Fluency Misattribution Research Articles

Only Familiar Information is a "Curse": Children's Ability to Predict What Their Peers Know.

The ability to make inferences about what one's peers know is critical for social interaction and communication. Three experiments (n=309) examined the curse of knowledge, the tendency to be biased by one's knowledge when reasoning about others' knowledge, in children's estimates of their peers' knowledge. Four- to 7-year-olds were taught the answers to factual questions and estimated how many peers would know the answers. When children learned familiar answers, they showed a curse of knowledge in their peer estimates. But, when children learned unfamiliar answers to the same questions, they did not show a curse of knowledge. These data shed light on the mechanisms underlying perspective taking, supporting a fluency misattribution account of the curse of knowledge.

Tracking familiarity, recognition, and liking increases with repeated exposures to Nontonal Music: Revisiting MEE-Revisited

Previous studies demonstrated mere exposure effects (MEE) with musical tunes (e.g., Halpern & Müllensiefen, 2008; Peretz et al., 1998). Our goal was to investigate the effects of repeated exposures on processing fluency, recognition performance, and liking ratings for unfamiliar tonal and nontonal tunes, with type of tune being manipulated between-participants. Tunes were presented either 1, 3 or 6 times and processed either with a familiarity rating or counting long notes orienting task. We found that participants' familiarity ratings increased across repeated exposures for both types of tunes. Likewise, recognition performance for both unfamiliar and nontonal tunes improved with repeated exposures. The increase in recognition sensitivity for nontonal tunes was steady across six repetitions whereas for unfamiliar tonal tunes the increase decelerated after three repetitions. Liking ratings, too, increased with repeated exposures for both types of tunes and in comparable ways. Liking ratings were also higher for hits than misses and correlated positively with recognition confidence ratings. Orienting tasks did not have an effect on liking or recognition. Findings are discussed with reference to the processing fluency account (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004), dual process account (Mandler, 1980) and the fluency misattribution model (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992).

The neural mechanism of fluency-based memory illusions: the role of fluency context.

Recognition memory judgments can be influenced by a variety of signals including fluency. Here, we investigated whether the neural correlates of memory illusions (i.e., misattribution of fluency to prior study) can be modulated by fluency context. Using a masked priming/recognition memory paradigm, we found memory illusions for low confidence decisions. When fluency varied randomly across trials, we found reductions in perirhinal cortex (PrC) activity for primed trials, as well as a (pre)cuneus-PrC (BA 35) connectivity. When the fluency context was unchanging, there was increased PrC activity for primed trials, with the (pre)cuneus showing greater connectivity with PrC (BA 36). Thus, our results tentatively suggest two neural mechanisms via which fluency can lead to memory illusions.

Fluency misattribution and auditory hindsight bias.

We conducted three experiments to test the fluency-misattribution account of auditory hindsight bias. According to this account, prior exposure to a clearly presented auditory stimulus produces fluent (improved) processing of a distorted version of that stimulus, which results in participants mistakenly rating that item as easy to identify. In all experiments, participants in an exposure phase heard clearly spoken words zero, one, three, or six times. In the test phase, we examined auditory hindsight bias by manipulating whether participants heard a clear version of a target word just prior to hearing the distorted version of that word. Participants then estimated the ability of naïve peers to identify the distorted word. Auditory hindsight bias and the number of priming presentations during the exposure phase interacted underadditively in their prediction of participants' estimates: When no clear version of the target word appeared prior to the distorted version of that word in the test phase, participants identified target words more often the more frequently they heard the clear word in the exposure phase. Conversely, hearing a clear version of the target word at test produced similar estimates, regardless of the number of times participants heard clear versions of those words during the exposure phase. As per Roberts and Sternberg's (Attention and Performance XIV, pp. 611-653, 1993) additive factors logic, this finding suggests that both auditory hindsight bias and repetition priming contribute to a common process, which we propose involves a misattribution of processing fluency. We conclude that misattribution of fluency accounts for auditory hindsight bias.

Overclaiming shares processes with the hindsight bias

Overclaiming is the degree to which individuals claim knowledge about factually nonexistent terms. Whereas overclaiming is often considered to reflect motivational misreporting, we argue that overclaiming involves biased (meta-)cognitive processing, i.e., sense-making and the misattribution of fluency. These processes also contribute to the hindsight bias: When individuals receive the correct answer to a question, their recalled own prior answer tends to be biased towards the correct answer, which is partly due to biased reconstructions of the original answer. Supporting the idea that overclaiming and the hindsight bias involve similar processes, we show in the present study (N = 157) that overclaiming is positively related to reconstruction biases in the hindsight bias.

A ‘curse of knowledge’ in the absence of knowledge? People misattribute fluency when judging how common knowledge is among their peers

Knowledge can be a curse: Once we have acquired a particular item of knowledge it tends to bias, or contaminate, our ability to reason about a less informed perspective (referred to as the ‘curse of knowledge’ or ‘hindsight bias’). The mechanisms underlying the curse of knowledge bias are a matter of great import and debate. We highlight two mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie this bias—inhibition and fluency misattribution. Explanations that involve inhibition argue that people have difficulty fully inhibiting or suppressing the content of their knowledge when trying to reason about a less informed perspective. Explanations that involve fluency misattribution focus on the feelings of fluency with which the information comes to mind and the tendency to misattribute the subjective feelings of fluency associated with familiar items to the objective ease or foreseeability of that information. Three experiments with a total of 359 undergraduate students provide the first evidence that fluency misattribution processes are sufficient to induce the curse of knowledge bias. These results add to the literature on the many manifestations of the curse of knowledge bias and the many types of source misattributions, by revealing their role in people’s judgements of how common, or widespread, one’s knowledge is. The implications of these results for cognitive science and social cognition are discussed.

