulls down cooperation level vis-à-vis the case where an agent always plays with another one having same norm. However, it is observed that a rather larger dilemma shows robust cooperation establishing compared with a smaller dilemma, since a norm that punishes a so-called second-order free-rider is prompted. To encourage the evolution of norms to be able to punish second-order free-riders, a society needs a small number of defectors. This is elucidated by the fact that cases with action error are more cooperative than those without action error.

Partner Selection Supports Reputation-Based Cooperation in a Public Goods Game

In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers’ history of giving has a significant impact on the donor’s decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the evolution of cooperation and whether this is affected by the kind of network structure adopted. Moreover, if agents interact on a bipartite graph with partner selection cooperation can thrive in large groups and in a small amount of time.

Direct and indirect punishment among strangers in the field.

Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals' willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment, individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish indirectly by withholding rewards. We investigate these competing explanations in a field experiment with real-life interactions among strangers. We find clear evidence of both direct and indirect punishment. Direct punishment is not rewarded by strangers and, in line with models of indirect reciprocity, is crowded out by indirect punishment opportunities. The existence of direct and indirect punishment in daily life indicates the importance of both means for understanding the evolution of cooperation.

Synchronous and time-lagged effects between occupational self-efficacy and objective and subjective career success: Findings from a four-wave and 9-year longitudinal study

We integrated research on the dimensionality of career success into social-cognitive career theory and explored the positive feedback loop between occupational self-efficacy and objective and subjective career success over time (self-efficacy→objective success→subjective success→self-efficacy). Furthermore, we theoretically accounted for synchronous and time-lagged effects, as well as indirect reciprocity between the variables. We tested the proposed model by means of longitudinal structural equation modeling in a 9-year four-wave panel design, by applying a model comparison approach and indirect effect analyses (N=608 professionals). The findings supported the proposed positive feedback loop between occupational self-efficacy and career success. Supporting our time-based reasoning, the findings showed that unfolding effects between occupational self-efficacy and objective career success take more time (i.e., time-lagged or over time) than unfolding effects between objective and subjective career success, as well as between subjective career success and occupational self-efficacy (i.e., synchronous or concurrently). Indirect effects of past on future occupational self-efficacy via objective and subjective career success were significant, providing support for an indirect reciprocity model. Results are discussed with respect to extensions of social-cognitive career theory and occupational self-efficacy development over time.