Mistake Of Fact Research Articles

Justifiability and culpability in lethal self-defense: Police officers vs. civilians

PurposeSome critics argue that legal standards, even when and where equivalent, are differentially applied to officers and civilians. This study examined evaluations of justifiability and culpability for police officers versus civilians, as well as White shooters versus Black shooters, in a 2✕2 factorial experiment. It also explored how personal attitudes and characteristics correspond to those evaluations. MethodsA national sample of 2492 online respondents evaluated culpability and justifiability involving a claim of lethal self-defense involving mistake of fact. After reviewing facts about the case, watching video of the incident, and being given jury instructions for murder and self-defense, respondents were asked to evaluate the justifiability of the shooting on a 6-point scale and render a verdict. ResultsPolice officers and Black shooters were evaluated more favorably. Pre-existing confidence in the police demonstrated direct effects and interaction effects on perceived justifiability and likelihood of acquittal. ConclusionsThese results reveal a double standard that benefits police in cases of lethal self-defense. The strong correlation between pre-existing confidence in the police and acquittal of police officers indicates a need for further research on how a generalized public trust in police impacts particularized evaluations of conduct in specific cases.

Dickens and Prince: A Particular Kind of Genius by Nick Hornby

Reviewed by: Dickens and Prince: A Particular Kind of Genius by Nick Hornby Joel J. Brattin (bio) Nick Hornby. Dickens and Prince: A Particular Kind of Genius. Riverhead Books, 2022. Pp. 171. $18.00. ISBN 978-0-593-54182-1 (hb). Novelist and screenwriter Nick Hornby has tried his hand at nonfiction before, writing books, essays, and book reviews on pop music and football. Here, he proposes links between Charles Dickens and the Minneapolis performer and recording artist Prince Rogers Nelson, more commonly known as Prince (1958–2016). This short book is written in an engaging style, offering information about both title figures in an accessible and often colorful manner. The two men have quite a lot in common, according to Hornby: among other things, both died at age 58 (except for Prince, who was only 57), overcame childhood poverty and deprivation, met with extraordinary success in their twenties, worked on multiple projects at once, achieved great financial success but were convinced they were being robbed, failed to make their marriages work, were outstanding performers, and had a remarkable work ethic, with “no off switch” (15). Hornby suspects there are few artists as prolific as Dickens and Prince. I thought of Anthony Trollope and of Telemann, but Hornby shut me up by saying “maybe you’re reading this and shouting Wagner! Picasso! If you are, you’ll have to write your own book” (7). Much of what Hornby tells us about Dickens will be familiar to readers of this journal, and perhaps few of those readers will care deeply about Prince. But there are interesting tidbits along the way. Of Prince, we learn that he recorded a Jehovah’s Witness album, and that he liked not only Led Zeppelin, but Grand Funk Railroad. We also learn that Robert Christgau said, in the wake of Prince’s album Dirty Mind, that “Mick Jagger should fold up his penis and go home” (43). Hornby offers some arcane bits of Dickensiana, too, noting that a business called “Havisham[’]s Wedding Centre” operated, and then didn’t, in Rochester (Kent); that a young Davy Jones, later of Monkees fame, played the Artful Dodger on Broadway; and that novelist Stephen King juiced up the old urban legend about crowds in New York waiting on the dock to hear a report of little Nell’s death by moving the locale to Baltimore and by drowning several of the crowding Dickens fanatics. He also says that Victorian novelist Thomas Hardy drove himself to the Marble Arch cinema to see an adaptation of Tess of the d’Urbervilles. Hornby has a unique comic perspective. He says if your nine-year-old child is reading David Copperfield, “please stop them. It will kill any future enjoyment they might get from those extraordinary novels. And also, you’re a terrible parent” (7–8). Referring to Prince’s often embarrassing interviews, Hornby says “Sometimes, to be a fan of Prince was to be cast back to one’s [End Page 257] school days, struggling to defend an inarticulate and possibly malodorous guitar hero while he postured and pranced on TV in front of my witheringly scornful mother” (45). He says that Dick Swiveller in The Old Curiosity Shop “is so clearly an influence on Wodehouse that Bertie Wooster would have been entitled to a DNA test” (90). And he notes that “there are, regrettably, a number of movies called A Tale of Two Titties, but these do not seem to follow the plot of the book” (156). Hornby never really identifies what he means by “a particular kind of genius,” but I suspect he’s primarily thinking about hard work. Finally, Hornby concludes that his book is “about work, and nobody ever worked harder than these two, or at a higher standard, while connecting with so many people for so long” (159). The book is light reading: fun, interesting, and often provocative. Hornby makes a variety of mistakes of fact and has a less nuanced view of Dickens than, say, many a university professor. But he makes no claims to expertise: he’s a fan, of both Dickens and Prince. It’s unfortunate that Hornby misspells Dickens’s full name...

