Minimum Rent Research Articles

СОЛИҚ ИСЛОҲОТЛАРИ НАТИЖАСИ:ЖИСМОНИЙ ШАХСЛАРНИНГ МУЛКИЙ ДАРОМАДЛАРИНИ СОЛИҚҚА ТОРТИШНИ ТАКОМИЛЛАШТИРИШ

This article examines the property income of individuals in accordance with the legal framework of the Republic of Uzbekistan, their composition, the current state of taxation of property income of individuals. According to the results of the study, it wasproposed to reconsider the minimum amount of rent for property leases, as the minimum rent for the use of state-owned realestate for legal entities is very low, legal entities -business approval of separate rental rates for entities; taking into accountthat it is not less than the minimum amounts established for individuals.Keywords: Tax Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, individual, property income, objects belonging to individuals, income declaration, income tax, source of income

Auto-Scaling Provision Basing on Workload Prediction in the Virtualized Data Center

With the development in the Cloud datacenters, the purpose of the efficient resource allocation is to meet the demand of the users instantly with the minimum rent cost. Thus, the elastic resource allocation strategy is usually combined with the prediction technology. This article proposes a novel predict method combination forecast technique, including both exponential smoothing (ES) and auto-regressive and polynomial fitting (PF) model. The aim of combination prediction is to achieve an efficient forecast technique according to the periodic and random feature of the workload and meet the application service level agreement (SLA) with the minimum cost. Moreover, the ES prediction with PSO algorithm gives a fine-grained scaling up and down the resources combining the heuristic algorithm in the future. APWP would solve the periodical or hybrid fluctuation of the workload in the cloud data centers. Finally, experiments improve that the combined prediction model meets the SLA with the better precision accuracy with the minimum renting cost.

Minimum Wage and Housing Rents: Theory and Evidence

I analyze the effect of minimum wage hikes on housing rents, which is illuminating in understanding the desirability of minimum wages for two reasons. First, if the minimum wage increases housing rents, it unintentionally benefits homeowners rather than workers. Second, the rent is a sufficient statistic about the desirability of minimum wages, which I show in a spatial equilibrium model. Utilizing a Japanese natural experiment, I estimate that in the low-quality rental housing market, 10% minimum wage increase induces 2.5%-4.5% increase in rents. It implies that workers benefit from the minimum wage increase, but it also unintentionally benefits homeowners.

Communicating airport concession operating costs

The long-term success of a concessions programme can depend on well-constructed business plans through which concessionaires demonstrate a thorough understanding of the cost of doing business at an airport. Sharing information upfront can allow concessionaires to make informed business decisions and is the first step to successful airport and concessionaire relationships. The layers of complexity and associated costs of operating a restaurant or shop in an airport are factors that prospective concessionaires need to fully understand in order to judge the potential for success and profitability of business opportunities. Operating at an airport presents a unique set of challenges not found in traditional street operations. Aside from basic operating costs associated with the business, airport concessionaires must operate longer hours to accommodate passenger traffic, comply with federal and airport laws and regulations, pay minimum rents and capital investment requirements, as well as a myriad of other fees associated with operating at the airport. Unfortunately, there is not an industry manual available that clearly defines the operating costs of doing business at airports, nor is there a consistent list of fees common to all airports. Each airport is unique, with their own set of specific operating requirements. Furthermore, only some airports offer a comprehensive list of anticipated concession operating costs at the onset of the request for proposals (RFP) process — at the point at which interested concessionaires are evaluating business opportunities. A prospective concessionaire — particularly new, small and/or inexperienced concessionaires — may have insufficient information to evaluate an airport business proposition. Consequently, these concessionaires may incur unexpected costs that challenge their financial viability and affect the customer service they deliver to airport passengers. Unison Consulting, along with the Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP), completed a synthesis to help identify gaps in the communication of cost data from airports to retail and food and beverage concessionaires. Armed with more complete information regarding the full costs of operating in the airport environment, prospective concessionaires — particularly less experienced businesses — will be better able to gauge the opportunity being offered by airports. This will result in better proposals submitted for airport consideration, featuring more accurate business plans and pro formas.

