Mixed-member Majoritarian System Research Articles

Talking Like Opposition Parties? Electoral Proximity and Language Styles Employed by Coalition Partners in a Mixed Member Majoritarian System

Extant literature has shown that political parties that form a coalition government face one major dilemma; that is, they must govern together but fight elections separately. Thus, coalition members tend to commit to a differentiated strategy as an election approaches. However, existing research has mainly focused on empirical findings from countries with proportional representation and few measures for direct criticism from partners. In order to test the theory, this study examines parliamentary speeches from Japan's mixed member majoritarian context. It uses a supervised machine learning method for measuring confrontational attitudes toward governments irrespective of their ideologies. The results of this study show that on average, while a coalition partner may present a slightly hostile attitude toward governments in parliamentary speeches, this effect is not influenced by election proximity. This may imply that incentives for managing coalitions could differ in majoritarian‐centered electoral systems.

Only Right Makes Might? Center-Right Policy Competition Among Major Japanese Parties After Electoral Reform

The effects of the 1990s reforms to the electoral system of Japan's House of Representatives have been among the most frequently discussed topics in political science research on the country. These reforms saw the replacement of a hitherto single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system by a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with a strong Single Member District (SMD) and a weaker Proportional Representation (PR) component. Many studies have suggested that the reforms may have had significant impact on the strategies of political parties. Generally, SMD systems have been widely thought to favor larger parties, while PR systems are more beneficial to small and medium-sized parties. On the content side, larger parties seeking control of the government would try to win the support of large numbers of floating voters by campaigning on universal/programmatic policy appeals, as opposed to particularistic interests. In contrast, smaller parties would cater towards their core supporters’ preferences. Previous studies have noted that the old SNTV system in Japan had produced results similar to PR systems (Reed 2003). Japan's electoral reform may have thus changed the strategy of large parties, which would need to win more seats in the SMDs to gain (or hold onto) power, while smaller parties have continued to try and win seats via the PR tier. Therefore, the reform provides valuable research material in so far as we can simultaneously observe different effects by the SMD and the PR systems on parties of different sizes.

The Elephant in the Voting Booth?

In 2005, the single nontransferable vote system for legislative elections in Taiwan was replaced by a mixed-member majoritarian system, with an accompanying reduction in available district seats. In theory, by increasing the threshold of exclusion and placing the power of nomination in the hands of political parties, this reform should reduce vote-buying and local factionalism. We collected data on legislative nominees charged with vote-buying and on the local factional ties of candidates. Our results suggest that the reforms did reduce these problems. First, comparing the proportion of candidates charged with vote-buying before and after the reform shows a decrease in the second and third post-reform elections. Second, factional status predicts a candidate’s likelihood of running in consecutive elections before the reform but not after. Differences between factional and nonfactional candidates ceased to be significant after the reform, revealing the decreasing relevance of factions.

The leaky pipeline and sacrificial lambs: Gender, candidate nomination, and district assignment in South Korea's national legislative elections

If gender quotas are applied to only one tier in a mixed-member majoritarian system, do we see a spillover effect of an increased proportion of women in the other tier? Based on statistical analysis of national legislative elections in South Korea from 1988 to 2016, this study casts doubt on the validity of the pipeline theory. The analysis shows that South Korea's gender quota has been achieving its primary goal of the political empowerment of women since its adoption in 2004, but with weak inter-tier contagion effect. In-depth interviews reveal the unique culture of the National Assembly and political parties which deem district-tier seats more prestigious than PR seats, and the informal practice of disadvantageous candidate district assignments lead to PR members having a hard time continuing their political careers once their terms as PR members are over.

Consolidation of Party Politics and Corruption: Cases of New Democracies with the Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

Consolidation of Party Politics and Corruption: Cases of New Democracies with the Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

Ticket splitting, strategic voting and personal vote in the 2012 Mongolian elections

This article examines ticket splitting under Mongolia's new mixed-member majoritarian system used for the elections in 2012, reaching several conclusions. First, we confirm that strategic ticket splitting depends on party size, as especially candidates of larger parties receive, on average, more district votes. Second, we show that strategic voting is not a universal phenomenon under the Mongolian mixed-member majoritarian system. Finally, as personal vote rather than strategic voting generally influences electoral behaviour of Mongolian voters at the district level, we hypothesize that institutional factors alone are not sufficient to explain both ticket splitting and strategic voting.