Zabluda u krivičnom pravu Republike Srbije

The paper presents the institution of mistake (error) in our criminal law, focusing on its legal regulation as a ground for exculpation. The fact that mistake is a psychological and legal concept whose meaning includes several substantial elements is acknowledged. The legal relevance of mistake contributes to its various treatment in legislation. Given that criminal law, as a branch of legislation, deeply engages with human rights, mistake becomes a crucial institution for excluding the guilt of a perpetrator. Depending on the type of mistake, and the legal and situational circumstances in which it is considered, two main categories can be recognized: mistake of fact (error facti) and mistake of law (error iuris). Their effect must be evaluated in the contest of a specific criminal case. This paper will elucidate the general term and types of mistakes, exploring their effects on the culpability of the perpetrator of the criminal act.

Unhomeliness—Afterlife and Testimony

ABSTRACT The article considers the unhomeliness of blackness by interrogating aspects of the controversial 2019 Dallas Country District Court case in which Judge Tammy Kemp ruled the jury to consider the state’s “ castle doctrine” and “mistake of fact” in the trial of Dallas police officer, Amber Guyger, who claimed to shoot Botham Jean, an unarmed black man in his own apartment, by mistake. In doing so, the article places together the notion of afterlife as conceptualized separately by Walter Benjamin and Saidiya Hartman to raise the role of testimony as a fundamentally anti-black structural dilemma rooted beyond legal theory and notions of evidence.

US Supreme Court rules that unintentional mistakes of law, like mistakes of fact, may be considered under the copyright registration safe harbour provision

Abstract On 24 February 2002, the US Supreme Court issued its decision in Unicolors, Inc. v H&M Hennes & Mauritz, LP, holding that an unintentional mistake of law is entitled to the benefit of the US Copyright Act’s safe harbour provision, § 411(b)(1)(A). In so doing, the Court clarified that not only unintentional mistakes of fact made during the application process, but also unintentional mistakes of law may be evaluated under the US Copyright Act’s safe harbour provision.

Mistake of Fact as a Ground of Review: Distinct and Defensible

Mistake of Fact as a Ground of Review: Distinct and Defensible

Interpreting Modern Monetary Reality

During the 1990s and 2000s, the quantity theory of money (QTM) fell out of favor both among policymakers and academics. Central bankers almost universally adopted short‐term interest rates as their policy instruments while money was often dropped entirely from the dominant theoretical macro models.The central bank response to the global financial crisis—which featured the large‐scale asset purchases called “QE”—breathed life back into the quantity theory and its adherents. The widespread, though in fact mistaken, belief that central banks were targeting an increase in money growth to stave off deflation elicited memories of Milton Friedman's famous claim that the Fed could and should have accelerated money growth to bring the U.S. out of the Great Depression. That belief also led to alarming predictions that central banks in the wake of the GFC were massively overdoing it. The Fed's policy led to a nearly fourfold increase in the U.S. monetary base from August 2008 to August 2014!But as things turned out, this monetary expansion turned out to be much ado about nothing. During the 13‐year period ending in December 2020 in which U.S. M1 grew by an annual average rate of 12.7%, inflation averaged just 1.6%. The prediction of QTM that inflation would mirror money growth over the long run has been wildly off the mark and, although things could change quickly, even today's capital market expectations for “long run” U.S. inflation appear to be running within a 2%‐3% band.In this article, the former IMF director of central banking explains why the QTM is no longer a useful “cheat code” for interpreting modern monetary reality. As the most promising replacement, the author offers the outline of a “fiscal theory of the price level” that has had more success in explaining global inflation during the past several decades. As its name suggests, the fiscal theory emphasizes that the underlying driver of inflation is government deficit spending while minimizing the importance of the instruments—whether money or debt—that governments use to finance their deficits. The QTM, by contrast, effectively assumes that whereas money finance is likely to be inflationary, bond finance is not.Among the most compelling features of the fiscal theory is to draw attention to the transformation of global capital markets during the past several decades that has brought government debt finance to the fore while diminishing the role of money finance. When assessing the inflationary consequences of permanent fiscal expansions, policymakers must consider both government monetary and non‐monetary liabilities. Because the policy response to the GFC involved primarily the exchange of bond financing for monetary financing without a significant increase in total sovereign debt, it did not prove inflationary. The response to the global pandemic, by contrast, has involved a significant deterioration in sovereign fiscal finances. But whether this turns out to be inflationary is likely to depend not on how the current deficits are financed in the moment, but on the commitment of sovereigns to shoring up their fiscal positions without resorting to a reduction in the real value of their own debt.

