Mixed Member Proportional Research Articles

Even in the best of both worlds, you can't have it all: How German voters navigate the trilemma of mixed-member proportionality

The growing fragmentation of party systems confronts mixed-member proportional electoral systems with a trilemma. Combining the goals of proportionality and of a guaranteed representation of district winners makes it ever more difficult to also achieve a third goal: the fixed size of parliament. Against the background of electoral reform in Germany, this paper studies how citizens position themselves in this trilemma. Using original survey data, we find that all goals are popular and no combination of goals commands majority support. In a context where institutional reform becomes politicized, the trilemma is thus not only a logical, but also an empirical constraint. Moreover, abstract preferences in the trilemma systematically predict how voters evaluate the status quo and specific reform proposals. At the same time, voters are receptive to the logical constraints of the system: Informing respondents about the trilemma trade-offs in an experimental setting makes them more accepting of reform proposals.

The major parties: National’s and Labour’s employment relations policies

The past two decades have seen new directions in New Zealand employment relations (ER) with ongoing shifts away from previous neo-liberal models. Most recently, two Labour-led governments have introduced a number of significant moves, ranging from changes to improved statutory minima and conditions, through to gender pay equity provisions and new protections for workers with labour-hire agencies. Another set of longer-term programmes were initiated but not completed, including holidays, protections for contractors and income insurance. Legislation providing for sector-wide Fair Pay Agreements was passed but no agreements have been concluded yet.
 The future directions of ER will largely be determined by the outcome of the 2023 General Election. The policies of the two main political parties, Labour and National, will be influential, although one week out from the election close, some policy areas have not yet been made available to the public. The situation will be further complicated by the MMP (mixed-member proportional) system which may see coalition or support arrangements negotiated with minor parties who have their own, separate ER policies.

Minor parties and employment relations at the 2023 election

After three years of the first single-party majority government of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) era, the 2023 general election in Aotearoa New Zealand will result in a return to the historical norm: a government containing a major party with one or more minor political parties in a formal coalition, or a minority government relying on minor parties for support. Thus, the employment relations policies, the priorities and the power of these minor parties becomes important for assessing the likely trajectory of employment relations policy (ER) in the coming three years. Indeed, recent polling suggests that minor parties will have an unusually large degree of influence. At the time of writing, opinion polls suggest that the combined support for the minor parties is at levels not seen since 2002, with support for the two major parties correspondingly low. This article analyses the positions of the various minor parties likely to be in parliament after the election and speculates on how these parties might seek to influence the employment relations agenda of the next government.

An institutional safety net? How electoral institutions mediate the fortunes of parties under threat

ABSTRACT How do electoral institutions condition the electoral fortunes of parties under threat? In this article, we examine how Germany’s mixed-member proportional (MMP) system has influenced the vote share of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), a party under threat which has consistently lost votes over the past two decades. Using the 2013 and 2017 waves of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we find that voters are likely to engage in “sincere” vote switching on both the district and party ballots and that they are less likely to engage in “strategic” vote switching when they cast their district votes than when they cast their party votes, which protects SPD district candidates. Moreover, voters who stay with the SPD when casting their district vote are also less likely to switch their party votes, which protects the SPD’s overall vote share. We thus conclude that Germany’s MMP electoral system serves as an institutional safety net for the SPD as a party under threat. Our findings have important implications for understanding the ways in which electoral rules shape voting behavior and how different rules can mediate the decline of parties under threat.

Electoral Systems and Party Systems in Germany on the Local Level

ABSTRACT The question of how electoral systems should be designed has already been broadly discussed. One of the most promising electoral system types are mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems. However, the positive evaluation of MMP systems strongly depends on the most prominent case applying such a system, Germany. In order to better understand the performance of MMP systems, we focus on this case and research to what extend German party systems are affected by electoral system designs. For this purpose, an examination of the local level is most fruitful. This level provides important variation in electoral systems in terms of two important factors – the general system type (MMP or proportional representation) and the prevalence or absence of a legal threshold. Our results show that (effective) thresholds affect the proportionality of election results whereas the general system type does not. The fragmentation of German local party systems is largely independent of both variables.