Issue Ownership and Electoral Rule: Empirical Evidence from Japan

AbstractThis article examines the effects of electoral systems on issue ownership. This study argues that electoral rules significantly affect issue ownership because they prompt candidates to adopt different types of electoral campaigns. Compared to the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system prods candidates to change the pattern of electoral campaigns from candidate-centred to issue-centred competition. In particular, partisan issue effects are more effective in gaining votes under the MMM. To support the argument, I find evidence from content analyses of party manifestos and multinomial logistic regression models of electoral surveys between the pre-reform and post-reform elections in Japan.

The 2016 Electoral Reform in Mongolia: From Mixed System and Multiparty Competition to FPTP and One-Party Dominance

This article tests the effects of a new electoral system that was introduced in Mongolia for the June 2016 elections. The decision to implement a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system instead of a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which was first and last used in the previous elections of 2012, was due to the April 2016 ruling of the Mongolian Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the list tier as one of the mechanisms for distributing seats within MMM. Through an analysis of national- and district-level results, this article addresses the question whether electoral competition at the district level was consistent with Duverger’s law and resulted in the restoration of bipartism, which had been disrupted in 2012 due to the use of MMM.

Ticket-splitting in mixed-member systems: on the importance of seat linkage between electoral tiers

In mixed-member electoral systems, voters usually have two votes: a nominal and a list vote. According to some studies, voters are increasingly using them to cast a split-ticket vote. However, very little is known about whether the type of mixed-member system, and in particular whether the allocation of seats across tiers is linked or not, creates different sets of incentives for this behaviour. This article provides new insights into the topic by analysing survey data from seven countries and 18 elections since 1990. It is found that the proportion of split-ticket votes is greater in mixed-member proportional than in mixed-member majoritarian systems. The results suggest that voters understand the operation of the electoral system and its consequences for the distribution of seats among parties, and adapt their behaviour accordingly.

Voter turnout and district-level competitiveness in mixed-member electoral systems

ABSTRACTIt has been suggested that one of the reasons why majoritarian electoral systems are associated with lower voter turnout in comparison to proportional electoral systems is that citizens in uncompetitive districts (“safe seats”) are not motivated to vote. This study brings this thesis into a new context and tests it with unique data. Mixed-member electoral systems have both majoritarian and proportional components. The relative importance of these components differs between mixed-member proportional (MMP) and mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. I argue that, due to this difference, the impact of district-level competitiveness on turnout is stronger in MMM than in MMP. An analysis of district-level electoral data from four countries confirms this hypothesis. Findings from this study advance our theoretical understanding of voter participation and also of the functioning of mixed-member electoral systems.

Does a mixed-member majoritarian system lead to a party vote?

One of the aims of the reform of the electoral system in 1994 was to increase the party vote. While the old system of multi-member districts with a single non-transferable vote promoted intra-party competition, the new system would encourage inter-party competition. The reformers expected Japanese electoral politics to become a party-oriented election. The analysis in this paper, however, shows that Japanese voters preferred a personal vote to a party vote in the 2012 general election. The results of a logistic regression analysis showed that the supporters of the Democratic Party of Japan and voters in districts where two parties competed tended toward the personal vote. The suggestion here is whether the voters who cast a personal vote are determined by not only the effect of the electoral system but also the evalu

Innovations of Candidate Selection Methods: Polling Primary and Kobo under the New Electoral Rules in Taiwan and Japan

AbstractThis paper explores the linkage between electoral systems and candidate selection methods (CSMs) by analyzing two innovations of CSMs in Taiwan and Japan: polling primary and kobo, respectively. With an assumption that parties’ CSMs reflect their strategies to win elections, this article offers the rationale behind why and how major parties in Taiwan and Japan adjusted their CSMs to meet the challenges posed by the transition of electoral rules in each country from single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems to mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. We argue that a party's choice of CSMs reflects its rationale for maximizing the prospects of winning under the given electoral rule, which counters the ‘no-finding’ conclusion in some previous large-N studies on the linkage between electoral systems and choices of CSMs. Additionally, our findings highlight the importance of institutional factors, such as electoral systems, in explaining CSM reforms in a comparative perspective.

