In liberal democracies such as the United States, law emerges from core ritual of the electoral-representation system, the theater of elections. From these cyclical rituals of consent, the people (re)discover political voice in embodied agents who ultimately do the work of governing. Lawmaking as craft, or increasingly as multibillion-dollar industry (CRP 201Oa, 20 1Ob), is performed by those who first pass through an arena where political commitments are mediated by space in which mass suffrage and mass consumerism dramatically converge. The experience of popular democracy for most citizens unfolds within this secular ritual that makes lawmakers. The very phantasmagoric spectacle of elections is the muse through which social relations are translated and reified into positive law. The state regulates everyday life through the discursive and material of law. But what renders law so productive in the modern states quest to control, surveil, and differentiate populations? Per Max Weber's classic formulation, the state is the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force (Weber 1947), totalizing fantasy at once impossible to realize and yet utterly essential for statecraft to imagine. But law is not simply unitary instrument to shape subjectivities, ideology, and cultural life. As Rosemary Coombe argues, law is nothing less than the authoritative means and medium of cultural politics in which the social is articulated. This social world itself must be represented, performatively expressed, and institutionally inscribed (1998, 36). Law then is also simultaneously social, cultural, and political process, and one that leaves behind genealogy of artifacts that help us to unpack the forces behind these modes of social regulation, ranging from outright coercion, to spontaneous consent, and counterhegemonic dissidence (Gewirtz 1996, 3). But if we begin our examination from within the courtroom, where law is interpreted, or even start our analysis within national political institutions, where law is drafted and executed, then our study falls prey to the tautological nature of state power: the law is the law because it is the law; it has distinct legal dialect, formal procedures, and institutional avenues. Hegemonic power is always self-referential But the legal sphere especially strives for autonomy and relies on its ability to strictly separate those actions backed by the coercive apparatus of the state from those that are not. Let literature borrow from law and life . . . but let law develop its own and structure and editing, declares Alan Dershowitz (1996, 104-5) in his polemic against the use of popular narrative as one strategy to combat systematic exclusions in the courtroom. For Dershowitz, the fantastic and the imaginary are external to law and should be permanently expunged in favor of the real, which exist as distinct category if there can be potential for justice. Richard Sherwin, too, worries about policing the borders between law and its other, popular culture. When Law Goes Pop overflows with concerns about systemic corruption, potential imbalance, and the negative effects of artificially enhanced passions, all pop-culturally driven tendencies that might potentially lead to a state of affairs ... in which tyranny rules (Sherwin 2000, 240-41). Sherwin observes that the culture industries progressively invade the courtroom, with an immeasurable capacity to shape popular legal consciousness and even judicial interpretation. One consequence, he suggests, is that justices, lawyers, and jurors alike are increasingly prone to conflate fiction with reality. Although Sherwin disavows the possibility of total separation between popular culture and law, he does believe that the sheer proliferation of visual imagery in film, television, and on the Internet may have permanently forced law to tipping point where it no longer finds legitimacy or consistency exclusively within its own domain. …
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