Minor Parties, ER Policy, and the 2020 Election

Since New Zealand adopted the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation electoral system in 1996, neither of the major parties has been able to form a government without the support of one or more minor parties. Understanding the ways in which Employment Relations (ER) policy might develop after the election, thus, requires an exploration of the role of the minor parties likely to return to parliament. In this article, we offer a summary of the policy positions and priorities of the three minor parties currently in parliament (the ACT, Green and New Zealand First parties) as well as those of the Māori Party. We place this summary within a discussion of the current volatile political environment to speculate on the degree of power that these parties might have in possible governing arrangements and, therefore, on possible changes to ER regulation in the next parliamentary term.

What happens when voting rules change? the case of New Zealand

This paper examines the impact of New Zealand’s 1996 adoption of a mixed member proportional (MMP) voting scheme on representation in the legislature, voter turnout, vote volatility and the likelihood of an incumbent party winning re-election. I then consider whether MMP has had any negative consequences for the effectiveness of government policy in relation to fiscal accountability and countercyclical intervention. The data used in the analysis begins from the formation of the party system in New Zealand (in 1890) and extends through the adoption of MMP to the pre-pandemic present (2017). The data set covers 42 elections: 34 before 1996 and 8 after.

Seat enlargements in mixed-member proportional systems: evidence from the German Länder

The German mixed-member proportional (MMP) system is considered a role model worldwide. Nevertheless, it has a neglected side-effect: it may produce greatly enlarged parliaments, like the 2017 Bundestag with 111 additional seats. Thus, it is highly relevant to know under which conditions MMP systems lead to such seat enlargements. The article explores this question for the German Länder that have used various MMP versions and seen occasional parliamentary inflations. The analysis demonstrates that a two-stage model of party-system features and institutional factors explain enlargements under MMP systems in 156 Länder elections from 1947 to 2019. Concerning the party system features, enlargements are driven by high seat concentrations in single-member districts and low list-vote shares of the largest party. Institutionally, high ratios of SMD seats and full levelling of surplus seats affect parliamentary oversize. These results have important implications for MMP systems in Germany and other countries.

Tailor-Made for Canada

While reform of Canada's electoral system has not yet occurred, it has been an ever-present, ever-potent topic in Canadian political science since the middle of the 20th Century. While there are aspects of First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) to be admired, its fundamental flaws cannot be ignored; the system encourages parties to exacerbate sectionalism, leaves far too many voters unrepresented, and too often allows for uncooperative governments. Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP), a form of Proportional Representation (PR), possesses the best aspect of FPTP, local representation and accountability, and amends its most serious flaws. MMP represents all votes cast, attenuates sectionalism, and creates diverse legislatures that incentivize cross-party cooperation far more than FPTP does currently. Canada is nearly a perfect country for MMP, and this system should be implemented for our federal elections.

MMP-Elections and the Assembly Size

MMP (Mixed Member Proportional) elections for legislatures have ballots with one vote in a local single seat tally and one vote for a party list in a multi-seat tally. In Germany, the multi-seat tally occasionally violated a Participation axiom. The federal Constitutional Court declared this unconstitutional in 2008. Rules were changed. In 2017, the result was a Bundestag with 709 members, 111 of them in extra-ordinary party seats. The paper considers two remedies against excessive assembly size. One is “faithful accounting” of ballot data in each local tally, another a change from Plurality to a Majority method. For this use, we consider IRV, i.e. Instant Runoff Voting, in combination with a 3-candidate Condorcet method. The mayoral IRV election in Burlington 2009 serves as an example, here in the special context of MMP. Violations of the Participation criterion occur also in the usual Majority methods for single seat elections. The legal adoption of a mathematical axiom from election theory have consequences seen in the context of established impossibility theorems.

Special voting in New Zealand

ABSTRACTThere has been a dramatic change in the effect that special votes have on the results of general elections in New Zealand. Under the former first-past-the-post system for electing Members of Parliament, special votes favoured the National Party. For example, during the 12 successive elections from 1960 through to and including 1993, Labour Party candidates received an average share of the special votes cast that was 1.58 percent less than their share of election-night votes, while National Party candidates gained, on average, 2.19 percent more special votes than their initial share of the provisional votes tallied on election night. Since the implementation of New Zealand’s mixed member proportional (MMP) representation voting system, however, special votes have favoured the Green and Labour parties. This article documents the effects that special votes have had in New Zealand for a period of more than 50 years and examines why a major change has occurred in the impact that special votes have on the fortunes of New Zealand’s political parties.

