Pollution Control Model Research Articles

Exploring pollution control in transboundary watersheds under the perspective of ecological compensation based on aggregate game.

Pollution control in inter-provincial river basins involves many complex subjects, so it is difficult to effectively implement ecological compensation policies. To clarify the interest relationship among pollution control subjects and stimulate their willingness to cooperate in collaborative governance, this paper builds a multi-agent coordinated pollution control model based on the theory of aggregate game; explores the change of equilibrium action of a single pollution control agent and multi-actors, symmetric, and asymmetric situations under the influence of synergistic benefits; and studies the incentive mechanism design to maintain the cooperation of various agents. The research results show that an increase in the number of upstream firms would lead to a reduction in the incentive effects of downstream government compensation and an increase in the likelihood of "free-riding" and "coordination failure." Synergy benefits vary positively with the degree of cooperation between government and enterprises, and higher synergy benefits can effectively compensate for the high transaction costs caused by multiple entities, alleviate the financial pressure on downstream governments, and increase the willingness of upstream and downstream entities to cooperate. In addition, focusing on wastewater reduction from core enterprises, such as heavy polluters can help improve the efficiency of regional emissions reduction, while having a catalytic effect on small enterprises.

Stochastic evolution game analysis of the strategic coalition of enterprise pollution control

<abstract><p>To address pollution control, cooperation among interested parties is essential. This paper examines a stochastic evolution game model involving a strategic coalition of three enterprises for pollution control. The model incorporates decision-making factors to construct a strategic coalition model of enterprise pollution control between enterprises. The study analyzes the evolution process of pollution control strategies within the coalition and determines the final stable strategy. Additionally, numerical simulations are conducted to explore the evolution paths of enterprises under various circumstances. Results from a case-based numerical example validate the theoretical findings, supporting the following insights: (1) the coalition requires an effective mechanism for incentivizing and penalizing actions, (2) the government should establish and improve coordination and management mechanisms, (3) citizens are urged to develop social oversight mechanisms for reporting environmental violation, and (4) a fair and equitable distribution mechanism should be implemented within the coalition.</p></abstract>

A regional cooperative reduction game model for air pollution control in North China

Due to variations in economic scale, economic structure, and technological advancement across different Chinese provinces and cities, the cost of air pollution reduction differs significantly. Therefore, the total reduction cost can be decreased by capitalizing on these regional discrepancies in reduction cost to carry out cooperative emission reduction. In this paper, taking NOx reduction in North China as an example, a regional cooperative reduction game (CRG) model was constructed to minimize the total cost of emission reduction while achieving future emission reduction targets. The fair allocation of benefits from cooperation plays a crucial role in motivating regions to participate into the cooperation. A comprehensive mechanism of benefits allocation was proposed to achieve fair transferred compensation. The mechanism combines the consumption responsibility principle based on input-output theory and the Shapley value method based on game theory. Compared to the cost before the optimized collaboration, the CRG model will save 20.36% and 13.71% of the total reduction cost in North China, respectively, under the target of 17.68% NOx reduction by 2025 and 66.44% NOx reduction by 2035 relative to 2020. This method can be employed in other regions to achieve targets for air pollution reduction at minimum cost, and to motivate inter-regional cooperation with this practical and fair way of transferred compensation.

A Review of Tipping Points and Precaution using HJB equations

This paper analyzes three models in environmental economics with the property that tipping can occur in the ecological part of the model: the pollution control model where tipping suddenly shifts up the damage, the fishery model where tipping suddenly lowers the carrying capacity, and the Ramsey growth model where tipping suddenly decreases the total factor productivity. The question is whether the possibility of tipping gives rise to precaution in the sense of lower production, lower harvest, or higher accumulation of capital, respectively. The paper shows that precaution always results in the pollution control model but in the other two models, it depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In these models, the tipping point is uncertain, and the analysis employs a hazard rate that can be constant or state dependent. The paper shows that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are the appropriate framework to implement this hazard rate. The results are mostly known, but this paper puts the results together in a transparent way, using the HJB equations consistently. In this way, it pays tribute to this technique in optimal control that proves to be useful when tipping points can occur. Extensions to differential games are discussed at the end of each section.

Regional Regression Correlation Model of Microplastic Water Pollution Control Using Circular Economy Tools.

Water pollution caused by microplastics represents an important challenge for the environment and people's health. The weak international regulations and standards in this domain support increased water pollution with microplastics. The literature is unsuccessful in establishing a common approach regarding this subject. The main objective of this research is to develop a new approach to necessary policies and ways of action to decrease water pollution caused by microplastics. In this context, we quantified the impact of European water pollution caused by microplastics in the circular economy. The main research methods used in the paper are meta-analysis, statistical analysis and an econometric approach. A new econometric model is developed in order to assist the decision makers in increasing efficiency of public policies regarding water pollution elimination. The main result of this study relies on combining, in an integrated way, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) data on microplastic water pollution and identifying relevant policies to combat this type of pollution.