Mistaking theft: Dishonesty ‘turns over a new leaf’

The common law doctrine of mistake of fact or civil law works as denial of offending, but dishonesty works as one of the definitional elements of crimes such as theft and fraud. It is argued in this article that the rulings in R v Barton [2020] 3 WLR 1333 and Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) (trading as Crockfords Club) [2018] AC 391 do not change the doctrine of mistake of fact or civil law but do change the law in respect of mistakes about what is honest. A defendant whose conduct is taken as dishonest according to community standards may well avoid criminal liability if he was genuinely mistaken about a fact or civil law right. It is submitted that since the doctrine of mistake of fact or civil law is already provided for, the law is not expanded greatly by the rulings in Ivey and Barton which merely bring back the objective test of dishonesty that had long been established before the Ghosh test. The decision in Barton is substantively welcome, even though the change in the law arose from a civil law case where dishonesty was not an issue before the court.

Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia re MH17, Amicus Curiae Brief on behalf of the Human Rights Law Centre of the University of Nottingham

This is an amicus curiae brief in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (nos 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20) before the European Court of Human Rights, filed on behalf of the Human Rights Law Centre at the University of Nottingham, which was granted permission by the President of the Grand Chamber to act as third party intervenor in the case. The brief deals exclusively with the 2014 downing of the MH17 airliner over Ukraine. The first part of this brief addresses issues of attribution and state jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 ECHR, providing guidance on the applicable tests for considering whether the respondent state can be held responsible for the downing of MH17. The second part of the brief examines how mistake of fact in the use of lethal force should be considered in light of the obligations under Article 2 ECHR. The third part of the brief examines possible prevention and complicity doctrines relating to the right to life under the Convention in the context of weapons transfers to third parties.

Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Law as a Ground for Excluding the Mental Element

Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Law as a Ground for Excluding the Mental Element

WITCH-KILLINGS AND THE LAW IN UGANDA

AbstractPeople believed to be witches have been killed in many parts of Africa since precolonial times. Belief in witchcraft persists today among many people, occasionally resulting in the killing of the suspected witch. The killer views witchcraft as an attack similar in nature to the use of physical force and therefore kills the witch in an attempt to end the perceived attack. As it stands today, the law in Uganda fails to strike a balance between the rights of the deceased victim violated through murder and those of the accused who honestly believes that he or she or a loved one was a victim of witchcraft. This article argues that the defenses that are currently available—mistake of fact, self-defense, insanity, and provocation by witchcraft—are insufficient, as they fail to strike that delicate balance. A more pragmatic approach to the issue of witch-killing, one that deals with the elimination of belief in witchcraft, is necessary.

