Modal Claim Research Articles

Organisations as Computing Systems

Abstract Organisations are computing systems. The university’s sports centre is a computing system for managing sports teams and facilities. The tenure committee is a computing system for assigning tenure status. Despite an increasing number of publications in group ontology, the computational nature of organisations has not been recognised. The present paper is the first in this debate to propose a theory of organisations as groups structured for computing. I begin by describing the current situation in group ontology and by spelling out the thesis in more detail. I then present the example of a sports centre to illustrate why one might intuitively think of organisations as computing systems. To substantiate the thesis, I introduce Piccinini’s restrictive analysis of physical computation. As I show, organisations meet all criteria for being computing systems. Organisations are structured groups with the function of manipulating medium-independent vehicles according to rules. Furthermore, I argue for the modal claim that this is a necessary feature of organisations. Having sketched the computational account of organisations, I compare it to other proposals in the literature.

Grading Modal Judgement

AbstractThis paper proposes a new model of graded modal judgement. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgements of probability targeting epistemically modal propositions. This paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are non-proposition-forming: (1) Moss (2015), in which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgements of probability targeting a ‘proxy’ proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief in the modal claim; (2) a model on which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgements of credence taking as their objects (non-propositional) modal representations (rather than proxy propositions). The second model, like Moss’s model, is shown to be semantically and mathematically tractable. The second model, however, can be straightforwardly integrated into a plausible model of the role of graded attitudes toward modal claims in cognition and normative epistemology.

Supervenience, Repeatability, & Expressivism

AbstractExpressivists traditionally explain normative supervenience by saying it is a conceptual truth. I argue against this tradition in two steps. First, I show the modal claim that stands in need of explanation has been stated imprecisely. Classic arguments in metaethics for normative supervenience and those that rely on it as a premise presuppose a constraint on the supervenience base that is rarely (if ever) made explicit: the repeatability of the non‐normative properties on which the normative supervenes. Non‐normative properties are repeatable when it is possible for numerically distinct individuals to share them. Second, I show if the modal truth that stands in need of explanation entails that there are individuals exactly alike in repeatable non‐normative respects that cannot normatively differ, then standard expressivist accounts of normative supervenience as a conceptual truth are unsuccessful. Expressivist metasemantics for normative terms, together with constitutive facts about the non‐cognitive attitudes essentially involved in normative thought, strongly suggest that repeatable supervenience could not be a conceptual truth. I argue, finally, that although repeatable supervenience bears the marks of a conceptual truth, expressivists should be content to treat it as an ordinary normative truth, and to explain it the same way they explain other normative truths.

Incarnation, Divine Timelessness, and Modality

A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside’ of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist’ view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes’ human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow’s modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow’s desired cross–worldly variation of the Son’s incarnation cannot be achieved.

Why AI shall emerge in the one of possible worlds?

The aim of this paper is to present some philosophical considerations about the supposed AI emergence in the future. However, the predicted timeline of this process is uncertain. To avoid any kind of speculations on the proposed analysis from a scientific point of view, a metaphysical approach is undertaken as a modal context of the discussion. I argue that modal claim about possible AI emergence at a certain point of time in the future is justified from a temporal perspective. Therefore, worldwide society must be prepared for possible AI emergence and the expected profound impact of such an event on the existential status of humanity.

DO IGNORANT ASSESSORS CASES POSE A CHALLENGE TO RELATIVISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC MODALS?