Retracted: A Cost Allocation Decision Model for Air Pollution Control.

[This retracts the article DOI: 10.1155/2022/4116527.].

Optimal Environmental Policy in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Emission Standards, Taxes, and Permit Trading

Global environmental problems such as transboundary pollution and global warming have been recognized as major issues around the world. In practice, governments of all countries are actively exploring various environmental policies to control pollution. The government needs to consider the impact of neighboring regions when formulating environmental policies, especially in the context of transboundary pollution. However, the above problems are less studied, to bridge this gap and aim at solving problems in existing practices, we consider a differential game model of transboundary pollution control to examine which policy is more effective in promoting environmental quality and social welfare in a dynamic and accumulative global pollution context. Three alternative policy instruments, namely emission standards, emission taxes, and emission permit trading, are considered and compared. The results show that the social welfare of each region is the lowest and the total pollution stock is the highest under the emission tax policy due to the “rent-shifting,” “policy-leakage,” and “free-riding” effects. Moreover, the realized level of the environmental policy in the Nash equilibrium of the policy game is distorted away from the socially optimal level. The emission standards policy is found to be better than the emission tax policy and characterized by initiating the rent-shifting effect without the policy-leakage effect. Moreover, the pollution stock of two regions is found to be the lowest and the social welfare is found to be the highest under the emission permit trading policy, which is not associated with any of the three effects. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the results, and a sensitivity analysis is performed in the steady state.

Analyzing the Water Pollution Control Cost-Sharing Mechanism in the Yellow River and Its Two Tributaries in the Context of Regional Differences

A river basin is a complex system of tributaries and a mainstream. It is vital to cooperatively manage the mainstream and the tributaries to alleviate water pollution and the ecological environment in the basin. On the other hand, existing research focuses primarily on upstream and downstream water pollution control mechanisms, ignoring coordinated control of the mainstream and tributaries, and does not consider the impacts of different environmental and economic conditions in each region on pollution control strategies. This study designed a differential game model for water pollution control in the Yellow River and two of its tributaries, taking regional differences into account and discussing the best pollution control strategies for each region under two scenarios: Nash noncooperative and cost-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the factors influencing regional differences in pollution control costs are analyzed, and their impacts on the cost-sharing mechanism of pollution control are discussed. The results show that: (1) The cost-sharing mechanism based on cooperative management can improve pollutant removal efficiency in the watershed and achieve Pareto improvement in environment and economy. (2) The greater the economic development pressure between the two tributaries, the fewer the effects of the cost-sharing mechanisms and the higher the proportion of pollution control costs paid by the mainstream government. (3) Industry water consumption, the proportion of the urban population to the total population at the end of the year, the value-added of secondary sectors as a percentage of regional GDP, the volume of industrial wastewater discharge, and granted patent applications all influence industrial wastewater pollution treatment investment. (4) The greater the coefficient of variation in pollution control costs between the two tributary areas, the less favorable the solution to water pollution management synergy. These findings can help governments in the basin regions negotiate cost-sharing arrangements.

An innovative transboundary pollution control model using water credit

Market-oriented means can effectively solve the problems of a single compensation form and insufficient capital investment in water pollution control measures. Hence, we propose a new trading mechanism using water credit we call “water quality currency.” Pollution control enterprises obtain “water quality currency” by paying pollution control efforts, and production enterprises obtain production licenses by purchasing “water quality currency.” We study the pollution control chain comprising a pollution control and production enterprise and construct a differential game model of random changes in water quality. Moreover, we compare decisions about pollution control effort and trade price under three scenarios and discussed the interaction mechanism between water pollution control and “water quality currency” trade. First, we found that “water quality currency” trading mechanism has created a virtuous circle of mutual promotion between water pollution control and market trading. Second, when all enterprises are farsighted, their pollution control efforts and profits are highest in the three trading scenarios. Third, when all enterprises are farsighted and pollution control enterprises are shortsighted, pollution control responsibility and exchange coefficient affect pollution control efforts positively and negatively, respectively. Higher pollution control responsibility and lower exchange coefficient are found to be conducive to improving water quality. For shortsighted production enterprises, pollution control responsibility and exchange coefficient have negative and positive impacts on pollution control efforts, respectively. Lower pollution control responsibility and higher exchange coefficients are conducive to improving the water quality.