GROUNDS EXCLUDING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

The application of grounds excluding criminal responsibility in international criminal justice indicates the development of international criminal law toward the observance of human rights and freedoms during a trial. The author argued that international legal standards for the functioning of criminal justice must be aimed at the achievement of the dual goal of the criminal process: the punishment of the perpetrators and protection of human rights.The article provides general characteristics ofthe grounds excluding criminalresponsibility under international criminal law as well as their classification. The Rome Statute of the ICC, by codifying the grounds excluding criminal responsibility combined the approaches of different legal systems to their understanding. The Rome Statute does not concretize whether a particular defence can be classified as an excuse or a justification. The Statute contains three groups excluding criminal responsibility. As practice shows, the application of grounds excluding criminal responsibility for committing international crimes faces a significant number of issues and requires a detailed study of each of the grounds, which has its own mechanism of action.The theoretical and methodological basis of the study was a complex of philosophical, general scientific and special approaches and methods (systemic, dialectical, theoretical generalization and comparison, causal-consequence); conceptual provisions contained in legal literature in international and national law, provisions of international instruments and jurisprudence.Special attention is paid to the substantive and procedural defences as well as «justifications» which exclude wrongfulness of conduct and «excuses» which negate the blameworthiness of wrongful action. The author described the system of grounds excluding criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute, identifying three main groups: 1) grounds excluding criminal responsibility provided for in article 31 of the Statute (mental disease or defect, intoxication, self-defence, duress/necessity); 2) grounds excluding criminal responsibility provided for in the articles 32-33 of the Statute (Mistake of fact or mistake of law, superior orders); 3) additional grounds for excluding criminal responsibility other than those referred to in the Statute. At the same time, the Statute does not contain an exhaustive list of such grounds, thereby allowing the application of grounds not provided for in the Statute. The conclusion is made about the flexibility of the Statute as a legal instrument.

Mistake of fact and endangering actions as circumstances which can affect differentiation of criminal responsibility for unfinished crime

Most of the aspects of differentiation of criminal responsibility for unfinished crime though being discussional, are duly researched in the criminal scientific studies. However, the sphere of unresearched institutes exists enabling us to speak about its influence on differentiation of criminal responsibility. This institutes are the mistake of fact and so called “delicts of endangering”
 The purpose of this research is to analyze the differentiated influence on criminal responsibility of crimes committed with the feature of mistake of fact and of delicts of endangering. It is planned to illustrate, basing on certain examples, the importance of these institutes for differentiation of criminal responsibility. By the way, the task of this article is to reveal the shortcomings of criminal law in force and to make propositions on their removing.
 Up to date, taking into consideration the provisions of part 3, 4 of Article 68 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the court can`t impose punishment on person, guilty of committing a crime under effect of mistake of fact, qualified as attempt, higher than 2/3 of the maximal severe punishment (envisaged in article of special part of the Criminal Code). The court, as well, can`t (in most cases) impose life imprisonment even when the damage totally equals the damage caused by finished crime. For instance, planning to kill with mercenary motives a minor, the guilty person kills an adult. This action can’t be qualified as finished crime, as the mistake of victim occurs. Nevertheless, object of human life is objectively damaged. So, the crucial necessity to make equal between each other finished crime and crime, committed under influence of mistake of fact, is evident.
 Differentiating criminal responsibility in situations when damage is desired by the guilty person, the legislator in fact hasn’t bothered to duly differentiate criminal-legal consequences in case of endangering without the desire of such damage. That`s why it is of great importance to regulate by norms criminal actions which are endangering social relations with social dangerous damages, but don’t have the features of criminal aim, motive and desire of guilty person. This step can provide differentiated approach towards socially dangerous behavior, delimiting the estimation of act and consequence. It can concentrate the attention on subjective evaluation of potential consequences by guilty person, notwithstanding the factors, which often exist besides mental estimation of the subject.

The Mistake of Fact Excuse in Queensland Rape Law

This article considers the role of the excuse of mistake of fact in Queensland rape and sexual assault law. We argue that the excuse has undesirable and socially regressive consequences by allowing reference to factors such as the complainant’s social behaviour, relationship to the defendant or lack of overt resistance that are at odds with the definition of free and voluntary consent. The excuse has also led to problematic results in cases involving impaired capacity (such as intoxication, mental incapacity or linguistic incapacity) by the defendant or the complainant. We canvass two potential reforms aimed at addressing these issues. The first would render the excuse inapplicable to the issue of consent in rape and sexual assault cases, while the second would limit the excuse to address its most troubling outcomes.

