Security is essential in mobile computing. And, therefore, various access control modules have been introduced. However, the complicated mobile runtime environment may directly impact on the integrity of these security modules, or even compels them to make wrong access control decisions. Therefore, for a trusted Flask based security system, it needs to be isolated from the dangerous mobile execution environment at runtime. In this paper, we propose an isolated Flask security architecture called iFlask to solve this problem for the Flask-based mandatory access control (MAC) system. iFlask puts its security server subsystem into the enclave provided by the ARM TrustZone so as to avert the negative impacts of the malicious environment. In the meanwhile, iFlask’s object manager subsystems which run in the mobile system kernel use a built-in supplicant proxy to effectively lookup policy decisions made by the back-end security server residing in the enclave, and to enforce these rules on the system with trustworthy behaviors. Moreover, to protect iFlask’s components which are not protected by the enclave, we not only provide an exception trap mechanism that enables TrustZone to enlarge its protection scope to protect selected memory regions from the malicious system, but also establish a secure communication channel to the enclave as well. The prototype is implemented on SELinux, which is the widely used Flask-based MAC system, and the base of SEAndroid. The experimental results show that SELinux receives reliable protection, because it resists all known vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2015-1815) and remains unaffected by the attacks in the test set. The propose architecture have very slight impact on the performance, it shows a performance degradation ranges between 0.53% to 6.49% compared to the naked system.