Comparison of Regional Urban Water Pollutants Emission Standards and Determination of Factors Influencing Their Integration—A Case Study of the Biopharmaceutical Industry in the Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration

Urban pharmaceutical industries are responsible for high intensity emissions of water pollutants. The regional water pollutant emission standards vary greatly throughout the Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration (YRDUA) in China, which, to some extent, results in increased risks and hidden dangers to regional water environment safety, especially water quality. Under the national strategy of Yangtze River Delta ecological and green integration development, a unified standard of water pollutant emissions should be integrated into the integration development process, but differences between characteristic items, concentration limits, and conditions among four local standards of water pollutant emission have become a key influencing factor in their integration in industry and in green transformation. When comparing the water pollutant emission standards of the biopharmaceutical industry in three provinces and one municipality of the YRDUA, the factors influencing integration were determined and caused by the main differences in local water pollutant emission standards, namely, the race to the bottom of the biopharmaceutical industry, the inconsistency of environmental protection regulation law, and transboundary water pollution risks. From the perspective of urban water quality safety, we propose the following strategies for promoting the integration of water pollutant emission standards in the YRDUA: (1) increasing government funding for local water pollution governance and encouraging industries to adopt the third-party governance model for pollution control in the YRDUA; (2) unifying water pollutant emission standards and environmental law enforcement standards in the YRDUA with a mechanism involving shared economic responsibility; and (3) establishing a platform for sharing data and governance performance for the emission of water pollutants in the YRDUA.

From Pollution Control Cooperation of Lancang-Mekong River to “Two Mountains Theory”

“Lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets ” (referred to as the “Two Mountains Theory”) plays an important role in the process of controlling environmental pollution. This article introduces this practice with an example of pollution control in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin (LMRB). The research considers that the upstream and downstream countries can carry out water pollution control by imposing fines on enterprises that cause ecological damage and investing in pollution control resources. Firstly, the differential game model of pollution control by individual countries and international cooperation is established. Then, a differential game model of joint pollution control with compensation mechanism is established under the cooperation framework. Finally, the feedback Nash equilibrium of each state is obtained. The study shows that in the process of industrial pollution control by countries in the LMRB alone, due to the one-way externality of water pollution control, the more downstream countries are, the more resources will be invested in pollution control and the fewer fines will be imposed on enterprises that cause ecological damage. At the beginning stage of management, if more pollution control resources are input, fewer countries will participate in cooperation, and the fines for polluting enterprise would be less. When the amount of fines for enterprises is relatively small, the establishment of a river pollution compensation mechanism is not conducive to the input of pollution control resources. On the contrary, it is beneficial for the state to invest in pollution control resources. The coordinated development of economic development and ecological civilization construction is the core purpose of the “Two Mountains Theory”. Therefore, the case of the LMRB fully illustrates the feasibility of the “Two Mountains Theory” based on cooperation.

A Cost Allocation Decision Model for Air Pollution Control.

Air pollution control as the background of a cost allocation method is based on the Shapley value to determine the core stakeholder, so fair pollution control projects and the establishment of the atmospheric pollution of governance cost allocation model are put forward for the solution of air pollution coordinated by the government supervision and the atmospheric pollution control collaborative group. The results show that the cost allocation model of air pollution control based on Shapley value is more reasonable, and the cost of stakeholders is reduced to a certain extent, and the risk of the participants is reduced so that it maximizes social benefits.

Endogenous Economic Growth Model of Energy Depletion and Pollution Control Based on Empirical Analysis of Inter provincial Panel Data

Endogenous Economic Growth Model of Energy Depletion and Pollution Control Based on Empirical Analysis of Inter provincial Panel Data

Kendala Pengendalian Pencemaran Total Suspended Solid dan Phosphat di Sub Das Tlaga Ria Sentani Pasca Banjir Bandang

The problem that occurs in Lake Sentani is that it has been contaminated by parameters of TSS, BOD, Pb, Cu, and DO respectively with valuesof 76 mg / L, 4.63 mg / L, 0.035 mg / L, 0.03 mg / L, and 5.72 mg / L because these parameters have exceeded the quality standard according to environmental regulations. This study aims to determine the assimilation capacity of TSS and PO4 parameters and analyze pollution control models in the Tlaga Ria sub-watershed. The research method used to determine the assimilation capacity is a linear regression equation and in analyzing the pollution control model the interpretative structural modeling method is used. The results showed that the TSS assimilation capacity value in Lake Sentani was -12,700 tons/month. The value of water quality in Lake Sentani is above the value of the assimilation capacity, this shows that Lake Sentani has been polluted by TSS parameters. Meanwhile, the value of PO4 parameter assimilation capacity is 44.36 tons/month and since 2016 Lake Sentani has been unable to conduct self purification. The key elements of the Sentani Lake pollution control constraints in the Tlaga Ria watershed are weak implementation of environmental regulations, differences in objectives among stakeholders, differences in objectives between administrative areas, weak support of business owners, conflict of interests, and weak enforcement of regulations.