Comparative Analysis on the Mixed-member proportional(MMP) in New Zealand

정치 현상적 측면에서 고비용의 정치구조, 일부세력의 독단적 의사결정 행태, 비민주적 정당공천이 고착화되어 국회와 정당에 대한 국민의 신뢰는 최저점에 이르렀다. 유권자 역시 패권적 지역주의에 편승하여 정당별 지역집중 투표현상을 보이는가 하면 한편으로는 정치에 무관심한 태도를 보이기도 한다. 그 결과 국민의 의사는 왜곡되어 대표되고 있다. 이러한 일련의 대의민주주의의 위기에 대한 유력한 해법으로 제시되는 것이 바로 연동형비례대표제이다.BR 현행의 소선거구제 다수대표제는 승자독식의 방식으로 지역구선거에서 다량의 사표가 발생하는 것이 본질이고, 이러한 사표에 의하여 득표와 의석배분 사이에 비례성마저 맞아질 수밖에 없다. 이와 같은 문제점은 소선거구제 단순다수대표제를 채용하면서 나타날 수 있는 일반적 현상으로 우리 선거제도가 가지는 본질적 오류는 아니다. 하지만 지역패권주의에 따른 투표행태가 가세하여 선거결과는 국민의 정당에 대한 지지와 균형관계를 상실하였고 대표의 민주적 정당성이 하락하는 결과에 이르렀다. 연동형비례대표제가 이러한 병리적 현상에 대한 해결책으로 거론되는 것은 인물선거를 동반하지만 비례선거가 중심이 되어 정당의 득표율과 의석배분 사이에 높은 비례성을 견지할 수 있다는 점 때문이다.BR 우리의 현재 모습과 유사한 민주주의의 위기를 겪은 뉴질랜드는 선거제도 개혁의 필요성에 대한 논쟁 끝에 1993년 국민투표를 통하여 소선거구제 다수대표제의 선거제도를 독일식의 연동형 비례대표제로 전환하였다.BR 본 논문은 뉴질랜드 방식의 연동형비례대표제 도입을 전제로 국회의원정수의 변화에 따른 세가지 모형에 20대 총선결과를 적용한 모의분석 결과이다. 뉴질랜드의 선거제도는 독일과 달리 비례대표선거가 주별 권역 단위로 실시되는 것이 아닌 전국 단일 선거구에서 이루어진다. 특히 이러한 전국단위의 정당명부 작성방식을 중심으로 사표의 발생, 초과의 발생정도, 봉쇄조항의 설정, 비례대표 후보자 추천에 관한 사항을 고찰하였다.

MPs’ Representational Focus in MMP Systems. A Comparison Between Germany and New Zealand

This paper examines how Members of Parliament (MPs) in Germany and New Zealand (NZ), two countries with a similar Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, define their representational focus and how they perceive the representational focus and prestige of list and district MPs. Relying on interviews with 25 German and 27 NZ MPs, it shows that there are differences in the representational focus of list and district MPs, but that they are limited. In particular, most list MPs also campaign in a district, and therefore—similar to district MPs—also argue that they primarily represent their district. More striking, however, is list MPs’ greater likelihood of also mentioning a social group (e.g., families, single people, ethnic group) as the group that they primarily represent compared with district MPs. This was more often the case in NZ compared with Germany. When asking MPs about their perceptions of the representational focus and prestige of list and district MPs, list MPs see little difference. District MPs, by contrast, argue that district MPs’ representational focus is more on their district and that district MPs also have more prestige than list MPs. This pattern is particularly strong in NZ.

Rational Choice Meets the New Politics: Choosing the Scottish Parliament’s Electoral System

AbstractAlthough there has been extensive research on electoral system choice at the national level, we know relatively little about the dynamics of deciding the rules of the game for sub-state institutions. This article examines the factors that influenced the choice of a proportional electoral system for the new Scottish Parliament in 1999. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with key participants, we challenge the conventional rational choice explanation for the adoption of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. Although rational considerations on the part of the Labour Party were involved in the choice of MMP, our findings suggest that, as at the national level, theories of electoral system choice need to consider normative values as well.

Mixed-member proportional electoral systems – the best of both worlds?

ABSTRACTMixed electoral systems are often associated with the hope of combining proportional election outcomes with a concentrated party system, and thus achieving the best of both worlds in electoral system design. It is especially the mixed-member proportional (MMP) variant that has retained a good reputation in this regard. Via a comparative analysis, we analyze whether or not the general praise for MMP systems is corroborated empirically. Our results show that the performance of MMP systems is heavily influenced by technical details, and elections conducted under MMP vary broadly with regard to possible proportionality–concentration combinations.