Work Requirements in Public Housing: Impacts on Tenant Employment and Evictions

In recent years, many have debated adopting work requirements in the public housing program, and a limited number of public housing agencies (PHA) have implemented these policies through the flexibility provided by the Moving to Work program. One such agency—the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA)—has implemented a work requirement across five (of 15) public housing developments that mandates households to work 15 hr weekly or face sanctions. This article evaluates this policy and presents the first empirical analysis on the outcomes of a work requirement on employment and evictions. We find that, following work requirement enforcement, the percentage of impacted households paying minimum rent (a proxy for nonemployment) decreased versus a comparison group. Analysis of additional data on both employment and hours worked indicates similar results regarding employment gains, but no increase in average hours worked. We find no evidence that work requirement sanctions increased evictions, and very modest evidence that enforcement increased the rate of positive move-outs such as moves to unsubsidized housing.

Work Requirements in Public Housing: Impacts on Tenant Employment and Evictions

In recent years, many have debated adopting work requirements in the Public Housing Program, and eight public housing authorities have implemented these policies through the flexibility provided by the Moving to Work demonstration. One such agency – the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) – has adopted a work requirement across five (of its 15) public housing developments that mandates heads of household work 15 hours per week or face sanctions. This paper evaluates this policy and presents the first empirical comparison of employment and eviction rates between those subject to the work requirement and a comparison group not subject to the policy. We find that, following work requirement enforcement, the percentage of households paying minimum rent (a proxy for employment) decreased relative to the comparison group. Analysis of additional data on both employment and hours worked indicates similar employment gains, but no increase in average hours worked. We find no evidence that work requirement sanctions increased evictions, and only modest evidence that enforcement increased the rate of positive move-outs. Surveys of CHA residents indicate that a large proportion support work requirements in public housing. While our findings clearly support the effectiveness of the CHA’s work requirement, we caution against imposing such a requirement before more research is conducted.

A Scheduling Method Based on the Rent and Loan Information

In everyday life, a situation often occurs wherein two or more persons with different personal schedules must determine a single job schedule. The authors focus on the practical concept of rent and loan and propose a scheduling system. This system generates a schedule that automatically coordinates with a state involving minimum rent and loan. They also propose a method that employs the analytic network process (ANP) for setting individual priorities based on the rent and loan information. Furthermore, the authors implement the proposed system as a simulation system and verify whether it generates a fair schedule by computing the sum of the rent and loan of different individuals. The result shows that in comparison with human scheduling, the proposed method generates a fairer schedule by computing the rent and loan of each individual.

Are Section 8 housing subsidies too high?

The Section 8 Existing Housing Program, currently the largest housing program administered by HUD, provides subsidies to low-income families living in privately-owned rental units of their own choosing. Under current rules and budgets, funds have not been sufficient to serve all eligible families willing to participate in the program, and public housing agencies have not limited assistance to the poorest eligible families. Instead, they serve many families above the poverty line while denying assistance to the majority of those below it. A simple proposal for targeting more assistance to the poorest families and eliminating the horizontal inequity resulting from offering assistance to some, but not all, families with the same characteristics is to decrease the subsidy at each income level by the same amount while continuing to spend the program's current budget. One objection to this proposal is that the poorest eligible families would not be able to find units meeting the program's space and quality standards if subsidies were lower. This paper finds that the program's subsidy to the poorest eligible families greatly exceeds the minimum rent of units meeting the program's standards. It also shows that the most common objections to reducing subsidy levels under the program are inconsistent with existing evidence or standard economic theory. Finally, it argues for converting the Section 8 Existing Housing Program into an entitlement program for the poorest eligible families.

Rent Assistance Policy for Residents of Retirement Villages

Objectives: To assess whether policies on rent assistance for retirement village residents are targeting help towards those who need it, and to provide an information base for future policy decisions on eligibility for assistance. Method: A telephone survey of managers of a national sample of 52 retirement villages and a postal survey of residents in 49 of these villages. Results: The findings did not support the policy rationale that higher entry contributions were correlated with lower ongoing charges. Just over 40 per cent of residents of self-care housing and two-thirds of those in serviced apartments had paid entry contributions low enough for eligibility for rent assistance with their ongoing housing charges. Many of these were not, however, receiving assistance, mainly because their charges were below the minimum rent threshold. The distribution of reported levels of non-housing assets tended overall to match the varying levels of entry contributions, but half of those paying relatively high entry contributions still had low levels of both assets and income. Conclusions: It appears that targeting remains reasonably accurate for the majority of residents, but there is a potential boundary problem created by the eligibility and minimum rent thresholds. Thus a minority of residents may be disadvantaged compared with others in similar financial circumstances.