Human body and technique, the idea of progress, and usain Bolt’s 100m dash in Beijing 2008: an interdisciplinary analysis of a paradigm changing performance

Through history, numerous events have taught us that the beliefs we once thought to be certainties were in fact mistaken, due to a lack of information. Still, in many occasions we tend to fall into the same cycle, believing that this time around we are actually on the right side of things, and that our newly acquired knowledge is a part of the progression to the betterment of humanity. The present research simply intends to present an example from the popular world of sports that shows how little we actually know about some of the closest things to us, such as our own bodies or the technique required to run straight, and how one single case is enough to disregard decades of assumed scientific certainty. This interdisciplinary approach to Usain Bolt’s case only attempts to shed some light over our ignorance, and specially in our pretentious assumptions regarding human knowledge. This humble approach is absolutely necessary in our quest to improve education in our society.

Progressive Punitiveness in Queensland

Jonathan Crowe and Bri Lee have recently argued that the mistake of fact excuse, for which s 24 of the Criminal Code Act 1913 (Qld) provides, should be rendered inapplicable to rape and sexual assault proceedings in that State. In this article, I argue that this proposal is objectionable because, however progressive its promoters consider it to be, it is incompatible with human rights – and would probably breach the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Moreover, the Queensland Law Reform Commission and the Queensland Parliament should reject an alternative proposal of Crowe and Lee’s, which seems to be aimed at achieving indirectly what their primary proposal would achieve directly. Even if Crowe and Lee’s research demonstrated that mistake of fact is causing injustice for rape and sexual assault complainants – and it does not – absolute liability for serious crime is indefensible.

On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered.

ANALYSIS OF STUDENT ERRORS IN COMPLETING MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS OF CLASS VIII CIRCLE MATERIALS IN SMP 1 WLINGI

This research aims to find out the type of student error in solving the problem of mathematics material in solving the problem of circle story and wide circle in class VIII SMP Negeri 1 Wlingi Blitar.Dalam this research type of research used is descriptive qualitative research. The subject of this study is the class VIII C MPN 1 Wlingi which amounted to 10 students who took the test.Teknik data collection in this study using written tests, interviews and documentation.Keabsahan data is done with reference materials and conduct checks members.Teknik data analysis is done with data reduction stages, data presentation, and verification or drawing conclusions. Students are grouped into three categories namely high-ability students, medium-skilled students and low-ability students. Each category is represented by one student. The results of this study are (1) The type of mistake made by a highly capable subject in solving soa l circle story and broad circle is a mistake of fact, error of concept and mistake of principle. (2) Types of moderate-ability students' mistakes are factual errors, concept errors and procedural errors. (3) Types of low-skill students' errors are fact errors, concept errors, procedural errors and principle errors

수출사기서류 매입은행의 책임범위에 관한 연구

There has been a gradual increase in the number of exporting trades spoiled by the fraud recently. It may happen that the documents which are tendered to the banks under a exporting contract of goods are forged, altered or fraudulent. They may be forged or untrue in relation to the goods to which they refer, however on their face they appear to be correct and good tender under the documentary credit, the collection instruction or the sale’s contract.BR If the documents presented by the exporter are forged or fraudulent, the negotiating bank is entitled to refuse payment or acceptance if it finds out before payment or acceptance and is entitled to recover the money as paid under a mistake of fact if it finds out after payment.BR Banks will act in good faith and exercise reasonable care of the documents received. Banks must determine that the documents received appear to be as listed in the exporter’s instruction and must advise by telecommunication or, if that is not possible, by other expeditious means, without delay, the party whom the instruction was received of any documents found to be other than listed. Banks will present documents as received without further examination and have no further obligation in this respect.BR Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness or falsification of any documents, or … for the good faith or acts or omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignors, the carriers, the forwarders, the consignees or the insurers of the goods, or any other person.

Ewolucja regulacji dotyczącej błędu co do znamion typu podstawowego w polskich kodyfikacjach karnych

The evolution of regulation of the mistake of fact in Polish criminal codesThe subject of the article is the problem of the mistake of fact in Polish criminal law from historical perspective. It discusses the regulation concerning the mistake of fact in Polish criminal codes of 1932, 1969, 1997 and shows the evolution of this structure. The author puts particular emphasis on the amendments to the section 28th of the Polish Criminal Code of 1997 which were proposed between 2013 and 2015. In the conclusion he criticizes the contemporary shape of the section and gives his own proposal for the amendment in this regulation which limits it only to non-intentional criminal acts and distinguishes properly guilty mind and mens rea which is essential in the light of the normative theory of guilt.