1.IntroductionOur ordinary conversations are filled with talk about what could or must be. For instance, in an iconic scene from On the Waterfront, the protagonist Terry bemoans his ruined boxing career. could have been a contender, he says, instead of a bum, which is what I am.1 Terry's regret is tied not only to the way things are but also to the way things might have been. As it was, Terry lost his chance at the title. However, had he not thrown a big fight, things might have turned out quite differently for him. Could and might, along with their duals, should and must, are modal terms: we use them to talk about what is possible and what is necessary. Terry's statement has to do with what is metaphysically possible. Although certain things are essential to Terry's nature, presumably being a bum is not. T here are other kinds of possibility besides metaphysical possibility. For instance, when a parent tells a child You must not lie, she is reminding the chi ld of what is morally necessary - that is, what is not possible given the constraints of morality.One particularly interesting type of modality is epistemic modality, which concerns what is possible given a body of knowledge or evidence. For instance, consider Luke and Max's conversation in (1).(1) Luke: What did you catch out on the lake?Max: I'm no expert, but it might be a rainbow trout.Luke: It can't be a rainbow trout. It is missing the pink streak down its side.Max: Oh, then I guess I was wrong.Cases involving epistemic modals, such as (1), present an interesting semantic challenge. In order to give a semantic treatment of epistemic modals, we must explain how informational states figure in the semantic representation of these terms. Recently, there have been several proposals for a semantic theory of epistemic modals.2 One major view - relativism -holds that claims involving epistemic modals are only true or false relative to epistemic agents or informational states. On this view, epistemic modals are quantifiers over epistemic possibilities, and the range of possibilities quantified over changes depending on knowledge is relevant. For now, we can think of epistemic possibilities as represented by epistemically possible worlds - worlds compatible with what is known.3 Formally, utterances containing epistemic modals express propositions (which we can think of as either sets of worlds or functions from worlds to truth values) that are evaluated for truth relative to a circumstance of evaluation (or index). The circumstance of evaluation includes a parameter i that represents an informational state that determines the range of the quantifier.Because informational states vary from person to person, an important question for the relativist to answer is whose knowledge is relevant? According to a basic version of relativism - call it speaker relativism - the truth of an epistemic modal claim depends upon what the speaker knows at the time of utterance. It is true just in case what the speaker knows at the time she utters the claim does not rule out the possibility in question. Relativist John MacFarlane claims that speaker relativism is inadequate. He argues that examples like (1) show that it cannot be the speaker's information that is relevant. If the speaker's evidence alone is relevant, then it would hardly be appropriate for Luke to contradict Max's claim, or for Max to retract it. After all, for all Max knew at the time he uttered the claim, the fish was a rainbow trout. Instead, MacFarlane suggests that the truth of epistemic modal claims depends on the informational state of the person assessing the claim. According to MacFarlane's view - call it assessor relativism - epistemic modal claims are assessment-sensitive in that their truth depends on what is known by the assessor at the time he or she assesses the claim. Hence, truth for epistemic modal claims varies with what MacFarlane calls the context of assessment4Examples such as (1) seem especially suited to support assessor relativism because, in this case, the assessor knows more than the speaker. …

The curious case of the self-refuting straw man: Trafimow and Earp’s response to Klein

In their critique of Klein (2014b), Trafimow and Earp present two theses. First, they argue that, contra Klein, a well-specified theory is not a necessary condition for successful replication. Second, they contend that even when there is a well-specified theory, replication depends more on auxiliary assumptions than on theory proper. I take issue with both claims, arguing that (a) their first thesis confuses a material conditional (what I said) with a modal claim (Trafimow and Earp’s misreading of what I said) and (b) their second thesis has the unfortunate consequence of refuting their first thesis.

There are Non-Causal Explanations of Particular Events

A defence of non-causal explanations of events is presented in cases where explanation is understood as modal explanation. In such cases the source of modal information is crucial. All explanations implicitly use contrast classes, and relative to a particular contrast we can privilege some difference makers over others. Thinking about changes in these privileged “actual” difference makers is then the source of modal information for any given explanandum. If an actual difference maker is non-causal, then we have a principled definition of a non-causal explanation of an event regardless of how much causal information is also contained in the explanans. A demarcation of explanation into causal and non-causal in this way recovers ordinary language about explanation as well as reflecting genuine differences in practice, such as the in-principle evidential base for any modal claim.

Clarke's Defense of the Contrast Argument

In his (2004), Randolph Clarke assesses an important version of an influential argument against libertarianism about metaphysical freedom. Clarke calls the anti-libertarian argument he evaluates the Contrast Argument. It targets the following claim: there could be an undetermined free act done by S such that S would have freely done something else had S not done the act in question. This modal claim will be endorsed not only by proponents of main brands of libertarianism, but also by action theorists of other stripes – including many compatibilists. Clarke aims to defend the Contrast Argument from a prominent objection by developing a novel case for the premise under attack. I show that Clarke's attempted defense of the Contrast Argument fails, thereby protecting the relevant libertarian and compatibilist positions. In brief, Clarke's argument depends on an ambiguous principle, each available reading of which leaves some or other premise of his argument unjustified.

Counterpart theory and modal realism aren't incompatible

Jim Stone has recently argued that counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatible. His argument relies on a particular modal claim about the nature of the Lewisian pluriverse: I argue that the person who believes in counterpart theory and modal realism ought not to accept this claim though. I conclude that Stone has not shown that counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatible. Jim Stone (2009: 650–51) presents the following argument against the compatibility of Lewisian modal realism and counterpart theory: Let a situation S be one at any possible world where someone finds a wallet and is free to choose whether or not to return that wallet; and let someone be free to choose to return a wallet iff if they return the wallet they could have not returned it and if they don’t return the wallet they could have returned it. It’s possible that every person in S (no matter what possible world they’re in)1 freely returns the wallet.

Getting God Out of Our (Modal) Business

Some hold that if we can imagine God creating a world in which a particular proposition (p) is true, then we can conclude that p is possible. I argue that such appeals to God can’t provide us with a guide to possibility. For either God’s powers aren’t co-extensive with the possible or they are. And if they are, these appeals either beg the question or court a version of Euthyphro’s Dilemma. Some may argue that such appeals were only intended to prompt us to think broadly about the modal claim at issue. I argue instead that these appeals must be understood as more than mere prompts. For it is these appeals that would, if successful, render the conceivability principle viable.