Parliamentary and presidential elections in Mongolia, 2012 and 2013

The 2012 Mongolian parliamentary election was historical as a new mixed-member majoritarian system was implemented. Compared with 2008, or even 2004, the 2012 election outcome indicates an at least tentative disruption of the bipolarisation of electoral politics in Mongolia. However, unlike in the past when the fragmentation of the party system was caused by the parties of the so-called “democratic camp”, the latest split occurred within the so-called “post-communist camp”. The presidential election took place on 26 June 2013. Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj of the Democratic Party was elected president and for the first time since the democratic transition of 1990, most executive and legislative powers shifted to the Democratic Party.

The Efficacy of the Mixed Member Majoritarian System Under a Strong Presidency : A Korean Case

The Efficacy of the Mixed Member Majoritarian System Under a Strong Presidency : A Korean Case

Strategic Voting of Small Parties Supporters in Two-Vote Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

Strategic Voting of Small Parties Supporters in Two-Vote Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

Continuity and Change in Party Politics in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea

The 2012 elections in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea exhibit both long-term trends and short-term variations in each country's political landscape. All three societies are moving towards two-party competition lately, thanks mostly to the mixed-member majoritarian system adopted for legislative elections, despite the social cleavages that provide, to varying degrees, niches for small parties. The cleavage structure coupled with the electoral system largely explains the changing political landscape in these societies.

A new day, a new way: the Democratic Party of Japan's allocation of posts under the mixed-member majoritarian system

In September 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won office, ending more than half a century of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Accordingly, DPJ legislators assumed important posts in the cabinet and Diet. How did the DPJ assign legislative posts to its members under the existing mixed-member majoritarian system in order to pursue votes, office, and policies as compared to the LDP? This study finds that, similarly to the LDP, the DPJ used inter-factional balancing and seniority rules because each of these can contribute to the maintenance of party unity. But, in contrast, in order to receive more votes, the DPJ allocated most key posts to electorally stronger members, whereas the LDP allocated posts seen as valuable in terms of re-election to electorally vulnerable members since most DPJ legislators had a party-centred electoral style, and most LDP legislators had a candidate-centred style.

Legislative Organization under the Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

Legislative Organization under the Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

Electoral Reform and Legislative Behavior in Post-Communist Ukraine

This paper examines the decision by the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada to introduce a pure proportional representation system for the 2006 legislative election. I argue that both office-seeking and policy-seeking explanations cannot account for this change. Instead, we need to understand how the issues of party control over legislators and the power of the presidency impacted electoral system preferences. I show that many of the parties, primarily center parties, that succeeded in the single-member district tier of the mixed-member majoritarian system faced difficulties controlling their deputies’ behaviors. In addition, preferences over the relationship between the president and the legislature influenced the positions of both the center and right parties.

Effects of a Two-Vote Mixed-Member Majoritarian System on Citizens’Voting Behavior in the Korean National Assembly Elections

In the 2004 and 2008 National Assembly elections, each Korean voter was provided two ballots under a mixedmember majoritarian system. Drawing on post-election survey data, this paper investigates differences in the extent of regional voting, partisan voting, ideology voting, and retrospective voting across the two components of a general election. The paper also examines the patterns of split-ticket voting. The analysis reveals that regional voting more strongly influences the district candidate vote than the party vote. But partisan voting, ideology voting, and retrospective voting less strongly affect the former than the latter, respectively. In the 2008 election, about 40 percent of the total voting participants engaged in split-ticket voting. A bit more than half the total split-ticket voters chose a district candidate of the two large parties, and endorsed the party list filed by a small party. The most frequent case was the Grand National Party chosen for the district candidate vote along with the Pro-Park Coalition for the party vote. These ticket-splitters tended to vote sincerely under proportional representation, and vote strategically for the viable candidate to avoid wasting the district candidate vote.