Logic brightens my day: Evidence for implicit sensitivity to logical validity.

A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative process. The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. Participants were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments. Participants were not asked to reason but instead rated the sentences for liking (Experiment 1) and physical brightness (Experiments 2-3). Sentences that followed logically from preceding sentences were judged to be more likable and brighter. Two other factors thought to be linked to implicit processing-sentence believability and facial expression-had similar effects on liking and brightness ratings. The authors conclude that sensitivity to logical structure was implicit, occurring potentially automatically and outside of awareness. They discuss the results within a fluency misattribution framework and make reference to the literature on discourse comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record

Gamma oscillations distinguish mere exposure from other likability effects

Repeated exposure to neutral stimuli enhances liking for those, which is called mere exposure effect (MEE) (Zajonc, 1968). Its behavioral effects have been extensively investigated. However, the mechanism by which it is generated remains unclear. To elucidate the neural mechanism of the MEE, we recorded electroencephalograms while subjects indicated their preferences for face stimuli with and without MEE induction. According to behavioral data, participants were divided into two groups, one with, and one without MEE tendency. In participants with an MEE tendency, gamma activity (40–60 [Hz]) in the parieto-occipital area was significantly weaker for exposed faces than unexposed ones, indicating a repetition-suppression effect. Gamma activity from sites exhibiting peak repetition-suppression effects was significantly weaker in theoretically genuine MEE trials than non-MEE trials, indicating that emotion processing might influence the MEE. These results suggest that existing theories regarding mechanisms underlying the MEE, namely, fluency misattribution and apprehensiveness reduction might not be mutually exclusive. Moreover, gamma activity might be a potential indicator to distinguish the MEE from other likability effects, at least in the case of human face stimuli.

A Broader View of Perirhinal Function: From Recognition Memory to Fluency-Based Decisions

Although it is well established that the perirhinal cortex (PRC) makes an important contribution to recognition memory, the specific nature of this contribution remains uncertain. The finding that PRC activity is reduced for old compared with new items is typically attributed to the recovery of a long-term memory (LTM) signal. However, because old items are processed more easily or fluently than new items, reduced PRC activity could reflect increased fluency rather than LTM retrieval per se. We tested this hypothesis in humans using fMRI and a well-validated method to manipulate fluency: the masked priming paradigm. Some words during an old-new recognition test were preceded by conceptually related words (primes) that were subliminally presented (masked). The behavioral results replicated previous findings using this paradigm, whereby the fluency manipulation increased "oldness" responses to both old and new items. The fMRI analyses yielded two main sets of results. First, in the case of new items, which are independent from LTM retrieval, masked priming reduced PRC activity and predicted behavioral misattribution of fluency to oldness. Second, in the case of old items, the same PRC region showing fluency-related reductions for new items also contributed to "old" responding to old items. Individual differences in PRC attenuation also predicted oldness ratings to old items, and fluency modulated PRC connectivity with other brain regions associated with processing oldness signals, including visual cortex and right lateral prefrontal cortex. These results support a broader view in which the PRC serves a function more general than memory.

Person perception by active versus passive perceivers

Person perception research is dominated by studies of passive perceivers who exert no control over the information they receive. In contrast, perceivers in everyday life can often actively choose the type and quantity of information they receive. In this study, active and yoked passive perceivers formed impressions of individuals based on information from Facebook. Compared to active perceivers, passive perceivers reported greater confidence and ease in their judgments. Passive perceivers exhibited greater confidence (though not greater accuracy) with increased information, but active perceivers did not show this effect, placing a boundary condition on past research. Passive perceivers also liked targets more than active perceivers, a finding that is not explained by valence-dependant sampling by active participants, or by misattribution of fluency or greater sensitivity among passive participants. These provocative findings highlight the need to account for active and interactive processes in person perception rather than continuing to focus on passive perceivers.

Implicit/explicit memory versus analytic/nonanalytic processing: rethinking the mere exposure effect.

In studies of the mere exposure effect, rapid presentation of items can increase liking without accurate recognition. The effect on liking has been explained as a misattribution of fluency caused by prior presentation. However, fluency is also a source of feelings of familiarity. It is, therefore, surprising that prior experience can enhance liking without also causing familiarity-based recognition. We suggest that when study opportunities are minimal and test items are perceptually similar, people adopt an analytic approach, attempting to recognize distinctive features. That strategy fails because rapid presentation prevents effective encoding of such features; it also prevents people from experiencing fluency and a consequent feeling of familiarity. We suggest that the liking-without-recognition effect results from using an effective (nonanalytic) strategy in judging pleasantness, but an ineffective (analytic) strategy in recognition. Explanations of the mere exposure effect based on a distinction between implicit and explicit memory are unnecessary.