A Logical Hole in the Chinese Room

Searle's Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in `Minds, Brains and Programs' in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of the argument, whatever significance Searle intended CRA to have. The problem with the CRA is that it involves a very strong modal claim, the truth of which is both unproved and highly questionable. So it will be argued here that the CRA does not prove what it was intended to prove.

Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure1

We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We discuss whether these empirical results cast doubt on the other modal claims as well. We argue that this not the case. Our argument is based on the thesis that the best argument for the modal claim about violet is quite different from the best argument for the modal claim about reddish green. To argue for this disanalogy we propose a reconstruction of the best available justification for both claims.

Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori

This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.

Aristotle on ‘Signifying One’ atMetaphysicsΓ 4

I IntroductionAtMetaphysicsΓ 3, Aristotle argues that it belongs to a single discipline, which he callsfirst philosophy,to investigate both substance (οὐσία) and a special class of claims which includes among its members the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). At Γ 4, after insisting that the PNC is, strictly speaking, indemonstrable, he sets forth a series of sketches of refutative arguments intended to show how it can, nonetheless, be substantiated. Traditionally, his main refutative argument has been taken to be embedded in the passage which runs from 1006a31 tob34. In that passage, he tries to show that anyone who denies the PNC and who can then be led, by means of an artfully arranged series of questions, to agree (whether willingly or grudgingly) to a few seemingly modest theses about the signification of expressions of a certain type — which Aristotle illustrates with the general term ‘man’ (ἄνθρωπος) — is thereby logically committed to the following modal claim: ‘It is necessary, then, if it is true to say that something is a man, that it be a bipedal animal' (1006b28-30).

Descartes's Case for Dualism

Descartes's Case for Dualism MARLEEN ROZEMOND ONE OF DESCARTES'S MOST LASTING CONTRIBUTIONS to philosophy is his wellknown argument for dualism. This argument continues to attract attention not just from historians of philosophy, but from the philosophical community at large. It is generally believed that the modal claim that mind can exist unextended or without body is central to this argument. According to some, Descartes's dualism simply consists in the separability of mind and body. Others hold that it does not consist in this modal claim, but believe that this claim is central to his argument for dualism. I wish to propose a radically different interpretation. It is true that Descartes was concerned with the possibility of mind existing unextended and without body. But I will contend that this idea is not central to the argument. Descartes's dualism does not consist in this modal nodon, nor is this notion fundamental to his argument. The most prominent statement of the argument is to be found in the Meditations. In this work the argument has two focal points, one in the Second and the other in the Sixth Meditation. As a result of the skeptical arguments of the First Meditation, Descartes doubts in the Second Meditation that there are any bodies. Nevertheless he is certain that he exists and thinks. Using these observations Descartes argues that he has a clear and distinct perception of the mind as a thinking, unextended thing. In the Sixth Meditation he uses this perception to show thai the mind is an incorporeal substance, really distinct from the body. This is the conclusion of what I will call the Real Distinction Argument.' What exactly does Descartes think he accomplishes in his discus- ' What I call the Real Distinction Argument is not, however, Descartes's only argument for dualism. Also in the Meditations Descartes argues that mind and body are distinct on the ground that the mind is indivisible, while body is divisible (AT VII 85-86 ). In the Discourseand other places Descartes lists various human capacities in favor of the idea that the human being is not just a body (AT VI 55-60). References to Descartes are specified as follows. I always provide the reference to Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, OeuvresdeDescartes(Paris: Vrin, a964- 1978), using the abbreviation AT and specifiying volume and page numbers. Translations can be found in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, trans., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 2 volumes), which provides the AT page 09] 3~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:~ JANUARY 1995 sion of the mind in the Second Meditation, and how does he think he can get from the results of the Second Meditation to the real distinction of mind and body in the Sixth Meditation? The argument is often criticized on the ground that the claims about the mind that Descartes is entitled to in the Second Meditation are insufficient to lead to dualism. My interpretation of the Real Distinction Argument provides answers to these questions. The argument, I will contend, crucially relies on various aspects of Descartes's conception of substance. Descartes held that each substance has a principal attribute, a property which constitutes its nature or essence.' Other properties of the substance are its modes. The modes of a substance presuppose this attribute: they cannot exist without it, nor be clearly and distinctly understood without it. These aspects of Descartes's conception of substance lead to the real distinction of mind and body in the following way. In the Second Meditation we find we can clearly and distinctly understand a thinking thing while doubting that there are bodies, and while ascribing no corporeal properties to the mind. This leads to the conclusion that thought is not a mode of body, but a principal attribute (sections 2-3). Furthermore, extension is the principal attribute of body (section 4)- Finally the argument relies on the idea that a substance has only one principal attribute (section 5). It follows then that mind and body are different substances, and really distinct . After completing my account of the argument I consider its relationship to the idea that mind and...