On Minimum Rents: Part 2, A Modern Interpretation

The idea that there might be some minimum rent below which a land-owner would not let to any tenant was put forward by Marx, but with little supporting argument. In this paper, it is shown that the modern concepts and analysis of transaction costs and monitoring costs can explain why such a minimum rent might exist. Further, that risk and uncertainty, coupled with the fact that tenancies are usually for some years, also provide an explanation for the reluctance of land- and property-owners to let at minimal rents. Some empirical evidence is cited, particularly the substantial rents which have to be paid to lay telecommunication cables across private land.

On Minimum Rents: Part 1, Marx and Absolute Rent

Marx suggests that land would not be rented to a tenant at less than some minimum rent which he calls absolute rent. This concept and Marx's arguments are analysed in this paper. It has been argued by some that absolute rent in Marxian economics derives from the fact that investment in agriculture is lower so that the organic composition of capital is lower. It is argued here that the low organic composition of capital in the Marxian schema is rather a consequence of the existence of absolute rent, and this in turn results from the landlord-tenant relationship. Marx himself stressed that if land were owner-occupied absolute rent would not exist—that it is a consequence of the system of land tenure—but provides no explanation as to why it should have this consequence. In an associated paper, modern economic analysis is used to explain why minimum rents will occur.

The number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures: An unpleasant result *

I examine a rent-seeking contest in which the winner gets a minimum rent but also gets an additional rent which is an increasing function of his lobbying expenditure. I give real-world examples of such rent-seeking competitions. Contrary to the standard result in the rent-seeking literature, I obtain the perverse result that aggregate rent-seeking expenditures may be inversely related to the number of rent-seekers. However, I note that even if this result holds, the cost of administering rent-seeking competitions may imply that society is better off with fewer contenders than with an infinitely large number of contenders, although the optimal number may not be the smallest number.

The Drafting of Percentage Leases

THE use of percentage leases for commercial establishments is widespread in the United States and is becoming increasingly common in Canada, particularly in the larger cities.' In the ordinary percentage lease the rental payment is established at a fixed percentage of the tenant's sales or receipts. A fixed minimum rent is usually provided, theoretically to assure to the landlord a return sufficient to pay the fixed costs arising from his ownership of the property. The standard formula provides for payment as rent to the landlord of the guaranteed minimum rent or of the percentage of sales (often described as additional rent), whichever is the larger amount. Variations in this form are to be found. The guaranteed minimum rent may be omitted or the percentage applying to sales may vary according to the volume of sales or to the type of goods sold. The guaranteed minimum rent is more likely to be omitted in a long-term lease where it is usual for a tenant to pay the fixed cost of maintaining the property. The popularity of percentage leases arises from their advantages over the ordinary fixed rental lease from the standpoint of both landlords and tenants of commercial premises. For the landlord the return on his investment varies directly with business conditions. In periods of business prosperity the percentage lease provides him with an increased yield from his investment together with a hedge against inflation and rising maintenance costs. Moreover where the rental value of the property is in doubt the landlord may, by lowering or omitting the minimum rent, attract more aggressive tenants to share the business risk. For the tenant operating with a predetermined margin of profit and with a predetermined percentage of this margin allocated to rent, the increased rent presents no undue burden. Conversely, during periods of business decline, diminishing rental payments are matched by falling prices and decreased maintenance costs to the landlord, and the tenant is afforded the advantage of a declining rent in line with his ability to pay. In practice the guaranteed minimum rent may be little less than a normal fixed rent would be and the percentage feature gives the landlord the opportunity to gain from the tenant's business ability. The tenant is usually not averse to this arrangement where he feels that the property location and business outlook more than outweigh any possible increased rent. Possible disadvantages to percentage leases should be pointed out. A competitor operating under a fixed rental lease can reduce his rent, viewed *B.A., LL.B. (Toronto), LL.B. (Harvard). Mr. Landis is presently associated with the Toronto firm of Sinclair, Goodenough, Higginbottom, and McDonnell. IThe rising popularity of percentage leases in the United States is indicated by the addition in 1954 of section K 200. 1, entitled Percentage Rental Agreements, to the West Publishing Company's General Digest of All American Cases, vol. 22.