Control Models and Spatiotemporal Characteristics of Air Pollution in the Rapidly Developing Urban Agglomerations.

This paper systematically summarizes the hierarchical cross-regional multi-directional linkage in terms of air pollution control models implemented in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei urban agglomeration, including the hierarchical linkage structure of national-urban agglomeration-city, the cross-regional linkage governance of multiple provinces and municipalities, the multi-directional linkage mechanism mainly involving industry access, energy structure, green transportation, cross-regional assistance, monitoring and warning, consultation, and accountability. The concentration data of six air pollutants were used to analyze spatiotemporal characteristics. The concentrations of SO2, NO2, PM10, PM2.5, CO decreased, and the concentration of O3 increased from 2014 to 2017; the air pollution control has achieved good effect. The concentration of O3 was the highest in summer and lowest in winter, while those of other pollutants were the highest in winter and lowest in summer. The high pollution ranges of O3 diffused from south to north, and those of other pollutants decreased significantly from north to south. Finally, we suggest strengthening the traceability and process research of heavy pollution, increasing the traceability and process research of O3 pollution, promoting the joint legislation of different regions in urban agglomeration, create innovative pollution discharge supervision mechanisms, in order to provide significant reference for the joint prevention and control of air pollution in urban agglomerations.

MODEL PENGENDALIAN PENCEMARAN AIR WADUK BATUJAI DI LOMBOK TENGAH, NUSA TENGGARA BARAT

Water quality management efforts need to be carried out in a sustainable manner to ensure that water resources are free from pollution. Water is an important component in human life, therefore the existence of water in nature must be maintained to ensure the continuity of human life. Decreasing water quality is caused by pollutant loads that enter water bodies due to human activities disposing of waste directly into the water. Batujai Reservoir is one of the vital objects for the survival of the people of Central Lombok. In an effort to control water pollution in the Batujai Reservoir, a model that is capable of managing Batujai Reservoir water is needed in a sustainable manner. The purpose of this research is to develop a model capable of managing the water in the Batujai Reservoir in a sustainable manner. The research methodology uses a quantitative approach using primary data from interviews with figures and experts as well as secondary data from literature studies and previous research data. Data analysis used the Interpretative Structural Modeling (ISM) approach. ISM is able to simplify complex relationships to be simple and form a hierarchy between existing relationships and be able to describe them in the form of system modeling. The results showed that the water pollution control model in Batujai Reservoir was carried out by involving all relevant stakeholders by placing academics, NGOs and Central Lombok Bappeda as the main drivers of program implementation and using the local wisdom approach.Keywords: pollution, control, water, model, batujai.

Jump Equilibria in Public-Good Differential Games with a Single State Variable

A simple sufficient condition is proved for symmetric Markov subgame perfect Nash equilibria in public-good differential games with a single state variable. The condition admits equilibria in feedback strategies that have discontinuous dependence on the state variable. The application of the condition is demonstrated in the Dockner-Long model for international pollution control. The existence is shown of equilibria that are arbitrarily close to Pareto dominance for all initial conditions. In the limit as the discount rate tends to 0, the equilibrium strategies differ from the optimal strategies under full coordination, but nevertheless the agents' payoffs do converge to those obtained from the coordinated (first-best) solution. For positive values of the discount rate, the supremal value function associated to the globally Pareto dominant equilibrium is a continuously differentiable function that is not a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.

Strategy Analysis of Promoting Pollution Control of SMEs

The pollution problem of SMEs is an important problem to be solved in the process of China’s economic development. Based on the game theory, this paper takes the government and SMEs as the two sides of the game, constructing the game theory model of pollution control of SMEs, putting forward the strategies to promote the pollution control of SMEs according to the analysis results of the model.

An Optimal Pollution Control Model for Environmental Protection Cooperation between Developing and Developed Countries.

With the continuous increase in greenhouse gas emissions in the world and the United States announcing withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the conflicts between environmental protection and economic growth of developing and developed countries have become increasingly challenging. In this paper, following the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” specified in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, we develop an optimal pollution control model based on a dynamic system for both developing and developed countries. We analyze how different perspectives of the developing and developed countries affect their investments in pollution control and how to determine their responsibilities based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Our aim is to obtain a stable equilibrium mechanism to maximize the social welfare between the developing and developed countries and explore the optimal pollution control and economic growth path. Our results show that it is optimal for the developed countries to help developing countries with pollution control in their initial stage of economic growth. Once the developing countries reach a certain economic development level, they can contribute more to pollution control, while the developed countries can reduce their environmental investment. We show that by following this optimal path, the developing and developed countries can effectively control environment pollution without significant loss of social welfare.

Evaluation on the Construction of Water Pollution Control Model Based on Random Forest

Evaluation on the Construction of Water Pollution Control Model Based on Random Forest