From People's Revolution to Partisan Reform: Recent Electoral Change in New Zealand

For a comparatively small and geographically peripheral nation, New Zealand enjoyed a moment of psephological prominence some 20 years ago when it abandoned its long-used single member plurality (SMP) voting system for a new mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral process. This national decision to swap the blunt simplicity of single party majority government in favor of the vagaries of proportional representation and coalition rule was particularly notable in light of New Zealand's status as a long-established, comparatively peaceful democracy that still adheres staunchly to a traditional Westminster form of government. The various reasons for taking this fundamental step, as well as the process used to do so, have been well picked over, and I do not propose adding substantially to the already existing literature on the subject. Rather, I take up the story since New Zealand's “big bang” move to MMP and outline a number of electoral law developments (and, just as importantly, refusals to change) that have taken place in that time. It is thus something of an updating of New Zealand's experience with electoral law reform over the last two decades, paying particular attention to the process that has been used to effect that reform.

Voter turnout and district-level competitiveness in mixed-member electoral systems

ABSTRACTIt has been suggested that one of the reasons why majoritarian electoral systems are associated with lower voter turnout in comparison to proportional electoral systems is that citizens in uncompetitive districts (“safe seats”) are not motivated to vote. This study brings this thesis into a new context and tests it with unique data. Mixed-member electoral systems have both majoritarian and proportional components. The relative importance of these components differs between mixed-member proportional (MMP) and mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. I argue that, due to this difference, the impact of district-level competitiveness on turnout is stronger in MMM than in MMP. An analysis of district-level electoral data from four countries confirms this hypothesis. Findings from this study advance our theoretical understanding of voter participation and also of the functioning of mixed-member electoral systems.

Political Stability and Peace through Party Engineering: The Case of Lesotho

ABSTRACTComparative scholarship suggests that sustainable democracy and conflict management are dependent on the existence of well-functioning political parties and institutionalized party systems. Surprisingly little attention has been given to how to strengthen parties by institutional means. Drawing on Lesotho, this article will discuss two different approaches of political party engineering: electoral system reform and banning party switching in parliament. Since reintroduction of multiparty politics, elections in Lesotho were marked by post-election conflict and violence. Following violent clashes after the elections in 1998 Lesotho adopted a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system to deal with electoral conflicts. The article argues that the introduction of Africa's first MMP system produced an inclusive parliament that mitigates violent conflict and the simultaneous introduction of a regulation of party switching was useful in preventing party system instability and could set an example for democracy building in other post-conflict societies in Africa.

The Law, Policy, and Politics of Federal By-Elections in Canada

This paper elucidates several key aspects of laws governing federal by-elections in Canada, both in contrast and similarity to general election laws and policies. Analyses begins with a brief overview of the history and purpose of federal by-elections in Canada, followed by statutory examination of the Canada Elections Act and Parliament of Canada Act (including laws pertaining to resignations and vacancies). Next, the role of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada and the Speaker of the House of Commons is examined, including case studies of Elections Canada and the Electoral Commission of New Zealand. Select jurisprudence is discussed, highlighting two particularly timely cases. Proportional representation (PR), coupled with first-past-the-post (FPP) by-elections are reviewed, including mixed-member proportional (MMP) representation. Two case studies are introduced: a judicial recount in Hochelaga, Quebec, and New Zealand’s MMP general election and FPP by-elections systems.

The New Zealand Print Media and the 2004-2007 Local Elections: A Case Study

Voters gain their information from news media, and in particular from print media, about politicians. More importantly, voters develop their understanding of political processes based on what they read. In this paper, I examine the print media coverage of the campaign introducing new electoral system Single Transferable Vote (STV) in the New Zealand Local Body Elections 2004 and 2007 compared with the campaign introducing Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system in the 1996 national election. I focus particularly on the coverage of the alternative electoral system, STV, by two newspapers – the Dominion Post and the Otago Daily Times from the perspective of type, nature, and number of the articles published and the attitudes toward encouraging participation and introducing new electoral system [STV]. The study shows that both newspapers offered a significantly poorer coverage of the 2004 and 2007 local elections compared to the campaign in 1996 national election. This also might lead to the prediction of one of the reason decreasing or increasing voter turnout.